Telegraph Media Group: Proposed Sale to RedBird IMI

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Julia Lopez

Tuesday 30th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Julia Lopez]

I thank the hon. Lady for her rather hyperbolic intervention. We are having a debate because two public interest intervention notices have been issued. The Government take their powers in this respect seriously, and the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom will be given the space and time to look into all these issues in detail. Those notices were issued because the Secretary of State takes the issues of media freedom and the ownership of important British media institutions extremely seriously.

I therefore ask the hon. Lady to help us. Those investigations are under way; we must not prejudice them and must ensure they are watertight. The important question of media ownership is something that all Members of this House care about. It would be regrettable if I were to say anything in this Chamber that should prejudice that process, so I say again to the hon. Lady that action has been taken, it is something the Government take seriously, and I ask her to let the process take its course.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

It is hugely new for us to be told that we will not get our questions answered at the Dispatch Box. We are used to that happening anyway, but it is good to be told that it is a waste of our time being here in the first place.

To press on with not being answered, I say to the Minister that I and 28 others, across all parties, wrote a letter to her Department specifying that we were all opposed to this potential takeover. We made it clear that we are not opposed to it because we dislike that particular Government—although I have to say that that may well be a feature. Rather, we would oppose it if the French Government wished to buy the newspapers, or even if this Government decided they would control them. We would oppose that on the basis that it would trample right across the idea of freedom of the press.

Following the notice that has gone to the CMA, I simply ask the Minister whether she would ask the Secretary of State to create a new PIIN on the basis that RedBird IMI has twice disrupted the Government’s efforts to properly scrutinise the purchase. Particularly with the idea of debt being loaded into the purchase, we need a further detailed investigation. I would be grateful if the Minister did that, because this could easily turn into a disaster for this Government.

[Julia Lopez]

I did not say I would give no answers; I said I would be able to give general answers, and my right hon. Friend will understand why. These are very precise processes that must be kept watertight, and I would not want to do anything to prejudice them or the Secretary of State’s ability to act in a way that is in the interests of this country and the media. This is not a waste of time. It is an opportunity for this House to make its voice and opinions known on what is a controversial issue of great public interest—an issue that we as a Government are very interested in.

My right hon. Friend also makes the important point that his concern is not about the Government in this particular case, but about Government ownership in principle. It is something I appreciate and understand, and I am sure it will be in the Secretary of State’s mind.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Iain Duncan Smith and Julia Lopez

Consideration of Lords amendments
Monday 8th November 2021 Commons Chamber

[Julia Lopez]

I appreciate the hon. Member’s comments. When the Secretary of State is looking to designate a vendor, she will put that to the House to be scrutinised, and we will be scrutinised on this issue through the usual procedures that I have outlined in my previous comments.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)]

I welcome the Minister to her place. If we look back over the past few months, even the past year or so, we see very much that the resistance early on by the UK Government with Huawei, when other Five Eyes countries were banning it, has led to a remarkable back-cost for replacing all this stuff because we failed to take an early decision. While the amendment may not be perfect, it indicates clearly a big weakness in the Government’s position, even in this very good Bill. If Five Eyes countries, which are our main allies in intelligence, spot there is a problem, we should pause, investigate the reasons why, and then come back to the House with the reasons why we disagree or agree. The amendment aims at doing that, so perhaps the Government should think about amending the Bill in such a way.

[Julia Lopez]

I appreciate my right hon. Friend’s comments, but it is important that we do not put in primary legislation the specific partners that we should have to listen to on these specific issues. It would create a hierarchy of diplomatic networks.

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

With respect, these are not specific partners; these are our closest allies when it comes to intelligence sharing. They do not get any closer than this. Working with them, as we do in sharing intelligence, means that using systems for sharing that intelligence would corrupt our own ability. I wonder whether the Minister could just slightly reset: these are not just partners.

[Julia Lopez]

I appreciate my right hon. Friend’s comments. The amendment would require us to do something that has been part of the legislation from the outset. We believe that our existing approach is the right way to continually consider the decisions of our international allies and partners, whether or not they are part of Five Eyes. That brings me to the second objection to the amendment, which is that it is unnecessary because we regularly engage with our Five Eyes partners and are committed to a close and enduring partnership with them. We agree with the other place that where possible, the UK Government should consider the actions of other countries when developing our own policies, and that is exactly what we do already. It is what we have been doing before and during the passage of this legislation.

The intelligence and security agencies across Five Eyes retain close co-operation, which includes frequent dialogue between the National Cyber Security Centre and its international partners. This dialogue includes the sharing of technical expertise on the security of telecoms networks and managing the risks posed by high-risk vendors. There are mechanisms in place for the NCSC to share this and wider information with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

Collaboration with our Five Eyes partners forms an intrinsic part of our national security work. The alliance was not created through legislation and it has not required legislation for us to develop and strengthen that relationship, and the amendment would set an unhelpful precedent. We do not need the amendment to compel us to work with our Five Eyes partners.

That takes me to our third reason for resisting the amendment, which is that the UK needs to have the flexibility to develop and encourage international relationships in addition to Five Eyes. Naming individual countries in this way would set an unhelpful precedent for national security legislation in future. As I have acknowledged, it is important that we consider the policies of our Five Eyes partners, namely New Zealand, Canada, Australia and the US, when developing our own policies, but we also need to consider the policies of a wide range of other countries, including those of our European neighbours, such as France and Germany, and those of other nations, such as Japan, South Korea and India. Stipulating in primary legislation the countries whose policies the UK Government should consider when developing our own national security policies, whether Five Eyes or other countries, would be unhelpful, given the wide-ranging nature of our international collaboration. It would be highly unusual to refer to specific countries in legislation in this way, and this Bill is not the right place to create such a precedent.

The fourth reason for resisting the amendment is that it is impractical because of the many different ways in which other countries operate their national security decision making. The amendment would require us to act whenever a ban takes place in another Five Eyes country, but it may not be immediately clear when a country has taken a decision to ban a vendor, particularly if they have relied on sensitive intelligence to make that decision.

It may not always be apparent why a particular country has banned a particular vendor. There could be any number of reasons why a foreign Government would choose to restrict a company’s ability to operate within that country. Those reasons may not be based purely on national security grounds. I welcome the intention behind the amendment, but we cannot accept it because we feel that it is duplicative, impractical, restrictive and, ultimately, unnecessary.

In summary, the House is presented with a strengthened Bill as Lords amendments 1, 2 and 3 will increase the chances of parliamentary scrutiny of the telecoms security framework. As I have set out, however, it would be inappropriate to agree to Lords amendments 4 and 5. I thank the other place for its scrutiny of the Bill. I commend Lords amendments 1, 2 and 3 to the House and ask that the House disagrees with Lords amendments 4 and 5.