Kurdistan Region in Iraq

Jack Lopresti Excerpts

Tuesday 4th July 2017 Westminster Hall

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Kurdistan region in Iraq.

Mr Davies, it is indeed a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I begin by declaring an interest. I travelled to Kurdistan in November 2016 as a guest of the Kurdistan Regional Government and I am now chair of the all-party group on the Kurdistan region in Iraq.

It is three years since the last debate here on the Kurdistan region, and everything has fundamentally changed in that time. The Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), earned much respect in his first stint as the Middle East Minister, and his wisdom, experience and expertise, not least with the Kurds, will be major assets in his second stint.

I have visited Kurdistan twice with the all-party group, which has done much in its 10 years of service to improve and increase understanding of Kurdistani issues. I use the term “Kurdistani” because Kurdistan contains non-Kurds as well; however, I refer only to the Kurdistan region in Iraq. I will start by testing key points and end with the measures that I believe require our Government’s help.

My basic points are that Iraqi federalism has sadly failed and cannot be revived, because the Shi’a majority has no appetite for federalism or minority rights. The Kurds voluntarily re-joined Iraq in 2003, on the basis of western and Iraqi promises that Iraq would be federal and democratic. This exercise of their right to self-determination did not expire on its first use. They cannot be forced into subordination by leaders in Baghdad. In effect, Iraq has severed itself from Kurdistan—it pays no budget contributions and does not help Arabs sheltering there—but recent co-operation between their separate militaries have been very successful indeed.

The Kurds have rejected the option of making a unilateral declaration of independence and wisely seek a reset of relations with Iraq, which could be much stronger without the constant internal disputes between Baghdad and Irbil. Sectarianism and centralisation caused the rise of Daesh and could do so again. A yes vote in September’s independence referendum in the Kurdistan region will lead to negotiations. The west should help, not least over the disputed territories, and the UK should send observers to the region during the referendum. In any case, the west should continue to nurture relations with the Kurds, as they are a beacon of moderation and pluralism and support for western values.

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this debate. Does he agree that the Kurdish people have helped to fight Daesh and have been a key ally to the western world?

[Jack Lopresti]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, and I absolutely agree. I will return to the peshmerga and the fight against Daesh later, but we owe the Kurds a huge debt of gratitude for what they are doing on a daily basis, including as we are here today.

I will briefly give some history. The treaty of Lausanne in 1923 led to the Turks formally ceding all earlier claims on Syria and Iraq and, along with the treaty of Ankara, settled the boundaries of the two nations. The earlier post-world war one discussions about a Kurdish state being formed after the break-up of the Ottoman empire, which had been nominally supported by the British, including Sir Winston Churchill, were absent from the treaty of Lausanne.

The Kurds have a long history of suffering second-class citizenship, and in the late 1980s they experienced genocide at the hands of Saddam Hussein—a genocide that was formally recognised by this House in 2013. From 1991 onwards, Sir John Major’s no-fly zone and safe haven protected the Iraqi Kurds from further attack by Saddam Hussein, and Tony Blair and George Bush’s overthrow of Saddam Hussein was welcomed by the Kurds as a liberation. Indeed, on my visits to the region I have personally been thanked for the British contribution to the liberation of Iraq.

The Kurds re-joined Iraq in 2003 and they have tried to make that arrangement work. They brokered a federal constitution, which was agreed by 80% of people in the Iraqi referendum in 2005. It enshrined a binational country of equals and, for instance, agreed a mechanism for resolving the status of the disputed territories. The deadline for that resolution was supposed to have been 2007, but it has still not been carried out. The end to federalism was demonstrated in February 2014 by Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki, who unconstitutionally cut all federal budget transfers to Kurdistan.

In June 2014, Daesh captured Mosul, took a third of the country and seized sophisticated American military kit, including lots of vehicles and heavy weapons. A Kurdistani offer of help before the attack was spurned. Maliki failed in the most vital duty of any leader, which is to uphold the security of the state and protect its people. So the Kurds suddenly acquired a 650-mile border with Daesh and there was an overnight influx of Iraqi Arabs from Mosul, who increased the population by a third, straining all public services to breaking point. Daesh attacked Kurdistan in August 2014 and came within 20 miles of the capital, Irbil, which was only saved by immediate American air strikes and other assistance.

Then, a massive slump in the price of oil exposed the inefficient nature of the Kurdistani economy—massive state employment, little productivity, a miniscule private sector and an almost complete reliance on energy revenues, which now came through independent exports via Turkey. The Kurds faced a perfect storm of crises and came through, not unscathed but in one piece. This highlights their great resilience.

The story of how the Kurds eventually united with the Iraqi army against Daesh is instructive. When I visited the Kirkuk frontline in November 2015, I was told that there was no co-ordination, or indeed any communication, between the peshmerga and the Iraqi army. A year later, with western support the two forces concluded a deal to continue to drive Daesh out of Mosul, and I saw for myself the result of that deal last November, both on the road to Mosul and inside Mosul. This unprecedented military partnership came despite the historic bad blood and bad feeling between the Kurds and the Iraqis, which largely exist because of the Iraqi army’s chemical weapons attacks on hundreds of villages and the extermination of nearly 200,000 people in the 1980s.

I will not focus on the moral reasons for airing arguments for Kurdish independence; instead, I will address the strategic gains for the west. Once Daesh is defeated in Mosul and later in Raqqa, the key question is how to prevent any such force re-emerging and how to undermine the ideological and political appeal of such “vile fascism”, as the KRG’s High Representative to the UK, Karwan Jamal Tahir, has put it.

We have to understand why many Sunnis came to believe that Daesh was less awful than Baghdad. Many could not accept the loss of the privileges they had enjoyed under Saddam. Thanks to the Kurds, however, Sunnis joined power-sharing Governments in Baghdad, and their militias and tribes helped to defeat the al-Qaeda insurgency in 2007-08.

However, the immediate consequence of the disastrous American decision to withdraw all its forces, a decision favoured by Maliki, was that Maliki brutally repressed Sunni civil rights protests. Sunnis had seen how badly Shi’a politicians had treated the Kurds and concluded that they themselves could face worse.

The central task now is to eradicate the drivers of Sunni radicalism and protect minorities, who have suffered rape, murder and dispossession by Sunni neighbours, as well as facing the massive cost of reconstruction and the need for a “Marshall plan of the mind” to tackle the deep traumas of those who were raped in their thousands and saw their menfolk slaughtered. The Kurdistanis also need devolved governance.

Already, we see that the old centralising is in contention; and it would be odd—bizarre, even—if the status of Kurdistan was not part of the conversation after Daesh. There are those who say that this is the wrong time, citing internal division in Kurdistan, the starkest symbol of which is the paralysis of its Parliament. I hope that the continuing negotiations, which have involved our diplomats, will resolve the dispute. As candid friends, we must continue to put pressure on the Kurds, so that their Parliament sits again and there is a functioning democracy as quickly as possible.

The state of the economy is another reason why some people say that now is the wrong time for the Kurds to consider, ask for and seek their own independence. However, I take the point made by the Kurdistani leader and former Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, that

“if we wait for all the problems to be resolved, we will have to wait forever”.

I commend the reforms of Prime Minister Barzani and Deputy Prime Minister Talabani: aligning revenues with state spending and introducing better forms of identification of the work force, to eliminate double-jobbing and ghost workers. They have much further to go, but statehood could end excuses for neglecting reform and allow access to development funds that are conditional on such reform.

The Kurds reckon that old foes are weaker or amenable to a potential independence deal, agreed with Baghdad. Turkey, Kurdistan’s major trading partner, could see Kurdistan as a major source of secure energy supplies, an interlocutor with the Kurds in Turkey, and a buffer between Turkey, Sunnis and Shi’as. Iran, of course, is resolutely opposed, but it is, thankfully, under intense pressure from America and the Gulf states and has absolutely no right to veto Kurdish independence. Arab-Iraqis adore Kurdistan, as Shimal Habib—the beloved north—thanks to the holidays they have there, enjoying the temperate climate and the hospitality. But Bagdad has refused to treat the Kurdish region fairly or with any good will. As for the bilateral relationship, the Kurds see us as a partner of choice, and the APPG supports a bigger British footprint in Kurdistan.

There are three specific issues I would like the Minister to address in his remarks. The first is the peshmerga. The gallant, brave, wonderful peshmerga are fighting Daesh on the ground, and that helps to secure our own security, freedoms and way of life. One of my most moving visits was when I went to see wounded peshmerga soldiers in Irbil. Many seriously injured soldiers are beyond the capacity of the medical facilities and the health system there, and I have asked two Prime Minister’s questions urging the British Government to supply a small number of beds at Queen Elizabeth hospital Birmingham because, as I am sure we agree, we owe the peshmerga a huge debt of honour and gratitude.

The second matter is visas. The visa application system is a vexed issue and the rejection rate has increased from 55% to 66%. We need up-to-date figures, and I ask the Minister to help with that. Entry clearance officers have perhaps three minutes to examine an application, and any small query means a no. One application was rejected due to a small discrepancy over claimed income, even though exchange rates had moved in the intervening days. Such issues are not clarified because we no longer interview and our diplomats and Ministers can no longer intervene to assert a national interest. We should, of course, police and secure our borders, but we must, looking forward to a post-Brexit world, encourage people to do business and holiday here, and not make it excessively difficult for them to do so.

Thirdly, on bilateral relations, the KRG’s Prime Minister visited the UK in May 2014, and we established a joint committee, which was obviously then overtaken by events. When will the committee begin to function or a new committee be set up? I urge the Government to invite the Prime Minister or the new President of Kurdistan to meet our Prime Minister.

Today’s debate coincides with independence day in the United States. The Kurdish people will decide in their referendum in September whether they, too, want to be an independent state.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I think I have been following the hon. Gentleman’s speech carefully. Is he really saying that a vote for independence by the Kurds in Iraq would be welcomed in Ankara?

[Jack Lopresti]

What I am saying is that the moods have shifted. I am not saying it would be welcomed, but I hope that, looking towards perhaps more co-operation and trade, we might get a better response than we had anticipated.

We can be optimistic and helpful in whatever discussions and negotiations follow on from the referendum, but whatever the people decide, the UK and the KRG have a lot in common, and our special relationship must be nurtured and developed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jack Lopresti]

I thank my hon. Friend for allowing me to intervene; I am enjoying his speech. On the military support we have given the peshmerga, some have said it has been inadequate and some have said we could do a bit more, but, importantly, there has been a shortage of body armour, helmets and respirators. Does he agree that we have a responsibility to make sure not only that they are properly equipped and armed, but that they have access to medical care and treatment as well?

[Leo Docherty]

I agree with my hon. Friend. The issue is not only about arming, but about protecting and providing facilities.

We are still living with the legacy of the unintended consequences of the 2003 liberation of Iraq and the end of Saddam’s tyranny. One of the most important unintended consequences is the fact that Iran is strategically dominant: the presence of Iran-backed Shi’ite militias across Iraq indicates a new-found political dominance of the Shi’a crescent by Iran. When Mosul falls, an Iran-controlled land corridor will link the Islamic Republic to its ally Hezbollah on the Mediterranean. That is likely to have increasingly serious regional implications. We must plan accordingly, with our allies.

Furthermore, today the viability of the state of Iraq is called into question, as it has been on a number of occasions since 2003. I want to be clear that I hope that the state of Iraq as a federal state is indeed still viable. However, the Kurdish hold on Kirkuk, the impending referendum, which hon. Members have mentioned, and the likely antipathy, when Mosul is liberated, from among the Sunni population towards the Baghdad Government, are factors that will shape the future of Iraq and they are beyond our control.

My experience as a soldier in Iraq has taught me that British direct involvement in its politics rarely meets with success. However, we are doing what we must continue to do and what we do best: engaging in full-throttle defence diplomacy to help the Kurds to defend their interests, and ours at the same time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alistair Burt]

My hon. Friend makes his point well. The United Kingdom provides support to those who are imperilled by Daesh and those who fight it through legitimate means. The British military is involved in a coalition—that job is being done. Much though people may feel inspired to go out to the region, the United Kingdom Government does not support that, as we are engaged in other ways.

[Jack Lopresti]

Will the Minister give way?

[Alistair Burt]

Briefly. I am keen to make progress to get on to my hon. Friend’s questions.

[Jack Lopresti]

Although I recognise, accept and agree with the Minister’s position on British nationals going to fight for the peshmerga, does he agree that there is no moral equivalent between people who go to fight with Daesh and people who volunteer to serve with the peshmerga?

[Alistair Burt]

Absolutely. There is no moral equivalent whatever, and I was not making that point; I was merely making the point that the United Kingdom Government are supporting those who are countering the most evil force, and that is the right way to do it. We counsel caution to those who wish to do it any other way.

In addition to the military support that I mentioned, the UK Government have provided £169.5 million in life-saving humanitarian aid to Iraq since June 2014, which has helped to support internally displaced people across Iraq, including those hosted in the Kurdistan region.

The hon. Member for North Tyneside (Mary Glindon) mentioned the women who have been captured and used by Daesh forces. I absolutely take her point about support from clinical psychologists; I will make inquiries about that. Yet another previous role of mine was Minister for mental health, so I am aware of the importance of that work and I will look to see what may be available. I am the United Kingdom’s commissioner for the International Commission on Missing Persons, and at a recent meeting in Stockholm I met a Yazidi woman who had escaped but whose mother and sister were still being held captive. As was mentioned, providing evidence for what may well turn out to be war crimes is of significant importance. Gathering evidence and, in time, using that evidence is as important as ensuring that those who are lost are recovered and missing no longer.

Let me turn to the specific questions that my hon. Friend the Member for Filton and Bradley Stoke asked. I will look at the specific item that he mentioned about medical assistance. Such assistance is not disaggregated, so I will look at what specifically goes to the Kurdish region. I take his point about visas, which are a constant issue in the middle east. I will discuss that with the Home Office, which is responsible for visas. We will welcome Kurdish officials meeting the Prime Minister in due course. The Prime Minister has not yet met Prime Minister Abadi, which should come first, but I take my hon. Friend’s point carefully.

I must mention the referendum before I give my hon. Friend the chance to wrap up. We understand the aspirations of the Kurdish people and will continue to support them politically, culturally and economically within Iraq, but we also believe that a referendum on independence risks detracting from the more urgent priorities of defeating Daesh, stabilising liberated areas and addressing the long-term political, social and economic issues that led to Daesh’s rise. That is why we maintain that any referendum or political process towards independence must be agreed with the Government of Iraq in Baghdad and that unilateral moves towards independence would not be in the interests of the Kurdistan region, Iraq or wider regional stability. Our position is shared by many of our key allies. My sense is that those responsible in the Kurdish region understand that well, and we expect this matter to proceed with due care, recognising the sensitivities of disputed areas as well as other parts of Iraq.

[Jack Lopresti]

Thank you for your chairmanship of this debate, Mr Davies. I am hugely grateful to every colleague who came along to support it; there have been some very good interventions and great speeches.

The debate has, to a large degree, demonstrated and reinforced the British Parliament’s support, affection and understanding of the Iraqi Kurdish people. I want again to put my thanks and appreciation on the record with respect to the peshmerga. The Minister referred to this, but I remind him that although training, equipment and war-fighting capabilities are important, those things have a cost and we must be mindful of the medical care and support that some of the peshmerga are not getting. Whatever the Kurdish people decide in the referendum in September, the British Government need to get fully behind them and continue to develop our relationships on security, trade, business and democracy.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the Kurdistan region in Iraq.