House of Lords Reform

Graham Stringer Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

It is the view of the Government that this reform, which is long-overdue and long-debated, can take place without the embellishment and framework of a written constitution.

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

The right hon. Gentleman says that the Parliament Acts are the reason why this House will retain primacy, but they apply only to legislation that starts in this House, not to that which starts in the House of Lords or to secondary legislation. When the House of Lords overturned a piece of secondary legislation concerning large casinos that this House had supported, the right hon. Gentleman supported the House of Lords and not the House of Commons. That was the first time that that had happened since the Southern Rhodesia issue.

[The Deputy Prime Minister]

Perhaps I have not followed the hon. Gentleman’s point carefully enough, but that arrangement will not change. The asymmetry between the two Chambers rests not only on the Parliament Acts but on the different mandates, different terms and different electoral cycles of the two Houses, as occurs in the vast majority of the 61 bicameral, elected systems around the world, which seem to rub along perfectly well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sadiq Khan]

The hon. Gentleman heard the speech from the Deputy Prime Minister, who gave a number of examples whereby the other Chamber—[Interruption.] I will give the hon. Gentleman an example. Is it right that we have 828 Members in the other place, all of whom, except for the 92 who by good fortune of their DNA have to go through elections, are not elected? That is not acceptable in a modern democracy.

There are those who have, I accept, legitimate concerns that a directly elected upper Chamber might seek to assert its newly found democratic mandate by facing down the Commons, and it is critical that the Joint Committee addresses that issue. After all, the primacy of this House must remain. It currently rests on two principles, the first of which is legislative. The Parliament Acts removed the powers of the Lords over money Bills and empowered the Commons to override the Lords on non-money Bills. The second principle underpinning the primacy of the Commons is drawn from the elected nature of its Members, so if we move to a directly elected upper Chamber it is not unreasonable for some to ask whether this House faces a threat to its primacy.

[Graham Stringer]

I will try to have another go at the point I made to the Deputy Prime Minister. In today’s edition of The Times, the previous leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy Ashdown, says that the newly reformed House of Lords—the Senate—would be able to stop this House doing what it wanted on a manifesto commitment. I was completely against the poll tax, but it was in the Conservatives’ 1987 manifesto. The Liberal Democrats want more power to go to the other place. How would my right hon. Friend guarantee the primacy of this House on non-legislative matters?

[Sadiq Khan]

There are big questions about the powers and functions of the second Chamber, and my hon. Friend has given one example of the anomalies that arise. The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr Field) gave another example of the issues that those of us who are in favour of a 100% elected second Chamber need to address if we are going to win the argument not only in this House but in the other Chamber. That is why a simultaneous debate on powers, conventions and the relationships between the two Houses is absolutely fundamental if we are to get the reform right so that it delivers the bicameral system that serves our democratic needs effectively. Form and function go together, and I am afraid that there is scant evidence that that is recognised in the draft Bill and in the White Paper.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I do not complain, Mr Deputy Speaker.

This is both a bad Bill and a half-baked Bill, and I shall certainly vote against it. It is not improvable in that sense because of the principles on which it is based. Admittedly, we are in strange territory with the new coalition, but some very strange policies and constitutional principles are coming out. First, in the name of democracy we are reducing the number of elected MPs and increasing the number of Members of the other place. That is pretty strange.

Secondly, the Deputy Prime Minister—I am sorry that he has left the Chamber—annunciates, as the basis of his support for many policies, that he can support any policy he wants, even if it is in contradiction to his manifesto, because he did not win the election. Who ever expected the Lib Dems to form a Government on their own? He is saying that because they were not going to form a Government on their own, he can support any policy he wants, irrespective of what he said to the electorate.

Thirdly—this is a difficult but fundamental point—reform of the House of Lords was in the manifestos of all three parties. However, that means that there was no differentiation. The electorate could not choose to vote for one party or another on the basis of what was in a manifesto. We have just had a fairly ridiculous referendum between first past the post and the alternative vote, but how much more important are making fundamental changes by introducing a voting system and changing the balance of power between this House and the other place? Are we having a referendum on that? No we are not, even though the electorate had no choice during the general election.

[Duncan Hames (Chippenham) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman mentions the lack of differentiation in the manifestos, but in actual fact one manifesto called for a referendum on the subject—the manifesto was for a party that was defeated at the election.

[Graham Stringer]

The hon. Gentleman may not have noticed, but all the parties lost the election. Nobody got a majority.

What is the problem? Is the problem in our democracy really the relationship between this House and the other one? I do not think so. Where has all the power gone from these Houses of Parliament? It has gone to Europe. Depending on which area people are in, 60% or 70% of our legislation is now passed by Europe. The proposals do not deal with that, but it is one of the most fundamental problems.

Within the power structure of our constitution—I accept that a lot of that power has gone away—the problem is not the House of Lords but the Privy Council, the royal prerogative and the fact that there is no separation between Ministers and Members of the legislature, which is almost never talked about when we compare Parliaments. It is fairly unusual in Parliaments around the world for Ministers to be accountable to themselves within a legislature. That is a big problem, and one reason why there is less Government accountability than one might expect, so the arguments for it are second rate and do not deal with the main problem.

Most of the debate we have had today has been about whether these reforms would affect the primacy of the House of Commons. If we introduce a democratic element into the House of Lords, it is bound to undermine the primacy of this House for several reasons. First, what would happen if we introduced proportional representation—STV or any other form of PR? Some Members of this House believe that PR is a superior and more democratic system to first past the post. The electorate disagreed, but that is those Members’ honest and openly held view. If we were to elect the other place by PR, it seems reasonable that they would then argue primacy.

Secondly, is it more democratic to elect people who never have to go back to the electorate who elected them and account for themselves? I do not think so. It is just a method of appointment. Democracy implies not only the ballot box, but accountability in terms of justifying which way Members have voted. Otherwise Members could vote any way they wanted without any consequences.

[John Stevenson (Carlisle) (Con)]

In the election to this Chamber, someone could be elected on a Thursday night and on Friday announce to the world that they had no intention of seeking re-election five years later. Where is the accountability there, according to the hon. Gentleman’s argument?

[Graham Stringer]

It is difficult to argue that the fact that individual Members of this House could say that they would not stand again is a justification for every Member in the other place never standing again. That would be a very odd argument to make.

My third point is one that the Deputy Prime Minister made a great deal of, and it is that the elected senators or Lords in the other place would never have a fresher mandate than we have in this place. However, that cannot be guaranteed. Even the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill contains mechanisms that allow for elections and one could still have elections twice a year, so we could get out of phase with the other place and their mandate would be fresher. They would then argue that they had primacy. I have never come across anyone standing for election who does not really believe that their view is the right view or who does not want to prosecute that view as hard as they can. Otherwise, why stand for election in the first place?

My final point is about how this House would assert its primacy if the other place were 80% or wholly elected. If legislation started in this place, it would be subject to the Parliament Acts. That process takes a long time and is of limited use. Further, some lawyers would argue that there are real difficulties with the second Parliament Act of 1949.

Much discussion and debate is not about legislation, but about policy. It is about secondary legislation, and some Conservative Members were pleased when the House of Lords overturned the decision of this House on a statutory instrument on the super-casino. That was not a principled issue of this House against the other place—people who did not like very large casinos voted against it, even though the primary legislation had been passed in this House. The House of Lords overturned a detailed decision—and that happened before they had elections.

I can see no situation in which an elected house would not want to have more power. That would mean that we would have less and we would not be dealing with the fundamental issues. These proposals do not deal with the biggest issues facing our society at the moment. International experience is prayed in aid of the Bill. In nearly every international case there is a written constitution, often set up by the British Government after wars or revolutions, when people have to define the various powers of the president, the legislature and the Government. We do not have such a constitution and the real fight in history has been between the House of Commons and the Government, of whatever stripe. Unfortunately, increasing the power of the House of Lords is likely to reduce the power of the House of Commons and all elected Members to the benefit of the Government. That is why this is a very bad Bill.