Defence Spending

James Gray Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

My hon. Friend and I may disagree about whether our interventions were misguided, but he makes a very valid point, which is that we have been intervening with increasingly marginal effect. Helmand in Afghanistan was a classic case of that. It took the Americans putting in another 20,000 troops before we pulled that situation round.

Let me return to the point about disconnect. The military interventions over the past decade have distracted us from the greater danger. Too often in these military interventions, we have failed to take the long view in favour of short-term foreign policy fixes that give rise to as many problems as they solve. A key reason is a deficit of strategic analysis at the heart of our foreign policy making, in large part because of continual underfunding—but perhaps that is a debate for another day.

There is little doubt that we went to war in Iraq on a false premise, and that we foolishly allowed the mission in Afghanistan to morph into one of nation building after we had achieved our original objective of ridding the country of al-Qaeda. Our Libyan intervention has not ended well courtesy of a vicious civil war. Speaking as someone who opposed them all, we must dispel these demons when thinking about defence more generally, because, in addition to being mistakes in themselves, these interventions have distracted us from, and blinded us to, the greater danger of traditional state-on-state threats.

For example, recent events in Ukraine reveal a resurgent Russia that is once again making its presence felt around NATO’s borders. Russian bomber aircraft and submarines have resumed their aggressive patrols, some near UK waters and airspace. The Defence Secretary correctly observed last month that Russia posed a real and current danger to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—all NATO members covered by article 5. Only by dispelling these previous intervention demons and recognising the bigger danger can we mend the political disconnect between commitments, on the one hand, and funding, on the other. It is absolutely essential that we do that.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that two of the most chilling interventions in recent weeks have been, first, from the chief of staff of the American army, who said that he thought that a diminished UK defence capability would serve not alongside, but as part of, an American division; and secondly, from the Europeans, who indicated that the best deterrent against Mr Putin was a European army? Are not both those interventions extremely telling?

[Mr Baron]

I can only agree with my hon. Friend. The idea that British brigades would serve within American divisions would probably have been unthinkable only 10 years ago. That is testament to the alarm in Washington, expressed—this is highly unusual—as we head into a general election. The extent of that alarm is clear for all to see.

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[Mr Gray]

I know of the hon. Gentleman’s personal commitment to defence; he is passionate about it, as we all are. He will also be standing for election in a couple of weeks’ time. Will he be standing on the platform that an incoming Labour Government will definitely commit to 2% or more on defence spending?

[Mr Jones]

Well, what I am not being is dishonest, which is what the Government’s position is. I shall reiterate the point that I made in the debate last week: what we have a commitment to, and will argue for, is maintaining the 2015-16 budget. Also, we will start the defence review—the detailed work that needs to happen, not the rushed job we saw last time—and that will inform the debate on future budgets.

[Mr Gray]

The same as us.

[Mr Jones]

No, it is not the same, because the Government and the hon. Gentleman have got the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s fiscal straitjacket around them—his commitments to reducing spending. There is a big difference, and it gives us a lot of leeway in making sure that we can deliver on our defence needs and foreign affairs commitments, whereas what the Government are putting forward will lead to a situation in which the budget is set, and there is no way that they can meet those commitments.

Something else has come out in this debate. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), who is in a good position because he was a Minister in the Department at the time, and the hon. Member for Dewsbury (Simon Reevell) raised the idea that the Prime Minister convinced his Back Benchers and the military to take the pain of the 8% cut in 2010, and that somehow once we reached the sunny uplands—I think the hon. Member for Dewsbury referred to that—we would have an increase in the budget. That is clearly not going to happen if the Prime Minister’s commitment to deficit reduction is followed. We have come to expect such smoke and mirrors from the Prime Minister. We have had that narrative again; I do not for a minute question the former adviser of the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), who has written in today’s newspapers in a similar vein. It is clear that that commitment cannot be met if the Prime Minister is to keep to the deficit reduction process laid out in the autumn statement.

We need honesty from the Government on what they are going to do. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) and I are not going to stand here and make the ludicrous promises we heard at the last general election from those now on the Government Benches. They promised a larger Army, more helicopters, and more of everything for the armed forces, but the Conservatives reverted to type, as they always do in government. The hon. Member for Dewsbury said that this was a right-left issue. No, it is not. The Conservatives’ record in office shows that they always cut defence, whereas Labour has always protected defence.

Defence and Security Review (NATO)

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Hugh Bayley]

I have had an interesting conversation with the statisticians in the House of Commons Library this afternoon. They provided figures for me in April of last year that showed spending as a proportion of GDP increasing from 2.48% in 1997-98 to 2.81% in 2009-10. Those are the Defence Analytical Services and Advice, or DASA, figures produced by the Minister of Defence. More recently—[Interruption.] I shall come to the point made by the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) in a moment. More recently, the Library has given me the PESA, or public expenditure statistical analysis, figures, which show defence spending at 2.5% at the start of the Labour Government and 2.5% at the end of the Labour Government. I think the difference in the figures is covered by precisely the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. If we include the costs of Afghanistan and Iraq, there is an increase in real terms. If we discount them, there is no change in real terms.

In 2013-14, according to the Government’s figures, spending was at 2.1%. That is counterintuitive. I do not think that many members of the public would recognise that the Major Conservative Government substantially reduced defence expenditure in real terms, that the Labour Government maintained it and that this Government have substantially reduced it, but that is what the Government’s own PESA figures show us.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I strongly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s powerful endorsement of the Prime Minister’s commitment to 2% at the NATO summit last September. Has he spoken to his own Front Benchers about whether an incoming Labour Government, if there were to be such a thing, would or would not maintain defence spending at 2%?

[Sir Hugh Bayley]

Yes, of course I have had that conversation—

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[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow such esteemed Members on both sides of the House, particularly the Chair of the Defence Committee, of which I am a member. I wholeheartedly endorse what he said about the threat from Russia. He talked about the arc of unpredictable threats that we could face from Putin, but he also put his finger on the overall problem that, whatever those threats are, a common feature of our response and posture is that we are signalling to Russia and to President Putin that we are simply not up for the fight. The longer that goes on, the longer we will give a sense that we will do almost anything to avoid confrontation.

I do not know whether the Minister for the Armed Forces is going to get to his feet later and repeat what his boss the Defence Secretary said last week, which was that there is only a diplomatic solution to the crisis. President Putin does not think that. As my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Sir Hugh Bayley) rightly pointed out, President Putin is increasing his defence investment and capability enormously, and he is doing so precisely so that he can potentially bring about a military confrontation. The longer we maintain this stance of cowering in the face of that threat, the more likely it is that we will face a military confrontation. The longer we delay, the worse it will be. I hope that the Government will get the message that we cannot go on like this, with the scale of cuts in defence expenditure. Frankly, it is a disgrace that we have a Prime Minister who so recently was trying to convince all our NATO allies to maintain the 2% commitment but who will not make it clear, when asked repeatedly, that a Government led by him would maintain spending at 2% over the next five years.

[Mr Gray]

rose—

[John Woodcock]

Of course I give way to my colleague on the Defence Committee.

[Mr Gray]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; he is extremely kind. We on the Government Benches entirely agree with him—we must hold our Prime Minister’s feet to the fire and insist that he live up to the 2% target. The more important question is whether the hon. Gentleman has had any indication from the Labour Front Bench that in the event of a Labour Government, Labour will go for 2%.

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[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

In July 2011, Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:

“Washington will not always take the lead when it comes to power projection. The United States will demand…that Europeans assume their responsibilities in preserving order, especially in Europe’s periphery.”

That is one of our greatest challenges. We have taken peace for granted, we have taken a status quo for granted, and we have taken American support for granted. Increasingly, we are, first, ignoring what is happening in Russia, secondly, cutting back, and thirdly, finding that America turns to the Pacific and has to justify to itself why it should support the Europeans in a pursuit that it regards as our job. That means that the situation becomes very difficult.

A war of information and propaganda is going on that we are singularly losing in the west but Putin is winning on his home ground. If we look at Russian opinion, we can see what Russians think. In 1997, they were asked:

“Are the big Western countries…partners or opponents of Russia?”

Then, about 50% regarded the US, Germany, Japan and Great Britain as partners of Russia. Now, 79% of the Russian population say that they think we are their enemies. If they are then asked whether Russia has the right to annex territories, the answer is interesting: 54% say that generally Russia has the right to annex territories, but the additional 34% who would usually say, “No, not generally”, will say with regard to Crimea, “Yes, of course it can do that.” That statement is as absurd as it would be if Angela Merkel in Berlin suddenly said, “Germany will annex Königsberg because it has traditionally always been German.” We would say that that was a totally, utterly bizarre argument, yet we are accepting it in relation to Crimea. We are also accepting, with a stunning silence, the fact that Putin has single-handedly redrawn international boundaries for the first time since 1945. We are all saying, “Well, he really shouldn’t be doing this, should he?”, but not offering options of any kind.

It is worth looking at what Putinism may actually mean. Strobe Talbott says:

“Putin’s aggression only makes sense against the backdrop of what has been the defining theme of his presidency: turning back the clock…Therein lies the most malignant manifestation of Putinism: it violates international law, nullifies Russia’s past pledges to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, carries with it the danger of spinning out of control and sparking a wider conflict, and establishes a precedent for other major powers to apply their own version of the Putin Doctrine when convenient”.

This is not just about Putin’s single-handed redrawing of international boundaries, because a number of other countries would be very happy to do the same thing. Once he is allowed to do that, they will feel that they are being given the green light to do so as well.

When we discussed the Greek euro crisis, it was staggering to hear how relatively relaxed people were about Russia offering Greece money. That should have set just about every red light raging, because it represents an extension of influence and, if we do not challenge it, it will simply continue. Putin is not acting out of strength, but out of the fact that he is terribly weak at home and therefore has to make enemies abroad.

[Mr Gray]

To enforce the hon. Lady’s point, is it not chilling that 75% of all of the equipment used by the Hellenic forces is supplied by Russia?

[Ms Stuart]

Indeed. It is an incredibly malign force, but we are not prepared to describe it as such, not only because of the historic reason that at one stage we thought Russia could become a partner, but because we now feel there is nothing we can do owing to its size and perceived power. Our debate about the 2%, what it means and how we respond has to go much deeper and address the roots of the issue.

In idle moments over the past few weeks I have been reading a biography of George I. Interestingly, it says that when George I took the throne 300 years ago the Great Britain of which he became ruler was one of the great European powers and intimately involved with the continent, and its island position rendered it immune to invasion. It was assertive and knew that it could strike its own bargains in Europe—it did not need anybody else’s permission. There was also a big divide whereby the Tories advocated concentration on seaward expansion to the West Indians, while the Whigs thought that we should go into mainland Europe.

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[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure, as always, to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), who speaks with passion for the military people of Colchester—nobody speaks better of them than him. He added to what has been a wide-ranging, interesting and well-informed debate of various topics, some broadly associated with the report on NATO that the Select Committee produced.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, ably set the tone of the debate. I stood against him for the chairmanship, but let me say in public that I am extremely glad that I lost that particular election. I am glad that he won it, and I am pleased to stand behind him now and will do so in subsequent Parliaments.

We meet in what can be described only as interesting times. There is a strange coincidence—or is it a conspiracy—of events happening in the world. We have talked extensively, of course, about Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, threats to the Baltic states and the assassination of Nemtsov over the weekend—and who knows what the consequences of that will be, what it means or who did it? We have talked about ISIS, or Daesh as we prefer to call it. An important assault on Tikrit is occurring as we speak, and again, who knows what the consequences will be? We look forward to the much anticipated assault on and retaking of Mosul—potentially later this year, although I sometimes find it hard to imagine that it will actually occur.

We have heard from others, including my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), about events in the South China sea, and about cyber-warfare and so many other aspects of the world that are extraordinarily worrying and dangerous, but also extremely unknown. We simply do not know what is occurring in most of the world, and we do not know what we are going to do about it. I find it concerning that we in the UK, leaving aside NATO as a wider force, seem to be so unclear about what we are planning to do.

Several Select Committee reports over the last months have touched on this failing. Our report on Daesh, for example, said that our contribution to the opposition to ISIL was lamentably small. We are responsible for something like 6% of the airstrikes, which is of course useful—it is important that we are doing it—but it is none the less an extremely small contribution. We have a tiny number of soldiers in Iraq. I heard the other day that the number of our personnel helping to train in Sulaymaniyah in north-east Iraq, which we visited, is being further reduced rather than increased, despite their ambitions.

We have no real idea why we are doing things in Syria, but not in Iraq—apart from the fact that is what the motion in the House lay down. We have no real plan: we do not quite understand what we are seeking to do against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. We know they are bad people; we know we do not like the atrocities that are being carried out; but we do not really have a grand plan for what we intend to do about them.

The same applies to Putin. We know he is a bad man; we know he should not have redrawn the boundaries of Ukraine; we know that the Baltic states are under threat. When General Sir Richard Shirreff was recently in front of the Select Committee—he was either still serving or had just stepped down as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe—it was interesting to hear him say so plainly that we should have permanent forces deployed in the Baltic states. He thought our people should be there permanently and at the very least that a large-scale exercise should take place there with equipment delivered to the Baltic states and so forth. That afternoon, my right hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Mr Hammond), then Secretary of State for Defence, said that Sir Richard was absolutely wrong and that we should have no troops in the Baltic states. We should not worry ourselves about that, he claimed, as the main threat to the UK remained a terrorist threat. He stood by the tier 3 categorisation of state warfare as described in the strategic defence and security review in 2010.

So I was astonished when, very recently, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Secretary of State for Defence disagreed in the course of a single day on what our policy should be on the defence of the Baltics. That raises an issue that will be the subject of a forthcoming Select Committee report, namely our distinct lack of understanding of who we are in the world, what our purpose is, what we want to do in the world, how we are to achieve it, and what kind of armed forces we need in order to do that.

The 2010 SDSR is woefully out of date. It downgraded all the threats that we now face, judging them to be potentially insignificant. The national security strategy, which was published on the same day as the SDSR, did not have a clue about what we are doing today. I was disappointed to hear the Prime Minister say recently that he thought that it was worthy of “tweaking” in respect of a few details. I think that he was absolutely wrong. I think that the Arab spring, the Russians, ISIL, events in the South China sea, and so much else that is happening in the world today require a fundamental rewriting of the national security strategy from scratch. We must identify what is wrong in the world, and say what we are going to do about it.

The notion that we could produce a new national security strategy—tweaked, as the Prime Minister had it—a few weeks or months after a general election and produce an SDSR at the same time strikes me as laughable, as does the notion that we should link the two in a strategic spending review, thereby handing all the controlling levers to the Treasury. The idea that we should say to the Treasury, “You tell us how much we can spend” , and the national security strategy will then be tweaked in an attempt to make it fit in with how much we can spend—and, incidentally, we will continue to cut our armed forces for that purpose—seems to me to represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which we should consider how we intend to position ourselves in the world.

Surely it is entirely reasonable, basic and straightforward to ask, “What is our role?”, and we as a nation should be asking that question. Are we to serve as part of the American forces, as the American chief of staff was quoted as suggesting in The Daily Telegraph this morning? Most definitely not. Are we to do as President Obama suggested in his letter to the Prime Minister, and say that we are a second-rate nation that no longer pulls its weight in the world? No; for my money, we are not. But if we are to fight our corner in the world, we must know how we are to do it, and we must do it through an absolutely clear national security strategy which sets out, not vaguely but precisely, what our aims are and how we are to deal with ISIL. Will we deal with ISIL by means of containment, destruction or defeat? We do not know. We need to set out precisely how we view President Putin and what we intend to do about that, precisely what we intend to do in the Baltic states, and precisely what we intend to do about so many other things.

Some time after the publication of the national security strategy, we must have a defence and security review specifying the assets that we need in order to realise the vision in the strategy, and some time after that, the Treasury must come along with a fundamental spending review and say, “Here is the money that you require in order to realise that vision.” I know that that will not happen. I know what will happen after the general election, whether we have a Labour or a Conservative Government: the spending review, the defence review and the national security strategy will be rushed out as they were before, entirely driven by mandarins in the Treasury. However, I think that it is worth our recognising, and worth the Select Committee’s stating, that we think that that is the wrong way of going about the defence of the realm.

We think that Britain is probably in a more dangerous state today than at any time since the second world war. We think that the nation hangs on the edge of a precipice over which it may fall, and that we, the United States and our colleagues in NATO must act urgently to do something about it. Tinkering around with 2% or not 2%, tinkering around with the current sclerotic decision-making processes in the Ministry of Defence, and tinkering around with cutting our armed forces and trying to patch them up here and there is not the right way in which to proceed. We are in an incredibly dangerous place. We as a nation, and we as a House of Commons, must act now and act decisively to put that right.

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[Mr Jones]

If the hon. Gentleman lets me get on with my speech, I shall tell him what our position is.

Every Conservative Member has called for 2% or more, but in a few weeks’ time they are going to stand for election on a manifesto that would see a cut in our defence expenditure. I refer to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s autumn statement, which clearly ring-fenced spending on schools, health, and overseas aid. The hon. Member for Aldershot mentioned overseas aid, which I know is dear to his heart. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, 60% more cuts have got to take place, so if we take the ring-fenced spending out, we see that the rest of the cuts that will have to be made amount to about £86 billion. Of that, it is estimated that £9 billion will have to come from defence—some 36% if we take the figures up to 2020. Some are saying that the figure may be in the region of 8%. The Conservatives have form on 8% margins, because that is the level at which the coalition cut defence expenditure when it came to power.

We have heard it argued that the Prime Minister gave a commitment to, and lectured others about, the 2% NATO target. I understand that today he has been in the constituency of the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), where he was asked about the commitment to 2%. As we expect from the Prime Minister, he dodged the question. He said that the equipment budget would be increased by 1%. He also made the remarkable statement that there would be no further cuts in the size of the Army. In that case, the situation for the defence budget is even worse than has been said, because the 9% cut that the Chancellor is arguing for will fall on only 55% of the budget. If the equipment budget has been protected, there are only two ways of keeping the Army intact while cutting 55% of the defence budget by 9%—by taking out of service equipment that is there today or by reducing the number of personnel.

The Prime Minister needs to level with the British people and be honest about what is being proposed. This is a charade. I do not doubt that the Conservative Members who have spoken—I know them all very well and they are very strong defence advocates—genuinely believe that more money should be put into defence or that the 2% NATO commitment should at least be met, but they need to challenge the Prime Minister on the figure. There is no way that the Chancellor’s cuts can be met by 2019-20 without affecting the 2% we currently give to NATO.

[Mr Gray]

I know that the hon. Gentleman is looking forward to being the Minister for the Armed Forces in the incoming Labour Government. Talking of levelling with the British people, would a Labour Government not do what he says we are about to do?

[Mr Jones]

I will level with the hon. Gentleman. What I will not do is what the Prime Minister and the then Members of the Opposition did at the last election by promising larger armies, more ships and more expenditure on the armed forces. The first thing they did when they got into power was cut the size of the army. Our position is very clear: we will meet the figure for 2015-16, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for York Central has said, that is still a reduction of £600 million according to the figures under discussion. Moreover, if we look at what the Defence Secretary has been good at, we will see that some £400 million has been given back to the Treasury over the past five years. That money was not even spent, which begs a question about the commitment.

Our strategic defence review will look at what most people want, as we did in 1997. It will be a proper defence review that looks at the bigger questions that many Members have raised today about our role in the world.

Service Personnel (Ukraine)

James Gray Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

It is slightly unfortunate that the hon. Lady has compared the general purpose force we were attempting to train—a very raw force of recruits from Libya—with the Ukrainian armed forces. She asked me a straightforward and quite reasonable question about where else the training might be. There will be, and has already been, some training in the UK, but there can also be training in countries alongside Ukraine. We are looking at where the training can best be provided, but it is likely that most of it will be provided in Ukraine, in the Kiev area or elsewhere in the west of Ukraine, areas that are very familiar to the British military as we have been on exercise there in the past.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is of course very important that there should be non-lethal support and training, but in a parallel situation in north-east Iraq, where we are training the peshmerga in Kurdistan, we have discovered that the Americans and other EU allies are training on the front line and they find that much more effective than the kind of training we have been providing about 100 miles behind the front line. Is there not an argument that, although that support is non-lethal, we might find a way to move the troops forward so that they can advise the Ukrainians where they are doing the fighting?

[Michael Fallon]

I do not think it is right for other countries to get involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia should now be withdrawing its heavy weapons from eastern Ukraine and be putting pressure on the separatists to lay down their arms. On the location of the training, we are not putting combat troops anywhere near the front line. The training we have been providing to the peshmerga in northern Iraq has, as my hon. Friend says, been well away from the front line. We have trained more than 1,000 peshmerga as well as supplying them with machine guns and ammunition.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The House has not given its authority for military operations to be conducted in Syria at the moment. However, we are preparing plans to help train moderate Syrian opposition forces outside Syria, and we are now drawing up plans to participate in that training at a number of sites outside Syria. The situation in Libya is equally disturbing. It now looks as though ISIL has several footholds along the Libyan seaboard, so we are also considering what further role we might play there.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Kurdish peshmerga have indeed done a magnificent job in halting Daesh and regaining some ground from it. I am proud that we have given them 40 heavy machine guns and that we have 46 members of 2nd Battalion the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment training them in Sulaymaniyah, but I have heard that we are reducing the amount of support we are actually giving them. Will the Secretary of State please outline in detail what extra help we can give the peshmerga forces in Kurdistan?

[Michael Fallon]

We are not reducing our effort; on the contrary, we have the RAF flying Tornadoes virtually day and night—a huge effort—from Cyprus. We have nearly 600 service personnel involved in this battle against ISIL, including more than 140 personnel in Iraq. It is important to help the peshmerga, but it is also important to help the reconstituted Iraqi army.

Trident Renewal

James Gray Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dame Joan Ruddock]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Nuclear weapons have no utility. They cannot be used to advance any cause or secure any territory without the most devastating effects. The true believers present them as benign, silently gliding under the oceans or quietly snoozing in bunkers doing no harm, but it is not so. Some 18 months ago, a book called “Command and Control” was published detailing more than 1,000 nuclear accidents in the United States. Its author, Eric Schlosser, spent six years researching and submitting freedom of information requests. The results are terrifying and would be unbelievable if they had not come directly from official military sources. Historic accidents range from the proverbial spanner being dropped, causing a fuel leak, leading to a missile explosion, and a warhead being blown off, to a nut being left off a bomber, resulting in the engine catching fire and the fire only failing to reach the bomb bay due to the prevailing wind. Today, there is far more dependence on computer technology than on the mechanical, but there is no consolation in that. In 2008, an engineer went to a Minuteman silo, realised that there had been a fire and that the fire alarm had failed. Luckily, the fire burned itself out before it got to the missile. In 2010 at the same base, online contact was lost for an hour with 50 Minuteman missiles—a computer chip had come loose, but it could have been a cyber-attack.

Even more terrifying is the true story of Stanislav Petrov, now portrayed in a film called “The Man Who Saved The World.” Petrov was a colonel in charge of a Soviet nuclear early warning centre when an alarm went off signifying that five American nuclear missiles were heading towards the USSR. Petrov took it on himself to refuse to follow protocol and did not send the signal for a retaliatory strike. He believed that the alarm had to be a malfunction, and he was right, but just suppose somebody else had been on duty. Had a nuclear exchange occurred at that time, we know that the world’s eco-system would have been destroyed. Today we are told that nuclear arsenals are smaller, which is true, and that the world is a safer place, which is not true.

In 2007-08, several groups of scientists published new and peer-reviewed research on the effects of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons, such as might occur between India and Pakistan. The firepower used for modelling purposes was 50 Hiroshima-sized bombs on each side, which represents just 0.03% of the explosive power of the current global arsenal.

We have known since 1945 of the immediate effects of nuclear weapons—blast, firestorms and radioactivity that would kill millions, but only those who are near the targets. This is what the scientists say of the indirect effects: about five megatons of black smoke would be produced and, as the smoke lifts into the stratosphere, it would be transported around the world. The climatic effects of this high layer of smoke would be unprecedented, plunging the planet into temperatures colder than the little ice age that began in the 17th century. Worldwide agriculture would be severely affected. A larger nuclear exchange, including that involving UK weapons, would result in a true nuclear winter, making agriculture impossible. Both scenarios show climate effects lasting more than a decade and up to 2 billion people dying of starvation.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady speaks with great passion and great authority on these matters. The question is whether she thinks that the awful scenario that she describes would be more or less likely if we did away with nuclear deterrents.

[Dame Joan Ruddock]

I will come on to suggest what the world community thinks about that. It is of course my opinion that we would be safer without nuclear weapons. If the hon. Gentleman were both to read the research on nuclear winters and the report of the accidents that have been recently published, he would realise that there is no safety in the possession of nuclear weapons, even if they are not used in anger.

It is instructive to look at how we view the world. We need to reflect on the deaths of those 17 people in Paris at the hands of terrorists. We were rightly outraged and right to mourn them, so how can it be that we are willing to contemplate the deaths of millions? Why do we have such moral certitude over the banning of chemical and biological weapons, land mines and cluster bombs but not nuclear weapons? It is also instructive to inquire how other countries and institutions view the nuclear weapon states such as Britain.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

We know that there are more community cadets. They are all equally important and we are determined to do everything we can not just to support them, but, as we have heard from Members on both sides of the House, to encourage more young people to take advantage of the benefits, opportunities and the fantastic experience that the cadets offer.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I strongly support the Government’s initiative for 100 new CCFs in schools across the land. It is a great idea, but the Minister mumbled over the question of the funding formula—[Interruption.] I apologise: she most certainly did not mumble. To put it a different way, I am a little unclear as to what she meant about the funding formula. Will she guarantee that she will not do what she originally planned, namely fund the CCFs by charging existing cadets up to £500 a year for membership?

[Mr Speaker]

That was a gracious withdrawal. I have periodically accused the Minister of things, fairly or unfairly, but I have never, ever accused her of mumbling and I cannot imagine ever doing so.

Al-Sweady Inquiry Report

James Gray Excerpts

Wednesday 17th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

Yes. As I said earlier, we have already made a series of changes in our procedures, and we will continue to do so. The report makes some important points about retrieval of information from the battlefield, archiving and the use of information systems to make it easier to get more quickly to the truth of what actually happened. Let me emphasise again, however, that when there are allegations they will be properly and fully investigated, and when there are failings we should own up to them and put the procedures right.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is of course an absolute outrage that it has taken 10 stress-filled years to clear these young soldiers of the baseless slurs against them, but is there not a wider point to be made? Does the Secretary of State agree that allowing further claims and allegations of this kind—the baseless ones and even, perhaps, the slightly less baseless ones—to be pursued in the same way might interfere with the perfectly legitimate conduct of warfare, and that there is a real risk that legitimate warfare will be replaced with “lawfare”?

[Michael Fallon]

I am, of course, concerned that the operational efficiency of commanders in the field should not be inhibited by additional legal complications, such as fresh rulings by the European Court of Human Rights or attempts to extend a health and safety regime that would apply in civilian life to the battlefield. We must think carefully about the weight of law imposed on those whom we ask to do very dangerous things in our name and to react very quickly. This was a battlefield, and I think it important for the House to bear that in mind.

UK Armed Forces (Iraq)

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The hon. Lady is right and we must always be careful who we are training. It is important that the Iraqi Government—she will have seen this on her visit to Baghdad last week—follow through on the reforms they are proposing. The army must become genuinely inclusive and militias must be properly under control. Holding ground that can be liberated must have the full-hearted support of local populations, and that will be particularly important as ISIL is pushed back in the tribal areas of the Anbar.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The brave peshmerga whom we visited being trained by the British Army in Sulaymaniyah last week did a fantastic job in stopping the breakneck advance of ISIL in the summer, and they are to be congratulated. They did so against huge odds in terms of personnel, equipment and training, and to this day they are a pretty makeshift army. Does the Secretary of State agree that although it is vital that this should be a Kurdish or Iraqi battle against ISIL, we have a vast role to play in terms of equipment, training—particularly IED training—and we must do our part to combat the dreadful wickedness that is ISIL?

[Michael Fallon]

Yes. ISIL is a threat to us in this country and generally to the west, as well as a threat to all those in Iraq—particularly those of other religions or indeed their own religion—who want to live at peace. That is why, with the support of the House, since early summer we have been considering what we can do to supply the peshmerga. We have supplied heavy machine guns and helped to airlift other equipment and ammunition that is needed, and we are considering—it is still only considering—the scope of training that we are able to offer in some of those specialist skills.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

The outline of the plan came from the original “Future Reserves 2020” review, which was chaired by the current Chief of the Defence Staff. The early blueprint was put together by General Sir Nick Carter, the Chief of the General Staff. The hon. Gentleman is partly right: there were some mistakes in the early stages relating to the way in which the recruiting pipeline was organised. Since those early glitches, we have made considerable changes—relating to meeting a common standard, for example—and recruits are now coming through in much greater numbers.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

9. What recent steps the UK has taken against ISIL in Iraq; and if he will make a statement.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon)]

Since Parliament authorised military action in support of combat operations, the Royal Air Force has flown some 139 missions, gathering intelligence, providing surveillance and striking some 37 targets. We are already providing training and equipment to Kurdish forces and we are now preparing to provide further infantry, combat first aid, sharp-shooting and counter-improvised explosive device training.

[Mr Gray]

Does the Secretary of State agree that if our policy aim in Iraq is the successful containment of ISIL, we are indeed making a fantastic contribution towards that, but that if our aim is the degradation or destruction of ISIL, as we were originally told, that will occur only if there is significant political engagement by the Baghdad Government, particularly with Sunni-friendly tribes? Does he agree that, unless we have that wider political engagement, what we are doing is either unnecessary or not enough?

[Michael Fallon]

Let me confirm to my hon. Friend that it is indeed our aim to help the legitimate Government of Iraq to degrade and defeat ISIL in that country. I agree that the new Government of Iraq have to be inclusive, and they are: they represent Shi’as, Sunnis and Kurds. The new defence Minister is a Sunni, and I have emphasised to him the importance of demonstrating that the Iraqi national army is there for all the peoples of Iraq.

Reserve Recruitment

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. A large number of hon. and right hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye. Ordinarily, I try to accommodate everybody; that probably will not be possible today, because there is considerable pressure on time, as there are two statements to follow. What is required is exemplary brevity, a tutorial in which can now be provided by Mr James Gray.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I will seek to do that, Mr Speaker. My hon. Friend the Minister has a long-standing commitment to the reserve Army, which I salute. I am proud that my Territorial Army regiment is, I understand, 125% above its recruitment target, which is great. Other regiments around England could follow that example. However, does he agree that we cannot replace regular soldiers with reserves on a regular basis? Would it not be better to do away with the 82,000 and 30,000 figures, and replace that with an Army of 112,000, which could be made up partly of one and partly of the other?

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, but I am not quite certain what he is proposing. We are planning for an Army of 82,000 regulars, and 30,000 reservists integrated with them—in other words, available as formed sub-units or individuals to supplement the regulars outside periods of great national emergency, and to be called up in much larger numbers during periods of great national emergency.

May I pick up on a point made by the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) that I failed to answer? We make no apology whatever for recruiting older people to specialist roles, such as intelligence roles, and as medics, where they have specialist skills. As for the new standards of fitness and so on that we are introducing for medics, there is no suggestion of having those people in the combat arms.