(3 days, 5 hours ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, I will make a statement on the Microsoft 365 outage. On Thursday 12 and Friday 13 November, an outage affecting Microsoft IT systems caused impacts around the world. Users of Microsoft products were unable to send and receive emails or to use a range of other Microsoft products and services. This was a serious incident that caused disruption for a lot of people and businesses.
Microsoft initially explained that the incident was caused by an elevated load on its infrastructure and later provided further details of the three main issues that led to the outage. The company said there is no indication that the incident was caused by malicious activity. In the UK, the incident affected individuals, businesses and the public sector. There were impacts on the health sector and other public services, but key services such as 999 remained operational. There were no major critical service impacts, and public sector resilience plans were in place.
The incident could have been more serious if it had lasted longer or affected wider parts of Microsoft’s infrastructure. It reinforces the importance of promoting and improving our digital resilience—something that the Government have already taken significant steps on. There was some organisational disruption in local government, where many organisations rely on Microsoft products. Multiple local resilience forums were stood up to provide support and co-ordination among local services.
The incident also caused disruption across businesses of all sizes. Staff were unable to carry out their normal duties, and firms were unable to complete their usual transactions. Members and staff in this place were also affected. We recognise the disruption that it caused to people and organisations, and we are still working to understand the full impact.
However, critical and important services remained available and operational across the country. Accident and emergency departments remained open. Transport services were unaffected by this outage. Borders remained operational. There were no known issues with UK mobile, broadband or landline connectivity. Major telecoms providers confirmed that their services were working as normal. We currently have no evidence of wider impacts on UK data centre infrastructure or other cloud operators, and no such impacts have been reported to us by industry at this stage. There were no reported impacts on water or waste water treatment processes. Businesses, including shops and services, remained open right across the United Kingdom. By Friday afternoon, Microsoft systems were back online, and services were returning to normal.
The Government take this issue seriously. Public sector organisations and Government Departments have plans in place to mitigate potential impacts and ensure the continuation of their operations in exactly these situations. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is the lead Department for national digital resilience issues. As soon as we became aware of the problem on Thursday evening, we contacted Microsoft to start discussions on the issue, to assess the impact and to request details of how the problem was to be resolved. The Minister with responsibility for cyber security, who is in the other place, spoke to the chief executive officer of Microsoft UK on Friday. My officials in DCMS led the co-ordination of the response across Departments in collaboration with the Cabinet Office. We expect Microsoft to share the lessons learned from the incident. We will be engaging further on how it will prevent such incidents from happening in the future, and plan for swifter remediation of incidents to limit service disruption.
Digital services, such as the cloud computing services that Microsoft provides, are already regulated under the UK’s Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, which require providers to manage security and resilience risks, prevent and minimise the impact of incidents, and report significant incidents, including non-malicious system failures. Our Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill will strengthen that framework further. It strengthens and clarifies the duties applying to cloud providers, brings data centres and managed service providers into scope, and enables security and resilience requirements to be updated as risks evolve.
The UK has adopted and benefited from new technology faster than many other nations. That has powered our economy and enabled growth and innovation. However, in an environment where we are so dependent on this technology, we need to ensure that our systems are resilient and that we have plans in place for when there is disruption. That will ensure that where there are problems, we can recover faster, and that is true for both Government and industry.
In parallel, we are also working to diversify Government’s supply arrangements, including backing small and medium-sized British suppliers. By using Government’s collective buying power, we can encourage a more competitive and resilient technology market—for example, through the national cloud infrastructure programme, which will improve resilience by diversifying supply options and enabling the Government to contract for cloud services at a whole-of-system level.
The first duty of any Government is to protect their citizens. That is why we have been taking significant action to improve resilience across the nation. The Government cyber action plan, published in January, sets out how we will improve cyber-security and digital resilience across Government and the public sector. I have already mentioned the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill, which is currently in this House. The Bill will boost UK cyber-defences and improve the resilience of our essential and digital services. In the recent Budget, we committed £500 million to build the secure foundations for an AI-enabled economy, including measures to strengthen the public sector technology estate.
A cross-Whitehall technology risk group for the UK Government is now established. It is actively reviewing and overseeing the response to other major strategic risks. We have recently established a chief IT operations function for the UK Government, which has been key to our work on the recent incident. Its critical role will be to systematically review post-incident reports, service outages and performance, and to work with IT operational, commercial and financial leads to develop future interventions that strengthen public sector resilience.
The future technology plan will set out operational standards and practices for firmer foundations across the UK Government, alongside accelerating an intensive baselining of the public sector technology stack, technical health and dependencies. We take these actions as any responsible Government would do in order to protect our citizens, our businesses and our economy.
This outage, like the CrowdStrike incident in 2024, shows how dependent our economy is on interconnected IT systems and why resilience planning matters. We have also seen in the US how outdated technology can have an impact on services the public relies on. My Department will now be working with partners across Government and industry to fully understand the impacts of this incident and gather any further lessons learned. We will use this work to strengthen our resilience. In that spirit, I commend this statement to the House.
On her birthday, I call the shadow Secretary of State.
A very happy birthday to the shadow Minister, and I am sorry that she has had to spend it in the Chamber with me, dealing with these serious issues. She asked a number of questions, and I am grateful for the way that she approached them. The questions she raised are those that the Government have been asking for some time, including through the Government resilience action plan in 2025; the cyber action plan came from the £210 million that we invested in that.
I can only re-emphasise that it is very early in the situation, and that there was no real impact on the public sector. When I said that we do not yet fully understand the disruption across the whole economy, that was more about the private sector. Understanding the impact and disruption that the outage had on the economy as a whole will take more time. We are not aware of any delays in the NHS, or of NHS patients who were put in danger, and 999 services remained as they have always been.
The hon. Lady asked about the assessment of different telephone systems, and diversification across Government. The cyber action plan is there to ensure exactly that; it looks at legacy systems and diversification. The national cloud infrastructure procurement process is about diversification of cloud services; the Government can use that big procurement to diversify our tech stack, ensure that we are seeding British companies, and ensure that we have some sovereignty here. There are only a few suppliers in the marketplace—the big ones that we all know. More than 90% of the civil service uses some kind of Microsoft product, so diversification must be part of the assessment. A comprehensive audit has been done of our resilience in Government. The hon. Lady asks what might have happened if there was a hostile state involved, or if the outage happened during a national emergency. All our plans are in place for that. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, along with the National Cyber Security Centre, stands up the co-ordination group. It ensures that there is only one point of contact, and ensures co-ordination not just across Government, but between companies.
As I understand, this was not a cyber-attack. If we think about the incident as being a five-lane motorway, one of the lanes was already down because Microsoft was working on it. There was a bug in the fourth lane of the motorway, if I can stretch the analogy. That overloaded the capacity; pretty much all the traffic was pushed into one or two lanes, and that caused the system to fall over. It was an incident after an incident. Three things happened that meant that we ended up in this situation. Microsoft resolved this relatively quickly, working in co-ordination with DCMS and the NCSC, and we are not aware at this stage that there is any legacy from that. It seems that the backlog is through, and everyone who sent or was to receive something should have got it. We are pleased that the backlog is now gone, and I encourage Members to determine whether they and their constituents have received the email traffic that they should have got by Friday afternoon; by 2 pm on Friday, the incident had passed.
I call the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee.
I am grateful to the Chair of the Select Committee for raising those issues, which we have discussed many times in the Committee. She asks about the shape of large and medium-sized managed service providers, like Microsoft. They account for about 97.6% of the total managed service provider marketplace in this country, which is worth about £47 billion, and about 321 large providers account for 86% of that total. We know that 98% to 99% of civil servants use Microsoft as their platform for communications, which is incredibly high. There is not much in the way of diversification in the marketplace for that, but some Departments use Google and some use Microsoft, so there is that sort of diversification.
The Government cyber action plan will look at where Government sits within the supply chain and logistics sector, and lay out our vulnerabilities and our vendor lock-in. It is incredibly important that we see that through as quickly as possible, but that is not easy. The sovereign AI fund, brought forward by the former Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall), before the summer, provides half a billion pounds to seed our own sovereign AI for the tech stack. As my hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee knows, we cannot compete in all parts of the tech stack —it would be wrong for us to try to do so—but we can compete in the parts that we are good at, and the sovereign AI fund is there to invest in those kinds of organisations and areas. In the Budget, we committed half a billion pounds to building the secure foundations for an AI-enabled economy. That is different from the sovereign AI fund that I mentioned.
At questions to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport last Thursday, we talked about ensuring that cyber-security is on the agenda in every single boardroom, so that business people are aware that the NCSC has free cyber-security tools that all businesses should be using. I encourage them to use them, so that our economy, as well as the Government, becomes more resilient.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
Victoria Collins (Harpenden and Berkhamsted) (LD)
Microsoft’s failure last week is a wake-up call for the UK. Our public services and economy need to stop relying on a few US firms and back more British tech. The outage knocked out services used by over a million UK businesses and public bodies, with 20 million users. Eleanor in the UK could not send urgent cancer referrals. Hugo could not pay his staff, who live pay cheque to pay cheque. Mohamed, a pharmacist, could not dispense prescriptions. Online police reporting went down. Even this House lost its main communication channel.
This is not a surprise. The Institute for Public Policy Research found that the US receives almost twice as much UK public sector tech spend as every other foreign country combined. It found that only £1 in every £6 of Government spending goes to British firms. We found that more than half of central Government keep most of their data with two US companies, and Palantir is still embedded in public services. In July, digital resilience failure was added to the national risk register, so the Government know the risk, but they lack a strategic plan.
The Liberal Democrats have spent months calling for a digital sovereign strategy, which has received cross-party support. It would allow us to stay open globally, while building resilience and competition, and would stop that lock-in. We even tabled an amendment to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, but unfortunately the Government rejected it. They might like to consider that the IPPR suggests practical steps. It says that we should build at home, in those areas where Britain can genuinely compete; use the Government’s power as a buyer, regulator and standard setter to shape the market; and partner with other middle powers, including the EU, so that no single country holds the off switch.
The Tories attacked our idea, but industry and experts agree with the Lib Dems. TechUK talks about a confident sovereign strategy for supporting growth, security and resilience. UK Research and Innovation calls for a sovereign AI strategy, and the Open Rights Group warns that over-reliance on foreign firms is an urgent national security issue. We do not have digital resilience; we still have digital dependence. Will the Minister back our calls and commit to publishing a digital sovereign strategy to support growth, security and resilience?
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for raising the issue of the future of TV distribution, which was raised in our media Green Paper; the consultation on that has finished, and the White Paper will be produced shortly. We took the decision in the Green Paper to turn off digital terrestrial television, but the issue is what date we use. That is examined in the Green Paper; it will be either 2034 or 2044. We have not made a decision as a Government on that date. We have made a decision on what we will do, but not on when we will do it.
I call the Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.
We are the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee.
The Minister has set out very clearly, as have others, the entrenched position of Microsoft in the UK’s digital ecosystem. Considering the great over-reliance of domestic businesses, consumers, Government and local authorities on its software, can the Minister set out how urgent the diversification and resilience building that he mentioned is? Has that urgency changed in the light of what happened on Friday? In addition, the Competition and Markets Authority is currently looking at whether it should designate Microsoft as having strategic market status, and is due to conclude that work in February. Has the Minister’s readiness to respond to that report also changed in the light of Friday’s events?
(8 years, 9 months ago)
General CommitteesI beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (Amendment) Order 2018.
The purpose of the draft order is to make a relatively small number of changes to the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order 2016, which, along with the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (Amendment) Order 2017, remains in place. The changes are needed to ensure that the charging framework set out in secondary legislation for immigration and nationality fees remains current and supports plans for the next financial year.
The Committee will wish to be made aware that it has come to my attention that there is an error in the draft order and its explanatory note. Following further review of the section of the draft order that deals with circumstances in which a fee may be set in respect of the provision of biometric identity documents, it has been identified that the change we sought to make, through article 2(4)(a), has no effect. That is because of the way in which the related legislation, the Immigration (Biometric Registration) Regulations 2008, operates. The intention was to permit the Home Office to charge a fee when a person fails to collect their biometric residence permit within the required time limit. However, the 2008 regulations do not in fact require an application in those circumstances, hence there is no service for which a fee could be charged.
Although the explanatory note states that article 2(4)(a) has an effect, that is not correct. Before such a change can take effect, we will need to amend the 2008 regulations. The explanatory memorandum has been amended to clarify that issue for the record. The 2016 order continues to set out the overarching framework and the maximum amounts that can be charged for immigration and nationality functions over the current spending review period, as previously agreed by Parliament.
Changes made by the draft order are intended to clarify existing powers in connection with entry clearance to the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man. The draft order will confirm powers to charge fees when offering premium services in relation to the Crown dependencies, and also makes clear that the current definitions of a “sponsored worker”, “unsponsored worker”, “sponsor” and “certificate of sponsorship” apply in respect of applications to the Isle of Man.
I am slightly disappointed that the draft order does not allow for a reduction in fees for European Union nationals seeking residency. Will the Minister comment on that?
(9 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
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In fact, there are also notices in all the Jobcentre Pluses indicating that the consultation is ongoing. We have communicated with our claimants, and it is very important that it is their views that feed into this process.
Does the Minister or her Department think that there is any correlation between ease of access to jobcentre facilities and those who are seeking work? Can she give a cast-iron guarantee that no one will be sanctioned as a result of the closure of jobcentres in a locality?
What we do know is that those who are on universal credit full service are spending more time looking for work. We also know that the vast majority of those job searches are conducted online, and that they are more successful.
It is important for individual claimants to have a relationship with their work coaches, because circumstances may change. That was emphasised to me in a Westminster Hall debate relatively recently. What is someone misses a bus? What if missing a connection means that a person is late for an appointment with the work coach? We want people to have a good relationship with their work coaches, so that they give them the necessary information. It is critical that if people miss appointments, they tell us why.