Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Harman Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading - Day 1
Monday 15th March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab)]

I very much agree with what the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) said. The terrible outcome of the police ban on the Clapham common vigil in the wake of the tragic killing of Sarah Everard shows how wrong the Government are to try in this Bill to curb the right to demonstrate, so I hope they will think again about that. The anger of the vigil was about women demanding to be able to walk the streets without fear, and we must listen to those demands and act on them now in the Bill. This demand is not new. Along with women up and down the country, I joined the “Reclaim the Night” protests in the 1970s, but then women’s demands were not listened to by the men in the corridors of power. Now there are women in government, in the Home Office and in the Cabinet. There are women in all parties in Parliament. We are in the corridors of power, so we must use our power to deliver for women.

We all argued it would make a difference if we were here as women in Parliament. Now we had better prove it. We can in this Bill make it a crime to do what men do to women on the street every day and which makes their lives a misery. Kerb crawling is terrifying for a woman or a girl on her own, especially after dark. A man has no right to do it, so let us make it an offence punishable by taking away his driving licence. Following a woman on the street, filming her, trying to get her number and not taking no for an answer are harassment. Why should women and girls have to put up with it? Let us make that a criminal offence. I have tabled two new clauses, which have the backing of Members from all parties, and not just women, but men, too. I hope that the Government will accept them.

Too often when a woman is the victim of a sexual offence, all her previous sexual history is dragged up in court and it ends up as though she is in the dock, not the man. That is not supposed to happen, but it does, so we need to stop it. I have new clauses with cross-party backing to do that, too, which I hope the Government will back. Women do not want us to sympathise; they want action, and that is what we should do.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Court Bill

Baroness Harman Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Ms Harriet Harman (Camberwell and Peckham) (Lab) [V]]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

(Deputy) Speaker: With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

New clause 2—Kerb-crawling—

‘(1) It is an offence for a person, from a motor vehicle while it is in a street or public place, or in a street or public place while in the immediate vicinity of a motor vehicle that they have just got out of, to engage in conduct which amounts to harassment in such manner or in such circumstances as to be likely to cause annoyance, alarm, distress, or nuisance to any other person.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to revocation of their driving licence, or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale, or both.

(3) In this section “motor vehicle ” has the same meaning as in the Road Traffic Act 1972.

(4) In this section “street” has the meaning given by section 1(4) of the Street Offences Act 1959.’

New clause 23—Child criminal exploitation

‘At end of section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (meaning of exploitation), insert—

“Child criminal exploitation

(7) Another person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls the person to undertake activity which constitutes a criminal offence and the person is under the age of 18.’

This new clause introduces a statutory definition of child criminal exploitation.

New clause 24—Registered sex offenders: change of name or identity—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of how registered sex offenders are able to change their name or other aspects of their identity without the knowledge of the police with the intention of subverting the purpose of their registration.

(2) The review must consult persons with expertise in this issue, including—

(a) representatives of police officers responsible for sex offender management,

(b) Her Majesty’s Passport Office, and

(c) the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency.

(3) The scope of the review must include consideration of resources necessary for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.

(4) The review must make recommendations for the long-term management of the issue of registered sex offenders changing their names or other aspects of their identity.

(5) The Secretary of State must report the findings of this review to Parliament within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed.’

This new clause would ensure that the Secretary of State must publish a review into how registered sex offenders are changing their names or other aspects of their identity and propose solutions for how the Government aims to tackle this issue.

New clause 26—Reporting of sexual offences: public awareness—

‘Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must draw up and implement a campaign to improve public awareness of the desirability of reporting sexual offences, with particular reference to offences which may not be reported because they are not considered sufficiently serious.’

New clause 27—Code of practice on dealing with sexual offending—

‘(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must issue a code of practice on dealing with sexual offending.

(2) The code must be issued to—

(a) all police forces in England and Wales,

(b) all local authorities in England and Wales,

(c) the National Probation Service,

(d) the Victims Commissioner and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, and

(e) anyone else the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(3) The code must contain provision designed to—

(a) improve public awareness of the desirability of reporting sexual offences, with particular reference to non-contact sexual offences, and

(b) achieve any other purpose the Secretary of State considers appropriate to deal with sexual offending.

(4) Before issuing a code under this section the Secretary of State must—

(a) publish proposals,

(b) consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate, and

(c) lay a copy of the code before Parliament.’

New clause 28—Domestic homicide reviews—

(1) Section 9 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (2) substitute—

“(2) The Secretary of State must in all cases which meet the circumstances set out in subsection (1) direct a specified person or body within subsection (4) to establish, or to participate in, a domestic homicide review.”

(3) After subsection (3) insert—

“(3ZA) The Secretary of State must by regulations set out—

(a) the type of data relating to domestic homicide reviews which must be recorded, including—

(i) the number of domestic homicide reviews taking place across England and Wales annually; and

(ii) the time taken to complete each individual domestic homicide review;

(b) that the data must be recorded centrally in a Home Office database; and

(c) that the data must be published annually.”’

This new clause seeks to modify the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 to force the Secretary of State to automatically direct a domestic homicide review in circumstances as outlined in Section 9 of the Act. The new clause also aims to improve data collection methodologies around domestic homicide reviews.

New clause 29—The right to protest—

‘(1) The Public Order Act 1986 Part II (Processions and Assemblies) is amended as follows.

(2) Before section 11 insert—

“10A The right to protest

(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.

(2) Public authorities have a duty to—

(a) respect the right to protest;

(b) protect the right to protest; and

(c) facilitate the right to protest.

(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect national security or public safety, prevent disorder or crime, protect public health or the rights and freedoms of others.

(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.”’

This new clause would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities whilst recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.

New clause 31—Offence of assaulting etc. retail worker—

‘(1) It is an offence for a person to assault, threaten or abuse another person—

(a) who is a retail worker, and

(b) who is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(2) No offence is committed under subsection (1) unless the person who assaults, threatens or abuses knows or ought to know that the other person—

(a) who is a retail worker, and

(b) is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, a fine, or both.

(4) Evidence from a single source is sufficient to establish, for the purposes of this section—

(a) whether a person is a retail worker, and

(b) whether the person is engaged, at the time, in retail work.

(5) The offence under subsection (1) of threatening or abusing a retail worker is committed by a person only if the person—

(a) behaves in a threatening or abusive manner towards the worker, and

(b) intends by the behaviour to cause the worker or any other person fear or alarm or is reckless as to whether the behaviour would cause such fear or alarm.

(6) Subsection (5) applies to—

(a) behaviour of any kind including, in particular, things said or otherwise communicated as well as things done,

(b) behaviour consisting of—

(i) a single act, or

(ii) a course of conduct.

(7) Subsections (8) to (10) apply where, in proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is—

(a) specified in the complaint that the offence is aggravated by reason of the retail worker’s enforcing a statutory age restriction, and,

(b) proved that the offence is so aggravated.

(8) The offence is so aggravated if the behaviour constituting the offence occurred because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.

(9) Evidence from a single source is sufficient to prove that the offence is so aggravated.

(10) Where this section applies, the court must—

(a) state on conviction that the offence is so aggravated,

(b) record the conviction in a way that shows that the offence is so aggravated,

(c) take the aggravation into account in determining the appropriate sentence, and

(d) state—

(i) where the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is different from that which the court would have imposed if the offence were not so aggravated, the extent of and

the reasons for that difference, or

(ii) otherwise, the reasons for there being no such difference.

(11) In this section—

“enforcement”, in relation to a statutory age restriction, includes—

(a) seeking information as to a person’s age,

(b) considering information as to a person’s age,

(c) refusing to sell or supply goods or services,

for the purposes of complying with the restriction (and “enforcing” is to be construed accordingly),

“statutory age restriction” means a provision in an enactment making it an offence to sell or supply goods or services to a person under an age specified in that or another enactment.

(12) In this section, “retail worker”—

(a) means a person—

(i) whose usual place of work is retail premises, or

(ii) whose usual place of work is not retail premises but who does retail work,

(b) includes, in relation to a business that owns or occupies any premises in which the person works, a person who—

(i) is an employee of the business,

(ii) is an owner of the business, or

(iii) works in the premises under arrangements made between the business and another person for the provision of staff,

(c) also includes a person who delivers goods from retail premises.

(13) For the purposes of subsection (12), it is irrelevant whether or not the person receives payment for the work.

(14) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is not necessary for the prosecutor to prove that the person charged with the offence knew or ought to have known any matter falling within subsection (12)(b) in relation to the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed.

(15) In this section, “retail premises” means premises that are used wholly or mainly for the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public.

(16) In this section, “retail work” means—

(a) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is retail premises, any work in those retail premises,

(b) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is not retail premises, work in connection with—

(i) the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public, or

(ii) the sale or supply of services (including facilities for gambling) in respect of which a statutory age restriction applies,

(c) subject to subsection (17), in the case of a person who delivers goods from retail premises, work in connection with the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public.

(17) A person who delivers goods from retail premises is doing retail work only during the period beginning when the person arrives at a place where delivery of goods is to be effected and ending when the person leaves that place (whether or not goods have been delivered).

(18) In this section, references to working in premises includes working on any land forming part of the premises.’

New clause 32—Assault due to enforcement of statutory age restriction—

‘(1) This section applies to an offence of common assault that is committed against a worker acting in the exercise of enforcing a statutory age restriction.

(2) This section applies where it is—

(a) specified in the complaint that the offence occurred because of the worker’s enforcing a statutory age restriction, and

(b) proved that the offence so occurred because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.

(3) A person guilty of an offence to which this section applies is liable on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.

(4) In consequence of subsections (1) to (3), in section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (which provides for common assault to be summary offences punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months)—

(a) insert—

“(3) Subsection (1) is subject to section [Assault due to enforcement of statutory age restriction] of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (which makes provision for increased sentencing powers for offences of common assault committed against a worker acting in the exercise of enforcing statutory age restrictions).”

(5) In this section—

“enforcement”, in relation to a statutory age restriction, includes—

(a) seeking information as to a person’s age,

(b) considering information as to a person’s age,

(c) refusing to sell or supply goods or services,

for the purposes of complying with the restriction (and “enforcing” is to be construed accordingly),

“statutory age restriction” means a provision in an enactment making it an offence to sell or supply goods or services to a person under an age specified in that or another enactment.

(6) This section applies only in relation to offences committed on or after the day it comes into force.’

New clause 42—Offence of interference with access to or provision of abortion services—

‘(1) A person who is within a buffer zone and who interferes with any person’s decision to access, provide, or facilitate the provision of abortion services in that buffer zone is guilty of an offence

(2) A “buffer zone” means an area with a boundary which is 150 metres from any part of an abortion clinic or any access point to any building that contains an abortion clinic.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), “interferes with” means—

(a) seeks to influence; or

(b) persistently, continuously or repeatedly occupies; or

(c) impedes or threatens; or

(d) intimidates or harasses; or

(e) advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade, or otherwise expresses opinion; or

(f) informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means; or

(g) sketches, photographs, records, stores, broadcasts, or transmits images, audio, likenesses or personal data of any person without express consent.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) in the first instance—

(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or

(ii) to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or

(iii) to both; and

(b) on further instances—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both; or

(ii) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or to a fine, or to both.

(5) Nothing in this section applies to—

(a) anything done in the course of providing, or facilitating the provision of, abortion services in an abortion clinic,

(b) the operation of a camera if its coverage of persons accessing or attempting to access an abortion clinic is incidental and the camera or footage is not used for any of the purposes listed in subsection (3), and

(c) a police officer acting properly in the course of their duties.’

This new clause would introduce areas around abortion clinics and hospitals (buffer zones) where interference with, and intimidation or harassment of, women accessing or people providing abortion services would be an offence.

New clause 43—Implementation of the Law Commission review of hate crime—

‘(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations implement any recommendations of the Law Commission which relate to hatred based on sex and gender characteristics following the conclusion of its review of hate crime legislation.

(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) includes—

(a) power to amend primary legislation; and

(b) power to amend or revoke subordinate legislation.

(3) A document containing a draft of regulations under subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament not later than six months after the publication of the Law Commission’s recommendations, and that draft must be in a form which would implement all those recommendations which relate to hatred based on sex and gender characteristics.

(4) Draft regulations under subsection (1) must be laid before Parliament not earlier than 90 days, but not later than 180 days, after the document referred to in subsection (3) was laid before Parliament.

(5) The draft regulations laid before Parliament under subsection (4) must be in the form in which they appeared in the document laid before Parliament under subsection (3), except that they may contain any changes which have been recommended by any committee of either House of Parliament which has reported on that document.

(6) A Minister must make a motion in each House of Parliament approving the draft regulations laid before Parliament under subsection (4) within 14 days of the date on which they were laid.

(7) Subject to subsection (8), if the draft regulations are approved by both Houses of Parliament, the Secretary of State must make them in the form of the draft which has been approved.

(8) If any amendments to the draft regulations are agreed to by both Houses of Parliament, the Secretary of State must make the regulations in the form of the draft as so amended.’

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to implement any recommendations made by the Law Commission’s review of hate crime which relate to hatred based on sex and gender characteristics. Draft regulations implementing the Commission’s recommendations would be subject to the super-affirmative scrutiny process (by subsections (3) to (5)), and would be amendable (under subsection (8)).

New clause 44—Commercial sexual exploitation—

‘(1) A person (A) who gives, offers, or promises payment to any person to engage in sexual activity with a person (B) is guilty of an offence.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a “payment” includes money, a benefit, or any other consideration.

(b) an activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that—

(i) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature sexual, or

(ii) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.

(c) no offence is committed by a person (A) unless the sexual activity with the other person (B) involves—

(i) the person (A) being in the other person (B)’s presence, and

(ii) the person (A) touching the other person (B), or

(iii) the person (B) touching themselves for the sexual gratification of the other person (A).

(d) it is immaterial whether the payment is given, offered, or promised by a person engaging in the sexual activity, or a third party.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’

This new clause criminalises buying sex and decriminalises anyone offering sexual services.

New clause 45—Commercial sexual exploitation by a third party—

‘(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) the person (C) assists, facilitates, controls, or incites, by any means, another person (B) to engage in sexual activity with another person (A) in exchange for payment, anywhere in the world; and

(b) the circumstances are that—

(i) the person (C) knows or ought to know that the other person (B) is engaging in sexual activity for payment; and

(ii) the person (C) assists, facilitates, controls, or incites the other person (B) to engage in sexual activity with another person (A) with the intention of receiving payment.

(c) Subsection (1) of this section is to be construed in accordance with section [Commercial sexual exploitation].

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’

This new clause criminalises pimping.

New clause 46—Advertising—

‘(1) A person commits an offence if the person causes or allows to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of activity prohibited by sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] and [Commercial sexual exploitation by a third party] of this Act.

(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.’

This new clause criminalises those who benefit from the advertising of sexual services. This includes ‘pimping websites’.

New clause 47—Extra-territoriality—

‘(1) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act regardless of where the offence takes place.

(2) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence—

(a) under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act if any part of the offence takes place in the UK, and

(b) under section [Advertising] of this Act if any person in the UK pays money to any other person as a result or through the advertisement published or displayed.’

This new clause allows criminal prosecutions for acts contravening the relevant sections whether they occur within or outside the United Kingdom.

New clause 48—Immunity of victims—

‘(1) A person (B), by reason of their involvement as a victim of an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act by another person (A) does not commit an offence by doing anything which (apart from this paragraph) would amount to—

(a) aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the commission of an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act by the other person (A);

(b) conspiring with the other person (A) to commit an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising] of this Act; or

(c) an offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting offences) in relation to the commission of an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] to [Advertising]of this Act by the other person (A); or

(d) an offence under section [Advertising] of this Act.

(2) In this section it is immaterial whether the other person has been convicted of an offence.’

This new clause ensures that those subject to commercial sexual exploitation do not find themselves criminalised by having ‘assisted’ the person buying sexual services.

New clause 49—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions—

‘Section 92 of the Protection from Freedoms Act 2012 is replaced as follows.

“92 Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions

(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under—

(a) section 12 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (buggery),

(b) section 13 of that Act (gross indecency between men), or

(c) section 61 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 or section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (corresponding earlier offences), may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.

(2) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959, may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.

(3) A conviction or caution becomes a disregarded conviction or caution when conditions A and B are met.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), condition A is that the Secretary of State decides that it appears that—

(a) the other person involved in the conduct constituting the offence consented to it and was aged 16 or over, and

(b) any such conduct now would not be an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory).

(5) For the purposes of subsection (2), condition A is that the Secretary of State decides that it appears that any such conduct now would not be an offence under sections [Commercial sexual exploitation] and [Commercial sexual exploitation by a third party] of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2021.

(6) Condition B is that—

(a) the Secretary of State has given notice of the decision to the applicant under section 94(4)(b), and

(b) the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice was given has ended.

(7) Sections 95 to 98 explain the effect of a conviction or caution becoming a disregarded conviction or caution.”’

This new clause permits those who as a result of exploitation have convictions for soliciting, to have their conviction disregarded.

New clause 50—Repeals—

‘The enactments specified in the following Table are repealed to the extent specified in column 2 of the Table.

TABLE

[Ms Harman]

Let me say at the outset that I completely agree with everything that the hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) has just said. We have not got enough time to properly debate the Bill and the many issues it engages.

I have four key issues, which are the subject of cross-party amendments and new clauses. One is to do with the crucial right to protest, which the Bill curtails. As Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I have tabled amendments on that. I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) will get an opportunity to speak about protecting and enhancing the right to protest. The right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) has also tabled a new clause on that, which has a great deal of support. Many other hon. Members will speak about the subject.

There are also concerns about the rights of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community. Again, as Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I have tabled amendments on that and so have other Members, including the hon. Member for Stockton South (Matt Vickers). My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones) will speak about both issues from our Front Bench. I will therefore not speak specifically about the right to protest and Gypsy, Roma and Traveller rights, but I strongly support those from all parts of the House who will speak on those matters.

I will confine my comments to new clauses 1 and 2, which have support from across the House. They deal with the safety of women and girls on the street. Hon. Members will remember that, after the horrific killing of Sarah Everard, there was an outflowing on social media from young women and girls, even young schoolgirls, saying, “We are not safe walking on our streets at night. If we have to walk home in the dark after school, we will often find a man in a van kerb-crawling us with the window wound down, calling for us to get in the van, asking why we are not getting into the van, and following us home.” Often, they will take a longer route home, even though it takes more time, to go down busier streets, rather than the quickest route, where they feel less safe. Often, they will take a cab when they would really like to walk home, but just do not feel safe.

What has been shown is that this is not just a problem for some young girls and women; it is a problem for all. It is a universal, everyday experience. Sexually predatory men feel that they can harass and intimidate young girls and young women when they are on the street, especially after dark and if they are on their own. We simply have to decide whether we are going to protect and support the rights of men to do that, or whether we are going to say, “No, we support the rights of women and girls to be able to walk down our streets at night on their own, after dark in the winter, coming home from school, without being subjected to this sort of intimidation, menace and harassment.” I do not think we hear anybody arguing that in this day and age, women and girls should accept that. I remember that, back in the day when I, like everybody else, was subjected to it, if someone complained, people said, “But you should be flattered—you should be flattered that people find you attractive.” It is not flattering. It is menacing, it is unwarranted and it is unwanted, and we should not accept it.

I have tabled two new clauses. One is about kerb-crawling. Currently, it is a criminal offence to kerb-crawl a woman if someone is doing so to solicit her because they want to pay for sex. That was introduced many years ago to protect a neighbourhood from becoming a red light district and having endemic kerb-crawling, so we already have the basis in the law. What I am suggesting, with a lot of cross-party support, is that this should be a criminal offence without it being because the man is doing it to try to pay for sex; it is enough if he is kerb-crawling. He should not be able to do that. The punishment ought to be taking away his licence. If a man is going to lose his licence for his van or car, he will pretty soon alter his behaviour, which is exactly what he should be doing.

I also have a new clause on harassment in the street. At the moment, if a man harasses a woman and there is a course of conduct because he is generally stalking her, that is a criminal offence, but if he does it to a schoolgirl going home who he does not know and it is not a course of conduct but one-off conduct, she has no right of redress. I suggest expanding the stalking offence to include even a one-off, so we have two bespoke offences.

If we have two new crimes, women and girls will know that they do not have to put up with this and that they can complain, men will know that they are going to be called to account and end up in court if they do it, the police will know that they have to investigate it and prosecute it, and the courts will know how to deal with it. Then, we can end the shameful situation that women and girls find themselves in on the street.

The Government have said in Committee that they are in listening mode. That is welcome, but it does not go far enough. Women and girls want the Government not just to listen, but to act. It is about time that the concerns of women and girls were heard and acted on. If we do not support the new clauses and the Government do not accept them, they will be guilty of letting women and girls down. I hope that will not be the case. I press the Minister, who has been very generous with her time in meeting me, to say that this is the moment that we are going to change the law and make a new start.

[Mr Speaker]

I remind hon. Members that, if we do put a speaking limit on, it will be on the countdown clock, which will be visible on the screen. I am now going to appeal to everybody, without the time limit on, to please not force it. Let us be kind to each other—short and brief. Everybody, I believe, has a genuine contribution to make, so I really want to hear them.