Geoffrey Cox
Main Page: Geoffrey Cox (Conservative - Torridge and Tavistock)Department Debates - View all Geoffrey Cox's debates with the Home Office
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will not give way to the hon. and learned Lady a second time, if she does not mind. We have been very clear that we take our treaty obligations seriously. In respect of the ministerial discretion in the clause, the Home Secretary, or whichever Minister of the Crown exercised that discretion, would of course take those obligations seriously and judge the individual case.
Is my right hon. Friend not in effect asking the House to give legislative sanction to at least the possibility that a Minister of the Crown will deliberately disobey this country’s international law obligations? Is not that really the effect of what is being asked?
No. As I have already said, we take our treaty obligations very seriously and the Minister who exercises this discretion would have to do so. This discretion would be exercised highly judiciously and would ultimately be judged on the facts and be very fact-dependent.
I am not going to give way to the hon. and learned Lady. I will give way one last time to my right hon. and learned Friend; then I must make some progress.
A Minister always has the ability to ignore an indication under rule 39, because there is no obligation under the convention for the Government to heed one—it is an indication. Why, then, does it need legislation if what is not in fact being asked is that this House should approve, quite consciously and deliberately, a deliberate breach of our obligations under the convention? That is the truth. The Minister could ignore an indication and it would be a matter between states, but the provision invites this House to give legislative authority to the Minister who does that, if she chooses to ignore it. Is that not the position?
My right hon. and learned Friend is correct in saying that rule 39 indications are just that, and that there are circumstances in which Ministers have chosen not to apply them—a small number of circumstances, but a number. The clause does not mandate a Minister to ignore rule 39 indications; it says clearly, to ensure that there is no doubt whatsoever, that the Minister has the discretion to do so. It gives a non-exhaustive list of reasons that they should consider, and in doing so they would clearly, as I have said on a number of occasions, take their treaty obligations very seriously.
Let me move on. As I have said, the Bill provides for two kinds of suspensive claims and sets out a fair but rigorous timetable for the submission of any claims, their determination by the Home Office, and any appeals. It is important that those who receive a removal notice should be able to receive appropriate legal advice to help them to navigate this process; accordingly, new clause 20 makes provision for legal aid. I trust that this new clause at least will be welcomed by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, given that it covers similar ground to her new clause 18. The provision of legal aid will reduce the opportunities for challenges and speed up removals.
On serious harm suspensive claims, new clause 17 augments the existing provisions in clause 38, which enables regulations to be made about the meaning of serious and irreversible harm for the purposes of the Bill. We consider it important, and indeed helpful to the courts, to provide them with guidance as to what does or does not amount to serious and irreversible harm, albeit that ultimately the judgment will be for the upper tribunal, to be taken on a case-by-case basis. New clause 17 also makes it clear that the serious and irreversible harm must be “imminent and foreseeable”, which aligns the test in the Bill much more closely with Strasbourg practice.
Amendments 114 to 119 relate to foreign national offenders. In the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, we legislated to disapply certain modern slavery protections to FNOs who have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more, and to certain other categories of persons who present a risk to public order. The amendments introduce a statutory presumption that the public order disqualification applies to FNOs who have been given an immediate custodial sentence of any length.