Draft Justices of the Peace and Authorised Court and Tribunal Staff (Costs) Regulations 2020 Debate

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Department: Home Office
Monday 9th March 2020

(4 years, 8 months ago)

General Committees
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Chris Philp Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)
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I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Justices of the Peace and Authorised Court and Tribunal Staff (Costs) Regulations 2020.

Mr Gray, it is, as always, a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. I intend to be extremely brief, because these are technical regulations, which form part of the Government’s implementation of the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 2018. I can confirm that, in accordance with the requirements of that Act, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, Sir Ernest Ryder, have been consulted, and both have indicated their approval of the regulations.

The regulations are rather technical, but they have the important purpose of underpinning the protection the Act gives authorised court and tribunal officers. It gives them an indemnity against liability for actions they carry out in good faith in the performance of their judicial duties. The regulations specifically outline the procedure to be followed when an order for costs is sought against one of these authorised officers. It is worth mentioning that the Act provides for court officers authorised by the Lord Chief Justice to perform functions that were previously undertaken by a justices’ clerk or an assistant justices’ clerk.

The regulations specify the procedure to be followed when an order for costs is sought against a justices’ clerk. They specify the circumstances in which those costs may be sought and that it is not the justices’ clerk but the Lord Chancellor who will pay those costs—I do not, of course, mean the Lord Chancellor personally, but the Ministry of Justice, although we say it is the Lord Chancellor. The regulations also specify when such a cost order can be made and how the amount to be paid shall be determined. The answer to that latter question is that it is determined by a costs judge—formerly known as a taxing master.

Very simply, therefore, the regulations make provision for the Lord Chancellor to pick up the costs if any cost order is made against a justices’ clerk—now called a court officer—in the discharge of their duties.

George Howarth Portrait Sir George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)
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The Minister has made clear what this measure does, but it would be interesting to know what prompted its introduction.

Chris Philp Portrait Chris Philp
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Very simply, this measure was first introduced in this form in the Courts Act 2003—of course, the practice predated that, but it was most recently legislated for in 2003, when it applied to justices’ clerks and assistant justices’ clerks. However, in the 2018 Act, those positions were replaced by court-authorised officers, who perform essentially the same function but under a different name. When we say “court-authorised”, it is ultimately the Lord Chief Justice who authorises those officers. This is really a technical change that continues a practice that has been going on for many years. It is really a change of nomenclature more than anything.

George Howarth Portrait Sir George Howarth
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The Minister is being admirably clear, but I do not think he has completely answered my question. What prompted me to ask was that I am not clear why these provisions were not incorporated in the 2018 Act.

Chris Philp Portrait Chris Philp
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Often when we legislate in this House, some of the more technical matters are not put on the face of the Bill. The Government are given regulation-making power the activate or implement powers at a subsequent time—otherwise the Bill would be enormously long. This is one of the many examples where the technical implication of a measure is done via a statutory instrument—in this case, an affirmative statutory instrument—rather than on the face of the Bill. In fact, we were in this very room just a few days ago implementing a similar measure in relation to alcohol abstinence and monitoring requirements. This is just one of those measures that are activated by an SI, rather than being on the face of the Bill, to keep the Bill a little smaller.

I hope I have outlined the substance of the matter before us. If colleagues have questions, I would be delighted to answer them—