(1 year ago)
Commons ChamberI cannot give way; I do not have time.
Let me move to the third and most important question, which relates to the exclusion of access to courts. This Bill carefully preserves the right of individuals to come to court in extreme cases of individual justice. I listened, impressed, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and I submit to those who think the Bill goes far enough that we cannot sacrifice the principle of access to a court. If we eliminated it entirely, not only would the Bill collapse because it would be interminably impeded in the House of Lords, but it would probably lead to the Rwandan Government withdrawing; and it is conceivable that the courts could entertain, for the first time, a complex challenge about the right of this Parliament to do away with fundamental constitutional principles such as access to a court. The supremacy of this House does not necessarily mean that it does not operate within a complex system of constitutional institutions, each of which has its own place as a component part in that system.
No, I cannot give way; I simply do not have time.
Constitutional principles compete in creative tension. Parliamentary sovereignty is the most important of them, but there are others that are fundamental and one of them is access to a court in extreme cases. That is what this Bill preserves. I say to my right hon. Friends that I understand their frustration and their deep, intense dissatisfaction with the current situation; I share it. I think that there is tightening that we could do, particularly on rule 39. But on the preservation of the right to go to court in an extreme case, I say that is part of the British constitution that our fathers and our party have supported, and for which they have fought, for generations, and it would be wrong of us to compromise on that—
(2 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will be quick. I have listened with fascination to the contributions and speeches made this afternoon. If I thought that the Bill would produce a durable and permanent solution, I would support it, but I do not believe it will produce a durable and permanent solution. The fact is that we cannot impose on Northern Ireland, or on any other party to a treaty that we signed, unilaterally a political solution. A political solution has to be reached politically; it cannot be imposed by this House through legislation. The EU—like it or not—and the Irish Government are a party to these negotiations. Unless we are able to achieve assent to the arrangements that we propose, they will not last. It will have to be resolved ultimately by agreement. It is much the same as the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill—another attempt by the Government to impose a political solution on Northern Ireland, without first having reached the solution and then produced the legislation that works out and implements that solution. I do not believe that this legislation will produce a permanent solution.
We come to the question of necessity. I am not prepared to say that there is an impossibility that the basis of necessity could not justify the actions that the Government are taking. I have the gravest of misgivings about it, and the deepest of scepticism about whether or not it affords a proper legal basis as a matter of international law, but we have not seen the evidence. It is possible that the Government and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General have seen some evidence that we have not seen that could crystallise at least the plausible case that this action needs to be taken.
I support the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), but the fact of the matter is that even necessity is not a legal basis for a permanent solution. The doctrine of necessity in international law requires the measures that have been implemented as a necessity to answer the urgent and imminent peril to be removed as soon as the basis for taking action on the grounds of necessity has gone. Indeed, necessity does not even remove the breach; one is still in breach of the agreement. Necessity simply removes the wrongfulness, which further emphasises the fact that necessity cannot produce a permanent solution as a matter of international law. Only agreement—only the reaching of a political solution—can do so.
Nobody need tell me about the politically tone deaf intransigence of the European Union in negotiation. I recall vividly in my visits to Brussels in the early months of 2019, saying to Michel Barnier, “But do you not see, Michel, that this produces an anomalous situation? If a farmer in Northern Ireland wants to take up the issue of cattle tagging, to whom does he go? When the law is imposed by the European Union, the only place he can go is either to Brussels itself or to Dublin, and how will that feel for one whole section of the community of Northern Ireland?” I must tell the Committee that the European Union representatives reacted as if they had been stung by wasps. We have to understand that those at the European Union believe the protocol to be the very zenith of creative diplomacy. They cherish and prize it, as if it were their own child. But that does not mean that we do not need to engage in the patient effort—maybe it will take months, maybe years—gradually to make them see that this is an unsustainable situation.
What we should not do is reach immediately for a solution, over which there are the gravest doubts as to its efficacy as a matter of international law, over which there are the gravest doubts about the sincerity and good faith of the Government—for I take it that the Government have advanced their case on the basis of necessity sincerely. I assume that they must mean, and genuinely mean, that they genuinely believe that there is a respectable case on the basis of necessity. If they do, why should we not at least be told the evidence—the evidence! We can gist it, we can summarise it if it is security sensitive, but at least let this House acquit itself of the doubt that exists over its legal efficacy as a matter of international law. It is no light thing for this House to take a step—
No, I will not give way. Too many need to speak.
It is no light matter for this House to take a step that is in contravention of its international obligations. The dignity of this nation rests upon its word being seen to be implemented once it is given. Therefore, I think it a small thing—a reasonable thing—that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has asked.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary talked about Members as patriots. I do not believe that there is a person in this House who is not a patriot, not a person in this House who does not believe—[Interruption.] There may be some exceptions on the Opposition Benches, but I certainly do not believe that of those on the Labour Benches. The fact is that I want to give credit and the benefit of the doubt to everybody, but patriotism can also be the belief that we should stand by our word and that we depart from it only if there is a proper legal basis for doing so.
There is plenty of precedent for the Attorney General coming to the House—I should know, I did it—to answer questions about the international law compatibility of a measure in this House. Indeed, it goes way back, I think, to either the Wilson Government or the Heath Government. Attorneys General would come to the House to answer questions on the compatibility of statutes with international law. I invite the Minister, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton North (Michael Ellis), to invite the Attorney General to come and answer those questions, because, in my judgment, it is an obligation to the House. The Attorney General has a residual duty to advise the House on matters such as this.
I say to my right hon. and learned Friend that I will not be able to support this Bill—that comes as no surprise—but I sympathise with the plight in which the Government find themselves. We should all be a lot better if we united in this House to besiege the European Union with requests so that it sees that it must effect real change in this protocol. That is why I asked the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle) what is his solution to the democratic deficit of which my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) has properly and accurately spoken.
These are really intransigent, intractable problems. It is no use sitting, as the hon. Member for Hove does, attacking those of us on the Government Benches for not having solutions if he just talks more and does not propose constructive, new replacement agreements that might fulfil the legitimate wish of the Unionist community to feel that they are not separated and segregated from the rest of the kingdom, while doing justice to the European Union’s desire to protect its single market.