Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of trends in the level of telecommunications equipment containing components manufactured in countries deemed to pose a security risk.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
Telecoms supply chains are complex and international and are managed by industry. However, the government is committed to ensuring secure and resilient telecoms supply chains.
The robust Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 regime places obligations on public communications providers to manage supply chain risks, including to identify, reduce and prepare for the risk of security compromises to their networks. Ofcom monitors compliance with these obligations through its information gathering powers, and the Secretary of State makes decisions on enforcement based on this information and additional advice. The Act also gives ministers powers to restrict the use of vendors in UK networks on national security grounds.
The previous government have used the Act’s national security powers to designate Huawei in 2022, and issue legally binding directions restricting their use in UK telecoms networks, supported by a strengthened underpinned by an enforcement regime including clear financial penalties for non-compliance.
The telecoms security Code of Practice was introduced in 2022, which sets out in detail the technical and organisational steps public communications providers must take to identify, reduce and manage supply chain and vendor‑related security risks, with compliance overseen and enforced by Ofcom. We are currently in the process of updating the Code of Practice to provide public telecoms providers with further guidance, reflecting recent changes in threats and technologies
We are also committed to growing the UK’s role in Advanced Connectivity Technology supply chains. The government is supporting targeted R&D programmes with UKRI and other partners to support the development and commercialisation of next generation technologies. This will enable UK firms to participate more fully in global telecoms supply chains and reduce UK dependence on other countries.
Telecoms supply chain risks are considered as part of cross-government efforts to improve the security and resilience of supply chains. The government works with business to address these risks, building the conditions required to deliver secure growth. The government continues to monitor and respond to turbulence in global sectors and supply chains that are crucial to the UK’s economic and national security.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what steps she is taking to ensure public sector data is secure where Cellular Internet Modules may originate from foreign suppliers.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The UK has strong safeguards to ensure that data is collected and handled responsibly and securely. Companies registered in the UK are subject to our legal framework and regulatory jurisdiction.
Public sector organisations are required to manage security and supply chain risks through established assurance and procurement frameworks, including the Technology Code of Practice, the Government Cyber Security Standard and following guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre. As threats to UK data are evolving, our response must be agile and proportionate. We actively monitor threats to UK data and will not hesitate to take action if necessary to protect our national security.
Any device with a cellular module that is incorporated into the network or systems of UK Critical National Infrastructure will need to comply with that network’s cyber security practices and standards and, as such, should have robust security controls in place.
The UK has one of the most robust data protection regimes in the world, with all organisations required to comply with our legislation to safeguard UK personal data when transferring it overseas. Failure to do so can result in enforcement action.
Our data regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office, has powers to take enforcement action and issue fines. Individuals who consider that their data has been misused can also take legal action.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what steps her Department is taking to reduce UK reliance on technology manufactured in countries like China that pose a security risk.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Prime Minister has emphasised that national security is the first duty of our government. Supply chain resilience and security remains a core part of this, and multiple government departments are working closely with international partners to embed resilience into critical UK and global supply chains.
We take an actor‑agnostic, risk‑based approach to supply‑chain resilience. Instead of reacting to individual firms or components in isolation, we focus on the structural chokepoints and systemic dependencies that create national‑level vulnerability, regardless of where in the chain they arise.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made with the Department for Education of the potential impact of recent instances of Chinese owned companies taking equity stakes in UK university technology research spinout companies on technology security.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of the potential implications for research security of Chinese firms acquiring ownership or influence in university technology commercialisation.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, whether her Department has issued guidance to universities on mitigating foreign investment risks in research-intensive spin‑outs, including investment originating from Chinese companies.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment her Department has made of trends in the level of Chinese investment in university spin‑out companies over the past five years.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Government recognises the importance of safeguarding the UK’s research and innovation ecosystem, including the university spinout sector, from risks associated with foreign ownership, influence, or investment. The government will not hesitate to use our powers to protect national security wherever we identify concerns and we have a range of effective measures in place to do so.
The Government is actively protecting the UK’s research and spinout ecosystem from national security risks. The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA), working with the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), supports universities and spinouts through the Secure Innovation programme, providing advice on due diligence, investment screening and managing security risks. Targeted Secure Innovation Security Reviews further help early‑stage firms identify and mitigate vulnerabilities linked to foreign engagement.
The Government has powers under the National Security and Investment (NSI) Act 2021 to review and, where required, intervene in investments that may pose a risk to national security. The Government also monitors the market at all times to identify acquisitions of potential national security interest.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of Chinese companies supplying cellular modules for use in the UK’s critical national infrastructure on national security.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
The Prime Minister has emphasised that national security is the first duty of our government. The Government has a broad set of tools to safeguard our Critical National Infrastructure, including The Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021, The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, The Procurement Act 2023 and The Product Security and Telecommunications Act 2022.
The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will also be introduced when parliamentary time allows, to deliver a step change in the UK’s national security, requiring essential and digital services in scope to have robust cyber security practices and standards. This will include empowering regulators to designate critical suppliers, ensuring that the most important suppliers to essential and digital services are subject to the regulatory regime.
Any device with a cellular module that is incorporated into the network or systems of UK Critical National Infrastructure will need to comply with that network’s cyber security practices and standards and as such should have robust security controls in place. If such a device falls within scope of The Product Security and Telecommunications Act 2022 then it will also need to comply with the requirements of that Act.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what assessment she has made of the potential impact of Chinese-manufactured smart devices in the UK's critical national infrastructure on national security.
Answered by Kanishka Narayan - Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Department for Science, Innovation and Technology)
National security is the first duty of our government.
Under the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022, any connected device intended to be used by consumers must meet three basic requirements: no universal default or easily guessable passwords; transparency about the minimum length of time manufacturers will provide security updates; and information on how to report security vulnerabilities directly to manufacturers.
The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology launched a Call for Views on 12 May 2025 on proposals to strengthen the cyber security of enterprise connected devices. Research commissioned in 2021 by DSIT of 400 businesses showed significant gaps in device security practices with 58% of businesses not requiring security checks when purchasing connected devices. Our Call for Views included a draft Code of Practice, developed with the National Cyber Security Centre, which sets out 11 security principles for manufacturers, covering areas like secure updates, authentication, data protection, and device integrity. Feedback is being considered, and a government response will be published in due course.
The Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will also be introduced when parliamentary time allows, to deliver a step change in the UK’s national security, requiring essential and digital services in scope to have robust cyber security practices and standards. This will include empowering regulators to designate critical suppliers, ensuring the most important suppliers to essential and digital services are subject to the regulatory regime.
Asked by: Graeme Downie (Labour - Dunfermline and Dollar)
Question to the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology:
To ask the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, what discussions (a) his Department and (b) Ofcom have had with international counterparts on international satellite regulations to increase the availability of satellite broadband in the UK.
Answered by Chris Bryant - Minister of State (Department for Business and Trade)
As set out in the Industrial Strategy, which closely aligns to the objectives of the UK Space Strategy and C-LEO programme, DSIT is committed to ensuring appropriate spectrum availability to support Advanced Connectivity Technologies (ACT), including satellite broadband.
DSIT will continue working closely with Ofcom and international counterparts ahead of the World Radio Conference 2027, as well as collaborating with Ofcom domestically to promote efficient, innovative spectrum allocation and regulation that supports the development and deployment of ACT.