(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesFor the reasons I have set out, I think the market share test is an eminently sensible part of our regime. I hope the Committee will agree.
I am grateful to the Minister for letting us intervene—he has been very generous in that respect. I say gently that I would have hoped for a little more impact assessment before we signed up to a system that is, to adopt the kind of language he used, unique in the world and a world-beating innovation, if we are indeed doing that.
The hon. Member for Aberdeen North made clear that vexatious complaints will be screened out by the economic and public interest tests, which are more stringent than those in the EU regime that we will take on board under the TRA.
The Minister referred to this process being an indication to firms of whether they have any hope of success, but it is not. We are not talking about a guideline. We are talking about a threshold that is a block. Yes, that block can be disregarded by the TRA, but it cannot be overruled by the complainant. That is the whole point. It is not just an indication. It is stronger than a guideline or a set of theoretical considerations. It is potentially a block on firms trying to seek redress through the TRA, which is unique in the world. I had hoped that we might have more explanation of that, despite the Minister’s valiant attempts.
Let me try to come back again. The share test comes at the beginning. We have to think about the order. The point is to provide transparency at the beginning of the process and to ensure, exactly as industry has asked, that we do not waste time on complaints, vexatious or otherwise, that have no chance of resulting in measures. That is the whole point of the test. It will be quickly applied and—the Opposition do not seem to have understood this—will have exemptions for infant industries. The system will provide a more transparent form of that which is routinely applied in other countries.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am grateful to the hon. Lady for the SNP’s support. The amendments focus on trying to provide the certainty that the Bill lacks but which is present in other trade remedies systems. Will the Minister indicate whether the Government have considered inserting such a provision in the Bill, in line with international practice? If not, will he say why not, given that no other country seems routinely to allow a review before a year has passed?
Amendment 55 seeks to provide a timeline in relation to reviews of continuing application of an anti-dumping amount or countervailing duty amount. Amendment 56 asks that definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties will continue to be applied during the investigation process of any review.
On amendment 55, let me start by explaining that there are a number of different types of reviews of definitive anti-dumping and countervailing duties, which apply in different circumstances—for example, to reflect the appearance of a new exporter, to address evidence that measures are being circumvented, or to review measures that are due to expire, to determine whether it is necessary to extend them. Reviews ensure that measures can be changed where and when appropriate. I recognise the desire for clarity regarding timelines in the review’s framework, but as demonstrated by the WTO agreements and EU rules, there is no uniform timeline that is appropriate for all review types.
The amendment is unnecessary, as it appears to apply to all review types, irrespective of the lack of uniform timelines currently applicable under the EU system. For example, it would not be beneficial to UK industry if it is required to wait 12 months before a circumvention review may be carried out. On amendment 56, paragraph 21(4)(b) already allows us to provide in secondary legislation that measures may be extended beyond five years where a review is being undertaken. However, an extension is not appropriate in every type of review—for example, the WTO specifically sets out that duties may not be applied during a new exporter review. Therefore it is more appropriate for this to be provided for in secondary legislation. The development of the review’s framework is still ongoing. It is intended that there will be targeted stakeholder engagement across the UK industry to discuss this issue in more detail, prior to setting out the details of the various review processes in secondary legislation. It is a complicated area, as my explanation of the unintended impact of these amendments shows. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw these amendments.
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. My concern is that the fact that that period is not set within the Bill could lead to a situation where there is no certainty for producers about the length of time during which a remedy would remain in place. I take on board the Minister’s comments. I hoped that they would reduce some of those concerns at least, and I hope that he will accept the concerns we have been suggesting, given that, for certain types of review, other regimes have at least a year’s threshold before decisions can be reconsidered. I am sure the Minister understands that, without having such a set period, we have these concerns. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 57, in schedule 4, page 74, line 1, leave out “request” and insert “consider a request for”.
This amendment provides for the TRA to seek to apply price undertakings in response to a request to do so.
This is a tidying-up amendment. It provides for the TRA to seek to apply price undertakings in response to a request to do so. Our amendment seeks to clarify the precise role of the TRA within the process of application of undertakings. I should mention that this process can be complex and some stakeholders have understandably drawn attention to the problems of ensuring compliance with price undertakings. However, that is not exactly the focus of the amendment. Rather, we are concerned that the Bill seems to suggest that the TRA would be proffering different alternative undertakings.
International practice indicates that authorities arbitrate the different options for undertakings that are presented not by the authorities themselves, but by exporters. That is in line with WTO practice. Article VI of the general agreement on tariffs and trade 1994 and the agreement on the implementation of article VI—the “anti-dumping agreement” that we have referred to in Committee—explicitly authorise the imposition of anti-dumping measures by WTO members, as we know. Article 8 of the anti-dumping agreement includes the set of rules governing undertakings. It refers to the offering and acceptance of undertakings from any exporter—not by authorities themselves—to revise their prices or cease exports at dumped prices. The action is from the exporter, not from the authority.
However, the language in schedule 4 gives the active role to the TRA, referring to regulations giving the authority the ability to request an undertaking. From what I can see, this contradicts the language earlier in part 5 of the schedule that rightly refers to overseas exporters and relevant foreign Governments rather than the TRA offering undertakings. Our amendment would offer a helpful clarification about the role of the TRA, and help to prevent confusion. I hope the Minister will take this in the constructive way in which it is intended.
The amendment would mean that the use of undertakings would rely solely on an undertaking being offered by an exporter or a foreign authority, and would deny the TRA the ability to prompt the offering of an undertaking, as the hon. Lady set out in her speech. Our aim is to provide the TRA with the full suite of tools available under the WTO agreements. We must ensure that the TRA is equipped to deal with every possible future scenario.
The Government understand industry’s concern that it is more common practice—the hon. Lady rightly laid this out and is right to probe—for a foreign authority or an exporter to offer an undertaking than to be prompted into giving one by request. None the less, this power to request undertakings is not unusual, as it is set out in a WTO agreement, and adopted in EU regulations. This power is required to cater for certain situations that may arise. For example, the TRA may need to request an undertaking following a review where the level of undertaking needs to be varied, or where the UK is committed to seeking constructive remedies with a trading partner as part of a trade agreement. Therefore, removing this power would serve to undermine the TRA and the discharge of its functions, which I know is the exact opposite of what the hon. Lady would wish.
We would expect that the TRA will exercise this power only where necessary, which we envisage to be rarely. The secondary legislation under this power will outline these circumstances, and we will engage with stakeholders as we develop proposals going further. I hope that, by doing so, we will be able to answer any remaining concerns the hon. Lady has.
It is also worth stating that, as per the WTO agreements, following a request from the TRA, there will be no obligation for an exporter or a foreign authority to enter into such an undertaking that will further limit the power. Once a request has been made, and if an undertaking is subsequently offered, the TRA will still need to conduct an assessment of the undertaking and its terms and conditions to decide whether accepting it would be appropriate and whether it would be in the UK’s economic interest. The fact that the TRA requested the undertaking in the first place will not predetermine this assessment in any way. For these reasons, I ask the hon. Lady to consider withdrawing the amendment.
I beg to ask leave that the amendment be withdrawn.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.
With this we will consider:
New clause 15—Review of transitional measures—
“(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State shall undertake a review of the advantages and disadvantages of making provision under section 51(1) to secure that transitional measures are applicable on the same day that the tariff provided for in section 8 first has effect.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “transitional measures” are those anti-dumping duties, or anti-subsidy duties, or undertakings, as the case may be, that were applicable in the European Union on the day preceding the day referred to in sub-paragraph (1) to which subsection (3) does not apply.
(3) This subsection applies to any goods in respect of which the TRA has made a recommendation, prior to the date referred to in subsection (2), that injury to a UK industry in the goods would not be likely to occur if a transitional measure were not applied.
(4) The Secretary of State shall, as soon as reasonably practicable after the completion of the review under this section, lay a report of the review before the House of Commons.”
This new clause provides for a review of the case for the continued effect of EU trade remedies after introduction of the new standard import tariff and pending full implementation of the new arrangements under Schedule 4.
I will not speak on this for long. We have much else to get through this afternoon, and maybe I am about to be surprised, but I anticipate that we may have a similar result to one we just had, particularly given that many of the same issues come up in relation to this amendment as to that just moved by my hon. Friend. It would be interesting if we had a plurality of views; maybe that day will come eventually.
As with many of our other amendments, this amendment clearly aims to increase the predictability for British business in the Bill. In particular, we think it is important to make provision in the Bill about exactly how a safeguarding remedy could be extended, to expand the considerations taken on board in that process.
With this amendment, the TRA would only recommend extending a safeguarding remedy beyond four years if the authority were satisfied that there was evidence that UK producers were adjusting to the importation of the goods in increased quantities—so not a plan, actual evidence of that adjustment would be necessary. The total duration of any such extended remedy would be only be another four years, so eight years in total. As with many other elements of the Bill, more clarity is needed here and our amendment would deal with that deficiency.
Schedule 5 sets out the provisions that will apply in cases where UK industry finds itself being harmed by unforeseen surges in imports. The WTO agreement on safeguards set outs the requirements that must be met for the UK, as for other members, to be able to impose safeguard measures. Through this schedule, we are adopting the key principles into UK law and setting out the broad elements of the safeguard process that will be operated by the TRA.
As we have already discussed, there will be a need for more detail. This will, rightly, be set out in secondary legislation. The schedule also provides the necessary powers for the Secretary of State to make regulations to do this, including, for example, to define what is meant by “increased quantities”, “UK producers” and “like goods”. Paragraph 19 of schedule 5 provides that regulations can be made to set out the process for reviewing safeguard measures. The regulations will set out, among other things, the circumstances in which measures can be continued.
Amendment 74 seeks to require UK producers to provide evidence that they are adjusting to increased imports before a safeguard measure can be extended beyond four years. It also aims to add into primary legislation that safeguard remedies may only be in place for a maximum of eight years. As I explained earlier, once we leave the EU, the UK clearly needs to be able to take action where our industry is being harmed by unfair trade from other countries, whether that is by dumped or subsidised goods, or as a result of fairly traded but unforeseen surges in imports. The safeguard provisions set out in schedule 5 achieve this. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguards relate to fair trade and apply globally. Therefore, it is especially important that these measures balance the interests of producers and downstream consumer industries by facilitating adjustment.
We have already discussed adjustment plans when considering the previous group of amendments. As I said, these are a vital tool in ensuring that safeguard measures not only provide protection, but allow those affected the opportunity to make necessary adjustments. It is not appropriate to introduce a requirement for producers to provide evidence of adjustment when seeking to extend measures beyond four years.
I ask the Committee to consider for a moment that we have measures in place—a safeguard—because of a massive surge on imports. The TRA has done its work. In an entirely novel process—I am aware of no parallel anywhere—Her Majesty’s Opposition, doubtless supported by their allies in the Scottish National party, want to impose a bureaucratic and burdensome measure—[Interruption.] I notice that the SNP Members are shaking their heads. For once, perhaps, they will strike out and not support something that is so clearly damaging to the interests of Scottish producers. Why on earth would the producers have to provide evidence of their adjustment when the main issue should be other aspects and criteria? It is a strange innovation that the Labour party has put forward.
Introducing a requirement for producers to provide evidence of adjustment when seeking to extend beyond four years would undermine the need for flexibility in our approach, which recognises—this is worth reflecting on—that adjustment is not always dependent on a producer’s own efforts. Yet, under the amendment, protection measures would cease if producers were not able to provide evidence that they were adjusting. Adjustment plans are a more suitable way of building in that flexibility and ensuring that there is a commitment to adjustment from as early as the initiation stage. Finally, with regard to the eight-year rule, the Government intend to be WTO-compliant by setting that out in secondary legislation.
It is our intention that the Government, when they seek to make such a change, and they are doing so under international law, would provide evidence of the law upon which they were relying. If the hon. Lady is happy with that, I will leave it there.
In conclusion, after leaving the EU, the United Kingdom will require the ability to vary the rate of import duty to respond to international dispute rulings and other contentious situations. That will ensure that the Government can continue to protect the UK’s economic interests by putting in place, when necessary, effective retaliatory and compensatory measures against other countries. I commend the clause to the Committee and hope that the amendment is withdrawn or rejected.
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarifications. I know he will regret hearing this, but the Opposition feel that the procedures are, sadly, not appropriate and proportionate. The new clause argues for an enhanced parliamentary procedure if import duties must be varied as a consequence of an international dispute. I will not go through the more rigorous procedure we suggest; it is similar to that described by my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle.
It would help if the Minister answered this initial question: what is the anticipated frequency of this kind of dispute? My view of what has occurred at EU level is that such disputes are not so frequent that appropriate scrutiny would not be possible. Some of us are concerned that a dispute might come sooner rather than later. I understand that experts took different positions in the International Trade Committee on whether the UK’s continuing to apply EU anti-dumping duties would be legal after it had left the EU. That is one of many reasons why it would be helpful to have more explicit mention in the Bill of existing measures being automatically rolled over. But, anyway, that is a caveat.
There are many other reasons why an enhanced procedure is necessary. The first is that the decisions taken in the context of such a dispute would be adopted by the Secretary of State himself, albeit with the advice of the TRA, and they could have a significant impact on UK industry. We have talked about how, in many cases, the supply chains are complex, and we need to talk about a variety of different consumers and business-to-business activity. It is therefore important that Parliament is able to examine a statement of the dispute and what exactly the Government propose should be done in relation to the dispute, such that the House can vote on that matter if necessary. These disputes do not affect just economic policy; they can have a significant impact on other areas of public policy as well. Therefore, it is important that colleagues are able to express a view on them and to consider the Government’s position on them.
The second reason it is important to have an enhanced procedure is that there is a lot of public concern at the moment about international economic disputes and how they tend to be resolved. I served as a Member of the European Parliament for three years, and I received tens of thousands of communications—about 38,000 at the last count—from concerned citizens about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership deal between the US and the EU. Most of those emails included criticism of the impact of investor-state dispute settlement, predominantly because that method of resolving disputes is not transparent and many people feel it privileges the voice of companies over Governments. We surely should not be putting ourselves in a position where Parliament’s voice would be not just ignored but not even heard when it comes to our Government’s actions in relation to trade disputes. For that reason, I hope the Government will support our amendment.
I hope that I will be permitted one last question, as this matter came up in the Minister’s opening remarks on the clause. Will he tell us where the Government have explicitly given themselves the power to create WTO schedules? I do not know where that is. He mentioned the necessity of producing those schedules, so can we have some clarification on that point?
I will deal with the questions as best I can and in order.
The EU has four retaliatory duties in place. It is not really possible to predict how frequently this power will be used. In some ways the question is not really the frequency but whether, when it does happen, we have a procedure in place to allow us quickly and effectively to take action to ensure that we put the matter right. That, rather than the frequency, might be the bigger issue.
Although we will be seeking, and will be prepared to use, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism as a way of ensuring that there is a level playing field for UK business to compete on, and we will have the tools available for us to participate fully in international trade disputes where necessary, we have no particular appetite to be more litigious than is required to protect the UK’s interests.
I will write to the hon. Lady and the Committee on the WTO schedules and the process attached to that.
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI agree with much of what the hon. Lady said. We heard on Tuesday some of businesses’ concerns about consultation even relative to the Bill. It is important, when we move on to its exact provisions, that we have proper consultative mechanisms. I have certainly benefited hugely from the input into the process around the Bill and information from the Fairtrade Foundation and Traidcraft. If this Government are truly committed to policy coherence for development, it is important that they ensure that non-governmental organisations with expertise on the ground in international development can comment on preferential trade decisions, which could have a significant impact on different nations.
I was encouraged by what the Minister said to me when we talked about ensuring policy coherence for development when it comes to tax treaties. We need to ensure that that is the reality for our preferential trading regimes as well. One way to do that is by having appropriate consultation with experts in the area.
Finally, the Library note to the Bill, which was enormously useful as always, says that,
“the Government argues that the negative procedure is appropriate here as regulations might be lengthy, technical, frequently changed, not yet known and/or administrative.”
The note goes on to indicate what the EU process is for such schemes. It is quite different from what the Government propose:
“The regulations setting out the current EU scheme…were adopted by the EU Parliament and Council”,
meaning that there was debate within both those organisations. Our country is represented in the Council, and our MEPs represent us in the European Parliament. Then there are
“provisions allowing technical/routine updates through Commission delegated regulations.”
Again, delegated regulations can involve thorough scrutiny. I suggest that in many ways, it is far easier for an MEP to trigger a debate on a piece of delegated legislation on the Floor of the European Parliament than for an MP to do so in the British Parliament, certainly when the negative procedure is used, but also, potentially, when the affirmative procedure is used, given the arithmetic of Committees mentioned by the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. It is enormously important that we have proper scrutiny of such provisions. One way of embedding that is by having appropriate consultation. We support the amendment.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main. It is an intimidating task that falls to me. I see many familiar faces, all pretty experienced and used to being in Bill Committees, as well as the Rolls-Royce Minister to my left. Fortunately, I am backed by the most extraordinary sea of talent behind me, as well as having on my right a much improved Treasury Whip, compared with his predecessor.
Amendment 108 seeks to create a statutory duty to consult on regulations relating to unilateral trade preferences for developing countries. The Government sought views on unilateral preferences as part of the trade White Paper and proposed creating a trade preference scheme that, as a minimum, maintains the preferential market access of countries in the EU’s generalised scheme of preferences, or GSP. The Government regularly engage with stakeholders on the issue, and—I can undertake—will continue to do so in future.
This seems like a sensible amendment, particularly because accessing that nil rate is crucial for so many nations. If there is ambiguity around the conditions, they need to be clarified. Definition, initially, as a least-developed country, is partly with reference to vulnerability to economic shocks. Inability to access that nil-rate, or inability have it reinstated when it should be, could cause economic shocks. As we know, the value of access to the nil-rate to UK markets for least-developed countries is incredibly important—it is £323 million a year. It is important that we have no ambiguity and are absolutely crystal clear.
As we have heard, the amendment seeks to clarify that the regulations may provide for the restoration or reinstatement of the nil rate of import duty to least-developed countries where this has been suspended or withdrawn. It is clearly important that we can reinstate preferential rates of import duty after they have been suspended or withdrawn, but the Government do not believe that the amendment is required. The existing power enables the withdrawal or suspension of preferences to least-developed countries to be partial and reversible. That is in line with the general principles relating to regulation-making powers. It goes to show that even when you deal with lawyers as eminent as those at the Law Society of Scotland, they sometimes get it wrong, even technically.
The Government intend to use the power to suspend sparingly and, if used, we will work with the relevant country with a view to reinstating preferences as soon as is appropriate. For trade preferences to be effective, they must be relatively stable, so that businesses have confidence to make decisions to import from beneficiary countries. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Aberdeen North to withdraw the amendments and give a categorical assurance that a provision to do what they suggest is already in place.
It is a pleasure to see the Minister in such a prominent role now. In his role as a Whip, he was of course fundamental to the operation of all the discussions that we have had in this Committee room, but it is good to see him speaking on these issues.
As the Minister intimated, the amendment relates to part 4 of schedule 3, which sets out the conditions under which amendments can be made to parts 2 and 3, including the lists of least developed countries and other countries eligible for preferential trading schemes. Colleagues will be aware that those schemes arose out of the work of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which from the 1960s onwards argued for improved market access for developing countries as a means of fostering their economic development. The so-called generalised system of preferences was adopted in 1968.
The whole point about that—the Minister alluded to it—is that a generalised system of preference, just as with a customs union like that of the EU, is allowed as an exemption from the most favoured nation rules within the WTO. Those rules stipulate that no country can have a preferential trade agreement with any other country that is not offered to every other member of the WTO. It is therefore enormously important to have the ability to deviate from WTO rules to promote development.
As the Minister suggested, the arrangements have over time developed at EU level into, effectively, three different layers of preferential scheme for developing countries: the everything-but-arms approach, which applies to the least developed countries; the generalised system of preferences—GSP—and then GSP-plus which, as the Minister said, offers additional favourable terms to those countries fulfilling environmental and good governance requirements.
Will the Minister clarify one issue relating to GSP-plus, and my reading of the existing Bill, with regard to classification as another eligible developing country under part 3 of schedule 3? I thought that the Bill referred to the Secretary of State developing regulations with a view to
“among other things…classification by the World Bank”
and that those “other things” were not just economic factors but human rights and environmental considerations, as is the case with the GSP-plus system in the EU. I think that was what he intended to say, but it was not crystal clear and it would be helpful if he would clarify it.
Our amendment is focused not on the arrangements for GSP and GSP-plus countries, which I believe are all gathered under part 4 but, in practice, on the least-developed country regime—the successor to everything-but-arms, which the Government say they want us to take on board. It is positive that the Bill provides the possibility for a three-year transition period, so that countries currently described as least-developed countries can remain in the scheme for another three years, as a graduation period. However, particularly with regard to current EU developments, it seems that in the Bill, the Government are missing out on an important opportunity.
The Minister was correct to say that the current everything-but-arms regime does not explicitly include reference to human rights and the environment or other criteria, but there is pressure at EU level for those factors to be taken much more closely into account. Our country could play a key role in that. That is very important when we look at how the everything-but-arms process has worked in practice.
A very good case study is the sugar trade in Cambodia. The sugar industry in Cambodia has grown exponentially over recent times due to changes in the overall sugar price, but also due to the imposition of a preferential trading regime. That has not led to sustainable development. Instead, very large global conglomerates have captured much of the market. Ninety seven per cent. of Cambodia’s sugar exports went to the EU in 2012. Tate & Lyle bought 99% of those, and companies linked to it—or some of those which it has now sold off—were controlling much of the new sugar plantations in Cambodia.
Those plantations have been enormously controversial because they have involved the wholescale removal of families from their smallholdings. Many people illegally transferred into Thailand because the sugar plantations forced them off the land. The growth in the industry has not led to an increase in people’s incomes. In fact, the opposite has happened: it has led to many people becoming destitute who formerly were able to live at subsistence level at least. Some families from Cambodia have even taken cases against Tate & Lyle to our High Court because they were dispossessed of their land and are no longer able to live sustainably.
Other changes occurred around sugar in the EU—minimum pricing and its removal—but surely, given that example, we should think about whether we need to do more to try to stop developments of the kind that existed under the everything-but-arms initiative from occurring in any UK-specific schemes. There is certainly an argument in the development community about whether it is appropriate for human rights matters to be taken into account in trade deals. Particularly in the sugar market, very large corporations are making a huge benefit, but that has not led to a more sustainable income for ordinary people—quite the opposite.
In addition, it is important that other factors can be taken into account in these classifications and in determining whether countries should be on the list. Three years is a good graduation period but it may be necessary for some countries to have longer, especially if they are subject to a particular economic or other problem.
Furthermore, I understand that there are cases where countries have used additional considerations in relation to classification under these kinds of regimes. Norway has said that if a country is not classified as a least-developed country but is part of a customs union with other least-developed countries, it is a good thing because it promotes regional integration. That nation is also likely to share many trade characteristics with the least-developed countries, and therefore should be able to be allotted trade preferences on the same basis. Norway at least believes that it does not need a waiver from the WTO for that—not only is that not being actioned by the WTO, but Norway believes that it does not even need to approach the WTO for a waiver. We could be more ambitious in that regard, and I hope that as a result the Minister takes our suggestion on board.
I thank the hon. Lady for her passionate espousal of a number of interesting issues. I will respond as best I can, but my three weeks in this post probably does not match her many years of expertise.
As highlighted, clause 10 and schedule 3 ensure that the UK can operate a unilateral trade preference scheme when the UK leaves the EU, supporting our long-standing commitment to support developing countries. The group of least-developed countries, as set out in schedule 3, are among the poorest in the world. As I said, providing nil-rate import duty access to goods from those countries helps them to reduce poverty through trade and is part of the UN’s sustainable development goals. Clause 10 enshrines that in UK law, ensuring that the commitment will be maintained in future. The clause is not prescriptive about the level of import duty for other eligible developing countries—they are listed in part 3 of schedule 3—that are not designated as least developed. However, as I have mentioned and as the Government set out in the trade White Paper, the Government’s policy intention is to ensure continuity at the point of exiting the EU by replicating the market access of all countries currently part of the EU’s generalised scheme of preferences.
I take on board the fact that the hon. Lady talked about being more ambitious. We have said that, as a Government, we wish to be more ambitious, but we need to bring into place in this country continuity from the existing system and give assurance and confidence that we are not opening up. If we open up the issues more widely, we will create uncertainty as to what we will continue—we may be strengthening in some areas; we might weaken in others. I therefore ask the hon. Lady to accept that I need to think and talk to her over time about some of the issues that she has raised. We do want to be more ambitious in the future, but for now, we believe that the right thing to do is to have continuity with the existing system and bring that as effectively as we can into UK law.
The amendment proposes that changes to schedule 3 be done by the affirmative procedure. As I have mentioned, eligible developing countries will be determined with regard to the classification by the World Bank or UN. The Government need to be able to react promptly to a country’s change in economic circumstances. Similarly, the power to specify the meaning of the term “arms and ammunition” is intended to allow the preference scheme to adopt the same nomenclature enabled through clause 8 for the customs tariff, which will itself be constrained by international nomenclature.
As I said, our intention is closely to replicate the EU’s preference scheme, including the GSP-plus tier. That is the enhanced tier of preferences available for economically vulnerable countries that ratify the international conventions I have mentioned. We expect beneficiary countries to continue to respect the conditions in GSP-plus, including meeting those international obligations. Those conditions will be set out in secondary legislation, as clause 10(2)(b) allows.
The question is asked why we would give preference to Cambodia even though land disputes have occurred following the EU’s everything-but-arms access. A key objective of the UK is building the UK’s prosperity by increasing exports and investment and promoting sustainable global growth. Greater prosperity leads to greater stability. We are aware that the Government of Cambodia have taken steps to improve their issue of economic land concessions, such as introducing a compensation process. Furthermore, the Ministry of Environment cancelled more than 20% of all economic land concessions. For now, therefore, we continue to work through the EU’s GSP monitoring system, and we seek to bring the existing system into UK law.