(6 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberI rise to speak to the amendments in my name, on behalf of the Scottish National party. As I said earlier, I will formally withdraw amendments 31 to 33, which the cross-party amendments have dealt with adequately.
First, I would like to thank the Government and their advisers and civil servants for their time and expertise in the run-up to the Bill, as well as all those who sent me information and briefings, which have been incredibly helpful. I also want to particularly thank the experts at the Law Society, UK Finance, Roger Mullin, Richard Smith and David Leask for their thoughts on Scottish limited partnerships.
A lot has changed since the Bill began its process. Salisbury has focused minds and, I hope, will now result in some action. The UK Government went from trying to find a way to wriggle out of the Magnitsky amendment to the Prime Minister giving it her full support. Regardless of how the Government have come to that decision, I am grateful that they have finally come on board, and we can all be grateful that that move has been made.
I spent the weekend finishing Bill Browder’s disturbing book “Red Notice”, which details the lengths to which the rich and powerful in Russia are willing to go to preserve their ill-gotten gains. I recommend that all Members read it as an object lesson in Russian oligarchs’ power, which we need to be mindful of. It is a complex trail which finally led to the brave lawyer Sergei Magnitsky being wrongfully imprisoned, maltreated, tortured and eventually beaten to death in prison because he refused to perjure himself. He stood for the truth. He documented the human rights abuses against him, and, after his death, Bill Browder and his team campaigned steadfastly to bring some justice to the situation. That led to the Magnitsky Act in the US, which introduced Government sanctions prohibiting entry to the US and access to the US banking system for those involved in Sergei Magnitsky’s death. It has since been expanded in scope to become the Global Magnitsky Act, tackling more dirty money and dubious people.
The UK Government made moves on that with section 13 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017. The amendments today expand on that in a very welcome way, and I am glad to give my party’s support to them. It is crucial that the names go on the record, and I am glad that the Government have committed to an administrative list being publicly available. I could read out right now all the names that are currently on the American Magnitsky list, because they are in the public domain and everybody can see them. There is transparency and accountability, with nowhere to hide once someone is on that list. It is crucial that the list is used in the same way in the UK and that the webpage, or wherever the names are held, is available and updated regularly.
I appreciate that this is not an issue for the House, but I hope that Members will give further thought to how the process of parliamentary scrutiny will work. Will it be through a Committee? If so, which Committee? Will that Committee have powers to add names and conduct reviews? We must hold ourselves to the same standard as the existing Magnitsky list for this to be fully effective.
I want to speak about the issue of Scottish limited partnerships, which is dealt with in new clauses 1 and 19. We believe that linking an SLP with a human individual would go a considerable way to cracking down on the abuse of SLPs, so we suggest that a limited partner and a general partner must both be British citizens and that a general and a limited partner must have a UK bank account. That would, at a stroke, remove a great deal of illegitimate SLPs, while protecting those in agriculture and other areas who would be easily able to fulfil those simple requirements. The anti-money laundering requirements of our banks would act as a degree of deterrent to those seeking to abuse the system.
On new clause 1, until 2009 registrants of limited partnerships were required under the Limited Partnerships Act 1907 to provide the full name of the partners. However, the Legislative Reform (Limited Partnerships) Order 2009 confirmed that the legally required level of registration disclosure needed to be less expansive. The new clause would restore the basic information requested at the time of registration and introduce a requirement for one of the general partners to be a British citizen.
New clause 19, on the UK bank account requirement, would tie this a bit more tightly. Although SLPs’ name and country of incorporation may give them the veneer of a UK-regulated entity, at the moment their bank account and all their financial transactions can be run through overseas bank accounts that have few, if any, anti-money laundering checks on their account holders. We want to tighten that up significantly, because allowing that kind of abuse could severely damage the credibility of UK legal entities abroad.
I am most grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way. I took so many interventions on overseas territories that I forgot to comment on new clauses 1 and 19. We think that both are very sensible, given the explosion in SLPs in recent years and the complete failure to act on what has happened in the past year. New clause 19 is particularly powerful because it would mean that these people were within the ambit of the anti-money laundering legislation for the banking system.
I thank the hon. Lady for her support. I hope to at least press new clause 19 to a vote, because there needs to be some action on SLPs, and tying it to a bank account is a good way of doing that.
The SNP is extremely proud of Scotland’s reputation as a successful place to conduct business, but with SLPs continuing to generate new scandals, there is an ever-growing reputational risk to Scotland, and indeed the UK, if action is not taken. I would like to take this opportunity to dig the Government up for their shenanigans on SLPs.
Owing to the diligent campaigning by the former Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath, Roger Mullin, the UK Government launched a consultation on SLPs on 16 January last year and closed it on 17 March last year. We then had an election, in which my dear friend did not get re-elected. We waited. Questions were tabled, and we were told again and again by Government that a response on the consultation was imminent. There was nothing. A month ago, we were told that it would be a matter of weeks, but probably not until after the Bill came back. Last week, we were told by officials that the report on SLPs was awaiting sign-off in Government, and on Sunday there was an announcement in the press that action was going to be taken, with a “Crackdown on abuse of UK businesses for foreign money laundering”. When we get to the detail, what in fact is it? It is another consultation—it is a consultation about a consultation.
That simply will not do. The UK Government are well aware of the problems with SLPs, which are well documented. The Secretary of State mentioned earlier the evidence that led to the bringing into scope of the person of significant control. We know that that was required, and there was evidence on it. We are waiting for fines to be levied on people who have not registered their persons of significant control.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThirty-three whole regimes is quite a chunky number, is it not? That is not 33 individuals; it is 33 regimes. Of course, I was extremely concerned about the way that the EU withdrawal Bill looked, as were many Members. However, in one respect the problem is greater in this Bill. This is a Bill with permanent powers; the EU withdrawal Bill is one with temporary powers. Therefore, when we come to the right moment, we will wish to put new clause 7 to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 48, page 36, line 5,
‘(5A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 1 that repeals, revokes or amends—
(a) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(b) a Measure or Act of the National Assembly for Wales, or
(c) Northern Ireland legislation,
must receive the consent of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly, respectively.”
This amendment would require the UK Government to obtain the consent of the devolved administrations before repealing, revoking or amending devolved legislation using a statutory instrument containing regulations under section 1.
As I mentioned before, in this Bill the Government have given themselves the capability—although it is not necessarily their intention—to amend devolved Acts. It is not necessarily that the Government will do that, but we need to be mindful that future Governments may choose to. We cannot foretell exactly what the future will hold. In its response to the consultation on this issue, the Law Society posed the question about whether the Government have consulted the devolved Administrations and for what purpose the measure is in the Bill. Although the Government have given themselves this power, they have not explained the circumstances in which they might need to use it. If they say that nothing in the legislation has to do with the devolved Assemblies, why are they giving themselves the power to revoke devolved Assemblies’ legislation, when they would not have any competence to do so? It does make any sense that they would put something in the Bill if they have no intention or need to use it.
I would also like to know—given that the Government have not explained this either—the circumstances in which they would want to override devolved legislation and why they feel a consent provision such as the one I am suggesting is not appropriate. If the Government believe that devolved legislations have no power in this area anyway and would therefore not be legislating in it, why have they put the capability of amending devolved Acts within the scope of this Bill? Would the Minister also explain why our consent provision would be considered inappropriate? That has not been explained up to this point, or during deliberations in the Lords. I have read some of the background, and Baroness Northover and Baroness Sheehan did not quite understand the need for what the Government propose either, so I would be grateful if they made more information available. It is not clear to me, and, as I mentioned previously, this provision strikes me as a power grab, and an unnecessary one at that.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 48 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 49 and 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clauses 51 to 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Extent
I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 54, page 41, line 6, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe amendments relate to the importance of having guidance. There is considerable concern in the voluntary and financial sectors that the regulations as provided for under clause 36—
“an appropriate Minister may make regulations”—
are a piece of volunteerism and not an obligation on the Minister. That is causing some anxiety and confusion among those actors who have to implement the sanctions, whether NGOs or the financial sector. I will give a slightly more detailed description of this, because it is a bit complicated.
Last year Chatham House looked at the issue in some detail. It concluded that a number of UN Security Council sanctions regimes authorise the imposition of targeted sanctions against non-state armed group parties to armed conflicts. Of particular relevance to humanitarian action are financial sanctions such as asset freezes, which, among other things, require member states to ensure that funds, financial assets or economic resources are not made available to or for the benefit of designated entities. Asset freezes can be problematic for humanitarian action. There is a risk that the obligation not to make assets available to designated groups will be interpreted as covering incidental payments that must be made to such groups—for road tolls or locally purchased fuel, for example—so that humanitarian relief reaches civilians in need. It may also be interpreted as covering humanitarian goods or equipment that are diverted to such groups or otherwise benefit them, directly or indirectly. The scope of potential liability for violating asset freezes is very broad, and no intent or knowledge is required for that to be an offence, which is harsher than the bar for other kinds of breaches.
Although asset freezes are most likely to have an adverse impact on humanitarian action and, consequently, they have received the greatest attention, other forms of sanction may have a similar impact. In Syria, the problem was oil and petrol. Broader financial crimes risks arising from the Financial Action Task Force have also complicated humanitarian work.
The role of the UK financial sector in implementing sanctions is also relevant. It is not clear whether, when assessing the impact of sanctions, the UK intends to borrow the EU’s 50% rule for ownership and control. UK Finance states that
“the clarity of the ownership and control structures becomes of paramount importance and can be one of the most complex elements of ensuring sanctions compliance. If ownership or control is established in accordance with set criteria, the making available of funds or economic resources to non-listed legal persons or entities which are owned or controlled by a listed person or entity will in principle be considered a sanctions breach. The EU, and indeed many other jurisdictions, tend to apply a 50 percent rule and criterion to establish the ownership and control of an entity…if a listed individual has 50 percent or more ownership of a non-listed entity, EU persons/entities are prohibited from making available funds”.
There is no reference in the Bill to existing EU standards. The purpose of amendment 27 is to clarify that.
I am concerned about the use of the word “may” in the clause, which states that the guidance “may include guidance” about certain things. I am concerned that that is not sufficiently well developed. I very much support the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland’s amendments, which would add a wee bit more clarity, detail and guidance. The clause is worth while, but the Government would do well to listen to the detail that she laid out.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Revocation and amendment of regulations under section 1
Amendment made: 6, in clause 39, page 30, line 24, leave out “(d)” and insert “(h)”—(Sir Alan Duncan.)
The provision amended here is a condition which applies to the power to amend regulations made under Clause 1 which state a purpose within Clause 1(2). The amendment expands the reference to Clause 1(2) so that it covers paragraphs (e) to (h) of Clause 1(2) (as well as paragraphs (a) to (d)).
Clause 39, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 41
Power to amend Part 1 so as to authorise additional sanctions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
I want to express some concerns that I mentioned on Second Reading. The clause grants a lot of powers to Ministers. It allows them to amend the definition of sanctions. What I and the House of Lords Constitution Committee are concerned about is how that is then scrutinised by Parliament. I do not know whether the Minister has had any time to think about how it might work since Second Reading, but I am concerned that the legislation does not include a mechanism to look at sanctions that is similar to the one that exists in the European Scrutiny Committee. I would like a wee bit further clarity on whether the Government have plans to do that. If not, why not? What might the mechanism look like?
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe purpose of these amendments is to increase the frequency of the periodic review of designations from every three years to every year. I owe this idea to the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, who suggested it on Second Reading. I thought that she might table amendments but that I had better do so in case she did not. It was a very sensible suggestion, and I am sure she wishes to explain why it is a good idea.
I thank the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland for tabling these amendments—she was just a little swifter getting them in than I was.
I spoke about this issue on Second Reading. First, there is an important point about consistency: the EU has a 12-month review period for its sanctions, and we ought to make the Bill consistent with that. There seems to be no reason why we should want to leave it as long as three years to review sanctions, particularly given that situations can change rapidly and that we should hope that sanctions take effect in a shorter period than three years. We are trying to promote good behaviour and resolution, and we should hope to achieve that within three years, making the three-year period redundant in some cases.
It makes sense to maintain consistency and allow constant review by keeping the review period to 12 months. If things take longer than that, it makes sense to look at them within 12 months to ensure that the Government’s foreign policy objectives are making progress and that things are actually happening. If they are not, perhaps they ought to be reviewed. A 12-month period would give us a good deal more flexibility and accountability. It certainly seems logical to me, and I very much hope the Government accept the amendments.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI think this motion is an extraordinary development on the part of the Government Whip. I have been a Member of this House for 13 years, and I have never been in a Bill Committee where it has been suggested that we adjourn after three hours of sitting and half an hour of the second session. We have another 40 clauses, two schedules, 11 Government amendments and 36 Opposition amendments to consider. They all concern extremely important matters. I am frankly astonished that the Government think it acceptable to behave in this way on these issues.
We agreed yesterday to the Government reshuffling the order of the consideration of the clauses. We agreed to their request that we consider clause 1 after clause 18. We did not demur from that; we asked them why. I do not know whether they are trying to avoid that consideration, whether they are uncomfortable about the many speeches they heard on Second Reading on the Magnitsky amendments that we have tabled, or whether they want to avoid fully debating their record on anti-money laundering. Do they not want us to discuss the secret regimes of the overseas territories? Are they uncomfortable about what they have overseen with foreign corrupt oligarchs buying property in London? Do they wish to supress exposure of those matters? There is certainly not a consensus in this Committee for adjourning now.
I agree that this motion is quite disrespectful to the Committee. We have only been here for half an hour, and we all want to press on. We have got only two more days to look at this huge number of amendments to a very important Bill. It smacks to me of game playing on the part of the Government to move the motion and to be so disrespectful. We are all here in this House, and if the Minister turns around, he will see that the weather outside indicates that we are not going anywhere soon. We are pretty much getting snowed into the building as we speak. We may as well sit here, huddled together, and finish the work that we have begun here this afternoon.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberPerhaps the hon. Lady would like to ask the Minister whether the powers he is taking in chapter 3—temporary powers in relation to EU sanctions lists—will not give him the power to enforce the fifth money laundering directive.
That is a very good question. I do not know whether the Minister wants to take this opportunity to answer it—perhaps not. He has heard the question, so I need not repeat it.
Finally, I want to refer to the Scottish Government, because aspects of the Bill reflect some of the powers that lie within Scotland. The Court of Session is referred to in clause 33(2) and clause 34(2). What consultation has there been with the legal profession in Scotland and with the Scottish Government on that? On clause 47 —“Regulations: general”—the power to change devolved legislation under the negative procedure is really not cool. It is not just I who object to this; the Library briefing states that this will
“enable ministers to make supplemental, incidental, consequential, transitional or saving provisions repealing or otherwise amending existing legislation, including devolved legislation.”
Lord Judge referred to this clause as “monstrous”. Has the Scottish Government been consulted on this provision? What has the Minister got to say about this? This power grab, hidden on page 35 of the Bill, is something that I will seek to amend in Committee.
I support any moves to improve the scope of the Bill, and I look forward to hearing the rest of the debate.