(8 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI endorse those comments completely.
Swap for swap outcomes are much more likely for RBS customers and the percentage of non-compliant sales that do not result in a tear-up of the agreement within RBS has gone from about 40% to about 60%, which is not in line with other examples. I would argue that the voluntary scheme that the FCA put together is not delivering and is not being monitored in accordance with the FCA’s mission statement. I will leave that issue there because I have spoken at length about interest rate swap mis-selling in this Chamber and made my concerns known time and again.
When the voluntary redress scheme was announced, we thought that the inclusion of consequential losses was a pleasant surprise. I am afraid that we were being overly optimistic. Our analysis of the redress scheme showed that in 50% of the 3,104 cases that we looked at, no consequential losses were received, and in 85% of the cases that did receive consequential losses, they amounted to less than £10,000. I have personally seen dozens of well-argued cases in the redress scheme that have been rejected by the banks without an explanation. Even worse, the business is allowed one appeal against that decision without knowing the basis on which it has been rejected—it has one opportunity to challenge, and invariably that challenge fails. On consequential losses we are again failing businesses.
Time and again cases go to court. They are often settled outside court, where the settlement will be better than what was offered under the redress scheme, and that should be a cause of concern for the regulator. Of perhaps even more concern to Members of the House is the fact that time and again gagging orders are placed on those settlements by a taxpayer-funded bank on the back of taxpayers. I find that utterly unacceptable.
Let me move on to the Connaught Income Fund, which creates a real problem concerning regulation in this country. The regulator was informed not of mismanagement but of fraudulent behaviour, yet it took four months before it put a notice on its website to highlight its concerns and say that the fund in question was not as safe as a bank account, and a further year before that fund was wound up. In the meantime, between the whistleblower informing the regulator about the problem with Connaught and the winding up of the scheme, more than half the total investments into the Connaught income stream occurred. It could therefore be argued that the regulator was responsible for at least half the fund.
Dr Eric Saunderson is one of many constituents who made significant losses under the Connaught investment scheme. He is not just frustrated by the inordinate length of time that the FCA is taking to investigate that and decide what compensation might be payable, but he is still unclear as to whether that compensation—once decided—will be paid directly to investors or put into the suspended Connaught fund.
My hon. Friend makes an important point, and there is a lack of clarity on that issue. Only last week the FCA decided to publish on its website the fact that there has been a settlement between the liquidators and Capita. Interestingly, the decision to publish that statement on its website breached the confidentiality agreement. Therefore, the regulator was commenting on a settlement, but the parties to that settlement were not able to offer any advice because there is a confidentiality agreement. The FCA has a track record of being accused of breaching confidentiality, but to publish the fact that it is taking a degree of responsibility for the outcome is utterly unacceptable in view of the fact that the liquidators are stating categorically that they are not associating themselves in any way, shape or form with the statement, that they do not agree with aspects of that statement, and that the only reason they had to force a settlement was that the mediation that the FCA decided to try to arrange was not successful. Indeed, the decision to finish the mediation was made without consultation. For the regulator to make a statement on its website that is then categorically denied by the parties to the agreement is a matter of concern.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI, like most colleagues here, have had correspondence with constituents who have lost considerable amounts of savings, with this often changing the direction of their lives as the amounts are so significant. Does my hon. Friend share my hope that the strength of feeling being shown in this Chamber today will force some urgency to be put into finding a solution to this?
Again, I fully agree with my hon. Friend’s comments, and I do think that tonight’s turnout indicates the concern across the House on this issue. It is important to point out again that the proposed mediation was described as the fastest way of getting some compensation to investors, which is why the APPG welcomed it, although with some reservations. A deadline date of 31 October 2014 was offered for the completion of that mediation. Subsequently, in November 2014 the FCA announced a new date of the end of January 2015, and then in January 2015 it announced a new date of the end of March.
On 9 March 2015, I was asked to meet Martin Wheatley, the now former chief executive of the FCA, in Portcullis House, where I was informed that the FCA was withdrawing from the mediation process—that was announced the following day. Again, the decision was unilateral. In effect, the decision to go for mediation was a unilateral one made by the FCA without consulting other stakeholders, as was the decision to end the mediation. As chair of the APPG, I think it essential that the FCA explains why it took those decisions. It needs to explain why it thought it was better to end the mediation rather than continue with a method of dealing with this issue that it had claimed would be the most effective way to proceed.