Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Jacob Collier and Tom Tugendhat

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Tom Tugendhat]

I will not. The problem is that this case is not just about these islands, or the issues we are debating today; it is about the way in which Governments approach these debates.

Just in case we are in any doubt about the changed nature of the use of law against us, it is worth looking at the timeline of these events—which is completely coincidental. We know, because colleagues have mentioned it, that in the 1960s a deal was done, a payment was made, Mauritius accepted it and we moved on. Just after the Falklands war, a legal action was begun, using Mauritius and extending a claim. Just after the Falklands war, the KGB started to fund the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. By the way, it is not me saying this—it is in the Mitrokhin archive; it is all public. Just after the Falklands war, when the Soviets realised that they did not have the military power to defeat NATO, they started experimenting with lawfare, and we have seen them do it again and again. If Members would like to read reports on this issue, Policy Exchange very kindly published a report by me in 2013, and another one in 2015—“Fog of Law” and “Clearing the Fog of Law”, for those who have trouble sleeping.

Since then, we have seen lawfare grow. We have seen states using the power of lawyers against the interests of the British people time and again, and the trouble with the capitulation we are seeing today is that it is not just about Diego Garcia, these islands or this interest; it is about the question of whether or not this Government will stand up for the British people, and for our security and our interests. Let me sketch out a hypothetical situation for you, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is possible, although I hope it is not necessary, that British troops will be asked to do some peacekeeping in somewhere like Ukraine. It is possible that they will have to leave at a moment’s notice with the equipment they have, without the ability to re-equip—simply to go with the best that they have. It is possible that countries like Russia will object.

We know, because we have seen it happen in the late 1990s and all the way through the 2010s and 2020s, that the Russian Government and others have encouraged legal action against our armed forces. To be honest, Governments have been poor on this issue since 1999—Labour Governments initially, and then Conservative Governments—so it was very welcome that Lord Cameron stopped this, recognising that a different position could be taken. Sadly, this Bill reverses that position. It reverses the presumption that our Government, the British Government, will represent the legal interests of the British people and fight these cases. Instead, they will capitulate. The problem is that capitulation is what got us into this problem in the first place. We can look at the Bici case in Kosovo in the late 1990s, where we settled rather than fought, or at cases in Iraq and Afghanistan, where we settled rather than debated—rather than going to court and seeking a judgment. Those cases created precedents, and I am afraid that this Government are creating another precedent.

I know that the Minister will say that the Governments of the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, and many other places have correctly said that this case has no connection to them. I am delighted that they have said so, and they are right, but they are sadly mistaken in thinking that that means nobody will test that point.

[Jacob Collier]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Tom Tugendhat]

Had the hon. Gentleman been in the Chamber at the beginning of the debate, he would have been welcome to contribute, but given that he has such a passing interest, I am sure he will not mind if I carry on.

The reality is that it is not up to the person who is pursued by law as to whether they will be challenged; it is up to the aggressor, and we know who the aggressor is. We know who has been using lawfare against us. We have seen it time and again, and I am afraid that the effect of this Bill is to concede that point. I am fascinated that so many Government Members feel that they had no choice but to conclude the negotiation. Admittedly it was begun mistakenly by a Conservative Administration and, yes, I did write to the then Prime Ministers—both of them—complaining about it and pointing out the error of their ways. I was a Minister, and I wrote about it and complained about it, as did Lord Murray of Blidworth—I think that is right. I am going to get his name wrong, forgive me—that is one for Hansard. We both wrote, because we both thought it was wrong at the time.

What can I say? We left office. The civil servants re-presented the same offer and sadly, here we go again. The British people feel so disenchanted at the moment because we see changes of Government and no changes of policy. We simply see a continuation and the Whips’ briefings coming out again. We simply see the pointlessness of democracy in this place, because we might as well not bother being here. The Foreign Office stitched this one up. The Minister cannot even change the judgment, and he has sacrificed everything on the whims of an international process with no regard to the interests of the British people.