Pension Schemes Bill [Lords]

Ian Blackford Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 30th January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Ian Blackford (Ross, Skye and Lochaber) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills), who has made some good points about the importance of advice and about the decumulation phase. I hope that we will have an opportunity to come back to those matters at a later stage.

I welcome the Government’s initiative in bringing forward the Bill. A desire to create trust in pensions savings should unite us across the House. We want all workers to be able to attain a standard of living that will be consistent in allowing them to save while in work in order to have dignity in retirement, secure in the knowledge that a regular income from a state pension and a workplace pension will allow them to enjoy their retirement without financial worry and without living in pensioner poverty. In our view, pensions savings are the best way for most workers to achieve that dignity in retirement. We need to deliver the appropriate level of protection for savers, and the Bill is an important step forward in that regard, albeit one that could be enhanced through constructive amendments in Committee.

Given the growth in master trusts and the desire to ensure that we protect savers’ interests, the Bill is overdue in some regards. Auto-enrolment has led to a significant increase in the use of master trusts. The impact assessment published this month informs us that some 200,000 savers were in master trusts in 2010, increasing to 4 million by 2015. According to estimates from the Pensions Regulator, that may now have risen to 4.3 million savers with around £8.1 billion of assets in master trusts. When we take into account the Government estimate that 10 million workers will be in auto-enrolment schemes by 2018 and that they will be saving as much as £17 billion by 2019-20, with the vast bulk of them in master trusts, the need for robust, effective protection is clear.

The master trust market has grown rapidly, with as many as 84 such trusts in operation today. While there are a small number of larger trusts, it is clearly a fragmented market, with risk of failure in certain cases. Indeed, the Work and Pensions Committee called for stronger regulation in March 2016 when it concluded that:

“Gaps in pension law and regulation have allowed potentially unstable trusts onto the market. Should one of these trusts collapse, there is a real danger that ordinary scheme members could lose retirement savings. There is a risk that faith in auto-enrolment as a whole will be undermined.”

That is a stark warning and underscores the requirement to take this Bill forward. We need to regulate to remove the prospect of inadequately resourced schemes collapsing and to offer protection against scammers entering the marketplace. The warning signs are already there. Two small schemes have already collapsed, affecting 7,500 members. It is currently extremely easy for anyone to set up a master trust and accept savers’ funds, and there is no established mechanism for responding to the collapse of a master trust.

The rules of many schemes currently allow the use of members’ funds to wind up a scheme should it collapse. That is simply not acceptable. As a consequence of the Bill, there will be a requirement for master trusts to be approved, requiring minimum standards of trustees and obliging schemes to prove access to capital that can be used in case of wind-up. There has been widespread support for the need for such a Bill. The Pensions Regulator welcomed the announcement of new powers to regulate master trusts and said:

“We have been calling for a significantly higher bar regarding authorisation and supervision, and we are pleased that today’s announcement proposes to give us the power to implement these safeguards.”

The ABI has said:

“We have previously called for tighter regulation of Master Trusts, and are supportive of the proposed direction set out in the Bill.”

The Pension and Lifetime Savings Association welcomed the Bill as

“essential to protect savers and ensure that only good Master Trusts operate in the market.”

I concur with all those remarks.

Some of the Bill’s requirements may have unintended consequences and require further attention. As the Bill represents a significant change in the role of the Pensions Regulator, the Government must ensure that the regulator is adequately resourced to deliver accordingly. Addressing some of the following concerns could go some way to getting the Bill watertight and satisfying the concerns of many stakeholders. My first point relates to clause 8. If a scheme funder is an FCA and PRA-authorised insurer, the ABI contends that it will already have to comply with solvency II and therefore the regulations under clause 8 should not apply as they would be onerous and costly. The Government should clarify whether they have assessed that potential impact and whether the additional regulation adds a further safeguard, making the provision necessary.

Clause 9 requires the Pensions Regulator to be satisfied that a master trust has sufficient financial resources to meet the costs of setting up and running the scheme and to protect members in the event of wind up. A master trust must therefore hold capital equivalent to six to 24 months’ worth of running costs. However, it is argued that there is little clarity over how that provision would be applied. The TUC argues that there is an assumption that other master trusts would have an appetite to absorb a collapsed rival’s book of business, but that may not always be the case, particularly if costs are involved. Some savers are more attractive to providers than others. In the absence of greater clarity over the robustness of the proposed capital regime, the TUC contends that clause 9 should be retained. It was accepted in the Lords and provides that the Secretary of State can

“make provision for a funder of last resort, to manage any cases where the Master Trust has insufficient resources to meet the cost of complying with subsection (3)(b)”

after a triggering event. I would support that as a principle.

On clause 10, concerns have been expressed about the additional costs that master trusts could face, such as those offered by insurers due to duplicated regulation enforced by the Pensions Regulator. The ABI has said that that would be to the detriment of existing scheme members, as these schemes already operate under stringent FCA and PRA regulation.

The key issue raised by the ABI is the definition of a “scheme funder” in clause 10. Concerns centre on the fact that the Government state that the clause is intended better to enable the Pensions Regulator to assess the financial sustainability of the scheme by increasing transparency on the assets, liabilities, costs and income of the master trust. The ABI is concerned that the clause does not meet the policy intent of providing transparency because, as a separate legal entity, master trusts can still transfer risk to other entities.

That issue was raised in the Lords, and the ABI continues to ask that, in order to protect the benefits to scheme members and minimise costs, the requirements under clause 10 should not apply where the scheme funder is an FCA and PRA-authorised insurer. There is also a need for greater transparency on fee charging, which needs to encompass transaction costs as well as any ongoing administration fees.

It is welcome that the Government are placing a 1% cap on exit fees for current members and no exit fee for new members. We know that large fees have been charged on exit in the past, and it is clear that we need to protect savers, although if new members are to be excluded from exit fees why should it be permissible for exit fees to remain in place for existing plan holders?

Under clause 12, at least one third of trustees of single-employer workplace pension schemes have to be member-nominated. There is no such obligation on master trusts. The Bill presents an opportunity to explore member involvement, and I hope we can pick up that topic in Committee.

Clause 32 creates a new power enabling the Pensions Regulator to make a pause order requiring certain activities to be paused once a master trust has experienced a triggering event. That includes accepting new members, making payments, accepting contributions and discharging benefits. There is concern about the impact of a pause order on a member’s savings, as there are no mechanisms in place to allow ongoing contributions to be collected and held on behalf of a saver. It is unacceptable that a member should be penalised and, in effect, lose wages in the form of employer contributions due to events out of their control. The Government should clarify whether they intend to take action to protect savers in that area.

We look forward to clarification from the Government on those issues, and we will work in the next stages, where necessary, to improve the Bill. This is therefore a pressing matter and, on behalf of the Scottish National party, I signal our intent to work with the Government to deliver a Bill of which we can all be proud.

The Bill, however, is a missed opportunity to undertake much-needed major reform of the pensions system, rather than patchwork attempts to plug holes in the system. We need a fundamental overhaul of the pensions system, and the UK Government need to introduce more ambitious plans on pension reform. We are disappointed not to have a Bill that looks at the issues with the state pension, particularly the need to address state pension age inequality for the WASPI women.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I take your comments about the WASPI women but, given that the SNP was traduced by the Chair of the Select Committee on Work and Pensions, I make the point that the SNP has raised the issue of the WASPI women at least 44 times in this House and has commissioned independent research. It is completely disingenuous for anyone to suggest that the SNP has refused to support the campaign. A reasoned amendment to kill the Bill was suggested. However, that would help no one and would only remove the Bill’s helpful regulation provisions relating to master trusts.

[Frank Field]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. The plan was not to kill the Bill but just to hold it up for a bit so that we could hopefully highlight the position of WASPI pensioners, for soon they will all be retired and the horror will have been completed. We have no other weapon against the Government, because they have made it plain that they are going to sit out this issue. The Scottish nationalists were not prepared to form an alliance with those of us who want to block the Bill in order to actually raise this issue and perhaps implement the recommendation of a previous Select Committee report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I also appreciate that he is not going to be speaking in tonight’s debate, but I just want to say that it is a very narrow Bill about something very specific and this is not the forum for discussing all that. People might be very disappointed that we are not debating transport policy, but we are not; we are debating master trusts, so I ask the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) to keep just to that. I know he is trying to skim over things, but if he could skim away from other issues and get back to the main point, we would all be very grateful to him.

[Ian Blackford]

I will endeavour to skim away, Madam Deputy Speaker. You made the point that this is a narrow Bill, which is exactly why it would have been impossible to amend it to take account of the WASPI case. The right hon. Gentleman should know that an attempt to kill the Bill would have done exactly that, and we do not solve the problem faced by WASPI women by defeating this Bill, which is so necessary to protect pension savers. Frankly, he should be thoroughly ashamed of himself; he does no justice for the WASPI women with his campaign and the remarks he is making.

Let me conclude the remarks I was making. The sheer fact that the Cridland review is currently looking at the state pension age, without looking at the existing problems, limits the ability to learn and develop a more progressive outlook, which could safeguard dignity in retirement for pensioners. Generally, the threat of pensions scams and transfers from pensions to high-risk schemes needs to be urgently addressed. [Interruption.] I have got to the bits I am not allowed to say any more. [Laughter.]

We reiterate our call for the establishment of an independent pension and savings commission to look holistically at pension reform, focusing on existing inequalities and paving the way for a fair, universal pensions system. The entire pensions landscape is in need of fundamental reform, particularly with a pressing need now to review and enhance auto-enrolment. The Government are set to review auto-enrolment this year, but reports seem to suggest there may not be substantial changes from the review, and with many missing out on auto-enrolment we need to ensure that this policy is moved forward. Although 7 million workers have been auto-enrolled, a further 6 million workers have missed out. The Pensions Policy Institute revealed that 3.3 million of the people excluded from auto-enrolment had been excluded because they earned less than £10,000 a year. It also found that three quarters of the employees earning less than the auto-enrolment trigger were women.

We believe that lowering or removing the auto-enrolment trigger would significantly increase the number of people saving through auto-enrolment and in master trusts. It would also go some way to alleviating some of the historical inequalities women face, whereby their occupational pension savings are already well below those of men. There are clear disadvantages here, particularly for part-time and the low-paid workers. For example, somebody earning £10,000 per annum will not benefit from the 8% contribution; they will benefit by only 3.4% because over half the earnings are excluded. Although self-employed workers are growing vastly in number, they have fewer incentives to save. If the Government were to review auto-enrolment sufficiently, they could consider moving to a flat rate of pension tax relief and allowing self-employed people to deduct pension contributions from profits to end the disparity.

Looking at the age at which auto-enrolment is triggered could also be more progressive. Just on 26 January, Zurich Insurance called on the Government to take

“a steady approach to increasing minimum auto-enrolment contributions above 8%”.

While there is an acceptance that the levels need to rise, it must be done in a way whereby workers do not opt out.

In conclusion, I welcome this Bill. It contains much we can support and we will work constructively with the Government to enhance it further. I hope that when the Minister winds up he will join with us in that spirit of consensus.

Pension Schemes Bill [ Lords ] (Fourth sitting)

Ian Blackford Excerpts

Committee Debate: 4th Sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 9th February 2017 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I understand that following the debate this morning, Mr Blackford no longer wishes to move new clause 8. Is that correct?

[Ian Blackford (Ross, Skye and Lochaber) (SNP)]

That is correct.

New Clause 11

Asset protection for unincorporated businesses

“The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to amend section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995 in order to protect unincorporated businesses at risk of losing their personal assets including their homes.”—(Ian Blackford.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Ian Blackford]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 12—Review of actuarial mechanisms for valuing pension scheme liabilities—

“Within six calendar months from the day on which this Act comes into force, the Secretary of State must conduct a review of the actuarial mechanisms used to value pension scheme liabilities under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995.”

New clause 13—Non-associated multi-employer schemes: orphan debt—

“The Secretary of State must, by regulations, exclude from the calculation in section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995 the orphan debt in any non-associated multi-employer scheme.”

[Ian Blackford]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. I thank the Committee for its assistance in taking new clauses 11 to 13 earlier than planned.

New clause 11 would help to deal with an issue facing plumbers in Scotland. Plumbing Pensions (UK) Ltd was established in 1975 to provide pensions for the plumbing and heating industry UK-wide. The scheme is managed by a group of trustee directors appointed from nominees of the Association of Plumbing and Heating Contractors in England and Wales, the Scottish and Northern Ireland Plumbing Employers Federation and Unite the union. The scheme has more than 36,000 members and assets in excess of £1.5 billion.

Under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995, employers may, in certain circumstances, become liable for what is known as a section 75 employer debt. That debt is calculated on a buy-out basis, which tests whether there would be sufficient assets in a scheme to secure all members’ benefits by buying annuity contracts from an insurance company. Legislation specifies that a section 75 employer debt becomes payable when an employer becomes insolvent, winds up, changes its legal status or ceases to have any active members in the scheme. Although we must be mindful that the purpose of those rules is to protect pension benefits, the way they are currently framed creates problems for some stakeholders, and we are sympathetic to SNIPEF’s concerns, which I know it has also raised directly with the Minister.

The solution is not clearcut. There are several options for the Government to consider, but each has complications for pension schemes, employers and scheme members. We urge the Government to balance employers’ interests with the need to protect benefits for scheme members. The previous Pensions Minister, who sits in the House of Lords, indicated that she would look closely at how a solution to this complex issue could be reached. We need the same assurances from the current Minister that the Government will work to find a solution for the industry. They could use the Bill to bring forward such a solution.

SNIPEF aims to achieve an amendment to the section 75 debt legislation. Its main concern is for unincorporated businesses where people risk losing their personal assets, including their homes. It wants the Government to review the actuarial methods that are used to value pension scheme liabilities, as it believes that given the current economic conditions, the calculation of section 75 employer debt on a full annuity buy-out basis is inappropriate and detrimental to non-associated multi-employer schemes.

SNIPEF argues that orphan debt in any non-associated multi-employer scheme should be excluded from the calculation of section 75 employer debt. It also suggests that, provided that schemes are deemed to be prudently funded, the Pension Protection Fund should act as guarantor of last resort for orphan liabilities. SNIPEF believes that any changes in legislation should apply retrospectively to all employers from 2005. It would be helpful to hear the Government’s view on that request.

As I mentioned, SNIPEF recently met the Minister, and it has advised several MPs that he confirmed that those objectives could be incorporated in a Green Paper, but I want to use the opportunity of the Bill to address these matters. We are eager to hear whether the Government intend to include a solution in the Bill, and I look forward to the Minister’s comments.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Pensions (Richard Harrington)]

It is appropriate, given the temperature in which we are working, that plumbers are mentioned. I only wish that some of them were in the Public Gallery to make repairs so that hon. Members would not have to wear their coats.

I joke about that, but I accept that this is a serious matter. When it was brought to my attention, it was my duty and pleasure to meet representatives of not just the plumbers but others. The Government are not ignoring the issue. Although some stakeholders have run an effective public campaign, as is their right, it was the job of the Department for Work and Pensions anyway to get to grips with this, despite the fact that MPs have contacted us individually, such as the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber—

[Ian Blackford]

Well done!

[Richard Harrington]

Thank you. I have finally got it. I shall provide tuition for other hon. Members.

This issue is important. For the record, I should remind hon. Members who are not as familiar with it as the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber why the employer debt legislation is in place. It is to help ensure that members of salary-related occupational pension schemes receive the pensions they worked for and have been promised when their own employer cannot provide them. I think everyone would agree that that is a noble aim. Were that not a rule, it would have led to even more difficulties.

When I see representatives of those in such positions, I try to think about this key question: if they are not responsible for the debt, who is? Someone has to be responsible for it. As hon. Members will have picked up from the hon. Gentleman’s speech, people who have been working quite properly and, typically in this field, running their own businesses find themselves with—I do not know what the legal term is—a contingent liability that could be called upon. It is not as though they have received an invoice or a demand, or people have been banging on the door to repossess something, but it is understandably on their minds that that could and might happen, which is a serious matter.

[Ian Blackford]

That is exactly the point. We are talking about often small businesses that have done the right things in making sure their employees are protected and have adequate pension provision, but there is a sword of Damocles hanging over them with the worry and uncertainty, caused purely by this debt, that they may lose their businesses and houses.

[Richard Harrington]

I accept the hon. Gentleman’s point. We all agree there is a problem. I do not see how anyone could disagree with that. These people are simply in an unfortunate position, but the Government have to decide, “If not this, what?” and “What are the alternatives?” The hon. Gentleman said, as the groups involved have, that the debt should be passed to the Pension Protection Fund, which everyone would agree has been a very successful mechanism. We mentioned the Maxwell case before lunch. The PPF was intended to deal with failing schemes. It is paid for by the levy payer—by all the successful pension schemes—and I am sure they complain because it is a significant amount of money, but everyone would agree that it has been successful.

In this case, we would place an unfair burden on the PPF, because we are not talking about failing schemes. Many of them are successful and proper. That is why I mentioned a contingent liability. If it is your liability— I do not mean yours, Ms Buck, but anyone’s—it is real to you. It is not quite as real as having an invoice or a demand, but it is there all the time. I do not deny that. However, passing the debt to the PPF would place an unfair burden on the PPF and its levy payers.

Like so many issues facing defined-benefit schemes, the problem is complex and finding a solution is difficult. I accept that it is for the Government to address it. That is what we are elected and paid for. But like everything else in government, there is not an instant, easy solution. It is worth highlighting the fact that the Government have already made significant changes to the legislation in response to representations made by some employers. A number of mechanisms have been made available in employer debt regulations whereby only part of the debt or none may be payable. There are eight such mechanisms in legislation. A wide variety of circumstances can arise, because there are a lot of diverse scheme structures. The best example, which has been discussed with the plumbers and those making similar representations, is flexible apportionment arrangements, which permit an employer debt attributable to the departing employer to be shared among the remaining employers. That sounds attractive, but it is part of a triangle of previous employers, remaining employers and the PPF—it is about which of them gets kicked with this liability. Each group is obviously going to be in favour of the others getting it. I say that not to cast any aspersions or to make a value judgment, but it has to go somewhere, and in the end that is for Government to decide. On the face of it, however, that would be such a solution.

New clause 11 calls specifically for a change by regulations to the employer debt legislation in the Pensions Act 1995. It is aimed at providing protection for the owners of unincorporated businesses. Many of the plumbers who have made representations happen to be self-employed because that is the structure of their business, but they are not self-employed and running a large business. They just happen to be a business owner who is self-employed. A mandatory provision to protect one group of employers from their responsibility for an employer debt, for which there may be personal liability, again boils down to that debt needing to be met in some way by others in order to safeguard members’ pensions. It is true to say that such an approach would also conflict with existing employer debt provision that recognises the wide range of employers who participate in occupational pension schemes. It does not differentiate between different types of business structure in relation to employer debt duties.

Secondary legislation, in the form of the 2005 employer debt regulations, already includes a range of mechanisms to facilitate the management of an employer debt when an employer ceases to employ active members of a pension scheme. The regulations operate so that in some circumstances, only part of the debt or no debt may be payable. Those regulations are currently under review. We had a call for evidence about the operation of employer debt legislation in non-associated multi-employer schemes. We needed to call for evidence because there are losers and winners. It is the role of Government to try to assess interests, and some form of judgment has to be made. This area of legislation is extremely complex, and we have to check and consider things carefully.

I reiterate that we are not kicking the can down the road—it is not that we do not want to make a decision. It is a complex issue, and we are looking to consult on specific proposals in the very near future. In any case, a whole range of new proposals might come about in our Green Paper on defined-benefit schemes. If I say the release of that Green Paper is imminent, that could mean anything from tomorrow onwards, but it will be very soon.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Blackford]

I think the Minister will accept that I am trying to be helpful to the Government in trying to find a resolution to this situation. Let us look at the wording of new clause 11 again:

“The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision to amend section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995 in order to protect unincorporated businesses at risk of losing their personal assets including their homes.”

I would be content if we could get an assurance that the Government are willing to work together with us to solve this problem. The Green Paper will be coming forward, and I appreciate that the Minister has said he is prepared to look at this matter and see whether there is a resolution that can be found that would not have any unintended consequences,. I seek assurance from the Government that that will be the case. I know the Minister cannot be too prescriptive about the Green Paper at this stage, but I hope there is willingness to ensure that these issues of actuarial valuations will be taken into account in it.

[The Chair]

Order. I remind hon. Gentleman that he is making an intervention, not a speech.

[Ian Blackford]

Sorry, Ms Buck; I will sum up. I am trying to get to a consensus, so that we can work together on this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Mackinlay (South Thanet) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair and to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Buck. The experience of the hon. Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber comes through very clearly.

I hope I can offer some help to the Committee. I realise that this is a complex area, but the hon. Gentleman’s new clause does not actually encompass the extent of the problem, which goes further. Under the old rules—extra-statutory concession C16 on the winding-up of companies, which was used widely until 2012—a group of directors or owners could wind up a company using a very informal method, but that did not cease their liabilities to that company. That liability extended for 20 years afterwards. That was then formalised under section 1030A of the Corporation Tax Act 2010, which gave a statutory basis to the informal winding up of companies with assets of less than £25,000. That provision is still used very widely. Directors or owners of such companies being wound up under that statutory method could still face 20 years of future liabilities, so although the hon. Gentleman has identified a problem in the system, it does not just apply to unincorporated associations.

The effect of the section 1030A of the 2010 Act, which came into force on 1 March 2012, is that directors and owners of slightly larger companies are going down the route of a formal liquidation, which terminates their liabilities for ever more. However, hundreds—if not thousands—of old, smaller companies using the old extra-statutory concession will still be caught by a section 75 notice. This is a very wide issue that does not apply only to unincorporated associations, so I do not think the hon. Gentleman’s new clause is enough to close down his concerns on future liabilities. Personally, I accept the Minister’s assurances, but I think this is the start of a wider debate as to how those liabilities can be cut down.

In the hon. Gentleman’s new clause 12, there is a problem with determining the proper value of a pension liability. It is not as sharp as just the transfer value that is often given, and we will need in future to be a little bit cleverer in how we actuarially assess pension liabilities.

[Ian Blackford]

On the basis of the Minister’s response, I will certainly not push the new clause to a vote. We have received assurances that the Government will look at these issues; I hope they will not only be addressed in the Green Paper, but that there is the possibility of legislation as a result of that. I think we all recognise—there is a consensus on this—that we have to make sure we can resolve this problem for the benefit or incorporated and unincorporated businesses. On that basis, I will happily leave things as they are for now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Investment Strategy

“(1) A Master Trust, after taking proper advice, formulate an investment strategy which must be in accordance with guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State,

(2) The Trust must consult scheme members on—

(a) the Trust’s assessment of the suitability of particular investment and types of investment;

(b) the Trust’s approach to risk, including the ways in which risks are to be assessed and managed;

(c) the Trust’s policy on how social, environmental, and corporate governance considerations are taken into account in the selection, non-selection, retention and realisation of investments;

(d) the Trust’s policy on the exercise of the rights (including voting rights) attaching to investments; and

(e) the right of scheme members to consider non-financial issues relating to their investments and be consulted on these issues.

(3) The Trust must review the strategy at least once a year, and revise if appropriate

(4) The Trust must revise the strategy at any time if there is any significant change to the information included in it.

(5) In the event of (4) above, the Trust must consult with scheme members, and the revise the strategy in the light of comments made.

(6) The Secretary of State may make regulations with a view to ensuring that the information disclosed under subsection (1) is provided in a timely and comprehensible manner.”.—(Alex Cunningham.)

A Master Trust must include an investment strategy which outlines what the Master Trust should consult scheme members on in areas of investment.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Welcome to our walk-in fridge, Ms Buck. I had a discussion with the Government Whip, the hon. Member for Winchester.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

I was talking about the conversation that I had with the Government Whip about whether we should invoke the Factories Act. He reminded me that, unhelpfully, said law does not apply to the Palace of Westminster. The Minister mentioned kicking a can, and I remember playing kick the can in the street as a young boy. Perhaps you can provide us with a can, Ms Buck, and we can have a game after we debate the next new clause to warm ourselves up.

New clause 2 continues our theme of transparency and member engagement. It is designed to improve the way that master trusts consult their members about their investment strategies and ensure that members are aware of the guidelines that trustees establish for the management of members’ assets. The new clause would modernise the approach to fiduciary—I find that word even more difficult to say than “Lochaber”—management of savers’ assets and update the statement of investment principles approach currently required of master trusts. A master trust would have to have an investment strategy and consult scheme members about that strategy and about socially responsible investment—commonly known as environmental, social and governance issues.

Until now, every occupational pension scheme has been legally required to prepare and maintain a statement of investment principles, which is expected to cover the trustees’ plans for securing compliance with their statutory duties, their policies on investments, risks and returns, and how they will exercise their voting rights. In short, it allows trustees to consider factors that they believe will influence the financial performance of their investments and consult members about those issues. As long as pension funds can show that any investment or policy decision was made on a fiduciary basis and members were consulted, they can avoid the charge that they have not considered members’ best interests.

Public opinion tends to position the average citizen as a helpless bystander in this drama, but in fact it is their money that underpins the entire system. Anyone with a pension is, indirectly, an owner of Britain’s biggest companies. The new clause seeks to create a world in which people feel that their savings give them a positive stake in the economy and a voice in how the companies in which they invest are run. Although we may hope or even expect that scheme members have a say, the reverse is true: power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of opaque and unaccountable financial institutions. As the Kay report showed, those institutions often face systematic pressures to act in ways that may not serve savers’ interests. Direct accountability to savers is a vital component of a healthy economic and financial system. As millions more savers are about to enter the capital markets through pensions auto-enrolment, now is the right time to build a more accountable system.

In June 2011, the Government invited Professor John Kay to conduct a review of UK equity markets and long-term decision making. The Kay review considered how well equity markets were achieving their core purposes—to enhance the performance of UK companies and enable savers to benefit from the activity of those businesses through returns to direct and indirect ownership of shares in UK companies. The review identified that short-termism is a problem in UK equity markets. Professor Kay recommended that company directors, asset managers and asset holders should adopt measures to promote both stewardship and long-term decision making. He stressed in particular:

“Asset managers can contribute more to the performance of British business (and in consequence to overall returns to their savers) through greater involvement with the companies in which they invest.”

He concluded that adopting such responsible investment practices would prove beneficial for investors and markets alike. In practice, responsible investment could involve making long-term investment decisions, as well as playing an active role in corporate governance by exercising shareholder voting rights.

I hope that master trusts will want to consider the Kay review’s findings when developing their proposals, including what governance procedures and mechanisms are needed to facilitate long-term responsible investing and stewardship through the funds that they choose for members to save into. The UK stewardship code published by the Financial Reporting Council also provides master trusts with guidance on good practice in monitoring and engaging with the companies in which they invest. The new clause would ensure sure that trustees are guided by the members of the scheme whose money they invest.

In recent decades, efforts to improve the way companies are run have focused heavily on making directors more accountable to their shareholders—for example, the recent introduction of a binding “say on pay”—but the job is only half done. Ownership rights are exercised largely by institutions that are themselves intermediaries. Accountability to the underlying savers who provide the capital remains weak. The logical next step must be for institutional investors to extend the same accountability they expect from companies to the savers they represent.

The UK stewardship code was introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis to address concerns that shareholders were behaving as absentee landlords. Rather than being enforced by regulators, it is a voluntary code that relies on scrutiny from below to promote compliance, mirroring the corporate governance code for companies. The investment regulations currently require master trusts to set out within the statement of investment principles the extent to which social, environmental or corporate governance considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and realisation of investments, but savers are left out of the loop. Just as I have argued for greater engagement with members on other issues, I believe it is needed here too.

In addition, accountability should build trust in the system even among those who do not choose to engage, thus encouraging people to keep saving. That is an important consideration in a market where just 7% of retail investors trust investment firms to do the right thing and consumers cite lack of trust as the No. 1 reason for opting out of private pension saving. Practical objections on the grounds that savers are not interested or not capable of engaging with their money simply perpetuate a vicious circle of disengagement. Savers may be put off by the language of investment, but that does not mean they are not interested in where their money goes. The onus must be on the master trusts and the wider investment sector to communicate with savers in a way they find meaningful. Likewise, savers may lack understanding of the technicalities of investment, but there are many matters on which they are qualified to comment, including the way their scheme behaves as an owner of major companies or its policy on social, environment and governance issues.

Transparency is necessary, but not sufficient for a more accountable investment system. Savers must also have the right to engage directly with decisions about their money, in the same way that shareholders engage with companies. Of course, we are not suggesting that all savers should be consulted on every decision. In our view, engagement with savers has three key elements. Savers should have the right to be consulted about investment policies, particularly those that should be firmly grounded in the views of savers, such as socially responsible investment policies. It is sometimes argued that since savers will inevitably disagree, acting on their views can prove difficult, but that objection can be refuted by example: schemes such as the National Employment Savings Trust demonstrate the possibilities of using face-to-face engagement with savers to inform the development of policy. Savers should be able to subject decisions made on their behalf to healthy scrutiny and challenge. While companies are obliged to hold annual meetings at which the board accounts to their shareholders, no such requirement extends to pension schemes.

Making capital markets more answerable to the individuals whose money they invest offers a potential lever for rebuilding trust in the City and for promoting more responsible and long-termist corporate behaviour. Such accountability must be nurtured over time by institutional investors such as master trusts, other pension savers and civil society in general. As Mark Carney said back in 2013, if it is

“finance that becomes disconnected from the economy, from society, finance that only talks to itself and deals with each other, that becomes socially useless.”

We have an opportunity here to change the landscape that sees pension savers as passive uninterested participants by engaging with them on decisions that affect their lives. When I started this speech, I said I was continuing the theme of member engagement. The new clause would extend what currently happens in relation to investment decisions, and I commend it to the Committee.

[Ian Blackford]

Before the hon. Gentleman concludes his speech, I wanted to ask about subsections (3) and (4) of the new clause, which state:

“The Trust must review the strategy at least once a year…The Trust must revise the strategy at any time if there is any significant change to the information”.

Can he explain what form that review would take and what role investment advisers would have, if any, in that review?

[Alex Cunningham]

That is an extremely difficult question to answer. [Interruption.] Everyone can laugh, but the Government talk about regulations and laying down guidance, and I hope that they would be able to provide the necessary guidance.

[Ian Blackford]

This is actually a very serious point. The hon. Gentleman’s new clause would require an annual review, so it is pertinent to ask how that would be conducted and what role, if any, investment advisers would have.

[Alex Cunningham]

There has to be a role for investment advisers, but the crux of my point is that members should have some say in the investment decisions that affect them.

[Ian Blackford]

Can I deduce from that that the hon. Gentleman actually has no idea how such reviews should be conducted?

[Alex Cunningham]

That is not exactly the case. It is clear that we need a set of circumstances in which members are properly engaged, equipped and informed. If they are, they will be able to contribute.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Harrington]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend; member engagement and involvement sounds very good—it is a laudable objective—but I have been around for nearly 60 years, of which I was in business for nearly 30, and I do not feel qualified to assess an investment strategy. I say that not to insult the vast majority of people, but because, although independent financial advisers and accountants may be able to do that, it is almost impossible for an individual to do so. We have to look at a way of ensuring that the investment strategy is the correct one for the majority of members, and that the regulatory system, the supervisory system and so on are in place. Hon. Members mentioned NEST, which already has more than 4 million members and 230,000 employers. This idea is very interesting but not at all practical.

I remind hon. Members that trustees play a key role in managing assets. They have overall accountability for the investment strategy. They have a legal duty; the hon. Members for Stockton North and for Ross, Skye and Lochaber—I can just about manage to say that now—used the expression “fiduciary duty,” and the trustees have a fiduciary duty to the members.

Laudable as new clause 2 is, pensions legislation already includes requirements for investment decisions to be transparent and in the best interests of members. The Government fully recognise the possible impact of investment decisions on members’ retirement outcomes. Even without the new clause, the Bill will add to those requirements. Clause 12(4)(d) already sets out that regulations made by the Secretary of State

“may include provision about…processes relating to transactions and investment decisions”,

while clause 12(2) states:

“In deciding whether it is satisfied that the systems and processes used in running the scheme are sufficient…the Pensions Regulator must take into account any matters specified in regulations”.

The new amendment would duplicate the provisions for master trust schemes that already exist under the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005. The regulations require trustees of all schemes with 100 or more members to set out a statement of investment principles for their scheme. That statement must be made available to members on request and

“must cover…their policies in relation to…the kinds of investments to be held…the balance between different kinds of investments…risks, including the ways in which risks are to be measured”

and other key issues. The trustees must ensure

“that the statement of investment principles…is reviewed at least every three years…and without delay after any significant change in investment policy.”

Most people who are automatically enrolled into pension schemes are likely to remain in their scheme’s default fund and will not actively engage themselves in the governance of the scheme. That is why legislation makes requirements about governance and oversight of these matters, and why most schemes, including master trust schemes, need to provide a default strategy that covers similar areas.

Finally, multi-employer schemes have a legal duty under the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 to make arrangements to encourage members of the scheme or their representatives to report their views on matters that relate to the scheme, including areas about which the new clause proposes that the trustees should consult scheme members.

[Ian Blackford]

I am listening carefully to the Minister, and I broadly agree with him. Obviously there will be ongoing reviews of investment strategy, which should be communicated to members where appropriate. One way in which that could be done, as a matter of best practice for these schemes, would be for a statement of investment principles to be mailed to members as part of the annual report. That would give more clarity on the direction of travel of the fund’s investments.

[Richard Harrington]

As usual, the hon. Gentleman makes a very sensible suggestion, which should be considered. However, I believe that everything in the new clause is already included in legislation and that it is therefore unnecessary, so I urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw it.

Pension Schemes Bill [Lords]

Ian Blackford Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 29th March 2017 Commons Chamber

[Ian Blackford (Ross, Skye and Lochaber) (SNP)]

May I associate myself with the remarks made by the Minister and the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) about the events of last Wednesday? We should reflect on the fact that those events were unfolding outside this Chamber while we were having our debate. Our thoughts are very much with those who, in the line of duty, defended our interests, including the police officer who lost his life, as well as with the others who lost their lives, those who have been injured and all those who have been affected.

As we have this debate, we should reflect on the responsibility that all Members have to build an architecture that creates a climate in which consumers around the UK can safely invest in pension schemes and savings, and in which there is an element of trust. I broadly welcome the Bill’s role in improving the landscape. It is an important step forward in so far as it puts in place the necessary protection for those who are investing through auto-enrolment. It is crucial that we have the regulation in the Bill.

Like the Labour spokesperson, the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth, I would have been happier if the Government had accepted some of our amendments. Having said that, I was very much encouraged by the Minister’s response last week, particularly to an amendment I tabled regarding section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995. I welcome the commitment to revisiting this issue. As has been said, the Bill has to be seen in the wider context of what we are seeking to achieve on pensions.

Two of my new clauses were not selected for debate, one of which was on the establishment of a pensions and savings commission. I still believe that the Government should consider that proposal, because an awful lot is going on in this landscape, some of which was described by the hon. Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth. There is the forthcoming review of auto-enrolment. We have had the Cridland review, the Green Paper on defined-benefit pension schemes and the FCA paper. I think that there is a willingness among all of us to work collegiately to improve the interrelationship of all these factors. I look forward to the debates that we will have in taking this forward. This all comes back to my point about how we can create further confidence so that we get effective saving in the pensions landscape.

I put this in the context of the Green Paper, one of the most striking features of which is the indication at its beginning that the average defined-benefit pot is £7,000. We all have to accept that pension savings are not at an appropriate level. We all want people to save to such an extent that they can have dignity in retirement through both their workplace pension and the state pension provision. I look forward to working with the Government on the review of auto-enrolment. While we are improving the protection for today’s consumers, we need to do more to protect other people, particularly a lot of women who have been excluded, such as those in part-time jobs who are below the threshold, and the self-employed.

I applaud the Government for what they are doing. While the Bill is a very necessary step forward, there is much more that we can do by working together for the mutual benefit of those who invest in pension schemes.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with amendments.