Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill (Second sitting)

James Heappey Excerpts

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 13th March 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Dr Alan Whitehead (Southampton, Test) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, leave out

“after this Act is passed”

and insert

“and no later than 30 November 2018”.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh. Let me start us off this afternoon with what I hope will be the first of many amendments that the Minister and other Conservative Members think so reasonable and constructive that they feel impelled to accept them.

Amendment 3 relates to our consensus that an energy price cap needs to be agreed across the board and brought in as soon as possible. Without presuming to speak on behalf of all Committee members, I believe that we are all united in our support for a temporary cap to allow the market to be set right. We hope that by the time the cap comes to an end, we will be reasonably assured that the market is working much better and that the circumstances that led to the cap’s introduction will not be repeated further down the road.

The Committee is united on our endeavour this afternoon. We want to finish our deliberations, get the Bill passed as speedily as possible, and have it on the statute book by the summer—hopefully the early summer—so that Ofgem can execute it. We heard this morning from Ofgem’s chief executive, Dermot Nolan, about the processes that Ofgem will be required to undertake to ensure that the price cap is properly implemented. The Bill requires it to have regard to a number of concerns, which I am sure we will discuss in our deliberations.

Essentially, Ofgem has the task of ensuring that the provisions in the legislation for the implementation of the price cap are legally waterproof, that the measures in the Bill around Ofgem’s responsibility for having regard to those various pillars are properly carried out, and that Ofgem has the arrangements in place that it will need to look periodically at what is happening to wholesale prices and to produce reports and proposals for how those wholesale price changes can be taken into account under the umbrella of the cap. Ofgem has to get a whole range of things right before the cap is properly in place. It is proper and right that Ofgem takes a reasonable amount of time to ensure that happens.

We heard this morning that Ofgem already has some consultations and discussions under way in anticipation of the Bill shortly being on the statute books, but there are a number of statutory things that it has to do and a number of further consultations that it has to undertake. We were told this morning that all this is about five months’ work as far as Ofgem is concerned. In principle, if we assume that the Bill will be on the statute books by the end of June, the five-month timescale that Ofgem has set itself would mean that the cap could be effective by the end of November this year.

Pretty much everybody associated with this Committee and the passage of the Bill has said that they fervently want to see this legislation enacted and a proper price cap in place before winter this year. By that, I am sure they do not mean when a cold snap takes place next February and looks a bit like winter, but the onset of winter—about the time people get their winter fuel allowances. That will ensure that the price cap is in place and benefiting customers in advance of the bills they face over winter.

To get this price cap in place not just over winter but as winter comes in—absolutely on the nail, given the time that Ofgem says it will need to get this Bill into shape and to get an operational cap—we will clearly want to ensure that that timetable is adhered to as closely as possible. That is why I asked Dermot Nolan this morning whether he thought the five-month period was an exact period, a maximum period or an approximate period. What was his view? He said that they would do their best to ensure it was within that five-month period. However, I did not get the impression from that evidence this morning that Ofgem was saying to us, “We can absolutely stand by the idea that there is a maximum possible period of that amount of time for us to do our work.”

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

My reading of Mr Nolan’s evidence this morning was somewhat different. I thought that he very much felt this could be delivered within five months. The only note of caution he sounded was over a legal challenge. I am not sure that any timeline that we prescribe in legislation would prohibit such a legal challenge from one of the current large suppliers.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. If there do turn out to be legal challenges, despite our best efforts in this Committee to ensure that the Bill is as watertight as it can be, it is conceivable that the whole timetable of a price cap could be seriously derailed—I think we have all understood that, as far as the process is concerned. Indeed, one reason there is legislation, rather than Ofgem going down the road of a price cap under its own steam, which it has been claimed at various times could have been the case, is to ensure that, as far as possible, the proposals and what Ofgem puts in place around them, are legally watertight. That comes in two parts. First, there is the question of ensuring that the legislation is as watertight as possible, but there is also a duty on Ofgem to ensure that, in translating the instruments in the legislation into a workable price cap, it takes measures that are also legally watertight, so that it does not slip up after we have done the good work in Committee of making the legislation as watertight as possible.

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[Dr Whitehead]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. Today, thinking about the cap, we are not in such a position that we can look back with complete equanimity and say, “Actually, everything that could have been done to hasten the cap, once it was decided that there should be a cap, has been done over that period.” There has been quite a bit of equivocation since, for example, the suggestion at the time of the Conservative manifesto for the last election that there should be a cap. It made an appearance but then went through a period when there seemed to be some resiling from that particular commitment.

As hon. Members will recall, there were indeed suggestions and discussions that Ofgem, in its own right, could and should undertake a cap: a cap would need no legislation from Government, so Ofgem could go ahead and put one in place. Indeed, as I recall it, a letter to Ofgem from the Secretary of State during the summer in effect said that. At the time, as hon. Members will also recall, Ofgem came back fairly publicly to say, “We are not convinced that we have the powers to do this,” or rather, “We may technically have the power to do this, but we wouldn’t be proof against legal challenge were we to go ahead and introduce a price cap administratively without the back-up of legislation from Parliament.”

As hon. Members will again recall, it was at that point—I think it was at the Conservative party conference—that the Prime Minister reasserted the fact that she wanted a price cap. Perhaps we will come on to what she said about the consequences of that price cap in a moment, but she certainly said at Conservative party conference that she wanted a price cap and that, in effect, legislation was to be introduced to produce one. So, arguably, we could say that, had we got on with legislation from the moment that the idea that there should be a price cap was put forward, we would not be sitting here today. Instead, we would be contemplating a price cap having been introduced, probably this autumn.

[James Heappey]

The hon. Gentleman makes his case well, but I remain to be convinced that putting in a deadline makes a difference. The biggest pressure that Ofgem will be operating under once we clear the Bill through Parliament—surely the biggest variable in the whole process—is an enormous amount of political pressure. Given that the hon. Gentleman does not propose a sanction against Ofgem should it miss the deadline, one would imagine that the political pressure Ofgem will be under from both sides of the House to deliver the cap is more than enough to deliver it very quickly. He will remember that the last time that there was a notice of insufficient margin, with the price spike that it brought, was in the middle of November 2015, so a date of the end of November seems somewhat arbitrary. We want it done as quickly as possible.

[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Gentleman’s point about the amendment not suggesting any sanctions on Ofgem is an interesting one. Were that suggestion put into operation, it would require about six more pages of amendments to secure a sanctions regime against Ofgem, but that is not how Ofgem works. In effect, Ofgem has a requirement to do things—in its charter of existence, in legislation—and it is instructed by legislation and not, by the way, in final and legal terms by what a Minister may or may not write to it on a daily basis. It is supposed to go along with what is in legislation. That was the problem that arose with the letter from the Secretary of State to Ofgem when the idea of a legislatively based price cap appeared to be up in the air.

Ofgem made the point that it would prefer, or that it thought it necessary, to have some kind of legislation on the statute book to guide and advise it—or, more than that, to be a framework for its carrying out of its responsibilities. The Bill requires Ofgem to do all sorts of things but contains no sanction. It does not set out what would happen to Ofgem—whether Dermot Nolan would be taken out, and something would be done to him—if it did not do all that is specified. The point is that there are requirements on Ofgem under its charter from Government.

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[Dr Whitehead]

The hon. Lady has a point, but if hon. Members read amendment 4 and clause 1(6) reasonably carefully, they will see that

“the need to ensure that customers on standard variable and default rates have their annual expenditure on gas and electricity reduced by no less than £100 as a result of the tariff cap conditions”

would be a consideration—I emphasise the word “consideration”—that Ofgem needed to take into account.

[James Heappey]

I am afraid that I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford. A number of the larger supply companies have already sought to get ahead of the Bill by transferring their most loyal, or “sticky”, customers from what used to be called SVTs—standard variable tariffs—to other tariffs that are called something else but may be just as expensive. My concern is that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is overly prescriptive and might allow the energy companies to get round what we seek to achieve.

[Dr Whitehead]

I do not think the amendment would allow energy companies to get round what we seek to achieve, although I accept the analysis that it may produce more work for Ofgem. I based amendment 4 on what the Prime Minister said. One could argue that she was being overly prescriptive—I do not know.

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[Claire Perry]

That is a very important point, and the hon. Lady is extremely knowledgeable in this area. She brings me to the second part, when I will hopefully address her point.

The safeguarding tariff came into force in April 2017. That perhaps gives the lie to the idea that the previous Government did nothing; this was all part of the pressure that we put in place. The tariff initially affects people who are on prepayment meters, who are often exactly as the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun described—perhaps living in fuel poverty. That tariff is put in place by the CMA—it is nothing to do with Ofgem—and it will run until 31 December 2020. We have seen Ofgem extend that to this additional group—those who have claimed warm home discount—as the hon. Lady quite rightly said. She raises an interesting point, and we should take a look at it to ensure the maximum number of people are capable of achieving that safeguarding discount.

I asked the team to look at the impact on the bills of customers on these tariffs. Before the safeguarding tariff came in, the PPM average standard variable tariff was about 5% more expensive than the average standard variable tariff. Now, those who are on the PPM and vulnerable tariff pay on average 8% less than those on standard variable tariffs. That is absolutely working, independently of the Bill, to deliver the savings that we want to see for vulnerable and disabled customers. Those caps will continue to be in place, and it is very important that both are in place and that the Bill does nothing to remove eligibility for them.

I want to talk about some of the other duties on Ofgem, which are already covered in clauses 1(6), 7 and 8. They require Ofgem to protect all existing and future domestic customers, including vulnerable and disabled customers, and to consider whether effective competition is in place for the domestic energy supply as a whole. When effective competition is considered, it has to apply for all customer groups, including vulnerable and disabled customers.

[James Heappey]

Before the Minister gets too far from the issue of vulnerable customers and the cap, I thought National Energy Action’s evidence this morning was interesting. It is probably premature to react to that evidence by enacting the Opposition’s amendments. Could the Minister confirm that she will go back and look at whether the evidence provided this morning warrants some action, perhaps before the Bill comes back on Report?

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[Dr Whitehead]

Yes, I certainly do. If one first agrees that this particular provision should be made, the question of tightening it is quite an important aspect of the Bill.

I am sure that hon. Members will be aware that the draft Bill, when it first appeared, had a much wider and I think much less satisfactory definition of the circumstances under which an exemption could be made. The Select Committee that considered the draft Bill and produced its excellent report singled out this particular clause as one that should be strengthened, as my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate has pointed out. It thought it should be strengthened on the basis that a number of stakeholders viewed the Bill as then drafted as allowing for

“unscrupulous suppliers to game the system and avoid the cap by moving customers on poor-value tariffs onto loosely-defined green tariffs.”

It recommended:

“The Government should work with Ofgem to strengthen the definition, standards and checks for electricity tariffs with environmental claims so the system cannot be gamed in this fashion and undermine the success of the cap.”

That concern was absolutely right. Regrettably, it is the case that throughout the present tariff offer a number of tariffs are in place that purport to be green tariffs, but when we drill down to what they consist of, they are pretty much not green tariffs. They may have a part of renewable energy in their make-up. It may be claimed that the company is advantageously purchasing renewable energy as part of its overall purchase arrangements, but of course we know in terms of today’s energy mix that it is fairly difficult to rigidly remove oneself from purchasing any renewable energy in the portfolio of purchases for tariff purposes.

[James Heappey]

I have huge sympathy with the point that the hon. Gentleman is making. My concern is that we risk letting the perfect be the enemy of the good. There may well be tariffs that are 95% or 99% green that really should be supported, but would not be under his amendment. The wider issue of greenwashing is a matter for the regulator more generally, rather than specifically a matter for this Bill.

[Dr Whitehead]

I take the hon. Gentleman’s point. I have tried to think about this point precisely on those sort of lines. It is difficult, in looking at such tariffs, to see the circumstances under which a company offering not a wholly renewable tariff is protected from a slippery slope—from going right down that slope and saying, “Well, as long as there is something in there that is renewable, we can call it a renewable tariff.”

I was about to make a point about the circumstances under which companies trade. Normally, because of the extent of renewable penetration into the energy system, most companies will come across a renewable supply as part of their trading arrangements. As I said, it is pretty difficult to avoid that, so we can imagine how relatively easy it is in principle for someone sitting in a company boardroom to say “How can we produce a tariff that looks like a green tariff but does not give us any sort of problem in producing it? Why don’t we just set aside what we have come across by chance, as far as our energy supply is concerned, say that it is our green purchase and put it in a tariff? Then we will have a green tariff and will be fine.” No work would have been done to distinguish that tariff from anything else, and the company would have no intention of doing anything within their tariff offer but trade in the ordinary way. That is a worry.

[Dr Whitehead]

The point that my right hon. Friend makes is, I think, taken into account by the circumstances that now apply across the board for energy sourcing. As she and I know, having talked about this for years, the process of the renewables obligation did impose a particular obligation for a proportion of energy purchased to be green. Then there was a system of trading those obligation certificates. Those people not directly purchasing green energy would have to purchase certificates, which could be traded from those who had actually traded in green energy in the first place, so that those involved had, in one way or another, carried out their obligation. The overall design of the renewables obligation system was to encourage the production of green energy, because the beneficiaries of the certificates when they were traded in cash would be the producers. That was a system that very much incorporated in it an incentive to trade in green energy in the first place.

Now, of course, the renewables obligation is no more. It continues as a ghost trade system and will continue on a declining basis, I think, until 2027, but as of March 2017 no more renewables obligation certificates are being issued. They are being replaced by the contracts for difference system, which does not impose an obligation to purchase green energy in the same way as the renewables obligation system did. The prospective system does not, as my right hon. Friend suggested, provide a universal underwriting of green energy production. She is right, of course, that the system overall encourages renewable energy production, but not in the same way as the renewables obligation.

I do not think that that particularly detracts from my right hon. Friend’s fundamental point, but it puts us in a position where we can properly consider the idea that a number of energy companies might accidentally, as it were, purchase green energy that does not, otherwise, have an obligation attached to it, and introduce it as part of a green tariff that is not really a green tariff. I suggest that companies wholly in the business of producing renewable energy, or those that produce it from their own sources or sources guaranteed through a power purchase agreement, or something similar, with the operator, are in a different category. I want to emphasise that difference with respect to the purpose of the amendment.

[James Heappey]

I think the point made by the right hon. Member for Don Valley was really about the existence of clause 3(2)(b) in the first place. I have a lot of sympathy with that. I think it is unhelpful to mark out green tariffs as a premium product—that is counter-intuitive to the wider effort we are making. However, if clause 3(2)(b) must remain, I am not convinced that the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Southampton, Test is necessary. I encourage him to consider again whether where we all agree is that Ofgem might take a much more robust view on the practice of greenwashing and that that is the actual challenge that we want the regulator to close with, not necessarily an amendment to the legislation this afternoon.

[Dr Whitehead]

I would say that the essential point is how far up the beach and close to the walls the greenwashing actually goes. Can we conversely say that we can put greenwashing into a particular box and say “That looks like greenwashing”, but as we move up the scale of more and more renewables in the system, the greenwashing ceases and therefore can we say that this really is a renewable product and is something we can apply special exemption arrangements to? That is the nub of the debate.

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[James Heappey]

It is useful that the Minister will go away and make an analysis of the green products that are already on the market. I wonder whether she might also, with the evidence from Octopus and Bulb ringing in her ears, go away and ask the Department to go for just one more lap on whether or not this exemption is necessary all together, or whether it might do more harm than good when it comes to promoting green energy and the way that consumers regard green tariffs.

[Claire Perry]

I am sympathetic to my hon. Friend’s point; he is extremely knowledgeable in this area. However, as we have been through, particularly in the draft scrutiny process, we genuinely do not want tariffs that customers actively choose to be on, and which support the welcome development of creating demand for the renewable market, to be captured, as it were. The hon. Member for Nottingham North made the point about unintended consequences, and that is why word-by-word scrutiny is so important. The BEIS Committee supported that view, and I think the legislation has been substantially improved by that process. I am therefore less inclined for the proposal to be withdrawn completely, but I want to talk a little more about the point that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test made. I have talked about publication transparency. To me, transparency—having Ofgem look at these tariffs, probably for the first time—is an important part of establishing that this is a credible part of the market.

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[Claire Perry]

Again, the clause outlines the final part of the licence modification process that Ofgem must undertake to impose the tariff cap—this is the actual modification of the licence conditions and implementation. It, too, sets out the statutory steps that Ofgem must go through. Ofgem must set out how it has taken account of representations made during the consultation specified under clause 4. As we heard in the evidence session this morning, it must set a date that the modifications will take effect from, which must be after a period of 56 days beginning on the day when the notifications are published.

The clause also sets out that the appeal mechanism is via judicial review, rather than through an appeal to the Competition and Markets Authority. We have had a conversation about that—certainly during the very good Second Reading debate—which is primarily because we want nothing to get in the way of implementing the temporary price cap. The CMA’s powers are used exclusively where there is a permanent control mechanism, but we and the Select Committee have taken substantial evidence to suggest that judicial review gives all interested parties an adequate means of address. A court has sufficient expertise to hear an appeal. A court is likely to be able to hear a matter more quickly than the CMA, which reduces the possibility of the implementation route being delayed.

[James Heappey]

I am keen to ensure that I understand the measure correctly. There is a 56-day period ahead of any modification being published, but presumably there is also a 56-day period for the initial implementation of the cap. Are we clear that Ofgem is content about being able to publish its cap within the five months—actually, eight weeks ahead of that five months?

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[Claire Perry]

The hon. Gentleman again puts forward a sensible probing amendment that it is a pleasure to think about and speak to, but I will chance my luck and try to persuade him to withdraw it.

The hon. Gentleman is right that the review is a crucial part of the Bill’s effectiveness. Is the cap set at the right level? Is the ability to change the cap clear? Have we set out the conditions under which the cap must apply? We will get on to the conditions as to what success looks like. Is the cap dynamic enough to make a difference in the market?

If I read clause 6 carefully, two words precede the hon. Gentleman’s one-number intervention. In terms of reviewing the cap, the clause uses the phrase:

“The Authority must, at least once every 6 months”.

When we had this conversation on Second Reading, I said, correctly, that the opportunity is there for Ofgem to review this cap more frequently than that, should it choose to do so. It can review it on a weekly basis or a three-monthly basis, but it must review the cap every six months. That is consistent with the reviews of the prepayment meter cap, which is already delivering savings of up to £120 a year, as we talked about, and which is what the excellent Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee report recommended. I think that the flexibility the hon. Gentleman is seeking is covered by the words “at least”.

Yet the hon. Gentleman raises an important point: what happens if there are suddenly wild fluctuations in the energy market, which we want consumers to benefit from, and particularly if there is a sustained price fall? I have looked at this a bit. It is a bit like the mortgage market: unless someone is on a tracker rate, changes in the wholesale prices do not always feed into the retail prices. Indeed, these companies make an art, or a science, of hedging their supplies so that they bake in what their margins look like on a future basis. Any sustained price fall would take its time to feed through to those companies’ overall cost of energy provision.

Indeed, companies change their SVTs only once or twice a year, even though those are standard variable tariffs. We had a very interesting conversation this morning in Committee about whether that was a rather benign description—maybe we should be looking to tighten up the language a bit. These variable tariffs vary only once or twice a year. There is an argument that giving Ofgem a statutory duty to review this at least every six months provides an opportunity for the market movement to be greater than it is under the SVTs. I feel that with the words “at least” we have provided in the Bill for Ofgem to react to market movements or any other structural changes that would affect consumers. That flexibility is there.

As always, the hon. Gentleman has thought about these things carefully. As he alluded to, there is a risk that by specifying every three months, given that this is a short-term cap—it will apply for a minimum of just over two years and a maximum of just over five years—we would perhaps create an unnecessary process burden. We want Ofgem to continue to regulate this market well; we want it to continue to bring forward initiatives such as the cancellation of billing backwards for more than 12 months and the work it has announced it wants to do in the wholesale energy markets to ensure that returns are proportionate. I am persuaded that by changing the period to three months, we would create a potentially unnecessary burden that does not deliver anything more than we have already allowed for with the wording of clause 6(1).

[James Heappey]

I got there in the nick of time. While the Minister has been speaking, I have been looking at Ofgem’s tracker for wholesale energy prices. It is clear to me that in the first quarter of each calendar year, prices are particularly volatile and disproportionately higher than in the remainder of the year. In his evidence, Dermot Nolan said that, over six months, those midwinter peaks are ridden out. That means we should defer to his judgment that six months is the right unit, not quarterly.

[Claire Perry]

My hon. Friend again brings assiduous online research, which is marvellous, and his knowledge of this market, to support the point that Ofgem believes that six months is a proportionate time. The Bill does allow Ofgem—should it be required to do so by market movements, and that volatility persists over a period of time—to make the necessary adjustments. I know that I am on a winning trend, which may not last, but on that basis, I hope the hon. Gentleman is persuaded once again to withdraw the amendment.

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I hope to receive an explanation as to why everything is all right in the world of the Bill as far as Ofgem is concerned and to hear that my fears are entirely imaginary and that the out arrangements for the cap are in perfectly good hands, so I need not worry myself at all. However, I fear I may not. I hope the Minister will have a very good attempt at persuading me. This matter is really important, and we ought to take it seriously.

[James Heappey]

I rise to speak briefly. I know exactly what the shadow Minister is trying to achieve with the amendment, and I agree with him that the cap must be a temporary measure. On Second Reading, I answered an intervention by saying that this should be a raid into the market, not an occupation. It is very necessary indeed to set out clearly the terms on which the cap will come to an end.

Having said that, my concern with the amendment is that whereas the Bill as drafted refers explicitly simply to progress with smart meter deployment—it quite reasonably leaves the regulator and the Minister to work out what progress is being made on the remainder—the hon. Gentleman’s list is so lengthy as to be overly prescriptive. Some measures in his list, such as improving efficiency in suppliers’ business models, are not the business of the regulator at all. I rather think that suppliers will be driven to find efficiency by the creation of competition, rather than needing to have it required of them. That is what the market does.

The hon. Gentleman is an enthusiastic fellow traveller on the route to a decentralised, digitised, dynamic energy system, so I wonder why his list does not include half-hourly settlement or the universal application of demand-side response, why he does not require the market to be electric vehicle-ready, why he is not concerned about transmission costs as well as distribution costs, why he does not seek signals from the regulator about the readiness of the market to manage a decentralised energy system given all the price advantages that might bring, and why he is not enthusiastic about a code review or embedded benefits, or about looking at what energy-efficiency measures have been made or at whether we are ready for a data-heavy digitised market.

As well as all those things, there is the unknown scale of the renewable deployment that might come our way, alongside the flexibility that storage and demand-side response will bring with them, and what impact that might have on price variability over the course of a year. There are so many unknowns, and the pace of change in the energy system is such that being as prescriptive as the hon. Gentleman desires at this stage would risk hindering progress in the system. It would shape the way the market worked towards achieving the end of the price cap, rather than allowing it to be disrupted in the way that I know he and I genuinely hope it will be.

[Alan Brown]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[James Heappey]

I was done, but I am happy to give way.

[Alan Brown]

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point about other factors that may ultimately influence the retail energy market, but why should progress with smart meter installation be the one thing we tell Ofgem it must measure in its review? It seems to me a bit strange to specify that criterion but say that we do not want all the other important criteria that the hon. Member for Southampton, Test laid out.

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[James Heappey]

I suspect that the Minister is much better placed to answer that than I am, but I guess—I would support this wholly if it were the case—that we have done a lot of work with carrots when it comes to smart meters and we are starting to get into stick territory. If we want the new digitised market to really work—I know that almost everyone here is passionate about achieving that—smart meters are no longer optional: they are a necessity. To use that as a metric of success seems very reasonable to me.

[Claire Perry]

I want to try to address two of the main points that came up: what “good” looks like, the conditions for success and how far we should specify them in the Bill, and why progress with installing smart meters is the only explicit condition. Ultimately, this is the nub of the whole Bill. We are all here because we believe that the conditions for effective competition are not in place and that the Bill will assist the market towards that evolution. I suspect that we all believe in well regulated, competitive markets delivering the best value and service for consumers, and if we see a regulatory gap—a place where the regulator needs new powers to deliver that—it is only right that we fill it. That is what we are doing.

Once again, I have great sympathy with what the hon. Member for Southampton, Test set out. I feel sometimes that we are a bit like Eeyore and Tigger: he is always looking for the very worst outcome and I am always very optimistic about the future. Perhaps it is good that we often meet in the middle. The challenge, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wells set out, is that the list that the hon. Gentleman has put forward is very sensible. I am sure that we could all come up with further factors that we thought would indicate that the market was acting more competitively.