High Court Judgment (John Downey)

Gregory Campbell Excerpts

Thursday 27th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dodds]

The hon. Gentleman raises the issue of amnesty. As was borne out in the Downey judgment, in reality, someone in possession of a letter of comfort issued by whoever it was—again, the inquiries will no doubt probe who gave authority for or signed off the letters, as well as to whom they were transmitted, and so on and so forth—could use it in court as a shield against prosecution even if evidence existed, provided that the information that they were being pursued or that evidence existed had not been communicated to them. That is my understanding of the situation in relation to Downey. Effectively, because a mistake was made on the facts in the Downey case, he could use the letter as a shield against any further prosecution, and the prosecution was stayed. For him, it was an amnesty, and given the double jeopardy rule, he cannot now be prosecuted for the particular crimes relating to the Hyde park bombings. Of course, prosecution remains open for other crimes, and I hope that the prosecution authorities and the police are looking into that matter.



My party and others opposed any relief or amnesty, or any scheme that would allow on-the-runs to evade justice. That has been our consistent position for many years. We opposed the legislation when it came before this House in 2005. The recent suggestion by the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, John Larkin, that there should be an amnesty as part of the Haass process has been rejected by us and others. As a party, we opposed the provisions of the Belfast agreement in relation to the early release of prisoners, whereby people who had been convicted by due process—some of them, on both sides of the community, had been convicted of the most heinous and horrible crimes of terrorism—were allowed to walk free from prison if they had served more than two years. We opposed that part of the Belfast agreement, while other parties, which opposed this scheme, supported it.

The point has of course been made—it is a fair one—that at least the early release scheme was known about and was in the public domain. It has even been described as a terrible betrayal of victims by the right hon. Member for Neath, who has said that he understands the hurt that it caused. It was at least open and out there, and people knew about it when they voted in the referendum in 1998.

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the galling thing about the Downey case is that had the scheme not come to light—he has outlined it, and our and many people’s rejection of it—it would still be continuing to this very day?

[Mr Dodds]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. He is absolutely right that had it not been for the revelations in the Downey case, we would still be in the dark about all this. The two-year release scheme was obnoxious, and it remains obnoxious because anyone convicted of a terrorism-related crime that took place before 1998 can still avail themselves of its provisions. If someone is now found who has evidence against them of an offence that occurred before 1998 and was related to terrorism in Northern Ireland, they can go to prison for at most two years. That continues to cause great offence in Northern Ireland, but at least that scheme was out in the public domain. It was debated in this House and debated publicly, and decisions were taken as a result. However, there was never such transparency in this scheme. As my hon. Friend has pointed out, we would still be in the dark if we had not had the Downey case.

We need to find out how this all happened—who knew and when they knew—and to examine the scheme’s legality. We also need to ensure that another Downey case never happens, and that such letters have no effect when it comes to being able to stay prosecutions.

When the details emerged, the Attorney-General made a statement in this House on 26 February, but it appeared to many people that that would be it. There was no indication in any statements made at the time that there would be any further consideration of the matter. Indeed, Ministers were on the radio at lunch time that day saying that, as far as they were concerned, that was the end of the matter and nothing more could be done.

As the House knows, the First Minister of Northern Ireland—my party leader, Peter Robinson—made it very clear that had he known about or been made aware of the scheme when the restoration of devolution was negotiated, we would not have been able to proceed with devolution on that basis. He said that the matter was of considerable concern, given that policing and justice has become a devolved matter, that it is now the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive, and that the Justice Minister is responsible for those matters. He said that given that the First Minister, the Justice Minister and the parties in Northern Ireland, apart from Sinn Fein, were not aware of the scheme, it needed to be addressed urgently. He made it very clear that there had to be a judge-led inquiry.

I welcome the fact that that inquiry was announced by the Prime Minister on 27 February. I welcome the fact that on that day, the Secretary of State also issued a statement, which said:

“We will take whatever steps are necessary to make clear…in a manner that will satisfy the courts…that any letters issued cannot be relied upon to avoid questioning or prosecution for offences where information or evidence becomes available now or later.”—[Official Report, 28 February 2014; Vol. 576, c. 39WS.]

I welcome the fact that Lady Justice Hallett has been appointed. Her terms of reference are in the public domain. The intention is that she should report by the end of May.

Some people in Northern Ireland were critical of the appointment of the judge-led inquiry. Some of those people had nothing to offer other than base political point scoring and have not contributed anything towards getting to the bottom of these matters. We were very keen that the inquiry should not be dragged out over a long period, as we have seen with so many inquiries that relate to Northern Ireland matters, and that it should not lead to a panoply of lawyers trooping in and out, extending the process so that we did not get an outcome for months, if not years. I therefore welcome the fact that it will be a short, sharp, judge-led inquiry that will be able to examine the papers and deal with many of the issues.

I welcome the fact that the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of the hon. Member for Tewkesbury, has taken steps to set up an inquiry. The Justice Committee in Northern Ireland, under the chairmanship of my friend Paul Givan, the Assembly Member for Lagan Valley, has also initiated an inquiry. It had its first session on 25 March, at which the permanent secretary at the Department of Justice appeared. Interestingly, the permanent secretary, who is a former official in the Northern Ireland Office, admitted to having knowledge of the secret OTR scheme while in that role, but apparently he did not feel that it was necessary to inform the Justice Minister of it when he became permanent secretary at the Department. That raises questions as well, but it is for the Justice Committee in Northern Ireland to pursue them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

The Downey case unfortunately brings into sharp focus some of the problems that we have as a society in dealing with the past. As I said in an intervention, we are in the unfortunate position of knowing that if the Downey case had not materialised, we would still be oblivious to the pernicious influence of the administrative scheme in Northern Ireland.

Since the Downey case, those of us who were not in possession of knowledge of the scheme have been criticised by those in Sinn Fein, who say that had we been informed in the run-up to any agreement on the scheme, we would have opposed it, and that was part of the reason for our being kept in the dark. After that was seen to be somewhat obtuse and ludicrous, the same people in Sinn Fein said that we knew about the scheme all the time. They tried to quote various judgments that might have made some passing reference to a scheme that required to be carried out. However, there never was any reference in the public domain, and as my right hon. Friend the Member for Belfast North (Mr Dodds) said, anything that was put in the public domain, either in the House or outside, precluded a scheme of this nature. In fact, the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr Hain), the former Secretary of State, made it absolutely clear that there was no scheme. Full stop. Period.

[Lady Hermon]

May I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the characteristic features that were mentioned by the right hon. Member for Neath (Mr Hain)? I am sorry that he is not here this afternoon, and I have explained why I understand he cannot be here. The Downey judgment, which is now in the public domain, contains written testimony submitted by the right hon. Gentleman, who said:

“The procedure was in a number of ways wholly unprecedented.”

Another characteristic was that

“the scheme progressed in a non public manner. Confidentiality was maintained for the individuals who submitted their names to the scheme; neither the names of the applicants nor the outcome of the applications were subjected to publicity.”

That is in the public domain, so for Sinn Fein to claim that we all knew about this and that we all have amnesia about it now is absolutely untrue and very insulting.

[Mr Campbell]

I thank the hon. Lady for that very enlightening quotation, which simply proves the point that what unites people right across Northern Ireland—with the exception of those who used to advocate violence and excuse or defend it—is that we are all rightly appalled at the secret nature of the scheme.

It has also been said—others have alluded to this—that members of the Policing Board were in some way briefed, but when we examine the record, we see that no one was ever briefed on such an administrative scheme. Of course, everyone knew that there was an outstanding issue with on-the-runs. There were those who said, “This matter must be resolved,” and those of us who were determined to say, “If it comes before Parliament and there is any possibility of us having some input into a resolution that means giving people immunity for what they have done in the past, we will resolutely oppose it.” That much is absolutely clear.

Others have mentioned the Eames-Bradley report, and the fact that one of its authors, Mr Bradley, said that people knew about the scheme. However, when we look into the matter, it is absolutely clear to us that, whoever may have been informed privately, no one was informed publicly. There was no public reference whatsoever to a scheme of this nature.

[Dr William McCrea (South Antrim) (DUP)]

It might be interesting to find out when Mr Bradley himself knew, and who told him.

[Mr Campbell]

Yes, indeed. I understand that Mr Bradley, who is the former vice-chairman of the Policing Board, said that the issue had been brought before the board. In fact, he had left the board at that stage.

Let me now turn to the question of intent, which is the very kernel of the issue. What was the intent of the administration that initiated the scheme, and what was the intent of the administration that continued it? What was the intent of those who were sending the letters, and what were the perception and understanding of the recipients? That is the key to the entire matter.

It is abundantly clear to everyone that the intent of the letters was to reassure people who might have believed—for a reason that we all understand—that there were circumstances in which, if they either came back to Northern Ireland or were approached by an officer of the law in another jurisdiction in which they happened to be, they could at some point in the future be made accountable for crimes in which they were suspected of having been involved. It is clear that they believed that the letters made them immune from that, and believed that they would be protected or sheltered in some way from the investigation of actions with which they had been associated in the past. For that very reason, Sinn Fein was quite happy to be the messenger of the tidings that would have been brought to the recipients of those letters.

It has been said—this was mentioned by the hon. Member for Belfast East (Naomi Long), who has had to leave the Chamber—that when news of the Downey case broke, disillusionment in some sections of the Unionist community became more apparent. I have a very different view. All that the Downey case did was crystallise some of the disillusionment that had been apparent for a number of years in sections of the Unionist community, and bring it into public focus. Unfortunately, we now have to try to repair the damage that the Downey judgment has done, along with a series of other issues.

The underlying principle is that those who supported terror in the past have used the potential of a return to violence as a bargaining chip, and not for the first time. Many of us believe that during the negotiations leading to and following the Belfast agreement, and, undoubtedly, during the negotiations relating to the administrative scheme, there was always the spectre—the prospect—that if this was not agreed to, violence could, unfortunately, return. Our view is very clear, and it is that we cannot be held to ransom by people who make threats or insinuations that bad times could return.

[Mr Dodds]

My hon. Friend has made an important point. May I reinforce it by asking whether he recalls, as I do, that at the time of the negotiations on the devolution of police and justice powers to Northern Ireland, when certain issues still needed to be cleared up and properly debated, some people—including Members of this House who, at that time, held ministerial office—told us that if we did not devolve those powers, there would be violence on the streets and the strength of the dissidents would increase? Even after the devolution of the powers, we have problems with dissident terrorists, so that is a bogus argument.

[Mr Campbell]

That is another instance of the use of a threat that will continue to be used. In fact, just this week we heard a prominent member of Sinn Fein say that there could be a crisis in the making. Well, we have had seven years of uninterrupted devolved government, and notwithstanding all the difficulties that have arisen during those seven years, there has not been a crisis. There may be a physical revolving door at the entrance to Stormont, but there has not been a revolving door in terms of devolution. We have survived many of these mini-crises and problems, some of them invented and some real.

Let us focus on what will happen in the near future. I have no difficulty whatsoever in saying that the current devolution process in Northern Ireland is sufficiently robust to withstand any prosecution of any member of Sinn Fein, however senior, if it can be demonstrated that that person has been guilty of involvement in terrorist acts in the past. I am currently trying to establish whether that is the case, as it may well be—and if it is the case, it would be an act of cowardice, of political expediency, if anyone were to say “We cannot proceed with that prosecution because doing so might jeopardise the political process in Northern Ireland.”

As I have said, we have had seven years of uninterrupted devolution, and hopefully it will continue. I have been part of the process for those seven years, and I believe that we must work to improve it, but we must not allow it to be held to ransom by those who want to make progress in terms of further concessions to the throwback period during which many of them were involved in violence. They want to expunge their previous involvement from the record, and that must not and cannot be allowed to happen.

Today, thankfully, we have had an opportunity that has been denied to us in the past. The light of truth is now being brought to bear on the administrative scheme, but it is unfortunate that it is being brought to bear so belatedly. Had it been brought to bear at the time of the scheme’s initiation, the reality and the outcome might have been very different.