Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Report)

Gregory Campbell Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

The right hon. Gentleman has, perhaps inadvertently, touched on some of the problems with the Saville report. Many in the Unionist community believe exactly what he has just said—that it was a political decision taken for political reasons with a premeditated outcome in mind that determined the announcement on Saville.

[Paul Murphy]

It depends what the hon. Gentleman means by political. I am not saying for a moment that it was a party political issue. I used the term “political” in the sense that it was part of the bigger picture to achieve peace. Both things together were important. Clearly, the nationalist community, the Irish Government, the American Government and people generally believed that we had to deal with this particular issue in the way that we did. That does not mean for one second that we did not have to deal with the other issues as well—I shall touch on them in a few moments—but Bloody Sunday was part of the problem.

There was a time some years later, after I had become Secretary of State, when I was troubled about the costs. At that time, it fell to me to deal with the direct government of Northern Ireland as well as the peace process, and £200 million is a great deal of money. Money was needed for hospitals, schools and other services to run a society in Northern Ireland, and of course those costs troubled me. They troubled me to such an extent that when some years later I agreed with the Canadian Judge Cory that there should be four public inquiries—into the cases of Wright, Hamill, Nelson and Finucane—we decided to use a different mechanism, through the 2005 Act and other Acts of Parliament, in the hope of making the process cheaper. In fact, the cost of those inquiries turned out to be £30-odd million.

I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for St Helens South and Whiston (Mr Woodward) about Finucane. I gave an undertaking on behalf of the Government that there would be some form of judicial inquiry into the Finucane case. None of that means that we undervalue the loss of the lives of people who served in the armed forces, the security forces or the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Thousands upon thousands of members of the armed forces and the RUC died as a consequence of the troubles, and we must never forget the sacrifice that they made. However, the Army is an organ of the state. In a liberal democracy the state has a responsibility to ensure that the Army does the right thing, and that is why the Saville inquiry turned out as it did.

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[Mr Laurence Robertson (Tewkesbury) (Con)]

It is an honour to follow the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy). He ended his speech by drawing attention to the need to bring people together and to allow Northern Ireland to move on. Last night, he and I—along with one or two other Members, including the Secretary of State—attended a dinner held by the Integrated Education Fund, whose aim is to bring people together and educate them regardless of their religion. Like the right hon. Gentleman and many other Members, I fully endorse that aim, because the future must be important.

On 15 June, the Prime Minister said that the killings on Bloody Sunday were unjustified and unjustifiable, and the Secretary of State repeated that today. I know that the way in which the Prime Minister dealt with the report in his statement has brought closure to many, though not all, of the families involved. It has brought a degree of comfort, and a degree of solace. The Prime Minister should be congratulated on that. The fact that some of us may have questions to raise about the way in which the report was conducted does not in any way compromise the words of the Prime Minister: he spoke them, and he spoke them very effectively. However, some questions do remain about the way in which the report was conducted.

I have the privilege of being Chairman of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. One or two concerns have been expressed in the Committee, particularly about the time that it took for the report to be compiled and about the costs associated with it. It was estimated in the then Northern Ireland Office that the process might take a couple of years. Lord Saville referred to that when he appeared before the Committee on 13 October. In answer to a question about the time scale, he said:

“We did not have one. I am told that the Northern Ireland Office thought it might last a year or two, or something, but on what basis they made that estimate, I have no idea.”

There was obviously something of a disjoin between the Northern Ireland Office and Lord Saville on that point. The prolonged time that it took to complete the report must have been very frustrating for the families and, indeed, the soldiers involved. A further problem is that memories would have already faded by the time the inquiry began, and would have become even weaker by the time it ended.

There is also, of course, a great deal of concern about the cost. In reply to a question about setting limits for the number of hours the inquiry could sit or the amount per hour lawyers could be paid, Lord Saville said in evidence:

“I just do not see how you can, in advance, put down any sort of time or cost estimate”,

but the Government at the time did that. He also said:

“I do not see how you can”

set limits, yet limits were set. My point is that there seemed to be a lack of co-ordination between the Northern Ireland Office and Lord Saville, and a lack of control over some aspects of the inquiry.

The point could be made that if the inquiry were to be independent, it should have nothing to do with, and be in no way the responsibility of, the NIO, but it troubles me that it is reported that Lord Saville refused to meet the NIO permanent secretary to discuss the report, and I know that that troubles some Committee members as well.

The original estimated cost of the inquiry and then the report was £11 million, with lawyers fees estimated at £1 million, yet the overall costs were £191.4 million, with lawyers’ fees of £100 million. I know that public contracts often run somewhat over-budget, but I think that is stretching that to the absolute limit. Again, I do not in any way wish to compromise the words of the Prime Minister on 15 June, but as taxpayers’ money was involved here, we are entitled to ask these questions.

The fact that the process took so long poses certain questions about exactly how accurate some of the evidence given could have been. We all have memories of the past, and if we are remembering a particularly important incident, we will remember it very vividly, but when we look back—or when, perhaps, television extracts are replayed or we read a book on the subject—our memories might not be quite as things were. Therefore, the fact that the inquiry went on for so long will have resulted in something being taken away from the memories of the events.

It should also be noted that we are looking back at a different era—we are looking back to January 1972—and I want now to read out some comments by Lord Saville that have not been given a great deal of airing in previous debates. In paragraph 2.6 of chapter 2 of the summary, he says:

“Parts of the city to the west of the Foyle lay in ruins, as the result of the activities of the IRA…A large part of the nationalist area of the city was a ‘no go’ area, which was dominated by the IRA, where ordinary policing could not be conducted and where even the Army ventured only by using large numbers of soldiers.”

In paragraph 2.7 he says:

“There had been numerous clashes between the security forces and the IRA in which firearms had been used on both sides”.

That is the background to the events.

[Mr Gregory Campbell]

The hon. Gentleman is accurately explaining what Lord Saville said in that section of the conclusion, but does the hon. Gentleman not share my amazement that, having come to that conclusion, Lord Saville did not investigate any of that destruction or any of the context that led to the events of 30 January?

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[Mr Gregory Campbell (East Londonderry) (DUP)]

Lord Saville and his team carried out public hearings beginning in March 2000, and the final witness was heard in January 2005. In total, 2,500 statements were taken, as a result of which 922 people were called to give direct evidence. Some 610 soldiers, 729 civilians, 30 journalists and photographers, 20 Government officials and 53 police officers gave evidence in some form. As we have heard on numerous occasions, the total cost was in excess of £191 million. Some of the families of those killed in Londonderry on 30 January 1972 have received some form of closure.

As I alluded to in my recent intervention, Saville concentrated almost exclusively on the events of the day in question. However, I and others have repeatedly stressed the need to examine the background and context of the events. After the Saville report was published in June, I spoke out saying it was simply not possible to declare the absolute truth about what happened some 30 years after the event. Because of what I said I was subjected to a vicious hate campaign, not least of which included a Facebook site where a number of contributors indicated that I should be shot dead; a Nazi poster showing a bullet hole through my forehead was put on the site. I went to the police and, that fact having become public knowledge, it was pleasing to see on Monday 21 June that hundreds of people who had signed up to supporting the aims of that site—wanting me murdered—had withdrawn their names within hours of the story breaking on that day. It would appear that supporting violence in secret is quite a good thing for some people but when it becomes public knowledge, they are not so keen. I understand from the police that the prosecution service is studying the evidence and that the police and prosecution service are deciding whether a prosecution is warranted—I await the outcome in due course.

Whatever is found about the attacks or the consequences, the truth about Saville, the context and the background must and will be told. Some try to insinuate that Bloody Sunday was the origin of the troubles, while others attempt to rewrite history by saying that if Bloody Sunday had not happened, the IRA would have been a footnote and a mere minor problem, but Northern Ireland was subjected to frequent attacks. The campaign between 1956 and 1962 was very fresh when the troubles, as they became known, broke out in 1968. Internment had been brought in just before Bloody Sunday to deal with the worsening problems. Widespread violence, right across Northern Ireland, was endemic.

Twenty-one people were murdered in three days of rioting in August 1971. On 10 August 1971, some six months before Bloody Sunday, Bombardier Paul Challenor became the first soldier to be killed by the Provisional IRA in Londonderry, when he was shot by a sniper close to the route of the fateful march on Bloody Sunday. A further six soldiers had been killed in Londonderry by mid-December 1971, five weeks before Bloody Sunday occurred. Almost 2,000 rounds were fired by the IRA at the British Army, which was patrolling the streets, and 211 explosions and 180 nail bombs were aimed at the Army, civilians and ordinary civilian properties, shops and homes in the vicinity, so Provisional IRA activity was rife before Bloody Sunday occurred. Thirty British soldiers were killed in the remaining months of 1971.

Both the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA had established no-go areas for the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary through the use of barricades. At the end of 1971, 29 barricades were in place to prevent access to parts of the Bogside where the march was to take place, 16 of which were impassable, even to the British Army’s one-tonne armoured vehicles. IRA members openly mounted roadblocks in front of the media, and daily clashes occurred between nationalist youths and the British Army. Rioting and incendiary devices aimed at shops caused a then estimated total—this was 40 years ago—of £4 million-worth of damage to commercial property.

I say all this to lay out the context, which Lord Saville did not lay out—£191 million was spent and he did not lay out the context of why the soldiers were there in the first place. I shall tell hon. Members why they were there. The central element of any comprehensive investigation into the events is that the soldiers were going into an area that was extremely hostile and where they were likely to encounter violence. But did Lord Saville—did the report—indicate that that was the factual premise from which to conduct the investigation? No, I am afraid he did not.

The fact that the soldiers met with violence only reinforced their view that they were in for a heavy concentration of fire. Such a concerted level of terror was not unique to Londonderry; as I have said, it was endemic in other parts of Northern Ireland. The truth is that murder, mayhem and terror were rife. In the weeks before the day, there were nine separate bomb attacks on commercial premises, six separate shooting incidents and an 80-minute gun battle, and gelignite and nail bomb attacks were prevalent. Reference has been made to the despicable and cowardly murder of two policemen that then took place three days before the parade and on the very route of the parade. One was a Protestant and the other a Catholic, and one was buried on the day of Bloody Sunday.

It remains the case that we will probably never know the truth of all that transpired on that day. Lord Saville can give his conclusions, and the Front-Bench teams of the Government and the Opposition can concur with those, but we will never know the truth. One participant in the Saville inquiry revelled in the thought that he would not engage in open-ended dialogue about what he was doing in the run-up to Bloody Sunday or on that day. He said that he was the 2IC of the Provisional IRA on that day and in that era; he is now the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness. I welcome his move away from violence and endorse the move towards embracing peace, but unfortunately he refused to go into any detail about his involvement in the IRA on that day. Lord Saville concluded that he “probably” had in his possession a machine gun on that day.

As has been alluded to in the debate, it would appear that some people are demanding prosecutions of soldiers who complied with the Saville inquiry and answered all the questions posed to them throughout the inquiry, but there does not appear to be the same eagerness or intensity of purpose to say that we should also look at the prosecution of someone who “probably” had a machine gun on that day. We have to ask what he was doing with the machine gun on that day. The conclusion is that we will never know.

Saville fell well short of analysing what happened before and during the events of that fateful day. We will not know the truth of all that happened. The one lesson that we can learn from the Saville report and the inquiry is that inquiries, however intense and however long, however protracted and however costly and expensive, seldom, if ever, bring progress towards the future. Let us move forward and not back to the past.

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[Stephen Phillips (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)]

I wish to associate myself not only with the statement that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made to the House earlier this year, but with those by both Front Benchers at the outset of this debate. The Saville report is a unique and valuable report, not only in the life of Northern Ireland, but in that of the whole United Kingdom. Like my right hon. Friend, I am deeply patriotic and I never want to believe anything bad about my country, but from the conclusions reached by Lord Saville and his colleagues, it is clear that something went badly wrong on that Sunday in January 1972. It is my belief that the Prime Minister was entirely right to deliver an apology on behalf of the Government and the nation to the families of those who lost loved ones on that dreadful Sunday.

Where I perhaps part company with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and some hon. Members who have spoken in this debate is on the clarity that has been ascribed to some of the conclusions that the inquiry reached, at least in the minds of some people. I do not for one moment dispute the tribunal’s findings, and they are clear; nor for one moment would I defend the indefensible. With one exception, the tribunal was clear. The firing by the British Army that day was entirely unjustified, and indeed contravened the rules of engagement applying at the time.

However, it is right for the House to bear in mind the fact that Lord Saville’s deliberations with his colleagues and his conclusions took place a considerable time after the events with which he and the tribunal were concerned. He started three decades after those events, and he ended his task nearly 40 years after them. It was a tall order to ask any judge, even one of the standing of Lord Saville, who was so ably assisted by Mr Hoyt and Mr Toohey, to reach wholly unimpeachable conclusions on the events that underpin the tragedy that we are discussing this afternoon. It is more than a tall order to ask a judge to do so some 30 or 40 years after the events in question, often unassisted by evidence owing to the death of those who were present. When a judge in such an inquiry is assisted by evidence, that evidence will be less valuable than it would have been without the passage of time.

[Mr Gregory Campbell]

The hon. Gentleman is elaborating succinctly on the tall order of expecting a judge to remember clearly what happened so many years before, but is it not an equally tall order to expect all the witnesses to have a clear recollection of all the events of so long ago?

[Stephen Phillips]

Indeed it is, and perhaps I was expressing myself unclearly. The difficulty for anyone who presides over such an inquiry so long after the event is that when the evidence is oral—that was principally the evidence that was directly relevant to the matters that the tribunal had to consider—it is undoubtedly weakened by the passage of time. The oral evidence was less satisfactory than it would have been much closer to the events in question.

That brings me to Lord Widgery’s report back in 1972. He was able to consider the events much closer to the time, but having read his report on several occasions and for this debate, I have always had, as I have today and as many hon. Members have, a feeling of considerable unease, even if it does not rise to the same level as that in the mind of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey).

The report was produced in a different era by a judge of a different mettle from Lord Saville, who had served in the Army during the second world war and who, in the 10 weeks available to him to deal with the matter, was deprived of much of the evidence that subsequently emerged. It is not my function on this or any other occasion to defend Lord Widgery, great judge as he was in many respects. I suspect that he was hindered by the absence of evidence before him, and by his training, but I also suspect that he was hindered by his outlook. Constitutionally, it was impossible for judges at that time to accept that soldiers from the Parachute Regiment, like policemen, who gave evidence would not be telling the truth when they said that they were fired upon before they fired.

We shall never know the truth of who fired first, but even with the passage of time and having read the report in its entirety, I have little doubt, given the evidence that supports its conclusions, that Lord Saville came much closer to the truth, even on the balance of probabilities, in finding, as he clearly does, that the first shots were fired by the British Army. I suspect, however, that neither we in this House nor anyone else will ever know for sure who fired the first shot. I accept entirely, as do the whole House and the Government, the conclusions that Lord Saville reached, but I have regretted some of the things that have been said about them by some in Northern Ireland, whatever hurt and anguish they might have carried to this day as a result of the events of Bloody Sunday.

I want to say a little about the position in which 1 Para found itself in Derry on that day. The situation was, in a sense, unprecedented in modern British history, and that should not be forgotten when we consider the report and the motion on the Order Paper. It was a situation in part of the United Kingdom in which the civilian authorities had effectively lost control of a British city and had not the means to regain it, even if they had been willing to make the effort. The Official IRA and the Provisional IRA were both active in the area, and there was real concern that there might be violence between the communities on either side of the sectarian divide during the march planned for that day.

That was all taking place against a background of the nationalist anger directed at the Army and the Government that had previously given rise to the many other incidents of violence that Lord Saville dealt with in his report. Referring to the so-called Saturday matinées—the regular incidents of rioting that took place at the corner of Rossville street and William street, a junction known to British soldiers as “aggro corner”—the report said:

“We have little doubt that had the crowd isolated a soldier, it is likely that he would have been killed.”

The British Army was facing such regular instances of rioting at the time in Derry and elsewhere in that part of the world.

In this country, we expect a lot of our young soldiers. We expect their bravery, their loyalty and their obedience, and we are right to do so. Yet soldiers are no more superhuman than the rest of us, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) can tell us. The stress under which they must have found themselves day after day on the streets of Northern Ireland must not be forgotten or underestimated. Their lives were at risk, and no one should doubt that to have been the case. That said, however, following the Saville report, I cannot associate myself with what my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) said earlier. If criminal acts were committed that day, the passage of time should not be seen to exculpate those responsible, and the course of the law will have to follow.

In a very real sense, given these facts, Bloody Sunday was a catastrophe waiting to happen. Whoever fired the first shot, and whatever actually happened on that day, all sides involved in the troubles must shoulder some of the blame. This long-awaited report—perhaps too long-awaited, and certainly too expensive—offers the House, the people of Northern Ireland and the country the ability to draw a line under this awful chapter in our history. The truth is now out, and I hope that this opportunity will be taken, so that we can finally ensure that there is peace in Northern Ireland.