UK Exit from the European Union

Debate between Geraint Davies and Mark Durkan

Monday 17th October 2016 Westminster Hall

[Mark Durkan]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising those issues. She is right to reflect on the fact that Charlie Flanagan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Taoiseach have reflected that they want to make sure that Northern Ireland’s very distinctive position is recognised and reflected in the future. Not only those in government, but all the parties in the Oireachtas have reflected that in the work of the Joint Committee on the Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement—a Committee that Northern Ireland MPs have the right to attend and speak at. It has set out a programme of work in relation to Brexit to look at the trade implications that might arise, and at the dangers of the incipient borderism that may emerge once we have one jurisdiction in the EU and one jurisdiction out. Once we have differential legislation coming in, we will have the tensions and difficulties of borderism. Whether customs posts are introduced or not, borderism will be an increasing problem. The problem will not only be in border areas and constituencies such as mine and that of my hon. Friend the Member for South Down (Ms Ritchie), but across the north. Indeed, it will affect the south as well.

Before I touch on those particular questions, I want to address questions that are reflected in the petitions, not least the question of the role of Parliament. It seems strange that people who led a campaign in the name of taking back control to the UK Parliament now want to bypass that Parliament as far as considering next steps are concerned. It is clear that the people who are meant to be steering us forward have no plan, map, app or satnav for where they are going. The rest of us are being told that as far as the devolved institutions are concerned, we just have to tailgate wherever London’s impulses take them next—whatever whims, prejudices and fancies emerge, so long as there is some sort of consultation, we can safely tailgate London—but if people do not know where they are going, it is not sensible to follow them blindly. People in Scotland and Northern Ireland who voted to remain have the right to say that our position should be reflected. Members of Parliament from Scotland and Northern Ireland at least should have the opportunity to record their position here and in Scotland. The Conservative party imposed the new construct of English votes for English laws in this Parliament, but perhaps the compromise should have been English votes for English exits. We should let them decide to take themselves out of the EU and let those of us who want to remain retain membership of the single market and have access to EU measures and programmes.

People seem to forget that we had a referendum to endorse the Good Friday agreement. It was almost unique internationally, because it was a double referendum: it had to be held not just in Northern Ireland but in the south, and a majority was needed in both. It was John Hume’s great idea. It was a way of recruiting and respecting both senses and sources of legitimacy in Northern Ireland—the Unionist sense and source of legitimacy, which was bound up in the wishes of the majority of people in Northern Ireland, and the nationalist sense of source of legitimacy, which was bound up in the wishes of the majority of people in Ireland.

In that referendum, huge numbers of people overwhelmingly endorsed the Good Friday agreement. It was the high water mark of Irish national democratic expression—a form of articulated self-determination. It is part of the very delicate constitutional understandings that are at the heart of the Good Friday agreement, whereby we brought people to accept the principle of consent. Some Unionists used to resent the principle of consent because they thought it put Northern Ireland on the window ledge of the Union. Many republicans, of course, rejected the principle of consent because they said it created a Unionist veto and was partitionist. The Social Democratic and Labour party—a constitutional nationalist party that was the first nationalist party to put the principle of consent at the heart of our constitution—worked hard to consolidate the idea, and we got a span of acceptance around the principle of consent.

The principle of consent states that Northern Ireland’s future will be determined by the wishes of the majority of people in Northern Ireland, so it is confounded by the way in which Northern Ireland is being taken out of the European Union against the wishes of the majority of people there. The dual referendum is being confounded, too, because when people in the north and the south voted for the Good Friday agreement, they took Irish and UK common membership of the EU as a given.

The preamble of the agreement between the two Governments in the Good Friday agreement clearly makes significant reference to common membership of the European Union. Strand 1 of the Good Friday agreement, which deals with the institutions in Northern Ireland, refers to the European Union. Strand 2, which is about institutions for north and south—for the island as a whole—refers to the European Union. Strand 3, which is about relations throughout the islands of Britain and Northern Ireland, and takes in all the devolved Administrations plus the Ireland Administration, also refers to the European Union. So people cannot say that the European Union was not a conscious factor in people’s understanding when they voted for the Good Friday agreement.

The improvement in British-Irish relations, in the context of our common membership of the EU, was a major part of the backdrop to the Good Friday agreement. Without the experience of common membership of the EU and the improved relations in that regard, we would never have got the Anglo-Irish agreement in 1985, which was signed by Margaret Thatcher and Garret FitzGerald, and set the context for the subsequent peace process.

People need to be very careful about what they are undoing here. They need to understand the difference between a mere stud wall and a supporting wall. When people talk about blindly taking Northern Ireland out of the EU against our wishes and about removing the Human Rights Act, which was a key pillar in the support for and understanding of the Good Friday agreement, they are dangerously knocking through a supporting wall. I am not saying that there will be a collapse straight away, but if other issues create pressure later we will regret this move. That is why people need to look more fundamentally at some of these issues.

People do not seem to realise, particularly in respect of the workings of strand 2 of the Good Friday agreement, which is about north-south arrangements, that a large part of the traffic and the programme of work of the six implementation bodies that were set up under the agreement relate to EU moneys or programmes. The Special EU Programmes Body, which, as its name implies, manages the EU programmes north and south, would disappear. The work of InterTradeIreland is in large part to do with encouraging businesses north and south to engage with European challenge funds, to understand opportunities in European markets and to understand European directives. It also uses EU money to help businesses and academia to take part in research consortia and alliances. That work would be affected. The food safety body largely deals with EU health and food directives and ensures they are transposed in a consistent and compatible way, north and south. Similarly, Waterways Ireland has channelled EU funding in a lot of its work.

We could end up with Brexit meaning that the workings of strand 2 are, in effect, hollowed out, which is a matter of gross insensitivity—to nationalists in particular, but to all who bought into and supported the agreement as a balanced package, in terms of the institutions in the north, the north-south arrangements and the British-Irish east-west arrangements. It will not be good enough if strand 2 is hollowed out in a way that suits the Democratic Unionist party, the largest party in Northern Ireland currently. It never supported the agreement, it opposed it in the referendum, it voted no and it campaigned against it. It just so happens that it would suit the DUP for Brexit to hollow out that key aspect of the Good Friday agreement by default.

People may say, “Well, that can happen. It’s just a matter of luck and happenstance,” but that is not what the people of Ireland understood when they endorsed the Good Friday agreement in overwhelming numbers, and the people of southern Ireland changed the terms of the Irish constitution specifically to reflect that. We cannot turn around and say, “You’re unilaterally being taken out of the EU. We are unilaterally going to weaken strand 2 by pulling out the underpinnings and all the key bolts, because people in England voted in a UK vote.”

The Good Friday agreement made it very clear that some decisions are for the people of Ireland north and south alone, without external impediment. The way in which the Government are conducting Brexit—they are saying it is a one-size-fits-all, for all parts of the United Kingdom—is potentially going to constitute an external impediment to the due workings and development of the Good Friday agreement in the longer term. People need to recognise that just giving assurances about trying to avoid a hard border will not be enough.

[Geraint Davies]

I am listening very carefully to the hon. Gentleman’s excellent speech. Is he saying, given what has happened, that the Government should undertake to ensure that all the rights that are currently enjoyed—whether rights at work or environmental rights—the economic grants and even the subsidies to counteract the tariffs that will be introduced should now be given to Northern Ireland so we can sustain what the people who signed up to the Good Friday agreement across Ireland understood to be the case?

[Mark Durkan]

I thank my hon. Friend for that point. Yes, essentially I believe that is what the people of Northern Ireland voted for when they voted to remain. They want to maximise our opportunities within the EU, such as our access to programmes and funding. We have had generous access to significant funding from the EU and we have taken advantage of particular programmes, not least some of the cross-border measures. When people voted to remain, I believe they were also voting to preserve the Good Friday agreement. They wanted to try to keep it intact and do the least damage to it. Of course, people who voted against the agreement in the first place had no care about that. They do not care what damage is done to it; they just feel, “Well, somebody else will have to look after it,” and maybe literally pick up the pieces.

The other issues that the hon. Gentleman touched on go back to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and others about the whole question of the great repeal Bill. Last week I described it as the great “download and save” Bill, because it will simply download and save existing EU law, but the significant question then is, who will subsequently control the delete key? Will the great repeal Bill make it clear that only Parliament may repeal or amend those key EU laws, or will powers be given to Ministers to make significant change to that legislation by regulation?

[Mr Charles Walker in the Chair]

That is a significant issue, because a number of Ministers would be happy to joyride around some of those laws, once they had said, “Oh, we’re behind the wheel,” and away they would go. Perhaps, as indicated last week, it would be a bit more like clowns with chainsaws or axes, as they go after particular environmental standards, employment rights, women’s rights or other things, just so they can demonstrate the powers under the great repeal Bill. I worry about what some people might do, in an excess of showing control, and the sort of joyriding that would take place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Durkan]

My view on that is clear, and I have been consistent. The hon. Gentleman has given the example of women’s sanitary products, but let us also remember that this Government have often cited EU restrictions against a lot of policy initiatives that many of us would want. EU obligations were quoted in favour of the unfair pension changes for women born in the 1950s, with Ministers and Government MPs insisting, “Oh, it’s because of the EU that we have had to do that, equalising in this sort of way and not adjusting.” It will be interesting to see how many of the Members who used that rationale in the past will say, “Now we are getting control, we can have a different take on the whole question of the pension changes and transitions.” Such excuses have been used in different ways and, similarly, were cited against having VAT concessions for hospitality or tourism, even though about 24 EU member states clearly have such variations in their rates.

The other question that I wanted to ask the Minister about the great repeal Bill is, as well as indicating whether any changes made to EU laws incorporated into domestic law will be under primary legislation or regulation, whether the Bill will automatically devolve powers that should go to devolved institutions, or will it have them retained for a period and subject to subsequent devolution legislation? In the particular context of Northern Ireland, some of us worry that under a so-called great repeal Bill powers would, in essence, be transferred to London, but not devolved before they have been exercised in London, perhaps to change some of the legislation or the standards on rights.

Doing that might be in the interests not only of the Government party in Westminster but, unfortunately, of the largest party in Northern Ireland, the Democratic Unionist party. A change in a law before subsequent devolution to Northern Ireland would mean that those of us who want to change it back might do so only by avoiding a veto from a political party such as the DUP. However, if under a great repeal Bill the functions and powers over legislation in the relevant areas automatically devolve to Northern Ireland, then anyone trying to remove those rights and protections, or to reduce the standards, could do so only with sufficient cross-community support and no veto from anyone else. That is a significant political difference, so again the Government need to be careful about what they are treading on and dealing with in such areas.

A final and fundamental point that I want to make about this in respect of Northern Ireland is to do with the Good Friday agreement and the particular provision at the heart of its delicate constitutional understanding. The agreement is a special political and constitutional hologram—Unionists can hold it up to a certain light and see things according to their principles, and nationalists in Ireland can hold it up to a certain light and see things according to our political ethic and outlook—but the fact is that it provides clearly for the possibility of a referendum on Northern Ireland removing itself from the United Kingdom into a united Ireland. That is provided for not only in the agreement, but in schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which translated the Good Friday agreement into law.

I want the Minister to address whether those specific provisions will be part of any new UK-EU treaty. Will there be specific provision for a UK that has left the EU to still respect and recognise that the Good Friday agreement provided for Northern Ireland to have the option of moving into a united Ireland? Such a provision needs to be included in any UK-EU treaty, if there is to be one, so that in Northern Ireland we are not hit with the kind of question that was used to vex and confuse people in the debate in Scotland, which is to say: “If you want to go into a united Ireland, you might not be able to go into the EU as well. You will be a new territory going into the EU, and therefore you will have to have new negotiations for Northern Ireland, and they could be very complicated.” People might also say, “A united Ireland will change the member state,” so even the Republic’s terms would be up for renegotiation and need a whole new negotiation.

That sort of scare was clearly used in Scotland, but it is one that we cannot allow any possibility of in future options for Northern Ireland. Some of us worked hard to get those provisions into the Good Friday agreement, and to get sufficient understanding around them. We cannot afford for those delicate understandings to be wounded or lost by the way in which the Government go about Brexit.

Some people have tried to say, “There is a precedent”—the German example is the perfect precedent—“so we don’t need anything in the new treaty.” However, the difference was, first, the weight of political interest in making that happen for Germany at the pace at which it happened and, secondly, the understanding that, because the original European Communities treaties specifically recognised the West German constitution—the basic law—which purported to apply to all of Germany, all that reunification did was to make de facto what, in recognising the basic law, was originally deemed de jure. That was the Germans’ equivalent of the old articles 2 and 3 in the Irish constitution—but the territorial claim of those articles was changed as part of the Good Friday agreement.

As diligent constitutional nationalists, we cannot afford for there to be any dirty work at the crossroads. There were understandings about the direct and straightforward premise of a referendum option for a united Ireland, and about how well it would be accommodated, and we cannot allow that to be confounded in any way by the terms of Brexit. The terms need to be specific, because we are also working in the context of different EU treaties from when German unification happened.

We also need specific provision so that no one in other EU member states will misunderstand that referendum option when it emerges in Ireland. People might say, “We, too, want the principle of regions being able to member-state hop, or to switch from one side of a border to another.” It needs to be clear that we are looking not for any wider or more general precedent for anyone else in or around the EU, but for specific recognition of the Good Friday agreement.

[Geraint Davies]

I am listening carefully, but is the hon. Gentleman putting the case that there should be a referendum now across Ireland about whether there should be a unification of Ireland, in order that the people of Northern Ireland who want to remain in the EU can do so as part of Ireland? He probably has not considered this, but will he consider extending that to Scotland—and indeed Wales, while he is at it—so they can join a unified Ireland?

Tropical Diseases

Debate between Geraint Davies and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Westminster Hall

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Davies. Like others, I commend the hon. Member for Stafford (Jeremy Lefroy) on securing this debate and on the helpful way in which he set out the terms of the debate, which was helpful not least because, as the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) said, he covered all the technical terms and jargon, meaning that none of the rest of us has to go over those hurdles. I also pay tribute to the hon. Member for Stafford for his steadfast and sterling work as the chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on malaria and neglected tropical diseases. I try to attend the group’s meetings as often as I can, and I appreciate not only the quality of his work, but the calibre of the evidence and engagement that is brought to the group, which powerfully demonstrates the range of commitment of a number of charities and campaign groups. We have also heard directly from companies, not only about the quality of the work and their research, but about the commitment that they have been prepared to make on things such as price sensitivity. We have also been able to see and hear how important the work of DFID is and about its various partners in the NGO sector, and internationally and multilaterally.

The rate of progress and advance highlighted by the hon. Member for Stafford in his introduction in many ways proves the power of marshalled will when we have multilateral actions and well defined global goals. For some it is fashionable to knock such initiatives, but seeing real success against declared goals should incentivise us to do more and to go further. As the hon. Gentleman said, when we might still be looking at 450,000 or more children dying from malaria and neglected tropical diseases, we clearly need to do more.

This is a time for renewed commitment, rather than complacency about the challenges. Tackling malaria and neglected tropical diseases will be key to achieving the sustainable development goals, especially the health goal, the realisation of universal health coverage and the reduction in maternal and child mortality. Achievement of the global malaria targets by 2030 will mean more than 10 million lives saved, giving all that added productivity, releasing all that quality of life and increasing economic activity.

The UK should be seen to be prioritising sustainable development goal 3. We should therefore sustain and, I hope, increase the annual investment—£536 million at present—to achieve malaria elimination. The UK’s malaria and reproductive health framework for results will run out this year, so we need a renewed vision and a new plan for the UK’s contribution to global efforts towards elimination.

DFID has the credibility, so it should be seen to ensure that SDG 3 is more articulate about neglected tropical diseases by using its own working indicator on the number of people requiring interventions against neglected tropical diseases by 2030. Furthermore, we should heed the caution of the hon. Gentleman about silo approaches, which are understandable in the face of so many difficult challenges and so many pressures, but it is vital that we do not miss the opportunity to use disease-specific vertical programmes for other diseases and other health challenges to contribute towards the defeat of other diseases. It is therefore important for the UK to continue to fund bilateral, disease-specific programmes if we are to sustain the gains that have been made.

There has already been some discussion of “elimination” or “eradication”. It is important whether we use and how we qualify such terms and the differences between them. The goal is, in essence, one of emancipation. When we achieve elimination or eradication, we will have conquered a disease, with all the ravages that it can bring, including death, disability or diverting the life opportunities of those who have to care for the sufferers—women and children in poor countries are affected in particular. At the same time we will need to remember that malaria and neglected tropical diseases are not only a face of poverty, but a force for poverty, not least in their impact on women and children.

We need to see the whole effort as one of emancipation, creating alternatives for people—not only lives no longer lost, but lives that can be better lived and more fulfillingly expressed through economic contribution and in public life. That is why it is so timely that the hon. Member for Stafford has secured the debate and that is why it is so important that we encourage the Minister and everyone he works with in DFID to do everything that they can.

[Geraint Davies (in the Chair)]

I was hoping to get two speakers in before 10.30 am, but I know that will be rather difficult.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Geraint Davies and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 22nd May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, as it shows exactly why people should be worried. If the best argument that Government Members can make is that this amendment is modest and merely permissive, people should be worried that the Government are opposing and rejecting such a straightforward, common-sense amendment.

[Geraint Davies]

I shall be brief, Mr Deputy Speaker. The coalition Government say that they want to encourage diversity in the market and increase the proportion and number of mutuals, yet they refuse to agree with measuring the number of mutuals or their market share. Anybody who is serious about any policy should want to measure it in order to manage it and show that it has been successful; otherwise they come across as completely hollow. Given that we have the Office for Budget Responsibility and so on measuring important things such as outputs and economic performance, I cannot understand why we cannot include mutuals as part of that portfolio.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Geraint Davies and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

I raise this because if one compares clause 4(4) with the text of amendment 18, it does seem to make a change. The text in the Bill allows for the possibility that is provided for in sections 31 and 32 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The amendment presumes and requires that the referendum and election happen together. There could be tension there, so I have asked the Minister to clarify or explain that. I am just puzzled by the wording. When one sees such variance in the words, one has to ask whether it is inadvertent or whether there is an intention behind it.

Amendment 162 raises the possibility of the UK chief counting officer disagreeing with the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland in respect of the arrangements for combining the issue and receipt of postal ballots. Hon. Members might say that that is unlikely to happen. If that is the case, why is the amendment legislating for such a possibility and what are the implications for the conduct of the other elections and the issue of the postal ballot? Again, I seek clarification from the Minister. In a UK-wide referendum on the voting system, representations could be made to the chief counting officer through the Electoral Commission and so on. There could be legal challenges and threats of legal challenges from a well-resourced campaign that wants to disrupt or create confusion during the election. The chief counting officer might be minded to say that the referendum postal ballot papers have to be handled separately, or some other pressure could cause disagreement. It could be that the chief electoral officer for Northern Ireland does not get agreement from the chief counting officer. In such cases, what is the price of that possibility and how will it impact on the arrangements not just for the referendum postal ballot papers but for the issue and receipt of the postal ballot papers for the local elections and the Assembly?

Finally, amendment 177, to which the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) referred, is a big amendment. Proposed new paragraph 44(2) to schedule 8 states:

“The spoilt postal ballot paper may not be replaced unless all the postal ballot papers issued to the person are returned.”

If we are providing for that in law, is it clearly stated in form 2—the form that is to apply in relation to a declaration of identity? The form provides advice on what to do in the case of a spoiled ballot, but it does not clearly state that one cannot return and have a spoiled ballot replaced unless all three forms are returned. There is confusion, so we need to see whether the effect of this amendment is properly covered, addressed and clearly expressed in the information that will be given to voters. It might be that voters reading the form as it is in the Bill will believe that they can have the referendum ballot paper replaced separately. If the Government are to go ahead with this amendment, they will have to make further amendments to the forms that are already in the Bill, or to the amended forms that they have provided for in this group of amendments.

[Geraint Davies]

As a member of the Welsh Affairs Committee, which has taken a considerable amount of evidence on this subject, I feel that I can talk about the potential confusion that surrounds the combination of polls that we face. The House may be interested in the testimony of Philip Johnson, the chair of the Welsh branch of the Association of Electoral Administrators. He said:

“The capacity for confusion is immense.”

He said that 2015, when there will be the combination of polls, could be horrendous. He is not talking about voter confusion over policy issues, which will, I think, be a significant problem for our democracy.

In Wales, where we have a Labour Government, various proposals will be made to carry on, revive and enliven the policies in Wales. Alongside that, Labour will put forward a different set of proposals on focus and investment to take to the UK Parliament. Therefore, there will be quite different proposals from the same party for different elections on the same day. What is more, there may be varying views on alternative voting. Furthermore, we will have different constituencies for the Assembly and for the UK parliamentary election. For example, I might be standing as the candidate for Swansea West and, at the same time, voters could be asked to vote Labour for the Assembly Member for Swansea Central. Obviously, that could be confusing to voters. We could have one party making different proposals in the same area.