(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a very valuable point. It is all too easy to see the physical scars of war; it is much more difficult to see the mental scars of war. It is because of the importance given to the matter by the Government that, cross-departmentally, we are making more funding available to mental health projects for our armed forces. We are looking at the scientific evidence available to see whether we can better target that help, but the measures that we are putting in place include the new phone line for service personnel.
The Secretary of State will recall that on 14 February he made a moderate and encouraging statement to the House, saying that he thought that the second half of this year would be a good time to make a political push towards a settlement. He also said that we would pay a heavy price if we failed to take the opportunity that would then occur. He has since no doubt seen the Defence Committee’s report, which says that at the moment the Americans seem disinclined to pursue a political settlement. Can he assure the House that he will use his best endeavours to encourage the Americans to take the course that he has recommended?
I am not sure that I am required to make efforts to get the Americans to make such a change in their posture, as the hon. Gentleman describes it. In fact, I spoke to Secretary Gates at the ISAF meeting in Brussels at the weekend, and it is very clear that we are all now moving together. The process of transition, including which parts of Afghanistan will undertake that transition, will be announced by President Karzai on 21 March.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberSadly, being colour-blind, I cannot share in the enthusiasm on that last point. However, I say to my hon. Friend that we always have to consider the wider security picture to ensure that we can maintain our supply routes. As he correctly said, there have been problems recently with the southern supply route, and certainly the Americans are increasing their dependence on the northern route. Along with our ISAF partners, we will consider what changes we might have to make in the balance between those supply routes to ensure that we never compromise the essential links on which our armed forces in Afghanistan depend.
May I, as others have done, compliment the Secretary of State on the considered tone of his statement? However, little was said in it about the prospect of a political settlement involving all the parties, including the regional ones. Although it might be impossible for him to include a section on that, given the dire security implications, will he bear it in mind that his view is shared throughout the House and the country? We are not seeking a military victory—one is not possible—in this set of circumstances. Furthermore, a political settlement will be protracted and difficult, so the sooner we get on with it the better, and the more he will be able to tell us about it.
The hon. Gentleman is correct that increasingly attention will be focused on the political element of a settlement in Afghanistan. Those who have visited it recently will have been struck by the fact that on the ground, at a tactical level, we are certainly making gains. The security picture on the ground is improving, in some cases beyond recognition. However, the problem remains at the political level. It remains this: how do we persuade those in Afghanistan that there is a better future for them under a democratic constitutional Government? This year we have a major opportunity. One of the Taliban’s great propaganda weapons has been to say that the international community will be leaving in July 2011. However, when it becomes clear not only that we are not leaving, but that we are building up the Afghan national security forces, we might deny it one of its best cards. We should be preparing, therefore, for a political push in the second half of the year on reconciliation and reintegration. That is when we will find that we have a better following wind than in recent times. We will pay a high price if we miss that window.
(14 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am very pleased to be able to follow the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), who speaks with considerable authority and knowledge on these matters. I believe that he has served out in Afghanistan and lived there for quite a while. Nevertheless, I am still not entirely sure that I follow the logic of what he said. Perhaps I shall return to that a little later.
Like many other Members, I congratulate the Backbench Business Committee on selecting this debate. It is the first such all-day debate that we have had, and it is most important. When I say that unfortunately I cannot support the motion, I mean no disrespect to the Committee. I am not sure how the motion came to be drafted, but I cannot see how Members can support so open-ended and black-and-white a motion stating that the House
“supports the continued deployment of UK armed forces in Afghanistan.”
There is no mention of a limited period, even though the Prime Minister himself has said—quite rightly, in my opinion—that it is inconceivable that we shall still be in a combat role by 2015. The Foreign Secretary agreed with that at the last Foreign Office questions, having made it absolutely clear that counter-insurgencies invariably end in a political settlement, which means talks. I shall come back to that in a moment. The Defence Secretary also agreed today, although he gave a mixed message. On the one hand he said that he wanted the troops to return as victors—a singularly ill-chosen word, since that is clearly not what will happen—and, on the other, he said that he knew there had to be a political solution.
If Members do not find themselves able to support the motion, as I cannot, that leaves us with the amendments. I congratulate the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on tabling his amendment and having it selected, but when he explained the nature of his alternative strategy I had doubts about whether an impregnable, sovereign strategic base with an enormous number of troops could be established and function in the role that he envisages. He has not had time to develop his argument today, nor have I had the occasion to talk to him further about it. However, his amendment is somewhat difficult to vote for, even though I would like to be able to do so given that it states what I believe is essential, which is that the current strategy is not working. While it is now said that we have learned to deal better with IEDs, the insurgents have switched their tactics and are now killing more and more successfully with sniper bullets.
On a purely procedural matter, there is nothing in the wording of my amendment that commits hon. Members to backing any particular solution. I have given my own interpretation, but as long as the hon. Gentleman agrees with the wording of the amendment, there is no reason why he, and I hope other hon. Members, should not vote for it.
The hon. Gentleman is now at his most persuasive and irresistible best, and I will give the matter further thought during and after my speech.
As for the other amendments, while I agree with much in amendment (c), tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), it is inadequate in that it implies a cut-and-rush approach of getting out willy-nilly as soon as we can. I do not think that is on, or that the country would want to see us scuttle away. I believe that the only approach is the one that I outlined in an early-day motion that I circulated to most Members, which I hope will find support throughout the House. It arose from the message that came from the Taliban in August, which was the subject of a front-page article in The Guardian. It stated that the Taliban were open to negotiations and discussions about civilian deaths. That is a major problem for the allied forces and is central to the counter-insurgency strategy that was mentioned earlier, but it would not necessarily lead immediately to talks about how we could reach a political settlement involving the Taliban. I do not think that any other exit strategy makes sense. Unpleasant though it is to many, and although we may not get everything we need from talks with the Taliban, the sooner we begin them, the sooner we have a chance of achieving what the hon. Member for New Forest East and I want, which is a reduction in the unnecessary and awful killings that are taking place, including of civilians in front of their own troops. They are bound to continue if we pursue the current strategy under the terms under which our forces are operating.
We cannot simply cut and run, so I do not support the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, but I will do my very best to meet the request of the hon. Member for New Forest East. I certainly cannot vote for the motion, which is defective and unacceptable because it does not give a time scale. Much though we may dislike time scales, Ministers are always asked, “How long will it last?” and they cannot dodge that and leave things open-ended. Time goes very quickly. If we are not up against a deadline, in no time at all we could find that there is mission creep and that the conflict expands. Before we know what has happened, we have built the conflict up to being about the defence of the whole western way of life.
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that his logic is the same as that of my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart)? Effectively, that logic is to abstain on the basis that the proposed amendments do not accurately reflect what we hope for, which is the timed withdrawal that the coalition Government propose?
The coalition Government are realistic on the matter—I have privately congratulated the Defence Secretary on his realism—but he was today conscious that, if they were listening, people will take comfort if they think they have the prospect of winning the war against ISAF in Afghanistan. He therefore painted a more rosy picture than the situation on the ground would properly allow him, and sent a more hard-line message to the Taliban than necessary.
I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham). It is now accepted throughout the House that there is no military victory to be won for either side in Afghanistan. The only prospect we have is of a few years—or many years, if we are not careful—of futile conflict that will get us nowhere. I am not saying that we should stop, which is where I disagree fundamentally with the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion in whose name amendment (c) stands. I cannot see the negotiations or discussions with the Taliban getting anywhere unless we remain in Afghanistan at our current strength and sustain our attack on them.
Indeed, from the early-day motion that I tabled, it was clear that the information, such as we have, is that we have a firm offer from the Taliban. The offer is not endorsed by the quetta shura—the central council in Pakistan—but comes from local commanders. Let us also bear in mind that 80% of the casualties occur within 10 miles. In other words, the fighting and deaths are very localised. We do not face an al-Qaeda insurgency campaign directed from outside; it is a local campaign.
The offer of talks, which appears to be serious, has emanated not from the top council leadership, which should encourage us to respond to it, yet as far as I can see, we are ignoring it. I entirely accept that the Government will say, “We can’t tell you what’s going on,” but the Americans say that they see no prospect of talks going anywhere. Panetta says that the time to talk is when the Americans have increased the pressure so that the Taliban believe that they are losing, but I take issue with the hon. Member for New Forest East on that, because that approach would mean that there will never be a right time for talks. Either we are winning, and therefore we do not need talks, or doing badly, when talks would mean weakness. If we were doing better, we might think that if we did a bit more, we might win. There is never a right time. What we have learned from previous insurgencies of this kind, and much larger ones, is that the earlier we get talks going and see what we can get, the better people understand why we are fighting, and the better the chance of a solution.
The correct time is when there is a stalemate, not when one side or the other thinks it is winning.
I agree, but it is difficult to send troops to fight in a stalemate. Even Mr Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, has said that he hates signing troop deployment orders when he is sending troops to fight in a stalemate. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but who knows what a stalemate is anyway.
The message that we have to send tonight is that although we would love to see an ISAF victory, we do not believe that that is possible, and that the only way forward is discussions with the Taliban, realistic, hard and unpleasant though those would be. The sooner we get into such discussions, the sooner the level of casualties will fall, and the sooner we would be able to bring the troops home. We clearly cannot bring them home before then.
As the hon. Gentleman will know, the business of the House is not a matter for the Chair. I have not been notified of any additional business. The Speaker has made it clear that any additional announcements by the Government should be made to the House first. I am sure that Members on the Treasury Bench have heard the hon. Gentleman’s point, and if there is anything in that point of order I am sure they will bring forward the necessary proposals.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I seek through you to put it on the record that although I was present during both Divisions I did not go through the formal process of voting in both Lobbies, but would like it on the record that I abstained on both the main motion and the amendment?
That is not really a point of order, but the hon. Gentleman has put it on the record. I hope this will not set a precedent—that every Member who decides not to vote either way raises it as a point of order.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is correct on all those issues. In fact, the number of the Afghan national security forces has tended to be ahead of trend in recent times. The quality of the training is constantly kept under review and I had discussions in Washington on the subject last week.
Does the Secretary of State agree that the security issue in Afghanistan is really whether we have enough troops on the ground? Even by General Petraeus’s assessment, we have barely one third of those required. Unless and until we can increase that number—and there is no prospect of doing so from any side—the choice will be to expose our troops and the American troops to more danger or, conversely, to expose the Afghan people. In the light of that, will he make a statement about the prospects for the future? Without security we have no future.
We are seeing an increase in the number of American troops at the moment. As for the UK troops, it is not just the number but the relative force density that is important. That has improved in recent times and there is now a better match between our footprint and the size of the force. That happened under the previous Government and will continue to happen under the current Government until we are satisfied that we have an appropriate ratio.