Hertfordshire County Council (Filming on Highways) Bill [Lords]

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and James Clappison

Tuesday 26th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clappison]

There is a procedure for making the orders by the local authority. I take my hon. Friend’s point, but I must say that many businesses are dependent on the film industry, particularly in my constituency, because there is so much film making there. People are so used to the film industry that they accept that some inconvenience is associated with attracting to Hertfordshire, and in particular to my constituency, important productions that are of so much general benefit to the public and the local economy. As far as I am aware—I will probably have an avalanche of mail complaining about it—there is a general acceptance of that in my constituency, as well as great pride in our connection with film making and a wish for it to continue. He makes a good point about the generality of the powers, but there are special circumstances to take account of in the case of my constituency.

I hope that I have been frank enough for my hon. Friends about the proposals in the Bill. As I have said, film notices go beyond the existing provisions for special events that I have mentioned in current legislation. Film notices enable the council to issue restrictions on road use where it appears to the council that it is expedient that the closure should come into effect without delay, which is particularly valuable to the film industry.

To turn to the detailed provisions, clause 3(2) provides that a “relevant event” under section 16A of the 1984 Act will include film making. Hon. Friends who are familiar with the 1984 Act will know that roads can already be closed, although for a shorter duration, for the several events specified in section 16A, covering

“the holding of a relevant event,…enabling members of the public to watch a relevant event, or…reducing the disruption to traffic”.

The film order will be added to that list of special events.

Clause 4 deals with restrictions on film orders and notices. Subsection (2) allows for film orders to remain in force for up to seven days, compared with the three days for relevant events under existing provisions, as we have already discussed. Subsection (4) provides that no more than six film orders may be made in any one year, that a film notice shall continue for only 24 hours and that notice of a film notice must be given at least 24 hours before it comes into effect.

Among other matters, clause 5 provides that a breach of a film order or notice will be an offence in the same way as a breach of an order relating to a relevant event under the existing provisions in section 16C of the 1984 Act. I understand that there has been some discussion and, I am happy to say, constructive dialogue between the Bill’s promoter and the Minister, as I hope the Minister will confirm.

Clause 6 provides for the council, as a highway authority, to give permission to film makers for the temporary placing of objects on a highway, subject to conditions imposed by the council and certain defined conditions set out in subsection (3). The general purpose is to ensure that that is done safely, because safety is of overriding importance. Subject to such conditions, clause 6 allows the council to authorise equipment, such as static film cameras, lighting rigs or camera trucks to be placed on roads during filming.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend explain what penalties will apply to somebody who breaks an order, particularly if they were trying to get back to their home on a road that had been closed?

[Mr Clappison]

To assist my hon. Friend, let me point out that those penalties are set out in existing legislation. I hope that I am right in saying that such breaches are dealt with by way of fines, but I will be corrected if I am wrong. I will look at the detail and come back to him in due course.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Will there be an exemption for people who are trying to get back to their own property, because it would seem unreasonable if the closure of a road made it impossible for somebody to get a vehicle back to their own drive or for a pedestrian to walk back to their own house?

[Mr Clappison]

I hope that it gives my hon. Friend some comfort to know that the penalties will be exactly the same as those that have existed for a long time under the 1984 Act, under which roads are closed for the holding of specified events. Famously, that related to the Tour de France, but it has also been used for other events and entertainments. I hope that there is a spirit of reasonableness in all such matters and that only somebody who is unreasonable will come anywhere near to receiving the penalties that can be meted out under the law.

In summary, the Bill will benefit film making, particularly in my constituency. I have no doubt that it will be subject to the same scrutiny as every other Bill of this kind. I hope that I have been frank with the House in setting out its provisions.

2014 JHA Opt-out Decision

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and James Clappison

Monday 15th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Indeed; we should all pay great heed to that report.

[Mr Clappison]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, on the face of it, although the Government’s proposed amendment to the European arrest warrant seems simple, it depends on the view taken by the European Court of Justice—if this area is now to be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice—and that we have no way of knowing what that view will be?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Where I part company with the Government is in believing that it would not be better to make these adjustments in the current structure, rather than under the new structure, and to negotiate to maintain the current structure with our European partners, because as it currently stands, if we change the law, that is the law of the land. Once we have opted in, it is not: the law of the land is subject to the European Court of Justice.

Then there is the issue of double criminality. The European Commission’s website, in explaining how the arrest warrant works, says quite clearly:

“If they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence of at least three years, the following offences”—

which are then listed—

“may give rise to surrender without verification of the double criminality of the act”.

Therefore, although we may pass a law saying that double criminality is a requirement before we extradite somebody, the rule of Brussels is not so. Now, in the situation we are currently in, our law is superior, but then their law will be superior.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

This is always a complex area. I have never thought that any Briton could ever suffer from xenophobia, because no Briton has ever been frightened of any foreigner.

I should like to continue a little on the detail and look at item No. 48, which is the Council framework decision on the European Union orders freezing property or evidence. Therefore, we are potentially going to give to the European Court and the European Commission rights to freeze the property of British subjects. Item No. 59 deals with the mutual recognition of financial penalties. “Mutual recognition” is the most dangerous part of the agreement on justice and home affairs.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend’s analysis of this list of measures is absolutely scintillating, but before he moves on from that one, is he aware that, as far as the freezing of assets or evidence is concerned, the problem is that in future the Commission will have the right of initiative to propose laws? These will then be determined through the co-decision and qualified majority voting procedure in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. That provision does not currently exist, because the agreement stands on its own and is subject to our law. In future, it will be subject to amendment under European law and we cannot know where that will end.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I do not think that is quite it, because I think the process is subject to a Title V opt-out. Therefore, if any of those issues are recast, we then have to decide whether to opt into the recast decision, but the decision we have opted into will be a permanent part of the acquis communautaire and we will therefore be bound by it, even if it is recast.

There are a couple of other measures that are being maintained that it is important to mention, because the surrender of powers is so significant. They include the mutual recognition of confiscation orders, which is similar to the property issue. Then there are measures dealing with the enhancing of procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial. Therefore, we are going to give mutual recognition to trials that are held without the person accused being present, which I have always thought a potentially highly unjust way of proceeding.

We should be deeply concerned about the proposals to opt back in, because of the lack of sovereignty we will then have over those essential measures. In these important areas—mutual recognition, the arrest warrant, trials without the person present and many others—we are handing over to the European Court the ability to decide whether our procedures are good enough or whether they have to be changed to meet European requirements.

Banking Union and Economic and Monetary Union

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and James Clappison

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clappison]

The proposals are here in black and white. I hope very much that the hon. Gentleman will join us in supporting the Government to take every measure, up to and including a veto if necessary, to preserve our position and to stand up for our interests in the European Banking Authority. We simply cannot have a sham.

It is no use pretending that by talking nicely, going into the room, being at the top table and all the rest of it is going to be the solution. We have heard those warm sentiments so many times in the past. We are discussing a matter of negotiation to protect our interests, and we have to be prepared to take decisions that are unpalatable.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Further to the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood), is it not the case that every member state of the European Union, with the exception of the United Kingdom and Denmark, is obliged to join the euro at some stage? When 25 out of 27 EU members are members of the euro, they will have a majority whatever voting system is cooked up.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend pre-empts my next point. I am drawing attention to the voting arrangements laid down as a matter of European law in a regulation that gives the eurozone the whip hand, as matters stand. But of course he is absolutely right that other non-members of the eurozone have the ambition to join the euro and that, along with Denmark, we do not have to join it as a result of the opt-out.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) said, even without the legal obligations we could expect members of the eurozone to cohere together to be a majority, and we can see that it will be a growing majority.

European Union Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and James Clappison

Tuesday 8th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clappison]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Minister for the care and attention that he has taken in answering this debate and for the manner in which he has done so. I am sure that it has been of great assistance to the House, and I will now be going to the Library to seek out a copy of the European Union access to documents regulations—I certainly would not want to fall foul of them, given what we have been told this afternoon.

My right hon. Friend has approached the debate in the spirit of the new clause. I am sure that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), in drafting the new clause, did not think that it was the finished article. It was a plea for greater transparency, and I hope that it has been taken as such. Despite possible problems with, for example, the phrase “relevant documentation”, what that might include, and what implications might flow from it, I hope at least that on the question of amendments proposed by a Government during treaty negotiations and treaty changes—that is what new clause 1 deals with—whether through the ordinary procedure or the new simplified revision procedure, members of the public and the House will be told what amendments are being, and have been, proposed by the Government, so that we, and members of the public, can judge, in due course, the strength of the Government’s position on what they ultimately recommend. We should be told whether a Government have been consistent in the amendments that they proposed and in what they subsequently recommend.

I will give one example. I was struggling earlier to think of one, although I know that there are a lot of them. During negotiations on the Lisbon treaty, Ministers in the then Government came to the House and advocated a certain clause or course of action, but it was discovered that during the negotiations on the Convention they had advocated exactly the opposite. One prime example was the creation of the European “foreign ministry” itself—the European External Action Service. During the debate, I have helpfully been told by the House of Commons Library that the then

“government’s amendments in the Convention to articles 1-27, III-197.1 describe the term ‘Foreign Minister’ as ‘unacceptable’ arguing that ‘he/she should have no ministry’. The government preferred the term ‘EU external representative’.”

Well we have our external representative—or rather, our High Representative—but perhaps that phrase conceals the fact that she is in reality a Foreign Minister, and the office was originally intend as such. We also have a European “foreign ministry” in the form of the EEAS, even though the then Government did not want it. They then had to come before the House, having apparently lost on that amendment, and argue from the Dispatch Box in favour of the creation of an external action service. The Minister will well remember, as I do, that on that occasion, Conservative Members opposed its creation. In the light of developments since, and what the public have come to learn and think about the EEAS and its conduct, I am not sure that our arguments against it have been entirely disproved. But there we are. That is one example.

The new clause was a plea for transparency. However, I know that there are important matters still to come before the House, and I do not want to delay them by pressing the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Parliament Act 1911 in relation to sections 1 to 7

‘(1) The Parliament Act 1911 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 2(1), after “five years” there is inserted “or a Bill amending or repealing sections 1 to 7 of the European Union Act 2011”.’.—(Jacob Rees-Mogg.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The purpose of new clause 2 is to exempt most of the Bill from the functioning of the Parliament Act 1911. That would mean that were a Government to attempt to repeal it, they would have to do so with the consent of the House of Lords, without being able to re-present it a year later and get it into law regardless. The new clause would give the same protection to the rights of the British people to vote in a referendum on European matters as exists concerning the length of a Parliament.

It is one of the ironies of our constitutional system that the unelected Chamber has since 1911 been the final guardian of the democratic rights of the British people. Since 1911, it has been impossible to lengthen a Parliament without the willing consent of the House of Lords. It is the one part of the Parliament Act that the House of Commons cannot simply override. The last extension of a Parliament came, I think, in 1944, as a final extension—until the war had been completed—of the wartime Parliament. That principle clearly applies to referendum Bills, which relate to a right of the British people to exercise their democratic choice that should not be taken away from them lightly, and should be as protected as anything within the constitution can be.

It is worth mentioning—I hope that the Minister will be interested in this point—that one criticism has been made of the Bill by people who otherwise are sympathetic to it. It is that an incoming Government who wanted to push through the euro, or whatever, could simply repeal this legislation and go ahead with what they wanted to do anyway. Quite rightly, no Act of a Parliament can bind its successors, but the Bill contains no protection at all against a Government who do not want to follow it. Given that the whole purpose of the Bill is to protect the rights of the British people from further Europeanisation, it would be extremely sensible to exempt it from the Parliament Act in order to strengthen it. That would remove the one criticism made by people who are otherwise well disposed to the Bill. It would make it a stronger Bill, and one more settled in our constitutional situation. I think that many of us would like to see that.

An important constitutional development is noted in volume 1 of the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee’s 10th report. It is a constitutional development that should concern the House, and on which the House should use its powers to set its seal, as it sees fit. It is essentially the Lord Justice Laws doctrine that came out of the metric martyrs case. He said:

“In the present state of its maturity the common law has come to recognise that there exist rights which should properly be classified as constitutional or fundamental…And from this a further insight follows. We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were “ordinary” and “constitutional” statutes. The two categories must be distinguished on a principled basis.”

Lord Justice Laws went on to set out his definition of a constitutional statute as opposed to an ordinary statute. In the Bills we pass, however, there is no such difference. It is a distinction thought up by the courts, particularly to exempt the European Communities Act 1972 from implied repeal. As a matter of the most urgent constitutional principle, if there are to be two types of Act, it ought to be this House and the House of Lords who decide and determine that, not the judges. The judges are there to determine what we have said and rule on it, not to say that a new type—a whole new category—of law has been created. It seems to me that one of the ways the House could get a round that is to make it clear when we think that a Bill requires particular and special protection. Fortunately—because, as some hon. Members may know, I am a great believer in tradition—we have a precedent for that in the Parliament Act, which allows the House of Lords to be overruled on everything, with the exception of a removal of a democratic right. The parallel with the Bill is exact: it is a protection dealing with a constitutional situation developed by the Lord Justice Laws doctrine.

European Union Bill

Debate between Jacob Rees-Mogg and James Clappison

Monday 24th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Clappison]

I do not wish to be unkind to the hon. Gentleman, but I believe that I dealt with that point in my reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Dover. As I have said, this is not an either/or situation; the amendment provides an additional safeguard. I repeat that the powers that are transferred may or may not be significant, and this House and the other place may or may not vote in favour of the transfer. It is a question of whether the decision is made by Parliament or by an individual Minister—a Minister of the Crown, as the Bill puts it.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

As my hon. Friend knows, I have considerable sympathy with his amendment, but I wonder whether he may be looking a gift horse in the mouth. Given that an Act of Parliament is superior to a resolution of the House, if a resolution of the House were rushed through with remarkably little time and heavily whipped, it would be a great deal harder to insist on a referendum when the stage of the Act of Parliament was reached. Although, on first reading, I rather like my hon. Friend’s amendment, I am increasingly concerned that if it were passed, those of us who wish to insist on a referendum would have a harder task to fulfil.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend has clearly given the matter great consideration, but I think that he is wrong, and that if others agree with him, they are wrong as well. The procedure for which my amendment provides is exactly the same as that which the Government propose in other parts of the Bill relating to other transfers of power, including those relating to the title V provisions on justice and home affairs. If my proposed procedure is defective, so is the Government’s proposed procedure, because the terms of the amendment are the same as the Government’s. If the Minister’s opinion was that the effect was not significant enough to warrant a referendum and Parliament did not agree with that opinion, there would have to be a referendum, because the significance test would not have been met. That provision is in the Bill, so I do not think that it could be any stronger.

[Mr Clappison]

My hon. Friend is right. The amendment follows the scheme of the Bill. Unless a Minister says that the transfer of power is insignificant, there will have to be a referendum, because the significance condition will not have been met. The amendment provides that if the significance condition is met because the Minister says that the transfer is sufficiently significant, there must be a vote in the House to prove that what the Minister has said is correct, and if the significance condition is not met, there must be a referendum.

Broadly, the question is this: does Parliament decide, or does a single Minister decide? The Government propose that a single Minister should decide, but, as my hon. Friend knows, there is a fall-back position, namely that the Minister should be challenged not in the House but by means of judicial review. I find that somewhat strange, as did some of the distinguished academic witnesses who gave evidence to the European Scrutiny Committee.

Under the Bill, if one of our constituents is aggrieved by what the Government propose, his recourse will be not to his Member of Parliament but to the courts, through judicial review. I think that that in itself sends a very odd signal. What should I tell a constituent who comes to my surgery and complains about the European Union, as some of my constituents do when it introduces a regulation that has an adverse effect on their jobs or companies, or when they disagree with some transfer of power? Should I say, “I am sorry. You may want a referendum, but you have come to the wrong place: you need to visit the solicitor’s office down the road”? I do not think that that is a very satisfactory state of affairs. We are told that clause 18 entrenches parliamentary sovereignty, but I think that if we adopt the proposal in this clause, we will bypass that.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

A Minister’s decision can be subject to a judicial review, and, under the Bill, the House would have an opportunity to insist on a referendum. If, on the other hand, the House voted against a referendum in a resolution, that would not be subject to judicial review, because procedures in the House cannot be reviewed by any court. I am beginning to think that the Government’s proposal for an Act is a stronger safeguard, because the Minister’s decision could be challenged and then voted on as part of the legislative process, whereas if the House were whipped to oppose a referendum, that would not be subject to any judicial review.

[Mr Clappison]

I fear that I must part company with my hon. Friend if he is suggesting that our democratic safeguard should lie in recourse to the courts rather than to Parliament. I am afraid that I must put Parliament first. In any event, as was demonstrated by evidence given to the European Scrutiny Committee by esteemed legal experts, it is very unlikely that a challenge to a decision by either a Minister or the House of Commons would succeed in a judicial review. I think that we are being led down a blind alley. In my opinion, even if the possibility of a judicial review of a ministerial decision had been contemplated in the explanatory notes or in ministerial statements, judges would be extremely reluctant to challenge a political decision on the significance of a particular transfer of power. I also believe that the fact that we are contemplating such a step as the main challenge to a Minister’s decision risks undermining the House of Commons while not providing any further safeguard.