Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Jack Straw and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that I cannot comment on surveillance techniques. However, I restate clearly that the Bill and, in particular, clause 4 do nothing more than is already the case in respect of the requirement to serve notices and the ability to issue warrants to overseas providers.

[Mr Jack Straw (Blackburn) (Lab)]

May I confirm, for the benefit of the Committee, that what the Minister has just said about the intention being that RIPA should extend extraterritorially in these respects is entirely accurate? If hon. Members look at RIPA itself, they will see that section 2(1), which provides definitions, states that

“‘telecommunication system’ means any system (including the apparatus comprised in it) which exists (whether wholly or partly in the United Kingdom or elsewhere)”.

That is but one example—there are many to which I could point—that shows that the clear intention of this House and the other place was to make this part of the Act extraterritorial. Indeed, we thought that that would be the effect of the Act.

[James Brokenshire]

I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for providing that clarification and for highlighting that provision in section 2 of RIPA, which gives a sense of the extent and nature of the provisions that were contemplated when it was introduced. It was thought that it would have extraterritorial effect. Given legal challenges, other court cases and the language used in the legislation, we think it right to put that beyond doubt. That has always been the intent and practice for this measure; I repeat that the Bill does not extend the position but restates and asserts what has always been the case in the legislation. Those who may be subject to notices or warrants should understand clearly that it will apply to them if they are outside the UK.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures

Debate between Jack Straw and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 21st January 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (James Brokenshire)]

Let me say at the outset that this Government regard protecting the British public from terrorism as absolutely one of the most important functions of the state. I stress the seriousness and weight that the Home Secretary, other Ministers and I attach to the exercise of these powers, and therefore the careful consideration that we give to them.

We have been consistently clear that violence and extremism of all kinds have no place in today’s society. We believe that individuals who engage in terrorist activity should be prosecuted wherever and whenever possible. The right place for terrorists is behind bars. In that context—I am sure that this will be supported by Members in all parts of the House—I recognise and pay tribute to the work of the police and the security services in protecting the security of our country and pursuing those who would seek to do us harm.

However, where individuals who pose a threat to this country and its people cannot be prosecuted or deported, we need powerful measures that can help manage the risk. My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) made that point clearly. That was exactly why we took stock and reviewed the control orders that the previous Government had used. Despite what a number of Members have said today, it was clear to us that control orders were not working as they were intended to.

During the six years for which control orders existed, seven people absconded. Moreover, they were being steadily eroded by the courts. A total of eight were either quashed or revoked because they were thought wrong in principle, because they were believed no longer to be necessary or because the previous Government were unable to make a disclosure ordered by the court. Furthermore, in four cases the relocation of individuals subject to control orders was quashed. That was why we judged that the state of affairs was untenable. The British public rightly expect protection from dangerous individuals, and we needed a robust system that would provide effective and workable restrictions. We therefore ordered a lengthy and considered review of our counter-terrorism powers against the risk that then existed.

We judge that TPIMs have proved effective and workable. They have consistently been upheld by the courts, they have been endorsed by two separate independent reviewers of counter-terrorism legislation and they have the confidence of the police and the Security Service. To quote David Anderson, they are a “harsh measure” that provide some of the toughest controls possible in the democratic world. They provide for a comprehensive range of restrictions that can be placed on terror suspects, including daily reporting; overnight residence at a specified address; a ban on overseas travel; the wearing of a global positioning system tracking tag; limits on the use of telephones, computers and financial services and on association; and exclusion from specific places such as ports and airports. They give the police certainty about how individuals will be managed. In his first annual report on TPIMs, David Anderson stated:

“In terms of security, the TPIM regime continues to provide a high degree of protection against untriable and undeportable persons who are judged on substantial grounds to be dangerous terrorists”.

[Mr Straw]

Since the Minister quotes Mr David Anderson with approval, does he also accept Mr Anderson’s view that the courts did not object in principle to the operation of the relocation provisions in control orders?

[James Brokenshire]

The right hon. Gentleman needs to understand—I am sure he will recognise this, as a former Home Secretary—that we need to focus on the management of dangerous offenders’ exit strategies and how they are released. As the Home Secretary made clear, the courts struck down relocation on a number of occasions. Our concern has been, and always will be, about having a continuing arrangement to provide assurance about the management of such offenders. Most importantly, the police and the Security Service, whose opinions are after all the ones we should listen to on the subject, say that TPIMs have been effective in disrupting individuals and networks that pose a threat to this country’s security. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made clear, however, they are only one weapon in the fight against extremism and terrorism.

[Mr Straw]

With respect to the Minister, that was not an answer to the question that I posed. Given that he quoted Mr Anderson with approval, does he accept Mr Anderson’s considered opinion that the courts did not in principle stand in the way of the operation of relocation?

[James Brokenshire]

The right hon. Gentleman and other Labour Members have implied that, in essence, the measure was a silver bullet and the solution, but that absolutely was not the case. The courts have challenged relocation in individual cases, and it is therefore important for us to reflect on that in the management of those individuals.

As my colleague the Home Secretary has made clear, TPIMs are only one weapon in our fight against extremism and terrorism. They are used only in exceptional circumstances as part of measures designed to disrupt a person’s activities—in other words, part of the bigger picture that my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) mentioned. Alongside TPIMs, the Government provided additional funding of tens of millions of pounds a year to the Security Service and the police, substantially increasing their surveillance and counter-terrorism capabilities. In addition to TPIMs, a range of tough measures are in place to disrupt the activities of people engaged in terrorist activities, and prevent people from becoming radicalised.

We are using the royal prerogative to remove passports from British nationals whom we believe want to travel abroad to take part in terrorist and extremist activity, and who on their return would pose a threat to this country. We have strong controls in place at British ports, and the National Border Targeting Centre is able to check advance passenger information provided by carriers, and identify any known persons of interest who intend to travel. We have the power to exclude extremists and preachers of hate from coming to this country, and where necessary we may consider the use of other disruptive powers, including deprivation of British citizenship where an individual is a dual national and the Home Secretary determines that such action is conducive to the public good.