Renters' Rights Bill (Third sitting)

Gideon Amos Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Matthew Pennycook]

I will be brief, as this clause is simple and straightforward. It ensures that leaseholders can continue to sub-let under the new regime where they currently have permission to do so.

Leaseholder arrangements may currently require any sub-let to be on an assured shorthold or an assured tenancy with a fixed or minimum term. The clause will enable existing sub-leases to continue under the new tenancy system once assured shorthold tenancies and fixed terms are abolished. This will ensure that leaseholders and their superior landlords are not unduly affected by the reforms and that previously agreed arrangements can continue. It will not grant rights to leaseholders to sub-let for holiday or rental accommodation unless they were able to do so before the Bill took effect. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Changes to grounds for possession

[Mr Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)]

I beg to move amendment 77, in schedule 1, page 155, line 6, at end insert—

“(1A) In the heading of Part 1, omit ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

(1B) Omit the heading of Part II.”

This amendment would make all grounds for repossession discretionary.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 73, in clause 4, page 4, leave out lines 35 to 37 and insert—

“(a) omit subsection (3);

(b) in subsection (4)—

(i) omit ‘Part II of’; and

(ii) omit ‘, subject to subsections (5A) and (6) below,’”.

This amendment would make all grounds for repossession discretionary.

Amendment 74, in schedule 2, page 175, line 40, leave out from “claims),” to the end of line 41 and insert “omit subsection (6)”.

This amendment would make all grounds for repossession discretionary.

[Mr Amos]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. The intention of this amendment is to make all grounds for eviction discretionary for the court. As the Committee heard from experts during oral evidence, many in the sector are concerned that none of the grounds will be discretionary.

There are a range of circumstances in which discretion would be advisable in deciding eviction cases. The tenant may be terminally ill—a cancer patient, for example—and I understand that that example was considered during the last Parliament in relation to the previous Bill. The court would have no discretion to enable a stay of eviction in that case. The tenant could have caring responsibilities, perhaps for a disabled person. Again, there would be no discretion to vary the terms of the eviction.

There could be undue hardship caused if the tenant was unable to stay for a given period. Perhaps the tenant had already arranged to move and arranged new accommodation, but that was not available on the timescale in the Bill; in that case, there would again be no discretion. The tenant might have an impending examination to sit or a work commitment that was vital to their career. Again, there would be no discretion for the courts. The tenant may be a disabled person and need extra time or support to arrange the physical burden of moving home.

In a previous discussion, the Minister talked about the importance of taking the personal circumstances of tenants into account, and that is the intent behind this amendment. The courts will not be able to take personal circumstances into account because there will be no discretion on the terms of eviction.

Parties are especially concerned about this issue in relation to grounds 1 and 1A, which concern eviction for repossession by the landlord or their family or for the sale of the property. We heard from Liz Davies KC during oral evidence that, in many cases, a tenant could have done nothing wrong but would still be subject to eviction without any discretion for the courts to vary the terms of that.

Even if the Government do not accept the amendment, I argue that there should be discretion for the courts, if not in every case of eviction, at least in exceptional circumstances. I urge the Government to take that on board in the spirit in which I have moved this amendment.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling these amendments, which allow us to have this debate. In my view—I think this is shared across the House —landlords must have robust and clear grounds for possession where there is good reason for them to take their property back. I hope that he will appreciate the steps the Government have already taken to ensure that the grounds are fair to both parties. We have overhauled the previous Government’s Renters (Reform) Bill to provide additional protections for tenants, including longer notice periods, a longer protected period and a higher rent arrears threshold. We have also scrapped the previous Government’s harmful proposals to introduce a new ground for repeat rent arrears, and we have reduced the discretionary antisocial behaviour threshold to behaviour “capable” of causing nuisance or annoyance.

However, amendments 73, 74 and 77, which would make all grounds discretionary, are a step too far. Indeed, I never argued for all grounds to be discretionary when we considered the previous Government’s Bill. Making all grounds discretionary would mean that landlords have no certainty that they would be awarded possession even if the grounds were otherwise met. That includes in situations of serious antisocial behaviour—where the tenant has been convinced of a serious criminal offence or has broken an injunction put in place to stop their behaviour. Landlords wanting to sell or move into their property could be prevented from doing so, and specialist sectors, such as temporary and supported accommodation, would not be able to guarantee regaining possession in order to house new individuals who require their support.

I assure the hon. Member that there are still many discretionary grounds in the Bill and that judges will have discretion in less clear cases or where possession may not always be reasonable, despite the ground having been met. It is absolutely right that judges have discretion where possession takes place in those circumstances, and that includes smaller breaches of a tenancy agreement or low levels of rent arrears. I believe the steps that we have taken to protect tenants provide sufficient protections against unfair evictions. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member not to press his amendments.

[Carla Denyer (Bristol Central) (Green)]

I would like to speak in favour of the amendment and to bring the Minister’s attention to the evidence we received from experts, which highlighted the fact that discretionary grounds do not make it impossible for the court to award possession. In fact, in many cases, especially ones involving antisocial behaviour, it is reasonable to assume that the courts would apply a high threshold for where to exercise discretion. Nevertheless, that does not negate the principle that there may be extremely exceptional circumstances in which discretion is needed. The Government completely tying the hands of the courts so that they are unable to consider those extenuating circumstances is counterproductive.

[Mr Amos]

I accept what the Minister says about the Bill’s intent and that there are very limited circumstances in which discretion would be available. It is disappointing, though, that it is not recognised that courts require more discretion than is given. The Bill would provide discretion only in those very limited circumstances.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Gentleman. The mandatory grounds for possession are very limited and specific—for example, grounds 1 and 1A, where the landlord has a clear intention to move back into the property or move a family member in or to sell the property, and they have to evidence that with the court. I ask hon. Members to consider—this was put to me many times in the evidence sessions—the challenges that our courts face and the burden that this legislation places on them. Making every ground discretionary, irrespective of how reasonable it is for a landlord in those grounds 1 and 1A circumstances, for example, to take back their property quickly, risks overburdening the courts. As I say, many of the grounds remain discretionary. However, we think that there is a good reason why a certain number of mandatory grounds are in a different bracket from the discretionary one.

[Mr Amos]

I hear what the Minister says. The case was made forcefully by witnesses in oral evidence that the discretionary grounds for eviction are far too limited and that we need to see further discretion given to the courts. This would not prevent evictions continuing or the courts from making the decisions in accordance with the Bill’s provisions, and it would provide discretion to the courts. I urge the Government to consider widening the categories of discretion for the courts in evictions. I hope that the Government will consider that issue during the passage of the Bill, and I am happy to withdraw the amendment on that basis.

[David Simmonds]

I certainly do not want to imply that there would be any degree of political love-in, but on this matter, I agree with the Minister. It is worth saying for the record that we in the Opposition understand that when the courts are considering this matter, the first issue will be an evidential test: has the necessary threshold for the mandatory ground to be triggered been met? If the court’s opinion is that there is some doubt about that, clearly it has the discretion to act differently because it considers through an evidential test that the threshold has not been met.

In practice, courts deal with this matter with a high degree of discretion, as they do with all other matters that are alike. As Members of Parliament, we will be aware of situations where constituents have been victims of serious, persistent, long-term antisocial behaviour. The grounds outlined are examples where evidence has been accumulated and a court can swiftly make a decision to grant possession in order for the situation to be resolved for the wider benefit of other people affected.

We therefore support the Government’s position that the mandatory grounds should be framed in this way and that moving to make all grounds discretionary would add an element of doubt over and above the evidential test. That would, in turn, enable those who wish to perpetrate long-term antisocial behaviour to get away with it for a longer period of time.

[Mr Amos]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Mr Amos]

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 4, page 5, line 40, at end insert—

“(fa) after subsection (5A), insert—

‘(5B) Where the court makes an order for possession on grounds 1 or 1A in Schedule 2 to this Act (whether with or without other grounds), the order shall include a requirement on the landlord to file and serve evidence no later than sixteen weeks from the date of the order.

(5C) Evidence provided under subsection (5B) must—

(a) provide details of—

(i) the state of occupation of the dwelling-house since the date of the order, and

(ii) the progress of any sale of the dwelling-house, and

(b) be accompanied by a statement of truth signed by the landlord.’”

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 69, in clause 4, page 5, line 41, at end insert—

“(2A) After section 7, insert—

‘7A Evidential requirements for Grounds 1 and 1A

(1) The court shall not make an order for possession on grounds 1 or 1A in Schedule 2 to this Act unless the landlord has complied with subsections (2) to (4) below.

(2) Where the landlord has served a notice for possession on grounds 1 or 1A, the court must be provided with evidence verified by a statement of truth signed by the landlord.

(3) Where the landlord has served a notice for possession on ground 1 and the dwelling house is required by a member of the landlord’s family as defined in paragraphs 2(b) to (d) of that ground, the court must be provided with evidence verified by a statement of truth signed by that family member.

(4) Where the landlord has served a notice for possession on ground 1A, the evidence referred to in sub-section (2) must include a letter of engagement from a solicitor or estate agent concerning the sale of the dwelling house.’”

[Mr Amos]

The amendment’s purpose is to require the evidence to be provided by landlords on grounds 1 and 1A, in the case of occupying the home or selling the property, to be clearly stated in the Bill, so that it is clear what evidence needs to be provided and the test is clearly stated. The Government have indicated that the evidence required will be contained in guidance, but it would significantly reassure Members in this House and in the other place if we could see the evidential test for landlords to gain possession. The amendment sets out the need for a statement of truth and suggests that a letter of engagement from a solicitor in the sale of a property is the kind of evidence that should be in the Bill. I believe the amendment is self-explanatory in that regard.

[Matthew Pennycook]

While I appreciate the sentiments behind the amendments—indeed, as a shadow Minister, I probed the previous Government on this point when discussing the previous Bill—on reflection, I do not think they are the right approach for the following reason, which relates to the previous debate. We have overhauled the Bill in a number of ways to strengthen protections for tenants, and we must be careful about tipping the balance too far the other way and penalising good landlords, who, in certain circumstances, have a right to certainty that they will get their property back and that this will move through the courts in an orderly fashion.

Amendment 68 is an attempt to deter abuse of grounds 1 and 1A, which is an honourable intention. It seeks to require landlords to present further evidence that they have fulfilled the grounds after the possession order has been granted. It does not detail what should happen if a landlord does not present the evidence. Furthermore, it will have no impact on cases that do not make it to court. Where a landlord has obtained a possession order through the courts, they will already have presented evidence to a court to satisfy a judge of their intent to meet the grounds. The amendment would also place an additional burden on courts, which would need to set up new processes to deal with the evidence, taking time away from progressing possession claims.

The hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington asked me to consider whether grounds that are currently mandatory should be discretionary, and I thought very carefully about which grounds should be discretionary and which mandatory when developing and overhauling this piece of legislation over recent months. On the basis of that reflection, I have concluded that increasing the prohibition on remarketing and reletting a property after using these grounds, including in cases that do not reach court, is a better mechanism for preventing abuse than adding requirements for evidence. This will allow a tenant to take action if they see, for example, their property advertised online following eviction.

Amendment 69 seeks to put into legislation prescribed evidential requirements for grounds 1 and 1A. We just had a discussion about how we should trust judges and their judgment on these matters. I believe that judges are best placed to consider and determine the evidence before them on these mandatory grounds. Setting an enhanced evidence threshold may mean that judges are less likely to consider wider evidence, and it could inadvertently lower the threshold where an eviction is ordered. It is right that judges have the discretion to respond to the evidence provided on a case-by-case basis. That is what the Bill provides for, and I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Amos]

The Minister says that the amendment does not include what would happen if the evidence was not provided—clearly, the evidence would not be there and the case would be weakened on that basis. I contest the idea that this is an onerous or burdensome requirement. The statement of truth is an extremely simple document—many on the Committee will have seen them—that can be produced easily and at little expense. I also contest the idea that courts need separate processes to look at statements of truth. They look at statements of truth all day, every day; new processes are not required.

The engagement of a solicitor in the sale of a property is not a particularly onerous requirement on someone selling their property. I assume that the person selling the property would, in any event, have to engage a solicitor, and would therefore need a letter of engagement. It is not an onerous requirement in any shape or form. The Minister said that judges would have less discretion. Again, I contest that, because judges would simply have more evidence in front of them; it would not have any effect on the amount of discretion that judges have. I urge the Minister to continue considering the issue, but I can do the maths, so I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

[David Simmonds]

Again, I agree with the Government on this matter. A lot of residential property transactions are undertaken by licensed conveyancers rather than by solicitors. That is a much more affordable and efficient option, often done on a fixed-fee basis, and that is particularly relevant to smaller landlords. Introducing a requirement that a solicitor must be used would be unduly onerous and would inhibit the number of transactions in the market.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I wish to provide further reassurance to the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, because I fear that we are dancing on the head of a pin here. Under the provisions in the Bill, judges will have to consider evidence to justify the use of mandatory grounds 1 and 1A. When I gave evidence to the Committee, I provided examples of the types of evidence that judges may require. It is up to individual judges to ask for that evidence and to make a decision on the basis of what is put in front of them. We trust judges to do that. With regard to the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, I do not accept the idea that judges are not looking at evidence and not ensuring that the use of these grounds is properly justified. That is misplaced, so I am glad he has indicated that he will withdraw the amendment.

[Mr Amos]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[David Simmonds]

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 4, page 6, line 14, leave out “1A,”.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

As the hon. Gentleman has just made clear, amendments 56 and 57 seek to reduce the notice period for the selling ground 1A from four months to two months. The Government believe that the notice period for tenants being evicted through no fault of their own should be four months, to give them adequate time to find new accommodation. An eviction notice can turn a family’s life upside down, and four months means they will not be forced to move during a school term. I draw the Committee’s attention to the remarks I made previously about the changing nature of the private rented system and the fact that more older people and families now live in it compared with the situation in the late ’80s, when the system was introduced.

Selling a property is often a long-term decision that involves significant planning on the part of landlords. We do not believe that landlords are likely to need to evict tenants with only two months’ notice, given the time it takes to secure a sale. They also have the option of selling with tenants in situ.

Amendments 70 and 71 were tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. They would make an extreme change that would reduce the notice period for the new student ground 4A to a mere two weeks from the current four months.

The Government believe that students are just as deserving of adequate notice as other tenants. The purpose of the student ground is to try to balance security of tenure with the need to preserve the annual cycle of typical student tenancies. These amendments do not assist the ground in that purpose at all. Student landlords plan their business models long term around the academic year, and after our reforms will factor the four-month notice into their planning.

There is no circumstance where a competent student landlord would suddenly need to evict tenants in line with the academic year with only two weeks’ notice. Indeed, currently they have to give two months’ notice under section 21. The hon. Gentleman’s amendment is a retrograde step vis-à-vis the current iniquitous arrangements that we are trying to undo.

Students often lack the capital to organise a move at short notice. A two-week notice period means it is likely they are given notice to leave during the summer break when they might be working, or even during their exams. We believe that it is right that they have four months’ notice to organise their move.

I therefore ask the hon. Members not to press their amendments.

[Mr Amos]

Amendments 70 and 71 would align the two weeks’ notice for students in HMOs with the two weeks’ notice that the Bill provides that students would have in purpose-built student accommodation. All the points that the Minister has made in relation to the short-term notice period apply to the Bill because that is the Government’s intent in relation to purpose-built student accommodation. The amendments would simply align those properties under HMO ownership with those that are university or purpose-built student accommodation.

Landlords of HMO accommodation are likely to be smaller businesses than universities. Under the provisions in the Bill, universities would enjoy much greater flexibility on eviction than much smaller landlords, who would suffer as a result.

My concern is that there would be a reduction in the amount of student accommodation because of those very different terms on which HMO landlords would be able to let their properties to students compared with other tenants. Any reduction in the availability of supply of student accommodation, particularly in university towns, would have a serious impact on family housing, which is of course often occupied by students, much to the chagrin of residents who are looking for family homes.

It is vitally important that an unintended consequence of the Bill is not the reduction in supply of student accommodation. That is why we seek alignment with what the Bill provides for purpose-built student accommodation.

I urge the Government to consider reducing, if not to two weeks, then to two months, the grounds for eviction in other student accommodation, so that it is more closely aligned with the provisions that the Bill makes for the majority of student accommodation. I urge the Government to consider that and I will not press the amendment.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

Amendment 61 seeks to expand the discretionary antisocial behaviour ground to include behaviour “capable” of causing nuisance or annoyance. Members may recall that this was proposed in the previous Government’s Renters (Reform) Bill. When in Opposition, we strongly opposed the change, because it had the potential to significantly reduce security of tenure and, most importantly, put vulnerable tenants at risk of eviction. I remain concerned that it would leave tenants open to eviction, even when their behaviour was not causing any problems.

A huge range of behaviours are “capable” of causing a nuisance or annoyance. I was tempted to say that some of the behaviour of my children, on occasion, is more than capable of causing nuisance or annoyance. We can all agree that such a subjective term potentially includes a huge range of behaviours, and it would not be fair for someone to lose their home on the basis of some of them. For example, a baby crying frequently is capable of causing another tenant annoyance. In those cases, and there are many others that I could cite, it would be fundamentally wrong to put a family at risk of eviction because of that. Worse still—this is a point I recall very clearly from the discussions I had with domestic violence charities at the time of the previous legislation—we heard from many organisations that represent victims of domestic abuse that sometimes such abuse can be mistaken for antisocial behaviour, because of loud noises, banging or disruption in the property next door. The amendment increases the risk that tenants in such a situation could be evicted.

I understand that the shadow Minister wants to ensure that landlords have confidence that they can evict tenants who engage in genuine antisocial behaviour. That is an honourable aim, but there are already measures in the Bill to address that, including reducing notice periods so that landlords can make a claim to the court immediately when using the antisocial behaviour grounds, as we have discussed. We have also made changes to section 9A of the Housing Act 1988 to include amendments to ensure that the court considers the particular impact of antisocial behaviour on victims living with perpetrators in HMOs, which was a specific concern raised by the sector. We will also encourage the use of mediation and other tools by ensuring that judges take into account whether a tenant has engaged with attempts to resolve their behaviour, making it easier to evict perpetrators who do not engage.

For the reasons that I have set out, we believe that lowering the threshold from “likely” to “capable of” causing nuisance or annoyance could have extremely damaging consequences, and I do not believe it is in the spirit of what the Bill is trying to achieve. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Mr Amos]

I rise to support the Government on this issue, as Liberal Democrats did in the context of the Renters (Reform) Bill in the previous Parliament. To my mind, introducing a definition of antisocial behaviour that is simply about what is “capable” of causing annoyance and disturbance is tantamount to an authoritarian approach. When the Minister talks about crying babies, I cannot help being reminded that my own crying baby was complained about by the next-door neighbour when I was in rented accommodation. She does not cry so much now—she is 32. The very idea that anything capable of causing annoyance should be regarded as formally antisocial behaviour in law is an extreme concept, and it is an extremely good thing that this new Bill has left such thinking behind. This amendment should not be accepted.

[David Simmonds]

I will withdraw the amendment, because again the numbers are against me. It is important to recognise as we consider it, however, that there are examples—loud music is one—that might not within the definition of “likely” to cause nuisance or annoyance, but potentially would fall within our proposed definition.

I hope that the Minister and the Government will consider this issue. We know that a children’s party—I speak as a guilty individual in this regard—can be a very noisy occasion that generally takes place in the middle of the day for a brief period of time, whereas playing loud music for one’s own freedom of enjoyment all day and night may cause significant issues. Most of us, as Members of Parliament, have seen examples of behaviour that of itself and on an individual, case-by-case basis would not cause a nuisance, but that can cause significant upset to neighbours when repeated. That can range from the environmental impact of an activity such as servicing cars or maintaining vehicles to things such as loud music, and people can do those things at times of the day and night that are antisocial in the context in which the home is located. It is important that the Government give further consideration to the matter, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 9, in schedule 1, page 172, leave out lines 29 to 32.—(Matthew Pennycook.)

This is in consequence of Amendment 5.

Question proposed, That the schedule, as amended, be the First schedule to the Bill.

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These measures will ensure that tenants are protected from arbitrary and unfair evictions. They will provide tenants with greater security and stability while supporting landlords’ rights to reclaim properties in circumstances where it is necessary and appropriate.

[Mr Amos]

I rise to ask the Minister to clarify something for my benefit, and possibly that of other people. The Liberal Democrats support the omission in paragraph 8 of the grounds for eviction for the purposes of creating holiday accommodation, but what will prevent a landlord from evicting to move in their own family, or purportedly for sale and then changing their mind and letting the property out as an Airbnb or holiday accommodation? There has been a massive rise in that type of accommodation; it is not scaremongering to suggest that there might be another increase. It is already a significant factor in the rental market, and it really hits some communities. I know we are debating this issue at a later stage, but I would be interested to hear what the Minister says about the schedule.

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[Matthew Pennycook]

Clause 6 provides for regulations that will allow the Secretary of State to publish the form to be used when landlords serve notice of intention to begin possession proceedings. It is crucial that the information landlords are required to provide reflects current law. This gives tenants the best opportunity to enforce their rights and seek appropriate support. The clause will allow regulations to be made so that we can update the forms at speed and respond to changing circumstances. It is a simple and straightforward clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Statutory procedure for increases of rent

[Mr Amos]

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 7, page 8, line 31, leave out from “determination” to the end of line 36 and insert—

“(4AA) Where the rent for a particular period of the tenancy is to be greater than the rent for the previous period by virtue of a notice, determination or agreement mentioned in subsection (4A), the rent may not be greater than the rent for the previous period increased by the Bank of England Base Rate.

(4AB) Any provision relating to an assured tenancy to which this section applies is of no effect so far as it provides—

(a) that the rent for a particular period of the tenancy must or may be greater than the rent for the previous period otherwise than by virtue of a notice, determination or agreement mentioned in subsection (4A), or

(b) that the rent for a particular period of the tenancy, where greater than the rent for the previous period by virtue of a notice, determination or agreement mentioned in subsection (4A), must or may be greater than the rent for the previous period increased by the Bank of England Base Rate.”

This amendment would mean that the maximum rent increase can only be an increase in line with the Bank of England Base Rate.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

[Mr Amos]

At the beginning of today’s sitting, the Minister and the shadow Minister asked the Committee to bear with them, because it was their first time leading the Committee stage of a Bill in their respective positions. I ask the Committee to spare a thought for the hon. Member for Bristol Central and me, as it is our first time being elected an MP, our first time in a Committee and our first time dealing with this Bill. There are a number of amendments that we would introduced but which have not yet made it through to the amendment paper.

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[Mr Amos]

I thank the Minister for his response on those points. We would argue that the current metric for market rents is actually more closely linked to inflation, and more likely to be affected by inflation, than would be the Bank of England base rate, which is obviously a separate—

[The Chair]

Order.