Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

George Howarth Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

Before coming on to specific provisions in the Bill, I want to say a few words on the context. Taken together, the provisions need to be subjected to a number of tests, some of which have already been debated, to see whether they are a coherent and effective way of tackling the problems we have already experienced with home-grown terrorism, and the problems of fighters in Syria and Iraq coming home, which has already started to happen.

The first and most important test, which has been discussed but needs to be reiterated, is whether proposed restrictive or intrusive measures strike the right balance between personal liberty and the right to privacy, and the degree of monitoring and restrictions placed on those who are considered to be posing a threat.

The second test is in some ways more problematic. It relates to the practical and legal framework in which any of the measures must operate to be effective in practice. The exchange between the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) brought out perfectly how legal principles and practical considerations sometimes do not quite work out in the way set out in a Bill.

My final introductory point is not so much a test, but, rather, relates to having a better understanding of the paths to radicalisation, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) talked about. If we ignore those paths and do not understand them, there will always be a danger that proposed measures will be ill-suited to the problem we are trying to challenge.

Before saying a few words on the process of radicalisation in the UK, I want to thank, like my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King’s college London, and in particular its director Peter Neumann. Its work has shaped my own thinking on this subject.

Researchers who have studied the phenomenon of radicalisation have identified certain key ingredients. These include “root causes” or “grievances”, including poverty, political marginalisation and exposure to a specific ideology—we have talked about how violent jihadism seems to offer an answer, or at least an explanation, for that sense of grievance—and what my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East called “peer group pressure” and what social scientists call “social and group dynamics”. However, this area is problematic, because there are different types of group and different types of individual; some act alone, operate differently and are influenced by different means.

I shall give two examples. First, Mohammad Sidique Khan, the leader of the London bombers, whom my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles mentioned, became disillusioned with his family and the local mosque over the teaching on arranged marriages. He wanted to make other life choices, as is modern and understandable in a young person, but the initial rejection escalated to the point where he became a violent jihadist and bought completely into the Salafist violent ideology, which was then reinforced by group loyalty. The ISC in its report studied that issue in great detail.

Secondly, by way of contrast, there is the case of Roshonara Choudhry, who tried—thankfully unsuccessfully —to murder my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms). She was a lone wolf, as the media put it, unconnected to any group; her radicalisation took place entirely on the internet. She had a grievance over foreign policy, bolstered by a growing sense of a particular version of Islamic identity, which took on a violent and ideological character. Those are some of the things that researchers have come up with and which we need to take into account.

The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) talked about counter-narrative in the context of the Prevent strategy and was asked about comparisons with Nazism in Germany and Marxist-Leninism. I understand the point, but there is a difference: the ideology we are talking about is intertwined with a particular view of Islam, which makes it a different kind of belief. Nazism and Marxist-Leninism offer particular world views, but this offers a world view that extends beyond the realms of the world—if he follows my meaning.

We ought to acknowledge that perhaps the state is entirely the wrong organ to propose a counter-narrative. If I were a Muslim in this country, I would resent the state’s telling me what Islam was and what I could believe, as I would were I a member of a Christian faith, a Hindu or any other religious believer. It is not the job of the state to tell people what views to hold. I agree that there is a need for a counter-narrative, but I do not believe it is the role of the state to come up with it—and certainly not to promote it.

Part of the Bill deals with the problem of communications data, and here I think there is one area where a certain part of the private sector could help. I refer to internet providers. Our ISC report last week referred to an unnamed internet provider that had some information about one of the people who killed Fusilier Lee Rigby that was not passed on to the agencies.

A paper that came out earlier today from the Quilliam Foundation made what I think was a sensible suggestion. It said:

“Private sector companies, particularly social media companies and ISPs, can also work to facilitate”

what it calls “counterspeech”,

“in a way that provides deliverables to counter-extremism. These private companies benefit from supporting counterspeech content as a means of countering online extremism since it creates a healthier realm of ideas within their platforms and naturally develops a more hostile environment for individuals wanting to use online platforms for extremist and/or terrorist-related purposes.”

I think that is a good idea, so I hope Ministers and others will think carefully about how those companies can be used if not exactly to promote a counter-narrative, at least to provide space where a counter-narrative can exist, and perhaps in some cases even a side bar where the opposite point of view can be put.

The final issue I want to cover is TPIMs. The ISC, on which I and other right hon. and hon. Members sit, raised its concerns about them in two of our annual reports. In 2012-13, we said:

“The Committee shares the concerns of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation over what happens when individual Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures…come to the end of their two-year limit. The Government must take steps now to ensure that they have sufficient policies in place when TPIMs have reached their limit and cannot be extended.”

In our annual report of 2011-12, we said:

“The Committee is concerned about the potential increase in the overall risk as a result of the introduction of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) regime.”

My late friend, Paul Goggins, who was also a member of our Committee, pursued this issue doggedly both in our Committee and on the Floor of the House. I would like to cite a point he made in June 2011:

“My final point is whether the whole new TPIM system represents the same level of risk as we had with control orders or a greater level of risk. I can only assume that the Home Secretary believes there is an increased risk from the new TPIM system, otherwise why would she be committing a serious level of resource—whatever that level is—to the police and the Security Service to help them deal with the additional work and the additional pressures that will result from the new system?”—[Official Report, 7 June 2011; Vol. 529, c. 88.]

As ever, Paul showed a sensible note of caution in what he said at the time, and in view of what has happened since, he was characteristically prescient in the remarks he made.

I started with a principle or a test, saying that the loss of civil liberties on the one hand always has to be balanced against the gains in national security on the other hand. As we have heard, those judgments still cannot be fully made in respect of large sections of the Bill. I do not oppose its Second Reading and I do not think that there is any move to do so, but a number of questions remain to be asked and a number of tests remain to be passed before everyone can feel comfortable with it, and I hope that those concerns can be laid to rest during its later stages.