Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 13th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

The target of 30,000 Army reservists—indeed, 35,000 trained reservists across the three services—was firmly in the Conservative party’s manifesto, and this Conservative Government are committed to delivering it.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I warmly welcome the maintenance of that target, and I congratulate the Minister on what has been achieved so far. He will recall that the purpose of the target was to enable the reserve and regular forces to be interoperable—change backwards and forwards between each other. A reserve force was to do precisely the same job as the regulars who, in the case of the Army, we were then cutting by 20,000. Will he confirm that the excellent plan that he laid out before the last election—and which has been laid out consistently in the House since—will remain? Will there be any change in that way that we use reserves?

[Mr Brazier]

As my hon. Friend knows, the Government do not accept that the expansion of the reserves was a direct swap with regulars in the way that he describes. The purposes of the reserve forces were set out in the commission—which, as he says, carried my signature—and were threefold: to provide extra capacity at slightly lower readiness; to provide skills not available to the military; and to rebuild the connection between the military and society. We are committed to all those things, and the commitment of £1.8 billion over the next 10 years for reserves, which was recently reaffirmed by the 2% commitment to defence spending, further underlies that.

Britain and International Security

James Gray Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I have a lot of sympathy with that view. Of course, our interlocutors in the Gulf and our coalition allies refer to it as Daesh, and as the Prime Minister reported on Monday, we have now got the BBC to move away from calling it any kind of state. I have referred to it in shorthand as ISIL, and it may be too late to replace “ISIL” with “Daesh”, but the hon. Lady is right to say that we need to reflect on it and not to confer any further legitimacy on ISIL.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend says that the BBC has been persuaded to drop the term “Islamic State”, but is he aware of reports that the BBC has in fact said that it

“must be fair with Islamic State…on the ground that its coverage of the terrorist group must be impartial”?

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the BBC need not be impartial with murderous scumbags such as ISIL and that calling them Daesh is perfectly correct?

[Michael Fallon]

I agree with my hon. Friend. The BBC needs to be impartial about the facts, but we cannot be impartial on terrorism and the rules by which the rest of us live.

Let me move on to my second point regarding state and non-state threats. ISIL/Daesh is not the only danger we face. Russia is sabre-rattling in eastern Europe and has followed up its illegal annexation of Crimea by backing rebels in Ukraine and repeatedly entering Baltic and, indeed, British air traffic regions. Russia is continuing to modernise its military capability, and by 2020 it will have spent some $380 billion upgrading or replacing 70% to 100% of its equipment. It has brought into service new missile systems, aircraft, submarines and surface vessels and armoured vehicles, as well as modernising its nuclear capability. It has chosen a path of competition with the west rather than partnership.

In Africa, failing states are falling prey to insurgency and triggering large-scale migration. These crises threaten not just our national security and interests, but the whole international rules-based system on which our values of freedom, tolerance, and the rule of law rely.

From Defence, we make a threefold contribution to protecting national security and upholding the international system. First, we protect and deter. All day, every day, our aircraft, ships and bomb disposal teams are employed in and around the UK, supporting counter-terrorism efforts and ensuring the integrity of our territorial waters and airspace and demonstrating our resolve to those who would threaten us.

Secondly, our defence personnel, ships and planes are out in the rest of the world, helping us to understand the challenges we face, as well as building the capacity of our partners and shaping events to prevent the spread of conflict and instability which could threaten our interests.

Thirdly, when our efforts to deter adversaries are not enough, we will respond with all the military force at our disposal, working with our allies and partners, to defeat aggressors, contain instability and sustain the rules-based system which is the key to our prosperity.

That is why today 4,000 brave and capable men and women of our three armed forces are working around the clock on 21 different joint operations in 19 countries—double the number of operations five years ago.

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[Dr Lewis]

I hope to be able to continue that degree of far-sightedness in future.

[Mr James Gray]

I am sorry to interrupt my right hon. Friend to make such a tiny point. It is most kind of him to describe me as “gallant”, but I was only ever a private soldier in the Territorial Army. Surrounded as I am by brave soldiers who truly deserve the title, I should say that I am not in any shape, size or form “gallant”.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is, in my eyes, as gallant as they come.

In my hon. Friend’s intervention, he drew attention—he was kind enough to give me the copy of the news article to which he referred—to what the head of the BBC had said. According to today’s edition of The Times:

“The head of the BBC has refused demands from 120 MPs to drop the term Islamic State on the ground that its coverage of the terrorist group must be impartial. Lord Hall of Birkenhead, the director-general, warned that an alternative name for the militants was ‘pejorative’ and said that the broadcaster needed to ‘preserve the BBC’s impartiality’.”

I have news for Lord Hall. I am well familiar with the concept of impartiality that applies to the BBC and independent television. I used to look into it decades ago. It is not absolute impartiality. The example that is always given is that there is no need for the media to be impartial between the arsonist and the fire brigade. The BBC is required to show due impartiality, which does not mean that it has to be impartial between terrorists and constitutionally constituted Governments and their armed forces. Lord Hall would do well to reflect on how he would react if somebody from his ranks of well-paid BBC executives said that the corporation needs to be impartial between the Nazis and the forces that fought them. He would not stand up for that suggestion for a moment.

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[Alex Salmond (Gordon) (SNP)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. You have no idea how joyful it is to hear those words spoken and, after so many years in this House, to be in a position where those time strictures do not apply. I know it is not democratic and is unfair to other Members, but I must confess a feeling of real joy and anticipation. You will be delighted to know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that despite the invitation to proceed at some considerable length, I intend to be quite brief. I have enough feeling regarding previous occasions to remember just how frustrating it is to Members not to be able to avail themselves of an opportunity to speak.

I am delighted to follow the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the new Chairman of the Select Committee. I have a fellow feeling for much of what he said, although perhaps not the last part. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), who represents Rosyth, is looking forward to serving under his chairmanship.

I want to re-emphasise my condolences and those of my hon. Friends and our allies in Plaid Cymru, the Green party and the Social and Democratic Labour party to the friends and relatives of those who suffered in the atrocity in Tunisia. It is really important that we emphasise that point across the Chamber—without any ambiguity whatever.

My own feeling is that we did the House a disservice last Monday by combining the statement on Tunisia with the statement on the European Council. If we look at Monday’s Hansard, we see that hon. Members were alternating between asking questions about their potentially dead or missing constituents in Tunisia and asking questions, which were legitimate in themselves, about the Prime Minister’s renegotiation stance on the European Union. When something such as the Tunisia outrage happens, I feel it is worthy of a statement on its own to be considered on its own. As I say, we did a disservice in not doing that.

There is some element of a disservice, albeit not to the same extent, in the Secretary of State for Defence claiming in his advance publicity that this afternoon’s debate relates to extending military action into Syria. If there were a military reaction to the atrocity in Tunisia, it would be important for it to be considered on its own merits and to be judged on that line of responsibility in terms of the justification and efficacy of such military action.

I have known the Secretary of State for Defence for a long time—perhaps too long for both of us—but I was struck by an interview he gave which said:

“The Ministry of Defence is like a sauna on Sunday. The air circulation system has been switched off and the place is hot—and deserted. Yet when you reach the Secretary of State’s floor, a small team is hard at work. As you enter Michael Fallon’s office, you see the reason why. On an easel sits a map of Iraq and Syria.”

Despite the weather conditions, this interview was conducted not last week but on 23 September last year. The Secretary of State has always believed—it is a perfectly honourable belief—that the United Kingdom should participate in the air actions in Syria. That has been his belief and statement. I do not think it is correct, however, to suggest, without specific understanding and without revealing to the House the reasons why—and in more than vague and general terms—that we should frame and publicise this afternoon’s debate in relation to extending military action into Syria.

As I mentioned in an intervention, the Tunisian Government have conducted a number of arrests today. They claim and believe that the terrorist cell responsible for the atrocity was trained in a terrorist camp in Libya. Logically, if there were a military response, people would understandably ask why it did not extend to where the Tunisian Government believe the responsible gunman was trained.

[Mr James Gray]

I very much agree with the right hon. Gentleman that if there were to be a military strike against Syria, the matter would have to come back to this House. I commend to him my recently published book “Who Takes Britain to War?” on this very subject. If ISIL or Daesh is operating from Syria as well as from Iraq—there is no real border between the two countries; the border is entirely porous—does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it would be perfectly logical to strike against Daesh in Syria as well as in Iraq?

[Alex Salmond]

I am coming on to explain exactly why I am sceptical about that argument. I would be delighted, however, to receive a signed copy of the hon. Gentleman’s book if he would care to provide one; in return, I shall give him a copy of my recently published book, which is nothing like as useful or informed as the hon. Gentleman’s. None the less, he might find it of some interest.

I particularly support the words of the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee on the question of the description of the terrorist organisation as Daesh, as opposed to the variety of other acronyms and descriptions that have been widely used. It is fundamental. It is not a matter just of semantics or language; it is fundamental to the campaign of ideas that we should be conducting. This is, fundamentally, a campaign that is going to be decided by whose ideas and whose vision of society and the world have the most attraction to generations of young people across the planet.

I would like to compliment both my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Ms Ahmed-Sheikh) and the hon. Member for Gillingham and Rainham (Rehman Chishti) who have been taking this matter forward so avidly over recent days. I have done a lot more thinking about this over the last few weeks than I have previously, and the more one looks at the arguments, the more sensible, rational and substantial they become.

There is in the Library an article written by Alice Guthrie, who is an expert on these matters and a translator of Arabic. I was struck by the logic and the coherence of the argument she advanced in the article. As I say, it is available in the Library and it is entitled “Decoding Daesh: Why is the new name for ISIS so hard to understand?”. She quotes a number of important sources—for example, al-Haj Saleh, the Syrian activist, writer and influential figure, who impressively said:

“If an organisation wants to call itself ‘the light’, but in fact they are ‘the darkness’, would you comply and call them ‘the light’”?

Clearly, the answer is no. Alice Guthrie herself goes on to say:

“All of this is why some Syrian activists therefore see it as so important that use of the word 'Daesh' spreads, and have been working hard to make that happen – so effectively in fact, as we know, that the word has been taken on by several global heads of state and their associated media, who have a limited grasp of the specifics behind the term. Originally hailing from the city of Raqqa, Daesh’s current Syrian headquarters, al-Haj Salih says his main goal in making a new name for Daesh was to avoid people getting used to referring to a tyrannical and despotic movement as a ‘state’… In terms of its use by global heads of state and media, he feels that this is only natural, and right, as ‘The people who suffer most at the hands of Daesh should decide what they are called’.”

This is much more than a matter of semantics. It is at the very heart of the need to remove from a terrorist organisation the legitimacy of its aspiration to statehood and a new caliphate, and of its claim—a misleading, wrongful and hurtful claim—to represent one of the world’s great religions. I think that that is absolutely fundamental to the question of how we deal with this matter.

I intervened on the right hon. Member for New Forest East to make the point that, as he later acknowledged, it is crucial for us to unite as a Chamber if we believe this issue to be important, as I do, and as my hon. Friends do. I think that the Secretary of State himself was sympathetic to that when, in response to an intervention, he said it was something that we must reflect on. I think we should reflect on it very soon. I am sure that if we unite, as a Chamber and as a House, in recognising the importance of the war of ideas behind the words, then the broadcasting organisations in this country will follow, as broadcasting organisations have followed in other countries. If we have the confidence to state something which is, at its heart, of fundamental importance, then let us do so. If the broadcasting organisations do not see the wisdom of it, then, and only then, will perhaps be the time for us to open up the full fusillade and barrage of gunfire against the BBC that the right hon. Member for New Forest East suggested.

My second major point is this. I am sceptical about the basis for the extension of the United Kingdom’s participation in an air campaign in Syria. There are questions that I think should be considered, and considered profoundly. The first relates to the legal basis. I have here a summary note which was presented by the Attorney General on 25 September last year and laid in the Library, and which provided the legal basis for the UK’s participation in the air campaign in Iraq. It is a one-page note, and it leans heavily—almost exclusively—on the argument that such action was beyond reproach in international law, because it constituted reaction to a request from a legitimate Government in Iraq.

The Secretary of State suggested that, by extension, it could be said that the Government in Iraq were requesting an intervention in Syria, but it is difficult to see how that could be justified on exactly the same legal basis as the one on which the Attorney General relied last September for participation in the air campaign in Iraq. Let me say to the Secretary of State, and to the Minister who will sum up the debate, that if that is to be the legal basis, we must be given, and presumably will be given, a further summary note explaining the legal basis for participation in Syria. Does the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) wish to intervene?

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[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Trident-sceptic and Europhile hon. Member for Ealing North (Stephen Pound) has the ability to say completely and utterly unacceptable things—total twaddle—but to do so with such charm that we do not realise he has said such unacceptable things. It is a great pleasure to follow him.

I do not intend to take up more time than I need, partly because this afternoon’s debate has been superb, with some very fine speeches covering an enormous amount of ground in relation to our defence policy. I shall not repeat much of what has been said before. It is also right that the debate has focused significantly on Tunisia and the consequences with regard to Syria. In that context, I pay tribute to my constituents, Eileen Swannack from Biddestone who was killed in Tunisia last week, along with her partner John Welch from Pickwick in the neighbouring constituency. We think of them at this difficult time.

It is right for us to find a solution to what happened last Saturday. I spoke strongly against the airstrikes against Assad in Syria two or three years ago, but I now feel that extending our airstrikes from Iraq into Syria would make nothing but logical sense. These people are easily moving back from Iraq into Syria, so if the Prime Minister were to ask us to support targeted airstrikes against Daesh targets in Syria, it would be only logical to support him in that ambition. It is entirely different from what we were asked to do two or three years ago.

At the risk of being technical, I intend to talk not about the broad sweep of defence policy but to focus on one thing. For five years, I have argued that we should have regular defence debates in this place. They should be Government defence debates in Government time and called by the Government on significant issues. For the last five years, we have had only Backbench Business Committee debates, in which the important issues of defence and international security have competed with such worthwhile things as animals, zoos and other such issues. I think that the Government should set out to provide a reasonable number of proper, full-day defence debates—probably six—during this Parliament. I hope that they will agree to do that, and will not leave it to the Backbench Business Committee.

If the Government are seeking topics for those debates—apart from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; we used to have one debate on each—I would say that the three topics on which they ought to focus are why, how and what. Those three questions are central to defence. “Why” is the topic we are discussing this afternoon. Why should we be doing anything internationally? “What” concerns how we do it, and the strategic defence and security review that will be held later in the year. “How” is the question of the amount we spend on it, and the issue of the comprehensive spending review.

Those are the three main debates that I propose. “Why” is the topic covered by the national security strategy. The strategy has worked well, and it was a good document five years ago. However, when the Defence Committee—I am proud to serve on it, and to have been re-elected to do so—addressed the issue recently, the Prime Minister was quoted as having said that the 2010 national security strategy needed some tweaks, although he may have changed his mind by now. In other words, the document ought to be reasonably fit for purpose today.

That may well have changed in recent days, and I hope that it has, because the world has changed entirely since 2010. We did not know anything about Daesh in 2010. We did not know anything about what is happening in Russia, Ukraine and so forth. We did not know of the threat to the European Union in the form of the Baltic states and Poland. Those things were unknown to us then. In the 2010 national security strategy, state-on-state warfare was downgraded to third or fourth least likely risk. It was said that all we needed to worry about was terrorism. Now, the whole picture has completely and utterly changed, and the first thing we must do is fundamentally redraft the national security strategy.

That must be dealt with at a different time from the security and defence review, which is planned for later this year. What would be the purpose of a fundamental rethink about Britain’s purpose in the world if we were simultaneously working out what arms and armaments we might need in order to achieve those ambitions? The two things must be done at entirely different times. The SDSR must attempt to address fundamental questions about our arms, armaments and people, and the Government must think particularly carefully about the youth reserves. The SDSR document must be designed to fulfil the ambitions that are laid out in the national security strategy.

Both those processes must be entirely separate from the comprehensive spending review, which did not happen in 2010. If we mix the three up and deal with the SDSR, the national security strategy and the comprehensive spending review on the same day, as we did in 2010, it will be said—possibly wrongly, but it will be said—that the SDSR is entirely driven by the Treasury, and will be concerned with cuts.

This year, defence budgets have been cut by half a billion pounds, and it is alleged around the souks that quite a lot more has been cut. Ministers have said very firmly that that does not change the baseline, which remains at £34 billion and will increase. I should like them to repeat that today. I should like them to say that half a billion pounds is only half a billion pounds, that we will start with £34 billion next year, that we will not see further defence cuts, and that we will stick by our manifesto commitments to make no manpower cuts and to increase spending on equipment by 1% per annum. All that is terribly important. Whether or not we spend 2% of GDP on defence, we need to see the output.

I want the national security strategy, the strategic defence and security review and the comprehensive spending review to be entirely separate—I want them to be logical and consequential, and not mixed up together—and I want our Government to commit themselves to doing what they should have done in the first place. We heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), the new Chairman of the Defence Committee—I look forward to serving under his chairmanship—that the first duty of a Government is the defence of the realm, and I want to hear the Government repeat that mantra tonight.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The 2010 review necessarily involved some tough decisions because we had to balance the budget as a result of the mess that we inherited from Labour. Let me assure the hon. Gentleman that we will be looking again at all these different capabilities and at the importance of Scotland. I hope that he noted that I was able to be on the Clyde this morning cutting the first steel on our very latest warship, HMS Medway, which is being built on the Clyde to defend the whole of the United Kingdom.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

When the SDSR finally arrives, it must incorporate three promises: the Prime Minister’s promise during the general election campaign that there will be no cuts whatsoever in the regular forces; the promise that the Prime Minister made shortly after the last election that there will be real growth in defence spending; and the promise recently reiterated by the Secretary of State about the 1% increase in real terms in defence equipment spending from now onwards. Given those three commitments—leaving aside for a moment the 2% commitment to NATO—where will the Secretary of State find any cash at all to save if he is asked to by the comprehensive spending review?

[Michael Fallon]

My hon. Friend is right that he and I were elected on a mandate to replace the nuclear deterrent with four new nuclear ballistic submarines; to maintain the current size of the regular armed forces; and to increase our spending on the equipment programme by inflation plus 1% each year. It is our task now in this review to ensure that those commitments are held to and that our armed forces have the equipment and the resources that they need.

Falkland Islands Defence Review

James Gray Excerpts

Tuesday 24th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I sense that my hon. Friend is inviting me to agree with him, and I do agree with him. The Governor and the Falkland Islands Government are a key part of the democracy that is the Falkland Islands, and a key part of the Falkland islanders’ ability to determine their own future, as they have just done.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I warmly welcome the strength of the Secretary of State’s commitment, including in answering many of the points made by the Select Committee. Incidentally, may we in passing pay tribute to our Clerk, Mr Ian Thomson, who was badly injured during the trip to Argentina?

Has the Secretary of State given any thought to a gap in our capability that is coming up, namely the withdrawal of the Royal Mail steamer St Helena next year? It currently supplies an essential link between the Falklands and St Helena, as well as to Ascension Island. What thought has he given to replacing that important capability?

Defence Spending

James Gray Excerpts

Thursday 12th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

My hon. Friend and I may disagree about whether our interventions were misguided, but he makes a very valid point, which is that we have been intervening with increasingly marginal effect. Helmand in Afghanistan was a classic case of that. It took the Americans putting in another 20,000 troops before we pulled that situation round.

Let me return to the point about disconnect. The military interventions over the past decade have distracted us from the greater danger. Too often in these military interventions, we have failed to take the long view in favour of short-term foreign policy fixes that give rise to as many problems as they solve. A key reason is a deficit of strategic analysis at the heart of our foreign policy making, in large part because of continual underfunding—but perhaps that is a debate for another day.

There is little doubt that we went to war in Iraq on a false premise, and that we foolishly allowed the mission in Afghanistan to morph into one of nation building after we had achieved our original objective of ridding the country of al-Qaeda. Our Libyan intervention has not ended well courtesy of a vicious civil war. Speaking as someone who opposed them all, we must dispel these demons when thinking about defence more generally, because, in addition to being mistakes in themselves, these interventions have distracted us from, and blinded us to, the greater danger of traditional state-on-state threats.

For example, recent events in Ukraine reveal a resurgent Russia that is once again making its presence felt around NATO’s borders. Russian bomber aircraft and submarines have resumed their aggressive patrols, some near UK waters and airspace. The Defence Secretary correctly observed last month that Russia posed a real and current danger to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—all NATO members covered by article 5. Only by dispelling these previous intervention demons and recognising the bigger danger can we mend the political disconnect between commitments, on the one hand, and funding, on the other. It is absolutely essential that we do that.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that two of the most chilling interventions in recent weeks have been, first, from the chief of staff of the American army, who said that he thought that a diminished UK defence capability would serve not alongside, but as part of, an American division; and secondly, from the Europeans, who indicated that the best deterrent against Mr Putin was a European army? Are not both those interventions extremely telling?

[Mr Baron]

I can only agree with my hon. Friend. The idea that British brigades would serve within American divisions would probably have been unthinkable only 10 years ago. That is testament to the alarm in Washington, expressed—this is highly unusual—as we head into a general election. The extent of that alarm is clear for all to see.

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[Mr Gray]

I know of the hon. Gentleman’s personal commitment to defence; he is passionate about it, as we all are. He will also be standing for election in a couple of weeks’ time. Will he be standing on the platform that an incoming Labour Government will definitely commit to 2% or more on defence spending?

[Mr Jones]

Well, what I am not being is dishonest, which is what the Government’s position is. I shall reiterate the point that I made in the debate last week: what we have a commitment to, and will argue for, is maintaining the 2015-16 budget. Also, we will start the defence review—the detailed work that needs to happen, not the rushed job we saw last time—and that will inform the debate on future budgets.

[Mr Gray]

The same as us.

[Mr Jones]

No, it is not the same, because the Government and the hon. Gentleman have got the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s fiscal straitjacket around them—his commitments to reducing spending. There is a big difference, and it gives us a lot of leeway in making sure that we can deliver on our defence needs and foreign affairs commitments, whereas what the Government are putting forward will lead to a situation in which the budget is set, and there is no way that they can meet those commitments.

Something else has come out in this debate. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington, the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), who is in a good position because he was a Minister in the Department at the time, and the hon. Member for Dewsbury (Simon Reevell) raised the idea that the Prime Minister convinced his Back Benchers and the military to take the pain of the 8% cut in 2010, and that somehow once we reached the sunny uplands—I think the hon. Member for Dewsbury referred to that—we would have an increase in the budget. That is clearly not going to happen if the Prime Minister’s commitment to deficit reduction is followed. We have come to expect such smoke and mirrors from the Prime Minister. We have had that narrative again; I do not for a minute question the former adviser of the right hon. Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), who has written in today’s newspapers in a similar vein. It is clear that that commitment cannot be met if the Prime Minister is to keep to the deficit reduction process laid out in the autumn statement.

We need honesty from the Government on what they are going to do. My hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) and I are not going to stand here and make the ludicrous promises we heard at the last general election from those now on the Government Benches. They promised a larger Army, more helicopters, and more of everything for the armed forces, but the Conservatives reverted to type, as they always do in government. The hon. Member for Dewsbury said that this was a right-left issue. No, it is not. The Conservatives’ record in office shows that they always cut defence, whereas Labour has always protected defence.

Defence and Security Review (NATO)

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 2nd March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir Hugh Bayley]

I have had an interesting conversation with the statisticians in the House of Commons Library this afternoon. They provided figures for me in April of last year that showed spending as a proportion of GDP increasing from 2.48% in 1997-98 to 2.81% in 2009-10. Those are the Defence Analytical Services and Advice, or DASA, figures produced by the Minister of Defence. More recently—[Interruption.] I shall come to the point made by the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) in a moment. More recently, the Library has given me the PESA, or public expenditure statistical analysis, figures, which show defence spending at 2.5% at the start of the Labour Government and 2.5% at the end of the Labour Government. I think the difference in the figures is covered by precisely the point that the hon. Gentleman makes. If we include the costs of Afghanistan and Iraq, there is an increase in real terms. If we discount them, there is no change in real terms.

In 2013-14, according to the Government’s figures, spending was at 2.1%. That is counterintuitive. I do not think that many members of the public would recognise that the Major Conservative Government substantially reduced defence expenditure in real terms, that the Labour Government maintained it and that this Government have substantially reduced it, but that is what the Government’s own PESA figures show us.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I strongly agree with the hon. Gentleman’s powerful endorsement of the Prime Minister’s commitment to 2% at the NATO summit last September. Has he spoken to his own Front Benchers about whether an incoming Labour Government, if there were to be such a thing, would or would not maintain defence spending at 2%?

[Sir Hugh Bayley]

Yes, of course I have had that conversation—

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[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to follow such esteemed Members on both sides of the House, particularly the Chair of the Defence Committee, of which I am a member. I wholeheartedly endorse what he said about the threat from Russia. He talked about the arc of unpredictable threats that we could face from Putin, but he also put his finger on the overall problem that, whatever those threats are, a common feature of our response and posture is that we are signalling to Russia and to President Putin that we are simply not up for the fight. The longer that goes on, the longer we will give a sense that we will do almost anything to avoid confrontation.

I do not know whether the Minister for the Armed Forces is going to get to his feet later and repeat what his boss the Defence Secretary said last week, which was that there is only a diplomatic solution to the crisis. President Putin does not think that. As my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Sir Hugh Bayley) rightly pointed out, President Putin is increasing his defence investment and capability enormously, and he is doing so precisely so that he can potentially bring about a military confrontation. The longer we maintain this stance of cowering in the face of that threat, the more likely it is that we will face a military confrontation. The longer we delay, the worse it will be. I hope that the Government will get the message that we cannot go on like this, with the scale of cuts in defence expenditure. Frankly, it is a disgrace that we have a Prime Minister who so recently was trying to convince all our NATO allies to maintain the 2% commitment but who will not make it clear, when asked repeatedly, that a Government led by him would maintain spending at 2% over the next five years.

[Mr Gray]

rose—

[John Woodcock]

Of course I give way to my colleague on the Defence Committee.

[Mr Gray]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman; he is extremely kind. We on the Government Benches entirely agree with him—we must hold our Prime Minister’s feet to the fire and insist that he live up to the 2% target. The more important question is whether the hon. Gentleman has had any indication from the Labour Front Bench that in the event of a Labour Government, Labour will go for 2%.

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[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

In July 2011, Anders Fogh Rasmussen said:

“Washington will not always take the lead when it comes to power projection. The United States will demand…that Europeans assume their responsibilities in preserving order, especially in Europe’s periphery.”

That is one of our greatest challenges. We have taken peace for granted, we have taken a status quo for granted, and we have taken American support for granted. Increasingly, we are, first, ignoring what is happening in Russia, secondly, cutting back, and thirdly, finding that America turns to the Pacific and has to justify to itself why it should support the Europeans in a pursuit that it regards as our job. That means that the situation becomes very difficult.

A war of information and propaganda is going on that we are singularly losing in the west but Putin is winning on his home ground. If we look at Russian opinion, we can see what Russians think. In 1997, they were asked:

“Are the big Western countries…partners or opponents of Russia?”

Then, about 50% regarded the US, Germany, Japan and Great Britain as partners of Russia. Now, 79% of the Russian population say that they think we are their enemies. If they are then asked whether Russia has the right to annex territories, the answer is interesting: 54% say that generally Russia has the right to annex territories, but the additional 34% who would usually say, “No, not generally”, will say with regard to Crimea, “Yes, of course it can do that.” That statement is as absurd as it would be if Angela Merkel in Berlin suddenly said, “Germany will annex Königsberg because it has traditionally always been German.” We would say that that was a totally, utterly bizarre argument, yet we are accepting it in relation to Crimea. We are also accepting, with a stunning silence, the fact that Putin has single-handedly redrawn international boundaries for the first time since 1945. We are all saying, “Well, he really shouldn’t be doing this, should he?”, but not offering options of any kind.

It is worth looking at what Putinism may actually mean. Strobe Talbott says:

“Putin’s aggression only makes sense against the backdrop of what has been the defining theme of his presidency: turning back the clock…Therein lies the most malignant manifestation of Putinism: it violates international law, nullifies Russia’s past pledges to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors, carries with it the danger of spinning out of control and sparking a wider conflict, and establishes a precedent for other major powers to apply their own version of the Putin Doctrine when convenient”.

This is not just about Putin’s single-handed redrawing of international boundaries, because a number of other countries would be very happy to do the same thing. Once he is allowed to do that, they will feel that they are being given the green light to do so as well.

When we discussed the Greek euro crisis, it was staggering to hear how relatively relaxed people were about Russia offering Greece money. That should have set just about every red light raging, because it represents an extension of influence and, if we do not challenge it, it will simply continue. Putin is not acting out of strength, but out of the fact that he is terribly weak at home and therefore has to make enemies abroad.

[Mr Gray]

To enforce the hon. Lady’s point, is it not chilling that 75% of all of the equipment used by the Hellenic forces is supplied by Russia?

[Ms Stuart]

Indeed. It is an incredibly malign force, but we are not prepared to describe it as such, not only because of the historic reason that at one stage we thought Russia could become a partner, but because we now feel there is nothing we can do owing to its size and perceived power. Our debate about the 2%, what it means and how we respond has to go much deeper and address the roots of the issue.

In idle moments over the past few weeks I have been reading a biography of George I. Interestingly, it says that when George I took the throne 300 years ago the Great Britain of which he became ruler was one of the great European powers and intimately involved with the continent, and its island position rendered it immune to invasion. It was assertive and knew that it could strike its own bargains in Europe—it did not need anybody else’s permission. There was also a big divide whereby the Tories advocated concentration on seaward expansion to the West Indians, while the Whigs thought that we should go into mainland Europe.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure, as always, to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), who speaks with passion for the military people of Colchester—nobody speaks better of them than him. He added to what has been a wide-ranging, interesting and well-informed debate of various topics, some broadly associated with the report on NATO that the Select Committee produced.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), the Chairman of the Defence Committee, ably set the tone of the debate. I stood against him for the chairmanship, but let me say in public that I am extremely glad that I lost that particular election. I am glad that he won it, and I am pleased to stand behind him now and will do so in subsequent Parliaments.

We meet in what can be described only as interesting times. There is a strange coincidence—or is it a conspiracy—of events happening in the world. We have talked extensively, of course, about Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, threats to the Baltic states and the assassination of Nemtsov over the weekend—and who knows what the consequences of that will be, what it means or who did it? We have talked about ISIS, or Daesh as we prefer to call it. An important assault on Tikrit is occurring as we speak, and again, who knows what the consequences will be? We look forward to the much anticipated assault on and retaking of Mosul—potentially later this year, although I sometimes find it hard to imagine that it will actually occur.

We have heard from others, including my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth), about events in the South China sea, and about cyber-warfare and so many other aspects of the world that are extraordinarily worrying and dangerous, but also extremely unknown. We simply do not know what is occurring in most of the world, and we do not know what we are going to do about it. I find it concerning that we in the UK, leaving aside NATO as a wider force, seem to be so unclear about what we are planning to do.

Several Select Committee reports over the last months have touched on this failing. Our report on Daesh, for example, said that our contribution to the opposition to ISIL was lamentably small. We are responsible for something like 6% of the airstrikes, which is of course useful—it is important that we are doing it—but it is none the less an extremely small contribution. We have a tiny number of soldiers in Iraq. I heard the other day that the number of our personnel helping to train in Sulaymaniyah in north-east Iraq, which we visited, is being further reduced rather than increased, despite their ambitions.

We have no real idea why we are doing things in Syria, but not in Iraq—apart from the fact that is what the motion in the House lay down. We have no real plan: we do not quite understand what we are seeking to do against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. We know they are bad people; we know we do not like the atrocities that are being carried out; but we do not really have a grand plan for what we intend to do about them.

The same applies to Putin. We know he is a bad man; we know he should not have redrawn the boundaries of Ukraine; we know that the Baltic states are under threat. When General Sir Richard Shirreff was recently in front of the Select Committee—he was either still serving or had just stepped down as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe—it was interesting to hear him say so plainly that we should have permanent forces deployed in the Baltic states. He thought our people should be there permanently and at the very least that a large-scale exercise should take place there with equipment delivered to the Baltic states and so forth. That afternoon, my right hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Mr Hammond), then Secretary of State for Defence, said that Sir Richard was absolutely wrong and that we should have no troops in the Baltic states. We should not worry ourselves about that, he claimed, as the main threat to the UK remained a terrorist threat. He stood by the tier 3 categorisation of state warfare as described in the strategic defence and security review in 2010.

So I was astonished when, very recently, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Secretary of State for Defence disagreed in the course of a single day on what our policy should be on the defence of the Baltics. That raises an issue that will be the subject of a forthcoming Select Committee report, namely our distinct lack of understanding of who we are in the world, what our purpose is, what we want to do in the world, how we are to achieve it, and what kind of armed forces we need in order to do that.

The 2010 SDSR is woefully out of date. It downgraded all the threats that we now face, judging them to be potentially insignificant. The national security strategy, which was published on the same day as the SDSR, did not have a clue about what we are doing today. I was disappointed to hear the Prime Minister say recently that he thought that it was worthy of “tweaking” in respect of a few details. I think that he was absolutely wrong. I think that the Arab spring, the Russians, ISIL, events in the South China sea, and so much else that is happening in the world today require a fundamental rewriting of the national security strategy from scratch. We must identify what is wrong in the world, and say what we are going to do about it.

The notion that we could produce a new national security strategy—tweaked, as the Prime Minister had it—a few weeks or months after a general election and produce an SDSR at the same time strikes me as laughable, as does the notion that we should link the two in a strategic spending review, thereby handing all the controlling levers to the Treasury. The idea that we should say to the Treasury, “You tell us how much we can spend” , and the national security strategy will then be tweaked in an attempt to make it fit in with how much we can spend—and, incidentally, we will continue to cut our armed forces for that purpose—seems to me to represent a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which we should consider how we intend to position ourselves in the world.

Surely it is entirely reasonable, basic and straightforward to ask, “What is our role?”, and we as a nation should be asking that question. Are we to serve as part of the American forces, as the American chief of staff was quoted as suggesting in The Daily Telegraph this morning? Most definitely not. Are we to do as President Obama suggested in his letter to the Prime Minister, and say that we are a second-rate nation that no longer pulls its weight in the world? No; for my money, we are not. But if we are to fight our corner in the world, we must know how we are to do it, and we must do it through an absolutely clear national security strategy which sets out, not vaguely but precisely, what our aims are and how we are to deal with ISIL. Will we deal with ISIL by means of containment, destruction or defeat? We do not know. We need to set out precisely how we view President Putin and what we intend to do about that, precisely what we intend to do in the Baltic states, and precisely what we intend to do about so many other things.

Some time after the publication of the national security strategy, we must have a defence and security review specifying the assets that we need in order to realise the vision in the strategy, and some time after that, the Treasury must come along with a fundamental spending review and say, “Here is the money that you require in order to realise that vision.” I know that that will not happen. I know what will happen after the general election, whether we have a Labour or a Conservative Government: the spending review, the defence review and the national security strategy will be rushed out as they were before, entirely driven by mandarins in the Treasury. However, I think that it is worth our recognising, and worth the Select Committee’s stating, that we think that that is the wrong way of going about the defence of the realm.

We think that Britain is probably in a more dangerous state today than at any time since the second world war. We think that the nation hangs on the edge of a precipice over which it may fall, and that we, the United States and our colleagues in NATO must act urgently to do something about it. Tinkering around with 2% or not 2%, tinkering around with the current sclerotic decision-making processes in the Ministry of Defence, and tinkering around with cutting our armed forces and trying to patch them up here and there is not the right way in which to proceed. We are in an incredibly dangerous place. We as a nation, and we as a House of Commons, must act now and act decisively to put that right.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

If the hon. Gentleman lets me get on with my speech, I shall tell him what our position is.

Every Conservative Member has called for 2% or more, but in a few weeks’ time they are going to stand for election on a manifesto that would see a cut in our defence expenditure. I refer to the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s autumn statement, which clearly ring-fenced spending on schools, health, and overseas aid. The hon. Member for Aldershot mentioned overseas aid, which I know is dear to his heart. According to the Office for Budget Responsibility, 60% more cuts have got to take place, so if we take the ring-fenced spending out, we see that the rest of the cuts that will have to be made amount to about £86 billion. Of that, it is estimated that £9 billion will have to come from defence—some 36% if we take the figures up to 2020. Some are saying that the figure may be in the region of 8%. The Conservatives have form on 8% margins, because that is the level at which the coalition cut defence expenditure when it came to power.

We have heard it argued that the Prime Minister gave a commitment to, and lectured others about, the 2% NATO target. I understand that today he has been in the constituency of the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), where he was asked about the commitment to 2%. As we expect from the Prime Minister, he dodged the question. He said that the equipment budget would be increased by 1%. He also made the remarkable statement that there would be no further cuts in the size of the Army. In that case, the situation for the defence budget is even worse than has been said, because the 9% cut that the Chancellor is arguing for will fall on only 55% of the budget. If the equipment budget has been protected, there are only two ways of keeping the Army intact while cutting 55% of the defence budget by 9%—by taking out of service equipment that is there today or by reducing the number of personnel.

The Prime Minister needs to level with the British people and be honest about what is being proposed. This is a charade. I do not doubt that the Conservative Members who have spoken—I know them all very well and they are very strong defence advocates—genuinely believe that more money should be put into defence or that the 2% NATO commitment should at least be met, but they need to challenge the Prime Minister on the figure. There is no way that the Chancellor’s cuts can be met by 2019-20 without affecting the 2% we currently give to NATO.

[Mr Gray]

I know that the hon. Gentleman is looking forward to being the Minister for the Armed Forces in the incoming Labour Government. Talking of levelling with the British people, would a Labour Government not do what he says we are about to do?

[Mr Jones]

I will level with the hon. Gentleman. What I will not do is what the Prime Minister and the then Members of the Opposition did at the last election by promising larger armies, more ships and more expenditure on the armed forces. The first thing they did when they got into power was cut the size of the army. Our position is very clear: we will meet the figure for 2015-16, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for York Central has said, that is still a reduction of £600 million according to the figures under discussion. Moreover, if we look at what the Defence Secretary has been good at, we will see that some £400 million has been given back to the Treasury over the past five years. That money was not even spent, which begs a question about the commitment.

Our strategic defence review will look at what most people want, as we did in 1997. It will be a proper defence review that looks at the bigger questions that many Members have raised today about our role in the world.

Service Personnel (Ukraine)

James Gray Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

It is slightly unfortunate that the hon. Lady has compared the general purpose force we were attempting to train—a very raw force of recruits from Libya—with the Ukrainian armed forces. She asked me a straightforward and quite reasonable question about where else the training might be. There will be, and has already been, some training in the UK, but there can also be training in countries alongside Ukraine. We are looking at where the training can best be provided, but it is likely that most of it will be provided in Ukraine, in the Kiev area or elsewhere in the west of Ukraine, areas that are very familiar to the British military as we have been on exercise there in the past.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

It is of course very important that there should be non-lethal support and training, but in a parallel situation in north-east Iraq, where we are training the peshmerga in Kurdistan, we have discovered that the Americans and other EU allies are training on the front line and they find that much more effective than the kind of training we have been providing about 100 miles behind the front line. Is there not an argument that, although that support is non-lethal, we might find a way to move the troops forward so that they can advise the Ukrainians where they are doing the fighting?

[Michael Fallon]

I do not think it is right for other countries to get involved in the conflict in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, Russia should now be withdrawing its heavy weapons from eastern Ukraine and be putting pressure on the separatists to lay down their arms. On the location of the training, we are not putting combat troops anywhere near the front line. The training we have been providing to the peshmerga in northern Iraq has, as my hon. Friend says, been well away from the front line. We have trained more than 1,000 peshmerga as well as supplying them with machine guns and ammunition.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

The House has not given its authority for military operations to be conducted in Syria at the moment. However, we are preparing plans to help train moderate Syrian opposition forces outside Syria, and we are now drawing up plans to participate in that training at a number of sites outside Syria. The situation in Libya is equally disturbing. It now looks as though ISIL has several footholds along the Libyan seaboard, so we are also considering what further role we might play there.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The Kurdish peshmerga have indeed done a magnificent job in halting Daesh and regaining some ground from it. I am proud that we have given them 40 heavy machine guns and that we have 46 members of 2nd Battalion the Princess of Wales’s Royal Regiment training them in Sulaymaniyah, but I have heard that we are reducing the amount of support we are actually giving them. Will the Secretary of State please outline in detail what extra help we can give the peshmerga forces in Kurdistan?

[Michael Fallon]

We are not reducing our effort; on the contrary, we have the RAF flying Tornadoes virtually day and night—a huge effort—from Cyprus. We have nearly 600 service personnel involved in this battle against ISIL, including more than 140 personnel in Iraq. It is important to help the peshmerga, but it is also important to help the reconstituted Iraqi army.

Trident Renewal

James Gray Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dame Joan Ruddock]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. Nuclear weapons have no utility. They cannot be used to advance any cause or secure any territory without the most devastating effects. The true believers present them as benign, silently gliding under the oceans or quietly snoozing in bunkers doing no harm, but it is not so. Some 18 months ago, a book called “Command and Control” was published detailing more than 1,000 nuclear accidents in the United States. Its author, Eric Schlosser, spent six years researching and submitting freedom of information requests. The results are terrifying and would be unbelievable if they had not come directly from official military sources. Historic accidents range from the proverbial spanner being dropped, causing a fuel leak, leading to a missile explosion, and a warhead being blown off, to a nut being left off a bomber, resulting in the engine catching fire and the fire only failing to reach the bomb bay due to the prevailing wind. Today, there is far more dependence on computer technology than on the mechanical, but there is no consolation in that. In 2008, an engineer went to a Minuteman silo, realised that there had been a fire and that the fire alarm had failed. Luckily, the fire burned itself out before it got to the missile. In 2010 at the same base, online contact was lost for an hour with 50 Minuteman missiles—a computer chip had come loose, but it could have been a cyber-attack.

Even more terrifying is the true story of Stanislav Petrov, now portrayed in a film called “The Man Who Saved The World.” Petrov was a colonel in charge of a Soviet nuclear early warning centre when an alarm went off signifying that five American nuclear missiles were heading towards the USSR. Petrov took it on himself to refuse to follow protocol and did not send the signal for a retaliatory strike. He believed that the alarm had to be a malfunction, and he was right, but just suppose somebody else had been on duty. Had a nuclear exchange occurred at that time, we know that the world’s eco-system would have been destroyed. Today we are told that nuclear arsenals are smaller, which is true, and that the world is a safer place, which is not true.

In 2007-08, several groups of scientists published new and peer-reviewed research on the effects of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons, such as might occur between India and Pakistan. The firepower used for modelling purposes was 50 Hiroshima-sized bombs on each side, which represents just 0.03% of the explosive power of the current global arsenal.

We have known since 1945 of the immediate effects of nuclear weapons—blast, firestorms and radioactivity that would kill millions, but only those who are near the targets. This is what the scientists say of the indirect effects: about five megatons of black smoke would be produced and, as the smoke lifts into the stratosphere, it would be transported around the world. The climatic effects of this high layer of smoke would be unprecedented, plunging the planet into temperatures colder than the little ice age that began in the 17th century. Worldwide agriculture would be severely affected. A larger nuclear exchange, including that involving UK weapons, would result in a true nuclear winter, making agriculture impossible. Both scenarios show climate effects lasting more than a decade and up to 2 billion people dying of starvation.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady speaks with great passion and great authority on these matters. The question is whether she thinks that the awful scenario that she describes would be more or less likely if we did away with nuclear deterrents.

[Dame Joan Ruddock]

I will come on to suggest what the world community thinks about that. It is of course my opinion that we would be safer without nuclear weapons. If the hon. Gentleman were both to read the research on nuclear winters and the report of the accidents that have been recently published, he would realise that there is no safety in the possession of nuclear weapons, even if they are not used in anger.

It is instructive to look at how we view the world. We need to reflect on the deaths of those 17 people in Paris at the hands of terrorists. We were rightly outraged and right to mourn them, so how can it be that we are willing to contemplate the deaths of millions? Why do we have such moral certitude over the banning of chemical and biological weapons, land mines and cluster bombs but not nuclear weapons? It is also instructive to inquire how other countries and institutions view the nuclear weapon states such as Britain.

Oral Answers to Questions

James Gray Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Anna Soubry]

We know that there are more community cadets. They are all equally important and we are determined to do everything we can not just to support them, but, as we have heard from Members on both sides of the House, to encourage more young people to take advantage of the benefits, opportunities and the fantastic experience that the cadets offer.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

I strongly support the Government’s initiative for 100 new CCFs in schools across the land. It is a great idea, but the Minister mumbled over the question of the funding formula—[Interruption.] I apologise: she most certainly did not mumble. To put it a different way, I am a little unclear as to what she meant about the funding formula. Will she guarantee that she will not do what she originally planned, namely fund the CCFs by charging existing cadets up to £500 a year for membership?

[Mr Speaker]

That was a gracious withdrawal. I have periodically accused the Minister of things, fairly or unfairly, but I have never, ever accused her of mumbling and I cannot imagine ever doing so.