Sudan

Debate between Geoffrey Clifton-Brown and Stephen O'Brien

Thursday 28th April 2011 Westminster Hall

[Mr O'Brien]

The hon. Gentleman is right. Southern Sudan represents one of the cradles where tropical diseases are most virulent and are most likely to sustain over our lifetimes. If one were to pick the three areas where it would be difficult to rid the world of malaria and other tropical diseases, they would be parts of the DRC, parts of Nigeria and southern Sudan. There is, therefore, an opportunity to make an appreciable difference and contribute significantly to the millennium development goals. That is why the focus on south Sudan, irrespective of the fact that it fits very well with our intention to put money behind conflict states and fragile states, will have a major multiplier and leverage effect.

Of course, NGOs and donor agencies will be instrumental in ensuring that there is sustained, predictable programme money to help local health systems, as they grow, to develop malaria control and malaria elimination opportunities. Equally, it will be important to recognise that, with a very low capacity in southern Sudan, it will be many years before the population will not be afflicted by malaria. A little like Ethiopia, southern Sudan is prone to epidemics of malaria simply because of the nature of the vector. In other parts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, malaria is more endemic and persistent across all the seasons. It is easier to persuade people to use nets all the time, whereas it is more difficult to persuade people to use the preventative method of a net when there are epidemics, because very often they do not get the net up before the epidemic has already taken hold. Without getting too diverted on malaria, about which I have been known to be able to wax lyrical—

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because he is making a very useful speech. He has said what he would like to happen in Sudan. Can he confirm whether the Department for International Development is in discussions with United Nations agencies to produce a plan of precisely which country’s aid agency will do what and which NGO will do what, so that there are not any overlaps, but equally, so that there are not any underlaps in achieving the very admirable aims that he has just outlined?

[Mr O'Brien]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful and important point. I was going to come on to his list, which was a shopping list rather than a too-difficult-to-do list, a bit later. He is right. There needs to be a clear delineation of who is meant to be doing what in order to achieve a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach, so that the benefits can feed off each other. Often in aid delivery, there has been a need to think about how to put the inputs in, rather than recognising what combined results we want at the end. The reason why his point is well-made is that, at a democratic and governance level—but also at the level of delivering good developmental aid—that is what might be termed as the post-CPA framework. Where will the governance levers be? Is it going to be a question just of donor agencies, NGOs and the UN talking about south Sudan, or is it going to be a question of south Sudan talking to them about how we all helped to contribute to their initiative, to deliver it on the ground and to embed it?

It is fair to say that it is not yet clear what form the post-CPA framework will take, but the main objective is to agree as much as possible—as was identified in the debate—where all the areas of difference lie. While they sit there, whether it is Abyei or the three areas, there remains the tension that does not allow the space through which that kind of co-ordinated consensual approach can take place. We are absolutely determined to do our best to foster that resolution of the differences, because we will get effectiveness and value for money, which is part of the transparency answer, only providing we have that consensual opportunity. While there is a dispute, people will seek to gain an edge off the other and that is where we get disunity. I am glad to have the opportunity to underscore that point, which is why it is so important that we agree as much as possible before the CPA expires on 9 July. That will obviously change the dynamics dramatically.

We are working with Thabo Mbeki and his high-level panel on precisely that. It is more likely to be achieved—a point that I think was hinted at by the opening speaker—if this is not seen to be a somewhat old-style solution of the international community talking about another country, and particularly a new country, but the family of African countries coming together themselves to produce something that might be regarded as an African solution. That is much more important, which is why Thabo Mbeki and his high-level panel are important and crucial to the process. We are encouraging all those parties to maintain as much momentum as possible in advance. I shall come back briefly to some of those issues.

I was talking about the financial commitment and the results that we are hoping to achieve. That was also partly in answer to the hon. Member for Edinburgh North and Leith, who wanted to know that we were in it for a sustainable, predictable period so that people could plan with some confidence. The financial commitment to Sudan represents a large amount of British taxpayers’ money. It is a priority for us to ensure that it is spent well, represents, of course, good value for money, and brings real benefit in terms of building peace and delivering assistance to those affected by conflict and extreme poverty. We are determined to ensure that our aid reaches the people who need it most. We do not give any money directly—let us be absolutely clear—to the Governments in Khartoum or Juba. All our funds are routed through NGOs, private sector firms and multilateral agencies, which have robust financial management systems in place. That is part of the due diligence and the tendering process and the real, tough hurdles that they have to get across. We require a detailed narrative and financial reports from all our partners, as well as audited statements. DFID staff also conduct regular monitoring of progress and formal annual reviews in line with our own project management procedures.

The UK is committed to its relations with north and south Sudan. We recognise that sustainable peace in Sudan can only be delivered by addressing the root causes of conflict, and we continue to urge the north and the south to take the steps needed to resolve the outstanding issues from the comprehensive peace agreement by 9 July. Those include the issues of Abyei, border demarcation—as was discussed and raised by a number of contributors to the debate—and arrangements for the conclusion of the inclusive popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan. It was interesting to note that while Blue Nile is moving ahead at a reasonable step, South Kordofan is giving more cause for concern. Of course, we come to the issues of distribution of oil wealth and citizenship, both subjects that need to be resolved. We will continue to press for full implementation of the CPA ahead of its conclusion in July, and for agreement on wider arrangements that have to be equitable and just between the north and south.

I will come on to some of the other issues in a moment, but on the issue of Abyei, in addition to Thabo Mbeki and his high-level panel, who seek to broker these solutions, we welcome the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the way in which that may help to support the outcome. That is an important point to put on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr O'Brien]

People might need to dash away, but I shall cover a few of the points.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East and others asked about the Lord’s Resistance Army. The LRA, having been driven out of northern Uganda, is now in pockets throughout the Central African Republic, the borders of south Sudan and the edges of parts of Uganda, even tilting into southern Darfur. We all abhor the whole essence of that abominable organisation, with its child soldiers and the mayhem it has caused over many years, but we are also concerned whether it might destabilise progress for south Sudan.

We are determined that the LRA should not represent such a factor by urging the regional Governments and peacekeeping forces—we have the two UN forces—to co-ordinate closely their efforts in combating the LRA. The point made by my hon. Friend the Member for The Cotswolds about how quickly it can regenerate was well made and is well known among the experts. One of the best things to do, as part of our response, is to engage with the demobilisation of LRA combatants. We should offer the hope of such engagement to those young people.

I visited Gulu recently, too, but I was there some four years ago in another guise, when I met some former LRA child soldiers who have been converted. Some of them have visited the DFID offices in London. It is important to recognise that we must take such positive and constructive steps as well as simply maintaining our vigilance and, where we find the LRA, rooting it out of areas in which it might destabilise neighbouring countries.

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown]

On the LRA, I would like to mention intelligence specifically. The LRA leadership has particularly good intelligence about the location of the armies that they are combating, and how quickly they can move. It is therefore necessary to be able to outpace it, which requires those regional forces to have more helicopters. Helicopters and intelligence about the LRA’s activities are key to defeating it.

[Mr O'Brien]

I know that and, when I have travelled in some difficult conflict areas such as the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, helicopter is the only mode of transport capable of being used by the UN for any purpose, so my hon. Friend’s point is extremely well made. I shall look into access to such genuinely vigilant machinery from the sky. If it is not available, I shall ask some more questions and perhaps reassure him at a later date.

Another point, made not least by my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham, was about trade. I emphasise that as far as DFID is concerned, for the past 11 years and at least since the International Development Act 2002, by law there can be no link between our aid—our overseas development aid spend—and British trade. That is the law, and what we must conform to. However, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office can make trade an explicit element of foreign policy, which it has now done as one of the new Foreign Secretary’s decisions. Trade, therefore, is now central to every aspect of our overseas engagement.

I confirm from discussions with my fellow Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs with responsibility for Africa, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham), that he has been looking explicitly for trade opportunities in both southern and northern Sudan. His visit received some publicity, but it was perfectly understood that the trade side was vital, and we have a long-standing trade relationship. Trade is an essential element in promoting the wealth-creation side of those economies. There is a clear distinction between what is done by DFID as part of programmes for ODA spend and what is done for trade by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and, indeed, by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.

What is important and new is the DFID policy decided on over the past year, which is to include specifically, as a complete pillar of work, private sector development and the encouragement of the private sector and of trade opportunities in a context of confidence that enables people to be entrepreneurial, to have access to finance, to be above micro-finance, to have the ability to take a risk and to have foreign direct investment more encouraged because of greater security from an independent judicial system or in repatriation of dividends. Those are all things that people around board tables who take risks with money borrowed from banks need, so that they will be prepared to engage, whether in a tractor factory, a spares supply chain, some kind of commodity or agricultural processing.

Such discussions with countries might often be an FCO matter—which countries might we invest in, and which companies might do it—but it will also be a DFID matter, for a DFID Minister to decide. Such a policy is part of the discussions that my ministerial colleagues in DFID and I have had. For instance, a country might be prepared to make adjustments to its land law, so that those who acquired land could be confident that it was not going to be confiscated from them. That element would create confidence for investors, who would then know that they had collateral to offer to a bank, so that they could invest further, develop markets and make demands about the infrastructure that ought to be put in place in order for them to get goods to market. We have clear dividing lines but, at the same time, they are part of a co-ordinated whole. We can satisfy, quite rightly, the idea of a strong recognition of what is development and what is trade.

Allied to that was the question of whether we should badge our aid more explicitly. Hon. Members will be aware that, whether in Sudan or elsewhere in Africa, DFID has generated a strong brand as a trusted deliverer of development benefit and results. DFID has a brand, and one of the issues we face in trying to change that is that we might be in danger of taking something away, because DFID is currently respected. Importantly, we are working very hard, and hon. Members here will see from the letterhead when I write to each and every one of them that it refers prominently to “UKaid”—

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Geoffrey Clifton-Brown and Stephen O'Brien

Wednesday 17th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr O'Brien]

The hon. Gentleman makes an informed point. One way of ensuring that the global fund, which scores well on its effectiveness, gets even better is to ensure that when there are conflicts in the country co-ordinating mechanisms, they are addressed. The co-infection of HIV and TB is an increasingly well understood area of research and practice, and that understanding is shaping the programmes through the multilateral aid review, and will therefore inform those programmes going forward.

[Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (The Cotswolds) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend tell the House what his Department is doing to support the Glion call to action, whereby consensus has been reached on the importance of family planning in preventing the spread of HIV, particularly maternal transmission from mother to child?

[Mr O'Brien]

My hon. Friend makes the vital point that family planning is at the heart of ensuring that we prevent the transmission of these diseases. I assure him that we are putting women’s and children’s health at the core of our international development agenda, and will contribute to saving the lives of at least 50,000 women and 250,000 babies, and to providing 10 million more couples with access to family planning.