(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I will deal with it and then make some progress, because there is a lot of interest in the House and many hon. Members want to speak. The hon. Gentleman raises an important point, and it is why the Government have set aside £31 billion to deliver the Dreadnought programme and ensure that we have continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence. We have also built in a contingency, because we are very conscious that we want to provide security confidence that the programme will deliver within budget and on time.
It is important that we pay our thanks to those who have served on the submarines, to families and to the whole industry. Next month, there will be the Westminster Abbey service recognising the commitment of our submariners. In July, there will be a parade at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, and at the end of the November, there will be a special memorial commemoration at Edinburgh Castle.
However, today’s debate is important because it gives us the opportunity to underline why the deterrent still matters so much to the United Kingdom, why it remains very much at the heart of our national security policy and why it has been one of the rare issues to command popular support across both sides of the House. It is an important point to make that the continuous at-sea deterrent has been supported by both Conservative and Labour Governments continuously over the last few decades; I certainly hope that it will be for many decades into the future.
The doubters who persist in believing that the deterrent is simply a cold war relic need to be reminded of three salient points. First and foremost, the nuclear dangers have not gone away; on the contrary, the geopolitical situation is more unstable than ever before. We are facing challenges that are growing in scale, complexity and diversity. Russia is rebuilding its nuclear arsenal. It has breached the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty and, in Europe, has now deployed new nuclear-capable missile systems to target and threaten the west. It also continues to develop and adapt its doctrine to give primacy to nuclear weapons. North Korea is the only state to have detonated a nuclear weapon in the 21st century. Despite positive dialogue, its weapons remain intact. We hope it will return to compliance with its obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. The point is that both Russia and North Korea have shown their willingness to rattle the nuclear sabre in the past.
There are no indications that those dangers will disappear any time soon, so we cannot relax our guard. While there is the risk of other states developing weapons, we must have a credible response to that threat. Our independent nuclear deterrent—our nuclear weapons posture—gives us defences against such actions. It is our ultimate insurance policy. It protects us every day from the most extreme threats to our national security and our way of life. Beyond that, it gives future generations greater strategic options and the power to protect themselves into the 2060s and beyond, whatever may lie round the corner.
As was recognised at last year’s NATO summit in Brussels, the UK’s nuclear deterrent provides a critical contribution to our alliance. Since 1962, the UK has assigned all our nuclear forces to NATO’s defence. That 50-year commitment to the defence and security of every member of that great alliance is as strong today as it has ever been in the past. All member states benefit from that capability, which gives the alliance another centre of decision making to complicate the calculations of our adversaries.
In fact, many allies signed the non-proliferation treaty in the late 1960s safe in knowledge they would be covered by the nuclear umbrella that the United Kingdom provides for them. Those who argue that we should disarm should consider whether such a move would actually make nuclear proliferation more, rather than less, likely. We cannot blame others, such as the United States, for questioning why they should be paying the price for protecting us from nuclear threats.
My constituency is the home of GCHQ, which has unprecedented and unparalleled security co-operation and intelligence sharing with the United States. Does the Secretary of State agree that the UK’s commitment to the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent is one of the foundation stones of that strong relationship, which keeps our people safe?
My hon. Friend makes an important point, which I will touch on later. Our nuclear deterrent is a cornerstone of that long and enduring relationship. The United States does not have such a relationship with another country anywhere on this Earth. That close collaboration makes us and our allies safer.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberOver the past few days, I have had the privilege of having discussions with the chief executive of Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin is an important industrial partner for us, providing a great number of jobs and a great deal of investment in the United Kingdom. I would certainly be happy to join my hon. Friend on such a visit.
I warmly welcome my right hon. Friend’s commitment to Britain’s future air defence, but will he say a little about affordability? It is important that we have cutting-edge units, but it is equally important that we have sufficient room in the budget to buy enough of them.
Absolutely. We need to be able to build mass into our air force, as well as exquisite technology. One of the key changes we want is rapidly to reduce the amount of time it takes to develop the new airframe. With the F-35, we saw that go on for far too long, and we need to reduce that period. I would like to see Tempest flying in the first half of the next decade, and we should bring forward the technology and give this project the inspiration and the drive to make it a reality as quickly as possible.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberWell, it is obviously difficult to monitor people we have no knowledge of. We are obviously working closely with the security services and allies in the region, whether it be Turkey or Iraq, and working closely with the SDF to keep close tabs on what Daesh fighters are doing. We are seeing a large number of Daesh fighters not actually returning to the United Kingdom, but also going to different countries such as Afghanistan and Libya. We keep coming back to the point that, although we are making great progress in Iraq and Syria, the threat is changing and moving to different countries. We have to be aware that the fight continues against the evil hatred in these people’s hearts, and we have to do everything we can to stop them.
Daesh is a dangerous ideology in cyber-space as much as it is a physical threat on the battlefield. Will my right hon. Friend join me in acknowledging the work of the intelligence agencies, including GCHQ in my constituency, in dismantling that power base online, and will he update the House as to what steps are being taken to expunge what remains?
As I touched on earlier, we are already using our abilities in the cyber-security field to counter the Daesh threat. We can only do that by working hand in glove with GCHQ—its amazing work and the technology it has developed—and with defence intelligence. We will continue to do that and to invest in this capability. An awful lot of extra investment has gone into this field from the Ministry of Defence and GCHQ, but we cannot be complacent. Although we have seen a significant, 70% reduction in the amount of propaganda that has been put out by Daesh, we saw a slight uptick as a result of the SDF shifting away from the fight in the middle Euphrates valley. Now that the fight has returned to that area, we are again seeing a reduction in the amount of online activity. These two things do not sit separately; it is about kinetic force, as well as cyber-force.