Welfare Reform Bill

Hywel Williams Excerpts

Wednesday 9th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Duncan Smith]

That is not our intention, and it is why we were are proceeding carefully and consulting about our proposals. The purpose is to maintain incentives to go to work. Universal credit is designed to encourage lone parents to go to work, but it recognises their need to meet their child care responsibilities. We can debate the various elements, but the principle is that the measure should be more than helpful to them. We will move on to the finer detail as we get to Committee stage.

As we increase support to make work pay, it is right to ensure that claimants do everything they reasonably can to find or prepare for work. As the House knows, we will tailor conditionality to individual circumstances, and require all claimants to accept what I call a claimant commitment. From the outset they will be asked to sign up to the idea that we will provide them with the necessary support and access to universal credit, but we will also expect them to recognise that the sanctions regime is applicable. It is easy to understand. If they do not comply with that as they go further through the process, they are likely to encounter that sanctions regime at key moments.

The toughest sanctions will apply to those who are expected to be seeking work but fail to meet important conditions. They should understand that if they keep on crossing a series of lines, they will invoke the sanctions regime. The problem at present is that the regime is often confusing. I have visited jobcentres a number of times—and I see on the Opposition Benches one of the Members who used to be a Minister in the Department. As he knows, if one talks to jobcentre staff, they will say that the problem is that when claimants reach the point where they are about to hit sanctions, it comes as a big surprise to many of them that sanctions will be imposed and that the situation is real and serious.

By letting claimants know much earlier and by introducing a regime that is easy to understand, with a simple tripwire process, they will know from the word go. That should disincentivise people from taking the wrong turns. Benefits will be taken away for three months after a first failure, six months after a second, and three years after a third. That will apply to those at the top level—in other words, those who are fully able to search actively for work and to take it. There are, however, other categories. The same conditions would not apply to lone parents, for example.

[Hywel Williams (Arfon) (PC)]

The rate of worklessness and the availability of jobs vary from area to area. What account will the sanctions regime take of that variation?