London Stock Exchange

Debate between George Kerevan and William Cash

Tuesday 21st February 2017 Westminster Hall

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the future of the London Stock Exchange.

It is a pleasure to serve under you, Mr Hollobone. I have brought this matter for debate because the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and the London Stock Exchange raises issues of national interest and, in my opinion, it is a slam dunk that the merger is not in the national interest.

The London Stock Exchange Group owns several key market components in the United Kingdom, including the London Stock Exchange itself, a recognised investment exchange regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the London Clearing House, which is supervised by the Bank of England. A number of subsidiaries of the group are also regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. The proposed merger requires regulatory approval by the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority. The most significant approvals are those required, first, from the Bank of England in connection with the London Clearing House, which I understand to be 57% owned by the London Stock Exchange, and which conducts euro clearing, and, secondly, from the Financial Conduct Authority with respect to the London Stock Exchange, which is fundamental to the City of London’s capital markets.

The London Clearing House is one of the two main clearing houses in the UK and clears all major currencies, including the euro. As I understand it, both the German and French Governments have indicated a wish to strip euro clearing out of the City. All of that has significant political involvement because it would facilitate in due course a substantial movement of UK market infrastructure to the continent and would permit Germany and France, in the context of Brexit negotiations, to achieve German and French objectives that will undermine the UK’s political leverage during those negotiations.

Her Majesty’s Treasury has certain powers to direct or make recommendations to the Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority to take action or not. The Prime Minister is First Lord of the Treasury, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer of course has fundamental responsibilities. The Treasury has powers of direction over the Bank of England under section 4 of the Bank of England Act 1946. It may give directions to the Bank following consultation with the Governor

“as…they think necessary in the public interest.”

The Treasury may direct the Bank to exercise its powers not to approve the acquisition of what is described as a “qualifying holding” in the London Clearing House.

It is not known whether the Bank of England has already given its approval, although the Treasury could direct such a decision to be reversed on the grounds of public interest. The powers include determining that the proposed deal is not a normal commercial deal in the light of the Brexit negotiations and to take account of the involvement of the state of Hesse, which has shown a desire to boost Frankfurt as a hub at the expense of London, which is indicated in the report of Professor Dirk Schiereck, commissioned by Deutsche Börse in January 2017. In the past few days a Minister in Hesse indicated that the headquarters of the merged group should be in Germany:

“The reasons for the headquarters being in Frankfurt are crystal clear.”

The objective could not be clearer. It is inconceivable, in the UK national interest, that the London Stock Exchange should be regulated in and operated out of Germany as we leave, and having left, the European Union. There are also questions, as yet unresolved, surrounding the new chief executive officer, who is under investigation for potential insider dealing in connection with the London Stock Exchange deal, and the regulatory relationship between the United Kingdom and the EU which forms part of the Brexit negotiations. It would not be in the public interest for the combination of the two groups to be achieved immediately in advance of those negotiations, since that would give commercial parties operating at the behest of German political masters the ability to remove the rug from underneath the UK’s feet without regard to the negotiated outcome, or to threaten to do so during the negotiations unless the UK made certain concessions.

If the deal goes through, the combined group will be able to bulk up euro clearing and exchange and business clearing generally in Frankfurt at the expense of London. Given the declared political objective to promote Frankfurt, Paris and the eurozone, that is not an outcome in the UK’s national interest.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman is, as ever, making a logical and compelling case, but is he suggesting to the House that the owners and management of the London Stock Exchange are willingly entering into a merger that will lead to the transfer of all of their business to another country?

[Sir William Cash]

There is severe detriment to our national interest in allowing a merger of that kind when the London Stock Exchange and its group are the jewel in the crown of the City of London. Any merger raises matters of national interest such as, first, financial stability and UK taxpayer liability. The merger would create a new financial market infrastructure group controlling, inter alia, about 90% of European-listed and over-the-counter derivatives transactions, but operated for the benefit of shareholders, not users, with an unprecedented complexity of risk profile and significant uncertainty as to whether the UK taxpayer would pick up the bill were part of the combined infrastructure to fail. The uncertainty created by the lack right now of a clear Brexit deal adds considerably to the stability and taxpayer risks.

Secondly, there is loss of control of a key UK asset post-Brexit. The London Stock Exchange is a major centre of global financial markets: more than 500 foreign companies are listed in London, which is 20% of global foreign listings; and it has the highest equity market capitalisation, 170%, in relation to the GDP of all the largest economies. Majority control of that vital business will pass to Deutsche Börse shareholders, who will own 54% of the new group post-merger. Passing control of the London Stock Exchange to Deutsche Börse in the context of Brexit is not in the national interest and might undermine our negotiations with the 27 member states as we leave the EU.

The issue is not where the headquarters of the new company is located technically. I am told that formally moving the HQ to Germany, as the state of Hesse has insisted, is not likely given the need for a significant shareholder vote, but that is beside the point. The real issue is who calls the shots and in whose interests critical decisions are made. It is no answer to say that the HQ will remain in the UK if the reality is that the people really in charge are flying in for the day from Germany. Decisions must be taken in the UK and in the interests of the UK.

My third point is about competition concerns. The only substantial remedy offered by the parties to the EU Commission to allay concerns about significantly impeding effective competition is the sale of the central counterparty, Clearnet SA, based in Paris, and part of the LSEG. No disposals have been offered by Deutsche Börse, which owns trading platforms, central counterparties and settlement systems that have been integrated into a single vertical silo in Frankfurt. That is not sufficient, and I am concerned that the outcome of the European Commission’s review of the proposed merger will be determined by the EU’s political priority to ensure that Germany has control over London’s capital market infrastructure, instead of by genuine market concentration and anti-trust concerns.

Fourthly, there has been a lack of public scrutiny and industry comment; there has been little proactive support for, or indeed criticism of, the merger from the main UK financial institutions. That is not surprising, since the parties have given 12 major investment banks a role in the deal and they are destined to share about £353 million in fees if the deal succeeds. There has also been little comment by the UK Government so far on a deal concerning a major UK asset, although they still have a public interest role to play under the Enterprise Act 2002. We need to know why it was, and who decided not to refer the merger when it first came before the Secretary of State. Vast profits and sums of money are involved, and some stand to gain financially on a grand scale. All of that can be ascertained, but the national interest must prevail.

Precious little has been put into the public domain to suggest that the deal is remotely in the public interest. On what possible basis can it be argued, in particular post-23 June and the passage through the House of Commons of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill, that the merger is in the national interest? Furthermore, under section 1JA of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, the Treasury

“may at any time by notice in writing to the FCA make recommendations to the FCA about aspects of the economic policy of…Government”,

including how to ensure compatibility with the FCA’s “strategic objective”, to ensure that the London Stock Exchange functions well, and how to advance the FCA’s objective to ensure the soundness, stability and resilience of the UK’s financial system, which is defined as including the London Stock Exchange and the London Clearing House.

[Sir William Cash]

As I have said, the withdrawal Bill is quite clear. We will leave. That means that we will be insulated from the catastrophe that could occur if the eurozone collapsed. I could enlarge that point, but I will not for the time being.

There is another statutory requirement to ensure the principle of the desirability of sustainable growth in the UK’s economy in the medium or long term. Those are all statutory functions, and I strongly suggest that Her Majesty’s Treasury should decide—in fact, I urge it to—that it is not in the UK’s interests to allow a deal where there is a clear intention to take action that would cause systemic risks in the UK and be detrimental to UK tax revenues.

I move to the powers of the Bank of England, which is under a judicially reviewable statutory duty in respect of the test of approval for any acquisition of the London Clearing House. Under the European market infrastructure regulation, the test for approval in general terms for the purpose of ensuring the sound and prudent management of the London Clearing House raises questions of the suitability of the proposed acquirer and the soundness of the proposed acquisition, including the person who will direct the business of the London Clearing House. It also includes questions relating to whether the Bank of England would be able effectively to supervise, and several other factors. All those are in question in this instance.

I turn to the powers of the Financial Conduct Authority, which is required to approve the acquisition of the London Stock Exchange because it involves the acquisition of the “control” over the LSE by the new holding company. In those circumstances, the FCA has to consider the suitability of the new group holding company and the financial soundness of the acquisition to ensure sound and prudent management, and have regard to the key influence that the new group holding company will have on the London Stock Exchange. There are grave concerns about all those matters that pose a threat to the sound and prudent management of the London Stock Exchange, including questions relating to moving euro clearing out of London. The removal of euro clearing to Germany would undermine UK economic growth, because it may lead to the movement of other currency clearing out of the UK and undermine the City’s success. Moving the new holding company to Frankfurt would also be against the UK national interest.

[George Kerevan]

I grant that there is an issue about the removal of all or a substantial amount of euro clearing to the European Union jurisdiction, but that may come anyway as a result of Brexit; it is not dependent on whether this merger takes place. Indeed, one could argue that the merger might act as a barrier to such a move.

[Sir William Cash]

I was against the merger before Brexit, and I have become even more so since. I emphatically repeat my view that it is against the national interest, and I will not in any way resile from that point.

This deal would operate against the UK’s national interest in several ways. For example, the driver behind the merger is to consolidate as much market activity across the whole value chain into as few liquidity pools as possible. The reason given for that is to allow customers—primarily the world’s largest banks—to manage their capital and collateralisation requirements as efficiently as possible, particularly in the illiquid and untransparent world of OTC interest rate swaps. The most efficient way of achieving that is to have one dominant silo. This merger would bring together the two pre-eminent trading and post-trade silos in Europe, the London Stock Exchange and Clearing House and Eurex, which is owned by Deutsche Börse. One of those silos would inevitably prosper disproportionately, at the strategic and economic expense of the other. Given that a German chief executive officer would immediately be in place—whether that is the presently proposed CEO or not—and more than 54% of the shares would be owned by Deutsche Börse shareholders, and given the strength of Eurex’s existing listed derivatives clearing house, there is a very meaningful risk that the London Stock Exchange and the London Clearing House, and therefore the City as a whole, would be at the thin end of the wedge.

In the real world of markets, this works as follows. There will be no big announcements, no formal closures and no notice of intention to leave. Rather, liquidity will be shifted from one place to another through the creation of incentives and tipping points. Mirror contracts will be created that mimic what is on offer in London. Special arrangements for collateral and cross-margining in the favoured venue will be put in place. Without anyone particularly noticing, liquidity will shift away from London to the continent. Once that siphoning of liquidity begins, it will be unstoppable, and without liquidity there is no market.

Prior to Brexit, when this deal was first negotiated, that was a very attractive outcome for the LSE’s German partner. Post Brexit, control of the combined group and the shift of London’s business to Europe is an absolute necessity for Deutsche Börse and its national stakeholders. The importance of that is shown by the ever louder calls from German politicians and regulators for the combined group to be headquartered in Frankfurt. Controlling the LSE’s direction is key to Frankfurt successfully becoming the new financial centre of Europe—clearly at London’s expense. Even if the headquarters are maintained in the UK, there will be a German CEO, a majority of shares will be held by Deutsche Börse shareholders and there will be a massive political push from Frankfurt, which will lead to decisions being taken behind closed doors, against the UK’s interests.

The exchanges themselves have suggested that that loss of liquidity from London will not happen, and the solution is a so-called liquidity bridge. No market participant—apparently even the companies themselves—seems to understand what is meant by that or how it would be delivered. No reliance should be placed on it.

Finally, the acquisition of LCH.Clearnet SA by Euronext, which is largely French and Dutch-controlled and headquartered in Paris, is another political wildcard. That would enable France to exert much greater political force behind its push for euro clearing to relocate to Paris, again potentially creating systemic risk and dangerous uncertainty in the UK’s markets.

This transaction has the clear potential to strip a key activity out of the City of London. It should certainly not be nodded through in the midst of Brexit negotiations. Why weaken the City before we have even started the process of exiting the EU? I have mentioned the Enterprise Act 2002, which I understand can still be used in the public interest, including by reference to the criterion of UK financial stability.

In an important article published in the Financial Times on 13 February, Jonathan Ford makes it clear that the €29 billion merger was, as we know, conceived before the Brexit vote. The deal was supposed to take advantage of a converging EU rule book in the single market by drawing together Europe’s two most vibrant securities markets and their clearing activities, which are the financial plumbing of the system. The aim was to create

“a single…‘pool of liquidity’”

that captured scale economies, in competition with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.

Jonathan Ford argues that to make their own common pool a reality, Deutsche Börse and the London Stock Exchange would have to be very ambitious. He doubts whether that is feasible. He indicates that there is a serious problem, namely, that

“clearing operations have a wider impact on the functioning of capital markets; not just the management of systemic risk but on the very competitiveness of financial centres.”

He states:

“Given the importance of finance to the post-Brexit economy,”

the United Kingdom has a “strong interest” in ensuring that the deal is not damaging to London as a financial centre. He argues that the Bank of England and the FCA still have vetoes, and the Government can

“determine the outcome in the wider public interest.”

He suggests that the Government would be wise to intervene to prevent the loss of future business, and indicates that it would be better to take account of the Brexit negotiations as they proceed.

The UK has long been in favour of foreign direct investment, which increases productive capacity through capital investment, transfers of technology, skills and better management. Deutsche Börse’s acquisition of LSE is not FDI. It is not cross-border investment in the UK by residents and businesses from another country with the aim of establishing a lasting investment in the UK. FDI does not cover the asset stripping and systemic risks associated with the proposed merger. Foreign investment in UK infrastructure, including in the LSE, is welcome—the LSE of course already has many foreign shareholders—but this merger must not be allowed to clamp down on competition, gut the UK’s financial infrastructure and cause significant and lasting damage to the UK. It is understood that the European Commission has already commenced proceedings and the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse have received a limited statement of objections to the proposed deal.

In conclusion, I urge the Government, the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority, and other regulatory authorities, including those in Germany and Brussels, to recognise that whatever the reasons may have been for the merger before 23 June 2016, the reasons since then for determining and resisting it are extremely strong and should be employed.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. This is an important debate, and we have discovered that an hour is not enough. I hope we can take it into the main Chamber at some point because a lot of issues need to be cleared up.

The hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) is correct: this is a national issue and we have to take the national interest into consideration. The track record of takeovers and mergers in recent years has actually proven that, more often than not, the national interest has not been well served. There are a number of instances, particularly in financial services at this crucial moment in time, where dangers have to be brought into the light. The takeover by MasterCard of VocaLink, our main payments system in the UK, is systemically dangerous. It is also a technology raid, because we have the best payments technology in the world—that is another issue.

We have to judge mergers on a case-by-case basis. I say with due respect to everyone—I am not trying to make a silly debating point—that, if there has been a move to politicise this particular merger, I am afraid it has come from those who supported Brexit. They are in danger of finding problems where there are none to be found. Why would the owners of the London Stock Exchange Group walk into a merger like this if it was so disastrous for their business, and if it was so patently obvious that they were going to be out-regulated and that their business will be shifted away to another part of the world? If we look at it from that perspective, it ensures a bit of common sense in the debate.

[Sir William Cash]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[George Kerevan]

I would dearly love to give way, but given the little amount of time I have, I will not. As things move on, I hope we will have the chance for further discussion.

Hon. Members might be interested to know who actually owns the two parties in the proposed merger. In fact, the bulk of the London Stock Exchange Group’s ownership is not British. It is the Qatar Investment Authority, it is BlackRock, which is a major American private equity group, and it is Invesco, which is headquartered in Bermuda—we can all ask why that is. It is not actually the jewel in the crown of the UK, as was mentioned. It is already an internationalised organisation.

If we were to ask who owns Deutsche Börse, the answer is that the majority is owned by City of London institutions. That underlines the fact that, while there are hundreds of small exchanges all over the world, particularly in Asia and Africa, the big exchanges are owned by global institutions, and they are about mobilising global amounts of capital. In particular, they are no longer simply about narrow trading in equity. They are fundamentally about finding the capital for exchanges in derivatives and interest rate swaps, which makes the whole global capital market work. For that, the capital needs to be pooled. That is why for the past 15 to 20 years, right across the globe, there has been a constant move to merge and in some way consolidate the large exchanges. As we know, it has not been easy for political and national interest reasons, but that is the way the market is going. I put it to Members that it is either this merger or another merger—a stand-alone London Stock Exchange Group is no longer tenable.

That brings me to the final point worth making. Aspects of the structure of the merger have to be discussed, particularly post-Brexit. For instance, it seems strange that it is 54% to Deutsche Börse and 46% to the London Stock Exchange, rather than 50:50. That should be discussed, but in the end, this or some other merger will go ahead. Let us look at the specific technical issues, but let us not politicise this issue, because it is the nature of the way these global markets are working.

Leaving the EU: Financial Services

Debate between George Kerevan and William Cash

Thursday 3rd November 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

There seems to me to be a great deal of overstatement and exaggeration in this arena. The media have tended to overstate difficulties in this area to a very significant extent.

This is about confidence. For nearly 400 years, up to our entry to the EU under the European Communities Act 1972, the United Kingdom was able to run one of the most effective—if not the most effective—financial services centres, the City of London. The idea that somehow or other, because of the intervention of the European Union, things will get better is completely outweighed by the disaster area and dysfunctionality that the EU now represents.

Only a few days ago, in Bratislava, I heard the chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets saying that the EU needed an “electric shock”, that there was far too much regulation, that it was far too intrusive, and so on. The chairman of ECOFIN said that the EU was facing the biggest economic and political crisis in modern political history. All that is true. The idea that we would not have to leave the European Union—thank heavens the British people made their own judgment about that—and the construal of our leaving the European Union as a disaster in itself simply belie the facts.

The reality is that EU legislation is deeply embedded in the financial services sector. Just to state the obvious, not only are we obliged under sections 2 and 3 of the 1972 Act to absorb all the legislation—I warned in a letter to the Financial Times in 2008 that that would lead to the kind of difficulties we are now experiencing with regard to financial services—but because of the Court of Justice we have to obey all the regulations. The massive regulatory overkill of the whole of the financial services sector as a result of that arrangement is an undoubted disadvantage. There are huge benefits to be gained by being outside the European Union, which I will come to in a moment.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

Surely the hon. Gentleman is aware that most EU bank regulation—especially since 2008—has been at the behest of the G20, so we will be subject to it whether we are in the EU or not.

[Sir William Cash]

The problem that the hon. Gentleman has perhaps not quite taken on board is that because of the European Communities Act there is a legislative requirement for us to accept those rules. Outside, we will, I hope, be able to benefit not only the United Kingdom but the EU, as I will come on to in a moment.

We only have to look at places such as Singapore and Hong Kong to understand that one does not have to be in the European Union to have a successful financial services sector and compete in the global marketplace. The same applies to New York. The objective must be to keep the financial markets open throughout the European Union as a matter of mutual concern throughout the UK and the other 27 member states. Breaking up the London system would involve much greater costs for everyone. Europe would end up far worse off, in my judgment—and that of many others, too—if the financial sector migrated to New York, Singapore or Hong Kong.

The passport is not specific to any one aspect of the financial services field. It works best in relation to banking accounting for about a fifth of annual banking sector revenue. It works less well in relation to asset management, which my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond) mentioned. It is vital to understand that there are subsidiaries set up all over Europe carrying on the business of other countries irrespective of a passport. A significant amount of EU assets are already in Dublin and Luxembourg and their management—this is the key issue—is run from the UK. Indeed, on a recent assessment I have read, only 7% of assets managed in the UK are thought to be threatened by the loss of the passport.

There is not a single market in insurance at all. I appreciate that my hon. Friend might wish to come back to me on that, and I am very happy to talk to the people he mentioned in reply to me, but I simply make the point that we are not always dependent on the passport. There is a special problem regarding Lloyd’s of London, but I am informed that the pool of underwriters across the EU amounts to only 11% of the market’s gross written premium, and only 3% is directly reliant on the passport.

We have three main alternatives: equivalence, bespoke agreements and local arrangements. Equivalence is granted by the European Commission. The Commission is guardian of the treaties and has the legal clout that we will get away from when we vote to leave, so equivalence would not apply to us if we left the EU. But we have the same regulations as the EU, and under the repeal Bill, which I put together just before the referendum and am glad the Government are so interested in, we would be able to run parallel operations where it was in our mutual interests to have regulatory arrangements in the UK equivalent to those elsewhere in the EU—and, indeed, internationally, as well.

As regards bespoke agreements, we have the potential to secure an agreement similar to that with Switzerland, for example. If no cross-border access arrangement is made, firms will still be able to set up subsidiaries. That would, I have to admit, cost money, but it would not be disproportionate. I do not want to go into the details of a private conversation so I will simply say that I got that straight from some very senior bankers the other day. It boils down to this: we can arrive at an arrangement similar to Switzerland’s or at a free trade agreement. Of the two, I must admit I prefer the latter.

Section 5 of the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993

Debate between George Kerevan and William Cash

Wednesday 23rd March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

It has been said in the past that the House of Commons is the only lunatic asylum that is run by the inmates, but I think we pale into insignificance compared with the European Union. This just does not work. I ask the Minister to make a note on the piece of paper in front of him to remember to answer my question relating to that deficit and surplus issue, because every time I raise it I get no answer. Although I agree that we will continue to trade and to co-operate with Europe—we want to do so and they want to do it with us—when it comes to this question of the need to stay in the single market, it simply does not stack up. This document is put forward for approval by Parliament, so we are entitled to an answer to that question.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

In case the Minister does not answer, let me say that a sizeable proportion of the imports that Britain takes from the EU are in fact intermediate products, such as automotive parts, that go into goods that we then re-export. We are talking about supply chain interconnection, not free-standing goods.

[Sir William Cash]

I can only refer to the fact that these are ONS figures. They are endorsed and verified by the House of Commons Library, and I will leave my point at that.

The argument on page 19 moves forward to a suggestion that any

“new relationship which gives the UK…access to the single market that it needs”—

that assertion continues to be made—

“would involve contributing financially to the EU”,

which we are certainly doing to the very substantial extent of about £10 billion a year, and

“accepting the free movement of people”.

The European Scrutiny Committee has been trying to have a debate on that for the best part of 18 months, but without success. I had a meeting with the Minister about it only today. That goes right to the heart of the viability of free movement and the immigration that flows from it. The argument continues:

“and adopting EU rules without having any say over them.”

I repeat: without any say over them.

Today, the European Scrutiny Committee embarked on an investigation into the influence it is claimed we have and the manner in which decisions are taken in the European Union. This document implies that, somehow or other, we have massive input. The European ombudsman is looking into the question of trilogues, but within the decision-making process of the Council of Ministers it is horrendous to observe the extent to which votes are not taken. The so-called consensus on all matters, including those dealt with on page 19, is arrived at without a proper degree of accountability—in fact, I would say no real accountability of any kind. Decisions are taken in what I would describe as a Dan Brown’s “Da Vinci Code” situation, in which the Illuminati—otherwise known as COREPER—make deals behind the closed doors of unsmoke-filled rooms. We do not know and cannot find out how the decisions are arrived at. There is no agenda; nobody knows who decided what and on what basis. It is an affront to the democracy of this country that the decisions that affect the daily lives of everyone in it in respect of the whole gamut of European rule making are made almost entirely without majority voting taking place, in COREPER. It is deeply offensive. It is a black hole and the European Scrutiny Committee is looking into it.

Finally, page 19 talks about productivity. All I would say on that is that, as I understand it, the OBR, whose report is contained in this document, says that the biggest problem this country has is lack of productivity.

The whole of our economic performance is being presented to the European Commission for approval under the 1993 Act and to Parliament for approval today. I will not vote in favour of the motion and I certainly will not approve this load of rubbish. I will vote against the Government because I do not believe that page 19 is true or accurate. I do not agree that the basis of the statistics relating to PIP is such that the document is sufficiently valid to be presented to Parliament. It is a serious matter. We have become far too accustomed to saying, “Oh well, it’s just a blip—just a slight mistake. Someone got something wrong. Let’s not take too much notice of it.” Well, I am going to take notice of it and I shall vote against the Government this evening on that account.