Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Ping Pong: House of Commons
Tuesday 22nd January 2019 Commons Chamber

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Security Minister for his opening remarks, and for his tone and the consensual approach he has taken. We most definitely do not agree on everything, and we have robust exchanges across the Dispatch Box, but we try to work together constructively on these serious matters whenever we can. I am grateful to him for accepting Lords amendment 1 to clause 3, which has caused controversy in the past. The clause deals with a situation in which it was previously illegal to download these terrible recruiting videos but not illegal to stream them. We have to have a situation in which both are illegal. We cannot have a situation in which watching something later on is illegal but watching it at the time is not. This has been difficult to deal with, and there is no perfect way to capture it in legislation.

As the Minister knows, I was also concerned about the three clicks approach, and I am pleased that the Government have dropped it. Dropping it has not, as some suggested, led to a situation in which one click could lead to an offence being committed. The Bill sets out clearly that anyone inadvertently clicking in that way would not be covered by the offence. I was concerned that the reasonable excuse defence mechanism went put on to the face of the Bill, particularly in relation to journalists and academics, and I am pleased that the Government have now accepted those concessions. It is clear that in the years ahead we will have to look at precisely how the clause works in practice, but it is important to send a clear message that streaming these terrible videos is equally as awful as downloading them and watching them later on.

On designated areas, the Security Minister quoted what I said in the Commons because this measure was introduced at a very late stage and I was unable to have that discussion with him in Committee. We do not oppose the overall aim of dealing with so-called foreign fighters, but the clause needed significant work. Again, I am pleased with the work that has been done and I pay tribute to my Labour colleagues in the Lords and those of other parties there who have put in the work and time to improve the clause. I am also grateful to the Minister for accepting the changes.

There was originally a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuse defences on the face of the Bill. This has essentially been taken and carved into the law itself, so that people do not commit the offence in the first place if they have a particular purpose for travelling. That was important for two reasons. First, someone with a perfectly legitimate reason for doing something would inevitably have been stopped, and would have been able to raise the reasonable excuse defence only further down the line. It is therefore much better in principle that they do not commit the offence in the first place. Secondly, the last thing anyone in this House wants is to deter people with a perfectly reasonable motive from going to areas of conflict. Aid workers are an example, and I know that the Chair of the International Development Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Stephen Twigg) has tabled an amendment on that.

For completeness, Lords amendment 3 states that the offence is not committed if one or more of the purposes of the visit is to provide

“aid of a humanitarian nature…carrying out work for the government of a country other than the United Kingdom…carrying out work for the United Nations or an agency of the United Nations…carrying out work as a journalist…attending the funeral of a relative or visiting a relative who is terminally ill…providing care for a relative who is unable to care for themselves”.

That is not meant to be an exhaustive list.

In addition, the reasonable excuse defence is maintained. This relates to the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby. The reason is that if no exception is already carved into the law and the purpose of the visit is not included in the list, it could none the less appear as a reasonable excuse defence. In an intervention on the Minister, the hon. Member for Torbay (Kevin Foster) talked about a burden in these cases. With the reasonable excuse defence, there is of course a burden on the defendant to raise it, but the burden to disprove it lies with the prosecution. In the carve-outs in the law that I have suggested, however, these people would not be committing the offence in the first place.

I want to press the Security Minister on how exactly this is going to work in practice. As he knows, there are two models around the world: the Australian model, which I think the sunset clause has been taken from, and the Danish model. The way the Danish model works in terms of not committing the offence in the first place involves an extensive system in which people obtain licences before they go. That is not without its problems, because journalists sometimes like to travel to certain areas without advertising the fact that they are doing so, so I am not suggesting that this would be a silver bullet or a magic solution. However, there will presumably have to be a system whereby we can show clearly that someone has not committed the offence in the first place, as against those situations in which there might be a reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed and in which the reasonable excuse defence was raised later. Any details from the Minister on how this will work would be appreciated.

The other Lords amendments on these issues are also important. They include the introduction of a sunset clause for the statutory instruments to designate particular areas so that they cease to apply and have to be replaced. This will ensure that the Government regularly make the case to Parliament if they wish to continue with a designation in the long term. Lords amendments 7 and 8 relate to two additional concessions. Lords amendment 7 provides that the Government have to make a statement outlining why they believe an area needs to be designated at the same time as they lay the relevant statutory instrument. Similarly, Lords amendment 8 states that when the Government revoke a designation, the change must be subject to the negative resolution procedure in Parliament in case anyone wishes to object to it. Taken together, the amendments produce a much better clause in relation to the designated areas. It will allow the Government to tackle the problem of so-called foreign fighters, of which we are all conscious, but it now does so in a more balanced, fair way, without deterring those who wish to travel to areas of conflict for perfectly honourable and legitimate reasons. No one in the House would wish to prevent them from doing that.

There are three other broad themes to the amendments in this group. The first relates to extraterritorial jurisdiction, which the Minister will be aware I have raised before in a slightly different context. The Government added extraterritorial jurisdiction to the offence of inviting or recklessly expressing support for a proscribed organisation, and concern was expressed about that by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Committee was concerned that the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction to certain offences was problematic when there was no equivalent offence in the country involved. The safeguard will now ensure that extraterritorial jurisdiction applies only if the offence was committed by a UK national or UK resident. That is in line with what the Joint Committee recommended, and I welcome that change.

Turning to the independent review of the Prevent strategy, I genuinely welcome the Security Minister’s acceptance that a review is required, and I give credit to the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), who has argued for one for some considerable time. As the Security Minister knows, I have visited Prevent programmes across the country, including in south Wales. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty) also raised the issue of far-right terrorism, which this House must be conscious of and take action on.

My argument about the independent review of Prevent is that there is a concern that its aims may end up in conflict with or become slightly confused between intelligence gathering, what I would call the more welfarist or safeguarding aspect of Prevent, and community cohesion. There has been an issue around community cohesion, because the facilities that are available to local authorities, for example, are an important part of that. I have had conversations in which it was clear that the pressures on local authority services are really affecting Prevent’s ability to deliver.

There are also aspects or parts of our society—in fairness to the Security Minister, he pointed this out himself—that have lost faith in the programme, and it is time to look at that. We need a programme in which everyone can have faith. None of us wants to see people living a life of violence and hatred that is driven by these kinds of ideologies. We all want to prevent people from doing that, but let us do so in the most effective way. From our conversations, I am hopeful that the Security Minister will be keen to have a wide-ranging review that can deal with such issues.

While I am on the subject of Prevent, I know that the competition to become the new independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has now closed to applications, and I hope that someone new will be appointed soon. I hope, too, that the Minister will be receptive to suggestions about how exactly to construct this independent review, so that we can have the most robust and reliable conclusions possible and, if necessary, make appropriate changes.

Lords amendment 16 is another sensible amendment, relating to bank accounts or terrorist’s bank accounts. There was an issue in the law as originally drafted in that the account would have to be in the name of a particular person. Of course, that did not take into account the fact that people can have control of other people’s bank accounts by their behaviour, and it is important that that was covered in the legislation as well.

Taken together, all the Lords amendments make this legislation far better, and it is pleasing that we end the passage of this Bill on a note of significant consensus.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I echo the comments of the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) about the consensual approach taken by the Government during the passage of this Bill and about the concessions already made during earlier stages, including on the likes of the three-clicks provision. As the Scottish National party has said since this process started last June, we welcome the Government amending this important legislation and appreciate the need to combat the constantly evolving threat from international terrorism in the modern age. However, we must be extremely careful how that is executed, and any new powers must be subject to stringent checks and safeguards if we are to maintain a healthy balance of security and civil liberties.

I will deal with the amendments in fairly short order lest I repeat many of the points already made by the Labour spokesman today or points that either of us made during earlier stages. The SNP welcomes the amendments—the improvements—made to the Bill in the other place and, as an SNP Member, I say that through gritted teeth. However, most of the amendments made in the other place were argued for in one way or another by the hon. Member for Torfaen and myself throughout the passage of the Bill in this place. None the less, I am pleased that the Government have dropped their opposition to many of the additional safeguards, and I hope the Minister is as generous in his treatment of the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill on Report and Third Reading next week.

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I again welcome the approach that the Security Minister has taken in reaching consensus on these matters.

First, and this is a very important principle, in this Bill we have maintained and preserved the right to receive legal advice in private. It is a very important principle and, as the Security Minister knows, I pressed him on it at a very early stage of and throughout the proceedings on the Bill. There was a concern either that someone who had been stopped and detained would use the ability to contact a lawyer to communicate the fact that they had been stopped—in other words, to contact someone who was not a lawyer—or, alternatively, that a genuine lawyer was contacted but that the lawyer would then somehow, inadvertently or otherwise, pass on information about the stop. I pressed the Minister on the solution that is now in the Bill at quite an early stage about a kind of duty solicitor scheme that could deal with both of those concerns, but also ensure that we preserved the very important right of legal advice in private. I am pleased that we have reached this stage on the Bill and that the Government have made that concession.

I now turn to a set of Lords amendments, starting with Lords amendment 14, on the urgent procedure for retaining and copying property at the border. I have looked at the Court of Appeal judgment in the David Miranda case. As the Minister says, the judgment, at paragraph 96, identified that there is

“no provision for authorisation by a court or other independent and impartial decision-making body in a case involving journalistic material prior to the use of the Schedule 7 power or, in an urgent case, immediately after the obtaining of the material pursuant to the exercise of the power.”

I fully accept that there are going to be very urgent situations, and this is expressed in terms of an imminent threat of loss of life or of injury. I am pleased to hear what the Minister has said about the code of practice, which we can look at in due course. I previously suggested that there could be situations where a decision maker was available at the end of a telephone line, but I appreciate that there will be truly exceptional cases. The key to this is that, while I fully accept the law needs to be brought into line with what has been suggested in the Miranda case, we have to understand that these must be truly exceptional cases. That is something we can set when we come to debate the code of practice, being very clear that in these particular circumstances there will have to be a genuine, imminent threat that needs to be dealt with. Again, however, bringing the law into line with what the Court of Appeal has suggested is, on the whole, to be welcomed.

I want to speak to two other sets of Lords amendments. I will start with Lords amendments 17, 19, 26, 28 and 29 on the definition of hostile activity. The difficulty is that if this is defined purely in terms of criminal activity, that does not capture other types of hostile espionage activity, which may not necessarily bring into play parts of the criminal law. I did think that there was a danger of this being drawn too broadly, and I am pleased that these amendments narrow the definition, so that when we talk about threatening the economic wellbeing of the UK, we have now added

“in a way relevant to the interests of national security”.

The key is to ensure that we have the powers we need while also being precise about what we consider “hostile activity” to be. It is a welcome amendment that improves the Bill.

Finally, Lords amendments 41 and 42 relate to information sharing. Schedule 3 provides that an officer questioning someone at the border can hand over information to appropriate bodies, as decided by the Secretary of State. I think that narrowing the provision to bodies exercising public functions is to be welcomed, but I have regularly made the point to the Minister during the passage of the Bill that bodies such as local authorities will need the appropriate resources, expertise and support to handle the information, particularly when it is likely to be highly sensitive.

Taken together, I think that the Lords amendments that I have spoken to, covering the four themes I have referenced, make the Bill a better and more effective piece of legislation, although I am keen to engage with the Minister when the codes of practice to which he referred come before both Houses.

[Gavin Newlands]

The House will be relieved to hear that I intend to be even more succinct in my comments on the provisions pertaining to port and border control powers. We have again seen positive movement in this area.

Despite the best efforts of the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) and myself, when the Bill reached the other place it restricted access to a lawyer for those detained under schedule 7. Specifically, it restricted an individual’s right to consult their legal representative in private, away from a relevant officer. As I and other Members have said at every stage of the Bill’s consideration, the ability to speak to a legal representative in private is a fundamental right that should not be infringed. Indeed, as the Minister outlined in oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee, both the Law Society of Scotland and Law Society of England and Wales have reinforced that point. Richard Atkinson stated in evidence that the UK’s criminal justice systems have an excellent reputation but that their very

“cornerstone is legal professional privilege…not access to a lawyer”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 30.]

We therefore very much welcome Lords amendments 12, 15, 35 to 37, 39 and 40, which ensure that that right is protected. Our preference would be for anyone detained under these powers to be able to consult legal representatives of their choosing, but I have heard the Government’s case for the power to require a detainee to consult a different solicitor and, although I would prefer not to have that provision, I completely understand the rationale behind it. I only hope that the power is not abused to ensure lesser representation.

On that note, we also very much welcome amendments 33, 34 and 38, which confirm a detainee’s right to be informed of their rights, which will now be in the Bill rather than simply in the draft code of conduct.

We also welcome Lords amendments 17, 19, 26, 28 and 29—I am not used to having so many Lords amendments, Madam Deputy Speaker. As the hon. Member for Torfaen said, the narrow definition of “hostile act”, so that it is an act that threatens the UK’s economic wellbeing, qualifies only if it

“is relevant to the interests of national security”.

We on the Scottish National party Benches are well known for standing up for civil liberties and human rights, but we do understand that keeping people safe and secure is the primary function of government and fully support our services having the appropriate powers to keep us safe. We therefore support an expedited process for retaining and examining property and confidential material where there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury, or of a hostile act being carried out. That relates to Lords amendments 18, 25, 27 and 30 to 32.

I am sorry to have to mention Brexit so close to the end of our considerations, but it will potentially have a huge impact on the effectiveness of much of this legislation. One of the greatest threats to our national security and counter-terrorism capacity is Brexit and the risk of losing seamless access to multilateral information-sharing tools. Terrorism and organised crime will continue to operate after 29 March without care towards the UK’s membership of the EU—I see that the Minister is delighted by the mention of Brexit. Yet without Europol, Police Scotland will no longer have access to information systems, support and expertise that help make Scotland, the rest of the UK and Europe a safer place. We cannot risk having arrangements that dilute the access that we currently have, and any new arrangements must consider Scotland’s distinctive criminal justice system in order to provide a continuing basis for the direct co-operation that currently exists between law enforcement agencies in Scotland and their counterparts. If we have not made provision to keep our policing effective outside the EU, how can we expect Prevent and everything that has been discussed today to work even after a review?

I thank the hon. Member for Torfaen and the Minister for the manner in which the Bill has been debated throughout its passage and I look forward with joy unconfined to dealing with them again next week on the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: House of Commons
Tuesday 18th December 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

It seems to me that the Minister is saying that there are circumstances in which he would make a different judgment. His judgment to me is that now is not the time to make a stand. Respectfully, I have to disagree with him. I believe that now is the moment to make a stand. The Opposition oppose the removal of the amendment.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Moon. The hon. Gentleman has set out the opposition to the Government amendment with commendable detail and clarity. I do not seek to repeat too much of that, but I will make a brief statement setting out the Scottish National party position.

The Minister spoke of principles and of tying the hands of Governments. I have a different set of principles: the SNP has not been a member of a Government who have passed on information without seeking or receiving assurances about the death penalty. The Minister also spoke about a compromise potentially before Report. That is largely a matter for the Government and the Labour party, although we would be more than happy to engage in that process.

To be crystal clear, the SNP will only support a compromise where the default position of Parliament would be not to provide data where assurances on the death penalty have not been received or sought and where it would be for the Government to argue otherwise in exceptional circumstances. At the end of the day, article 2 and protocol 139 obligations should be met and our shared principles across the United Kingdom on capital punishment should be protected.

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Amendment 11 is about safeguards on bulk data. Baroness Williams of Trafford spoke on this issue in Grand Committee on 5 September and explained why she felt that an amendment excluding bulk data was unnecessary:

“The Bill has been drafted to require appropriate officers to consider carefully what data they are targeting—which, of course, is not the case with bulk data—and where the information is stored, in order to help with the investigation and prosecution of serious crime, in addition to demonstrating that the data will be of substantial value to the investigation and in the public interest. It feels to me that there are sufficient safeguards in place,”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 5 September 2018; Vol. 792, c. GC150.]

Put simply, there is a worry that under current safeguards it could be argued that bulk data was of substantial value to any criminal investigation and was in the public interest. This is a simple but discrete point regarding reassurances that bulk data will not be accessed by the powers in the Bill. The Government’s position, as set out in the other place, is that the safeguards there are sufficient to ensure that as the Bill stands, but I am hoping that the Minister will be able to set out and expand in greater detail on the reassurance given in the other place.

[Gavin Newlands]

The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Torfaen is probably more grammatically correct than mine—my high school English teacher would not be surprised by that—but the principle is exactly the same. Rigorous safeguards are required to ensure that overseas production orders are not open to abuse in terms of requesting access to bulk data.

As someone who suffered—served—on the Investigatory Powers Bill Committee, I used to read the excerpts on the levels of oversight on the various elements of bulk data collection and interception to help to put me to sleep at night; if this is a dry Bill, then the Investigatory Powers Bill, although incredibly important, was even drier. The Scottish National party held out strong opposition to bulk data collection, and it is important to explain why we tabled this amendment: to remind the Minister that we believe that surveillance should be targeted by means of warrants that are focused, specific and based on reasonable suspicion.

Although the Government produced an operational case for bulk powers in between the draft Bill and the Bill as scrutinised in Committee, it was inadequate because it was largely anecdotal. We still firmly believe that such powers do not pass the legal tests of necessity and proportionality, and the additional test that the same results could not be achieved using more proportionate and less intrusive means. Two American Committees that asked to look at these Bills concluded that the same information could be obtained using more proportionate and less intrusive means.

Amendment 21 in my name is straightforward; the hon. Gentleman has already outlined many of the arguments and quoted Baroness Williams, but we agree that applications for bulk data lack a careful consideration of specifically which data is to be targeted. However, the Bill does not contain any express provision requiring orders to be targeted in the manner the Government describe. It is perfectly possible for officers to argue to the Government’s satisfaction that bulk data will be of substantial value to criminal investigations and in the public interest, given that the Government already regularly make arguments about why bulk powers are required in a wide variety of circumstances.

That assumption on the Government’s part does not amount to an adequate safeguard against the potential for bulk data to be requested under an OPO. Any access to routine daily surveillance of communications en masse should be expressly prohibited, and that is what the SNP amendment and the hon. Gentleman’s amendment are both intended to do. I urge the Minister to accept our amendment.

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[Gavin Newlands]

Many of the arguments relating to these amendments have largely been made in the previous set of amendments about PACE. To clarify, from our point of view, journalists are currently given notice under PACE, which allows them to negotiate changes to their application in most cases. These amendments simply replicates what already exists and works well under PACE for the measures in the Bill. They would ensure that the evidential value test mirrors the current law on both terrorism and non-terrorism cases, in reference to the point made by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle. They would also ensure that confidential journalistic material is protected as under the current law for domestic applications. As has been said already, the Bill strips out the requirement that the information sought is likely to be relevant evidence and that other means of obtaining it have at least been considered. In a free, democratic society, seizing journalistic material should be a last resort.

Although there is a public interest test in clause 4, it sets a lower threshold than in PACE. Instead of the judge being required to determine whether granting access to information would be in the public interest, as in PACE, the judge must merely be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it would be in the public interest. Separately, the police and security services have covert powers, primarily under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. These powers are exercised through the issuing of a warrant by the Secretary of State and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Exceptionally, these powers have been used by the police to identify a source. Most infamously, the police used a journalist’s phone number to identify the police source who had leaked the “plebgate” story to The Sun. As a result of concern from the press about this, some safeguards have been added. However, neither the journalists nor the CSP is given notice of an application for an IPA warrant.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I support what the hon. Gentleman is saying, and there is a later amendment for a notice. Is not the essential issue here that, as the Bill stands, the notice provision is not there for material that might not be confidential but is none the less extremely sensitive? It would be sensible to have the notice provision for that journalistic material as well.

[Gavin Newlands]

I could not agree more. The Investigatory Powers Act—I thought I left it behind a couple of years ago but I am on it again—provides for communications to be intercepted in the course of transmission; for communications data, but not content, to be produced to the police; and for the bulk surveillance of communications, with access to the content of specific communications that are highlighted in this process. Other than that, there is not a general right under the Act to apply for the content of stored communications, so there is no general ability under domestic law to obtain the content of journalistic communications other than through applying for a domestic production order.

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[Gavin Newlands]

We are talking about PACE, not POCA—I think that the Minister meant that, so I will answer accordingly. What he outlined is not before us today. If he introduces another Bill to make such changes to legislation, then perhaps on considering it we would argue the same points. That is for another day, but I take his point.

If the Government do not table appropriate amendments to provide protections, I suspect that we shall revisit the matter on Report, but for now I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 5 to 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Inclusion of non-disclosure requirement in order

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 8, page 8, line 42, at end insert—

“(3A) A judge shall only include a non-disclosure requirement for a period which, in the judge’s opinion, is necessary and proportionate in all the circumstances.”

This amendment would require a judge to include a non-disclosure requirement to cover a period which was only as long as he or she deemed necessary and proportionate.

This is another quite discrete point. Clause 8 empowers a judge making an overseas production order to include a non-disclosure requirement. Subsection (3) provides:

“An overseas production order that includes a non-disclosure requirement must specify or describe when the requirement is to expire.”

However, the clause does not include a necessity and proportionality test. Of course, it is essential that a non-disclosure requirement should not run for longer than reasonably necessary. Whereas under subsection (3) an order with a non-disclosure requirement would certainly have to specify or describe when it would expire, the judge would not be asked to consider the necessity for and proportionality of the order and its duration.

The purpose of the amendment is simply to probe the Minister for an indication of why there is no necessity and proportionality test, and whether he thinks any reassurance can be provided that those factors would be borne in mind in any non-disclosure order, which he will appreciate is a powerful order to make. It has quite profound consequences in these circumstances.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Tuesday 10th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again this morning, Mrs Main.

We have already had a wide-ranging debate on schedule 3, with more to come. Amendments 24 and 25 would delete provisions in the Bill that restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under schedule 3. Specifically, they would retain the right of an individual to be able to consult their legal representative in private, away from a relevant officer.

As I mentioned in my previous contribution, being able to speak with a legal representative in private is a fundamental human right that should not be infringed. In oral evidence, Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland spoke about the fundamental importance of this:

“If we want people to be in a position where they can freely discuss matters with their legal representatives, we have to preserve this value. It is key to the rule of law that people can discuss matters openly with their legal representatives so that the solicitor, advocate or barrister is in a position to advise properly on what avenues are open to the person. Clearly one would want to ensure that that was adequately protected.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 49, Q103.]

The Law Society of England and Wales also raised concerns, suggesting that the proposals risk the excellent reputation across the world of the UK justice systems—I add the plural to Richard Atkinson’s words. In oral evidence—an aspect of this quote has been raised before—he said:

“The cornerstone is legal professional privilege. That is not access to a lawyer; it is the confidential nature of discussions between a lawyer and their client. That is the cornerstone that has been in existence for hundreds of years and that is held out internationally as a gold standard that we have in this country. That is what is being undermined by this Bill saying that a police officer can stand and listen to the consultation that is going on between the client and the lawyer.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 28, Q63.]

For a full house of views on that, Abigail Bright of the Criminal Bar Association said:

“That is deeply concerning and wholly new. ‘Radical’ is a well-chosen word here; it is a radical departure from anything known to English law. My view, and the view of the specialist Bar associations, is that it is unnecessary and undue, and that it would not in any way be a serious improvement on the powers available to law enforcement agents.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 58, Q129.]

In my view, if the schedule is left unamended, it risks infringing a basic, fundamental right that has been in place for hundreds of years, as the legal profession says. It is unnecessary and undue, and it would not be a serious improvement on the powers available to law enforcement. Access to a lawyer—fundamental access to justice—is something we should not compromise on.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Main.

We had a wide-ranging debate on this issue in Committee last week. I want to raise the specific issues in amendments 42 and 43 and to support what the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North said about the importance of legal professional privilege. It is obviously a cornerstone of our criminal justice—indeed, our justice—system and is admired around the world as a gold standard, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out.

However, in the cases we are talking about, it is not as if we must have a trade-off between two purist positions. In my view, there is a simple, practical solution to the problem before us, which should satisfy the Government’s concerns about people who are detained passing on messages to others through a lawyer who either acts knowingly or is not in the know. I responded to the Minister on that point last week.

Legal professional privilege is circumscribed by the codes of conduct that govern lawyers in our country. No lawyer can be a party to an illegal act, and they have, of course, to be very mindful of money laundering regulations. The practical solution I suggest in amendment 43 is that the Law Society approve solicitors to provide advice to persons detained. Such solicitors would be subject to the professional code of conduct, which would plug the gap in the legislation as it stands, with people simply not having access to a lawyer at all.

I put that suggestion to Richard Atkinson, the co-chair of the Law Society’s criminal law committee, in the 26 June evidence session. I said:

“From what you are saying, there is a practical solution for any legitimate concerns there may be. There is also a situation—in a police station, for example—where you can have a duty solicitor or lawyer made available. That person could be someone of particular standing and reputation in whom we could all have faith and whom we would not have those concerns about.”

Richard Atkinson replied, “Absolutely. Again, code H”—he was referring to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—

“allows exactly for that. If there are specific concerns about a lawyer, the duty lawyer or solicitor can be called to come and advise. That maintains privilege and maintains the defendant’s access to advice at that point.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 27, Q56.]

This proposal would not involve a large number of cases. The Minister will recall his own questions to Richard Atkinson, when he asked whether a lawyer would be required every single time there was a stop, which clearly is not the point. The provisions apply only when we get to the questioning stage, as set out in the evidence.

The right to private legal advice can be maintained if we adopt the idea that solicitors approved by the Law Society can provide that advice. The arguments that the Minister made against the proposal last week—that those lawyers would somehow inadvertently hand on information—are incredible. These lawyers would be subject to training in this area and would have to act with the highest professional standards. Nor would it be a restriction on the right to confidential legal advice to have a limited number of, say, panel lawyers who are able to provide it.

I urge the Minister to go back and look at this proposal for Report stage. The Government’s concerns can be allayed if they put in place a practical scheme that would be limited only in terms of the number of people who would have to deal with it but that would have the crucial effect of maintaining the very important principle of legal professional privilege, upon which our criminal justice system is based.

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Main. I echo what the Minister said, and I thank him for taking a constructive approach to the Bill—he said on Second Reading that he would do that. I add my thanks to the Doorkeepers and the Hansard writers. I am very grateful to the Clerks, in particular, for dealing with the numerous amendments I emailed in.

I thank you, Mrs Main, and Ms Ryan for your excellent chairing of the Committee. I am very grateful to all the officials for their contribution to the Bill. I thank the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North for working so constructively, and the witnesses for giving us very helpful evidence and cause for debate throughout the Committee.

[Gavin Newlands]

Further to that point of order, Mrs Main. This is for the hat-trick. Thank you for allowing us to sit without ties. I thank you and Ms Ryan for chairing the Committee and for being so patient with us at certain times. I thank the Clerks, the Doorkeepers and the various officials. I add my thanks to the witnesses who came to the oral evidence session and those who submitted written evidence and briefing papers, which helped Members to draw up amendments.

I thank the Minister for being open—not quite as open as I would have liked, but open none the less, compared with other Ministers I have sat opposite in previous Bill Committees. I also thank the other Front Benchers for their assistance and co-operation.

Bill, as amended, to be reported.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 5th July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

The amendments would delete the provisions that restrict access to a lawyer for those detained under schedule 3 for the purpose of assessing whether they have engaged in hostile activity. However, in doing so, the amendments would add an important safeguard that would ensure that that would not apply if the examining officer reasonably believed that the time it would take to consult a solicitor in person would create an immediate risk of physical injury to any person.

In addition, new clause 3 would amend schedule 8 of the Terrorism Act 2000 with regards to access to a lawyer. It acts on the concerns that have been expressed to us by many different organisations and respected individuals. As we have heard, this section of the Bill would allow an individual to be detained for a significant period of time without reasonable grounds.

Notwithstanding the Minister’s points about the varied forms of intelligence that are received, the amendments are not about constraining the powers of the men and women who work at our borders, but acting on the concerns that have been expressed to ensure that correct and proper due process is followed. During the evidence session, we heard from Richard Atkinson that the schedule was of “great concern” to him as

“It fundamentally undermines what I would consider to be a cornerstone of our justice system—legal professional privilege.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 26, Q55.]

We will come on to that in more detail in the next set of amendments.

In addition, during the oral evidence, Abigail Bright of the Criminal Bar Association also had concerns about

“having no access to a lawyer, on the face of it for no good reason”

and

“why the rights of a suspect, who is potentially an accused person, should be diminished”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 58, Q128.]

I suspect that the schedule has been drafted as a result of concerns that lawyers and legal advisers could be exploited and manipulated in some way, as has been outlined. However, as was pointed out, that is not unknown to our criminal justice system and we already have powers in place to deal with such occasions. For example, in code H of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which deals with counter-terrorism cases, if there is a concern about an individual lawyer, there is provision for the suspect to have the consultation with that lawyer delayed but to be offered the services of another lawyer in the meantime, so the suspect is not devoid of legal advice.

Access to legal advice is a cornerstone of the British justice system—as a Scottish National politician, I should say the English and Welsh justice system and the Scottish justice system, before I get chided—and one that we should protect at all costs. I accept the Government propose the changes with the best of intentions to keep us safe but, as we have pointed out, there are ways that that can be done without eliminating or infringing on the basic principle of the rule of law.

The amendments provide a degree of flexibility to the authorities while ensuring that individuals can still access and make use of proper legal representation. Specifically, amendment 23 would, as I have outlined, provide that an individual can be prevented from consulting a lawyer in person only where the officer reasonably believes that the time it would take to secure a solicitor’s presence would create an immediate risk of physical injury to an individual or group of people. Those are important safeguards when there is valid suspicion about waiting for a lawyer to meet a client. Public harm can be caused by the wait, but at the same time there is an issue in the majority of circumstances of protecting someone’s basic right of access to a lawyer.

New clause 3 would amend schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It would delete provisions restricting the access to a lawyer of people detained under schedule 7 to the same Act. I respect the concerns that the Minister has outlined, but I think that they were alleviated in the oral evidence given by Max Hill a couple of weeks ago. By tabling the amendments and new clause I am trying simply to maintain access to justice.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North; I also want to speak to amendments 38 to 41, which I tabled. They follow the same general tenor as the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, in that they are practical suggestions for maintaining the right to access to a lawyer. Amendment 41 is about consultation via telephone.

I will not discuss the amendments in the next group now. They have far more to do with the right to consult a solicitor in private. None the less, that issue is also at the heart of the amendments in the group we are now considering. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North has already referred to the evidence given by Max Hill, and I commend the evidence of Richard Atkinson, too. He chairs the criminal law committee of the Law Society, and I am sure that the Minister recalls a conversation with him on this very issue.

The Minister put the practical point to Mr Atkinson about whether access to a lawyer would be requested on every stop at the border. However, that is not what is at the heart of the amendments. The Minister asked Mr Atkinson whether he thought

“that when a Border Force person, a customs person, seeks to detain you for an hour or however long to examine and question you further, they, too, should have access to a lawyer”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 29, Q66.]

That was about when the stage of being questioned was reached. The Minister mentioned a series of stages—whether it was a screening stop or another type of stop; but what I am talking about applies when questioning starts, when legal advice would be a necessity. We are not talking about the thousands of stops that are made. We are talking about particular circumstances that would be analogous to the position in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

I also commend Mr Atkinson’s evidence in terms of seeking practical solutions to deal with the Government’s concerns and still maintain our cherished right of legal professional privilege. As I have said, Ms Ryan, I will not talk about that in principle now, as I will do so on the next group of amendments. However, Mr Atkinson suggested several ways in which the balance could be maintained. He said the consultation could be delayed; if there were concerns about a particular lawyer, the services of a different one could be offered; and advice could still be given within the sight of examining officers without necessarily being given within their hearing.

I recognise the issue of immediate physical threat, as well. However, I urge the Minister to look at the matter practically, and not to sacrifice legal professional privilege but to take note of the practical solutions by which we could deal with concerns about individuals abusing the right to consult a lawyer by, for example, consulting someone who is not a lawyer or passing on information. I accept that there is a risk and I accept what the Government say, but we should turn our minds to finding a practical solution that maintains legal professional privilege.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I do not propose to take this particular group of amendments to a vote at this stage, but I say to the Security Minister that the first of the two explanations given—that somehow solicitors bound by a code of conduct would be unwilling and unaware stooges passing on information to third parties—is not particularly credible. I do not think the distinction between a police station and a border security stop is particularly strong either, and I urge the Minister to look again at the practical steps around this. However, it is not my intention to push the amendments to a vote at this stage.

[Gavin Newlands]

I have to say that I remain somewhat unconvinced by the Minister’s arguments, and we may choose to revisit some of these amendments on Report, but at this stage I will keep my powder dry until the next group of amendments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

Despite the Minister praying in aid the Biometrics Commissioner, I still do not buy the Minister’s comments or the strength of his argument about these provisions. However, despite the outrageous description by the hon. Member for Torfaen of my amendment as a blunt instrument, I am conscious that the Labour Front Bench has tabled an amendment in the next group that retains the Biometric Commissioner’s oversight, although it also retains the five years. I will throw my support behind that amendment and for that reason I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I beg to move amendment 33, in schedule 2, page 35, line 17, at end insert—

“21 (1) A person whose biometric data is retained under the provisions of this schedule may apply to the Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material (‘the Commissioner’) for the destruction of that data when the conditions in sub-paragraph (2) are met.

(2) The conditions referred to in sub-paragraph (1) are—

(a) that the retention of the biometric data has not been previously authorised by the Commissioner or a court of law; and

(b) that the biometric data was taken from the person—

(i) in circumstances where the arrest or charging of the person was substantially due to a mistake, whether of identity, place or other material fact; or

(ii) the person was arrested but never charged for the relevant offence.

(3) On receiving an appeal under sub-paragraph (1), the Commissioner must seek representations from the chief officer of police in the area in which the biometric data was taken as to whether the data should be destroyed or not.

(4) The Commissioner must determine an appeal under sub-paragraph (1) within three months of receiving the appeal.”

Although I described the previous amendment as a blunt instrument, it was proposed in an effective way and was eloquently argued.

[Gavin Newlands]

You are forgiven—just don’t do it again.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I will try not to.

I will put the case for amendment 33, as I started to do in the last series of amendments. The amendment squarely aims at striking an appropriate balance between liberty and security. Two circumstances are highlighted. The first is when there has been a mistake, which can happen, such as a mistake involving identity, place or any material fact—or in the intelligence, which can also happen, as the security Minister would accept. The second circumstance is when a person has been arrested but not charged for the offence. My hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton referred to the impact on the BAME community, which fits precisely into that category—people who do not end up being charged with an offence.

The amendment states that an application can be made to the commissioner for the destruction of data when the conditions are met. On receiving the appeal, the commissioner must seek representations from the chief officer of police in the area from which the biometrics data was taken as to whether it should be destroyed or not. Even if there is an appeal by an individual to the commissioner, that additional sub-paragraph means that the chief officer of police can make representations, which seems to strike a balance between the two. The individual person has the right, but if there are background concerns, the chief officer of police can make those representations.

There would also be a period of three months in which to determine the appeal, which is a reasonable period for collecting the necessary data from the chief officer of police and for consideration. Of course, there will be circumstances in which appeals will be turned down on that basis, but none the less it provides a framework. If people’s data is being retained in circumstances where a mistake has been made or when they have not ultimately been convicted of an offence, they can appeal to have it taken away, but that safeguard of representations from the chief officer of police remains. In those circumstances, I commend the amendment as a reasonable way through what I accept is a difficult problem.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to all the amendments together, Ms Ryan, which I think will assist the speed of business in Committee this morning. The Opposition support the aims of clause 3, as I made clear on Second Reading. A clear problem with the law is that the Terrorism Act 2000 covers downloading but not streaming. As I remarked on clause 1, updates to the law need to be made to take into account technological changes. The reality is that people now live-stream many things, rather than formally downloading them. It is not right that we criminalise the downloading but not the live-streaming. That clearly has to change.

However, two major points arise on the updated offence. The first is that it has to be workable from a practical perspective. If it is not, that will clearly be a problem. The second is that the clause should not bring into our criminal law those who carry out perfectly legitimate activities, so how the offence is drawn is extremely important. It was with those two factors in mind that I tabled my five amendments. They all aim, first, to make the clause workable, and secondly, to ensure that the way the clause is drawn targets the activity that we all wish to target and to criminalise but not that which I am sure every Committee member would want to encourage.

Amendment 5 relates to the period of time in the Bill over which the three clicks would be considered to give rise to a criminal offence. I proposed it as a safeguard on the three clicks, although I have severe reservations about the three clicks provision. It is vague, as it stands—we do not know whether it will be three clicks on the same stream or on different streams. By its very nature, it is also arbitrary. I have tabled amendment 5 to draw a period of time to the attention of prosecutors in making decisions on this new offence. I do it on the basis that I have reservations about the underlying three clicks approach in any event.

Amendment 6, on the intention to provide practical assistance, is based on something the Home Secretary said on Second Reading. The chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) intervened on him and made the sensible point that, as clause 3 stood, she was concerned that the Select Committee itself could be in trouble under that clause. He replied:

“The objective is clearly to find and punish those with terrorist intent.”—[Official Report, 11 June 2018; Vol. 642, c. 633.]

That may be right at a common-sense level, but is not quite what the three clicks approach does, because there is no intention requirement alongside it. Amendment 6 would simply introduce the intention requirement to which the Home Secretary referred on Second Reading.

Amendments 7 and 8 are about the reasonable excuse defence, which I would like to see added to the Bill. It would be an important safeguard and reassurance to academics, researchers, members of the Home Affairs Committee or anyone else who might be viewing this type of content, not—to use the Home Secretary’s words—with any kind of terrorist intent, but for perfectly legitimate reasons in studying this kind of activity and helping the rest of society to understand and defeat it. That is very important and something that we should all encourage.

Amendment 7 would also reverse the burden of proof. It should not be for the person raising the reasonable excuse defence to have to prove it. Once raised as a defence, it should then be for the prosecution to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. I am sure the Minister will also pick up that that reverse burden is in the Terrorism Act 2000 and, in my view, it is reasonable to expect that it should also be in this Bill.

Amendment 9 would provide for a review of the operation of the clause and a report to Parliament on it. If we were to persist with the three clicks approach, Parliament would need to look at its operation carefully in terms of how it is drawn and its workability.

To conclude, I am greatly concerned by the three clicks approach. I have tabled five amendments aimed at workability and safeguards, and I hope they will be considered carefully by the Minister.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the chair again, Ms Ryan. I support amendments 5 to 8 in the name of the hon. Member for Torfaen. As has been outlined at various stages, clause 3—and the Government’s three clicks policy—has received the most attention and probably the most public criticism of any part of the Bill. Furthermore, I think the Minister knows that it is imperfect in its current guise. He has been open about the fact that the Government are not fully aligned to the three clicks policy, as the Home Secretary commented on Second Reading.

The Minister and the Government have my sympathy on this. The first job of any Government is to keep their citizens safe in these difficult times of high terrorist threat combined with the constant march of technology and online communication. It is very hard to keep legislation up to date and answer the calls of police and security services for further powers, while maintaining the balance of freedom and civil liberties that we expect and enjoy.

The SNP has serious concerns about how the policy will work in practice, and the impact that it may have on innocent individuals who have no interest in, intent to engage in, or no wish to encourage terrorist acts. It is self-explanatory that anyone who downloads or streams content for the purpose of planning or encouraging terrorist activity should face a criminal charge and, if convicted, a long sentence. Nobody would disagree with that, but this is about finding the most effective approach that targets the right individuals.

I accept the Government’s point that more people now stream material online than download it to a computer or other device, and as such it is vital that we continue to review our counter-terrorism approaches and ensure they meet the current threat level, but the Government’s approach to tackling streaming content through the three click policy is riddled with difficulty. Amendment 5 deals primarily with timing and does not take into account when a prosecution may be made.

The Government suggest that the three clicks policy is designed as a protection for those who accidentally access certain content online, but we must consider how easy it is for someone to click on a relevant source that could put them into conflict with the provision. It could catch someone who had clicked on three articles or videos of a kind likely to be of use to a terrorist, even if they were entirely different and unrelated and the clicks occurred years apart. Timing is crucial, because it would be difficult to accuse someone of being involved in terrorist activity if they had clicked on a certain source three times over a 10, 15 or 25-year period. Those concerns were echoed in the evidence session, and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill—who we should all listen to—expressed his concern about the variable threshold proposed. We should act on that independent and expert advice by introducing a safeguard that could effectively help to identify a pattern of behaviour.

Richard Atkinson, the chair of the Law Society, also voiced his concerns about the Government’s three clicks policy, stating that it could undermine or restrict those with legitimate cases, and that the lack of any consideration of timing makes the measure very vague. He said:

“To leave the law in the hands of prosecutorial decision as to whether or not it meets the public interest is a step too far. I think there is a need for greater definition around what is being sought to be prohibited.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 31, Q74.]

Amendment 5 would add the safeguard that an individual would have to view the information three times or more in a 12-month period to have committed an offence, and that position was supported by Max Hill during the evidence session.

On Second Reading many Members made clear their concerns about the lack of other safeguards in clause 3, particularly regarding intent—for example, the clause does not take into account the length of time that anybody watches a video or views a website. That point was raised by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine on Tuesday in a question to Gregor McGill, who confirmed that the length of time that someone watches a video is not defined in the Bill, so watching a video or viewing a website for one second by mistake could be counted under the Government’s three strikes policy.

I accept the point made by Mr McGill that such breaches would be harder to prosecute, and that discretion would be applied, but as I have said, I am not comfortable with leaving such a wide area open to prosecutorial discretion. More importantly, as Max Hill said, such an offence without a test of intent is too broad and would capture too many innocent individuals. It is important that the Home Secretary accepts that a balance can be struck between liberty and security. Hoda Hashem, a law student at Durham University and one of many individuals and groups who sent helpful briefings to the Committee—I thank them all on behalf of the SNP—summed it up well by saying,

“the certainty and precision of laws are essential principles of our legal system. It allows ordinary people to know when their behaviour might veer into the realm of criminality, and it also means that the government and police cannot arbitrarily choose who to prosecute. In effect, it is wrong for the Home Secretary to argue that it would be down to the Police and CPS to fix a bad law. As a matter of principle, it is for Parliament to ensure that the laws it passes are clear enough to be applied consistently and, more importantly, predictably…If the government is serious about striking the right balance between liberty and security, the offence must include a criminal intent, or it must be withdrawn altogether.”

The Government may claim that adequate safeguards are in place to protect innocent individuals, but as we have heard, few agree with that position. That is why we support amendments 7 and 8, which have been tabled by the Labour party. The Government are asking for wide and vague powers, and we need safeguards in place to protect innocent individuals by ensuring that they are not prosecuted in the first place, and to provide for an adequate defence in the event that non-terrorists are taken to court. The stress placed on someone who was being investigated in that scenario would be extreme. Unless the safeguards are strengthened, and notwithstanding the Minister’s commitment regarding journalists and academics, it would be a brave journalist or researcher who would not be deterred or at least have second thoughts before viewing such material. Max Hill warned that thought without action must not be criminalised. We all agree that real terrorists should have nowhere to hide. We should also agree that legislating in the name of terrorism when the targeted activity is not actually terrorism would be wrong.

As we have heard, the French courts struck down a similar attempt by the French Government. In addition, a UN special rapporteur, Professor Joe Cannataci, expressed concerns about this provision, saying:

“It seems to be pushing a bit too much towards thought crime…the difference between forming the intention to do something and then actually carrying out the act is still fundamental to criminal law. Whereas here you’re saying: ‘You’ve read it three times so you must be doing something wrong’.”

In our view, amendments 5 to 8 are eminently sensible and, indeed, vital if the Government are to have any chance of surviving a legal challenge to elements of clause 3 and—almost as importantly—if they want to make good on the Home Secretary’s commitment that a balance can be struck between liberty and security.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I rise to support clause 13. It is self-evident that terrorism is a serious offence, and the SCPO regime, which has been in place since the 2007 Act, can be an important tool in dealing with terror offences.

As the Minister has set out, the SCPO will come into effect when an offender is released from custody with the purpose of preventing or disrupting their involvement in serious crime. Restrictions on travel and access to property or telephones can be part of that. The regime has worked in relation to other serious offences, and it is sensible to extend to it to terrorism.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14

Traffic regulation

[Gavin Newlands]

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 14, page 15, line 20, at end insert—

“(2A) The authority may not impose any charge where the relevant event is a public procession or assembly as defined by section 16 of the Public Order Act 1986 taking place for the purposes set out at section 11(1) of the same Act.”

This amendment would ensure that a new power to impose charges in connection with anti-terror measures at events or particular sites would not restrict protest rights through the imposition of costs that organisers are unable to pay.

[Gavin Newlands]

Amendment 13 is straightforward, so I will not detain the Committee too long. Anti-terrorism traffic regulation orders—ATTROs—allow vehicle or pedestrian traffic to be restricted for counter-terrorism reasons. We have all seen the bollards and barriers that are set up during events to protect the organisers, spectators and those taking part. ATTROs can be temporary or permanent fixtures—as is the case at the moment outside Parliament. The amendment is not about restricting the importance of ATTROs, but ensuring that any new measures that are introduced are proportionate and do not restrict people’s ability to protest and demonstrate.

Clause 14 proposes a range of changes to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, including removing the requirement to publicise an ATTRO in advance and allowing the discretion of a constable in managing and enforcing an ATTRO to be delegated to third parties, such as local authority staff or private security personnel.

In addition, the clause would allow the cost of an ATTRO to be recharged to the organisers of an event. It states:

“The authority may impose a charge of such amount as it thinks reasonable in respect of anything done in connection with or in consequence of the order or notice (or proposed order or notice).”

The new charge would be payable by an event promoter or organiser, or the occupier of a site, and relevant events include those taking place for charitable and not-for-profit purposes. Although I see a lot of merit in clause 14, I am concerned that it will stop people gathering for demonstrations.

Amendment 13, which I hope is a common sense amendment, was tabled to address those specific concerns. It would allow an exemption to be made, so that any new power introduced through clause 14 would not restrict an individual’s right to protest on a cause that is important to them. Clause 14 certainly will not save a huge amount of money; the Library briefing on the Bill states that it could be as little as £66,000. The amendment is designed to ensure that the right of freedom of assembly and association, as protected by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights, is not violated due to the organiser of a protest being unable to meet the costs levelled against them.

Last week, Corey Stoughton of Liberty expanded on that in her evidence to the Committee. She said:

“To be consistent with the right to assemble and protest under article 10, there must be a legislative exemption for activity protected by those fundamental rights. That is an exemption that we have seen replicated in other, similar provisions in UK law…A simple fix to this would be to recognise that putting such charges on activity protected by the right to protest and assemble is an undue burden on that activity, and the cost of protecting those events has to fall on the state in the course of its obligation to protect that right.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 52, Q109.]

I agree. We have created exemptions in the past to protect our right to protest. The state must protect that right and I think most people, even Government Members, believe that a citizen’s right to protest is worth a lot more than £66,000.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I rise to support amendment 13, and amendment 29 in my name. Although the amendments appear to differ, they are essentially meant to achieve the same thing. I would not dream of entering into a competition with the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about who has the better drafted version.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. I first want to make a few general remarks about clause 1.

I think we all accept that there is a need to update the law in this area, and that is for a number of reasons. The first is the evolving and changing nature of the terrorist threat over past decades. There have also been changes in technology, which I appreciate we will deal with in later clauses. However, there is also—this is vital for clause 1—the fact that we now have experience of the Terrorism Act 2000 in our criminal justice system and in the decisions taken by the Crown Prosecution Service.

The clause essentially updates section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Just so that we are clear, section 12(1) of the Act indicates:

“A person commits an offence if—(a) he invites support for a proscribed organisation, and (b) the support is not, or is not restricted to, the provision of money or other property”.

The key part of that subsection is the inviting of support for a proscribed organisation.

When Assistant Commissioner Basu gave evidence to the Committee on Tuesday, I was careful to ask him whether there were examples of situations that are not covered under the 2000 Act but would be captured—or are intended to be captured—by this new offence, and he gave a couple examples. One was the case of Mohammed Shamsuddin and the Channel 4 documentary, “The Jihadis Next Door”. He referred to a speech that Shamsuddin gave on 27 June 2015, in which

“it was very clear that he supported Daesh and what they were doing…He criticised Gay Pride and said that gay people should be thrown from tall buildings. Having spoken on recent shootings in Tunisia, he said, “The spark was lit,” and that the listeners knew the rest.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c. 6, Q3.]

Of course, the problem with those remarks, which I will come back to, is that they are not captured by the 2000 Act as it stands, because there was no specific invitation to others to join the cause.

The other example given was of Omar Brooks, in relation to an incident on 4 July 2015. Again, there was clearly talk about religion being spread by the sword and about it not being a soft religion about peace, and there was the mocking of a Shi’ite who had spoken out against killing of Lee Rigby. The tone of the speech shows clear support for the concept and principles of Daesh, but, again, it does not take the additional step of inviting support from others.

Prior to this clause being proposed, the law as it stands was interpreted in the case of Choudary and Rahman, which the Minister referred to in his questions to the witnesses on Tuesday. About the offence as it stands, the Court of Appeal said:

“When considering the proportionality of the interference, it is important to emphasise that the section only prohibits inviting support for a proscribed organisation with the requisite intent. It does not prohibit the expression of views or opinions, no matter how offensive, but only the knowing invitation of support from others for the proscribed organisation.”

In essence, along with the two examples I have given on the basis of Assistant Commissioner Basu’s evidence, that captures where the law is and where it stops. There are others acting in a clearly unattractive way whom we wish to extend the law to.

The issue then becomes how, precisely, we want to draft the law to achieve that. Nobody says that freedom of expression is a wholly unqualified right—it is not, actually—but I am sure we all wish to strike a balance between people expressing views that we find distasteful and may not agree with, but that none the less come into our public debate and are defeated by others, and the clear nature of the offence, which is about recruiting people to the terrorist cause. How we draw that distinction is very important.

The amendments in my name seek to consider how we get that balance right. Nobody in the Committee would want to put something unworkable on the statute book, or something that was likely to attract a declaration of incompatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998. I tabled these amendments for the Minister’s consideration in that spirit and to assist in striking that balance appropriately. This is not a partisan issue, and I hope that we would all wish to strike that balance appropriately and to make the clause effective.

The two amendments—there are really two amendments, although there are three on the amendment paper—seek to look at the original offence under the Terrorism Act 2000 and at how the extension of that offence appears in clause 1. I have put forward two options: first, that the offence is committed only when the person intends to encourage support for a proscribed organisation—in other words, when the opinion is expressed, as set out in clause 1, together with intention; and, secondly, that recklessness is attached to the offence. Both options extend the existing offence, but not quite as widely as clause 1 as it stands.

Recklessness is not an unknown legal concept in our criminal law; on Tuesday, the Crown Prosecution Service gave evidence about it. There has been a change in the concept of recklessness in law. It is what we call subjective recklessness, so it is about what the individual person thinks about the risk. Recklessness would be far more difficult as a concept in this area if it was defined as it was prior to 2003, when it was about an objective view and about others assuming what that person might mean. With the restriction that is in our law on recklessness anyway, recklessness should perhaps be less of a concern for the Committee.

I offer the two amendments for consideration in a constructive spirit. Their purpose is to ensure that, when the Committee looks at extending the law, as we all agree we should be doing, to examples of what the Minister has referred to as the “charismatic preacher” and to the impact of a person who is recruiting people to the cause, but who is not quite using a form of words that is captured in the intention in the Terrorism Act 2000, we do that in a way that is workable and proportionate and does not draw a declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act. I therefore hope the Minister will indicate that the amendments will be considered.

[Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)]

I rise to support the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Torfaen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 2, page 2, line 6, at end insert—

“(1C) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1A) to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for the publication of the image.”

This amendment explicitly sets out that a person charged with the new offence under subsection (3) has a defence if they can prove a reasonable excuse for the publication of the image.

Clause 2 fits into the category of offences I have mentioned that are being updated to take account of technology. Amendment 4 is not unreasonable and would simply set out the defence of reasonable excuse. Whether that is necessary may be subject to argument, and I am happy to listen to the Minister’s position, but I tabled the amendment to give a degree of comfort in relation to the scope of the offence.

We would all agree that the situation needs to be updated. It is set out in section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, on uniform. Under that provision, which was of course passed some 18 years ago, a

“person in a public place commits an offence if he—(a) wears an item of clothing, or (b) wears, carries or displays an article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

A term of imprisonment not exceeding six months can be imposed.

The problem that arises is that people can now perfectly well wear such an item of clothing, or display an article, in a private place and take a photograph to be quickly disseminated on social media such as Facebook or Twitter, or by other means. It is right for the Government to look at that. Wearing something in a private place and putting a picture of it on social media could result in far more people seeing it than would have happened in the situation envisaged in the old offence, where the item was displayed in a public place.

My first reason for tabling the amendment is simply to add a note of caution. We are moving from criminalising behaviour in a public place to criminalising something that happens in a private place in the first instance, but which technology allows to be disseminated in the public sphere.

The second reason is that we should take care not to extend the criminal law to behaviour that we might all think unattractive—I hesitate to use the word “reckless” after the previous discussion—but that none the less would not give rise to terrorist intent. In a question during the evidence sitting on Tuesday, I gave the example of a 16 or 17-year-old going to a fancy dress party who wears something that we might all regard as offensive, in bad taste and showing poor judgment, but whom no one would seriously want to criminalise as the clause would do. The answer I received from Mr McGill on behalf of the Crown Prosecution Service and Assistant Commissioner Basu was simply that, in such cases, they would not be interested in pushing the matter into court. Assistant Commissioner Basu said, with respect to the CPS and Mr McGill:

“I would never get such a case past him anyway, even if I was prepared to put that case. We are far too busy on genuine acts of terrorism to be concerned with such a case. What it might point to is somebody who is in trouble and needs a bit of guidance”.––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Public Bill Committee, 26 June 2018; c.7-8, Q4.]

He referred to Prevent.

Assistant Commissioner Basu is right. Such behaviour might suggest that someone had problems. It might just suggest in the situation I described that they were being offensive for the sake of it. I obviously appreciate, too, that the Crown Prosecution Service has to apply a public interest test, but at the same time, while that prosecutorial discretion is important, the legal framework we set out in the first place is also important.

I completely support the intention of the clause. It is right that we update the law in the social-media age. We want to deal with the dissemination of unpleasant images. However, it is not an unreasonable amendment to. We ask simply to put that reasonable excuse on the face of the Bill to cover the situations I have suggested may arise.

[Gavin Newlands]

I neglected to say earlier that it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ryan. As has been outlined by the Labour Front-Bench spokesman, clause 2 extends the offence that would result in criminalisation for the publication of an image, the wearing of an item of clothing or the display of an article such as a flag in such a way that would arouse reasonable suspicion that a person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.

It should be noted that it is already an offence to wear certain clothing, or to carry, wear or display certain articles in public places. The behaviour of those who disseminate terrorist publications intending to encourage terrorism, or being reckless as to whether the behaviour encourages it, is already criminalised by section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 and will attract a 15-year maximum sentence under the provisions of the Bill.

The clause would criminalise those who might be highlighting their support for a proscribed organisation, which is akin to using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. It overcomplicates the response and risks targeting innocent individuals in the attempt to target people who would look to do us harm. In a briefing, which I am sure the hon. Member for North Dorset fully endorses, Liberty—his favourite campaigning group—[Interruption.] I was talking about Liberty.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

Q We heard this morning, in terms of some of the Bill’s provisions, such as the three clicks and the lack of a time limit on that, that to rely on prosecutorial discretion, rather than having fixed limits and so on in the Bill, is a step too far. Do you agree?

Michael Clancy: That is an interesting question, and it allows me to get out my brief on clause 3. Prosecutorial discretion is an important issue. The position of the Lord Advocate in Scotland, as a Scottish Minister, is separate from his position as head of the prosecution service. Prosecutorial discretion is therefore key to how the prosecution service undertakes its work, and it has to be inherent in any prosecutorial legislation. It is quite difficult to dictate to the prosecutor what cases should be prosecuted, so I would prefer to stick with the arrangements for prosecutorial discretion in Scotland.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Thank you for coming along, Mr Clancy. I appreciate your evidence about terrorism legislation being reserved to the UK and about the memorandum of understanding between the Attorney General and the Lord Advocate and so on. However, moving beyond that, do you have any concerns about clause 3 of the Bill that you have not already referred to?

Michael Clancy: I think we were generally in favour of the idea that this area should be updated to take account of the digital revolution. The fact that the review of terrorism legislation that the Government precipitated last year has resulted in no further offences, as Max Hill described, is a vindication of the extent to which the law captures most of the issues. However, there are always questions that can be asked—some of which you have already heard about—about the balance between the right of expression and the requirements under the Bill.

It is fair to say that the courts have been quite explicit about where they fall on that balance. The right to freedom of expression under ECHR article 10 is not an absolute right; it has to be balanced with the other rights that the rest of us enjoy, such as the right to life, and so on. Therefore, although others may not subscribe to this view, the case has to be made that the provisions in the Bill will upset those rights to the extent that we would be considerably concerned about them, given that they build on existing provisions that have already been tested in the courts.

In that context, we have to look at all the legislation we have got—several Acts relate to counter-terrorism—and construct some sort of codification or consolidation of it. I do not know about you, ladies and gentlemen, but flitting between three or four Acts of Parliament within the compass of one Bill is difficult enough. It is difficult to imagine that those who will be subject to the legislation will do that kind of thing. We should make the law as simple and easily understood as we can.

--- Later in debate ---

[Gavin Newlands]

Q Back to your earlier point about prosecutorial discretion, do you think there is a danger that elements of clause 3 risk criminalising thought without action?

Michael Clancy: Well, there is an action: clicking three times is the action. It depends on what is clicked on and how that works in practice. It says in the existing provision for the collection of information in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000:

“A person commits an offence if…he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism…he possesses a document or record containing information of that kind”

or—this is the addition made by clause 3 of the Bill—

“on three or more different occasions the person views by means of the internet a document or record containing information of that kind.”

That fits in the analogous provision in the 2000 Act of possessing

“a document or record containing information of that kind.”

The fact that it is on the internet is simply an update.

I am not convinced that three strokes is the problem. We heard from Max Hill about the French cases. We have to be cautious about drawing analogies with another legal system—certainly one that has a written constitution and a codified arrangement for its law. Those are two significant differences from the system here, where something that contravenes article 10 or some other article of the European convention on human rights is subject simply—simply—to a declaration of incompatibility. That would require Mr Wallace to come to a decision about whether he would amend the legislation, were the courts to make such a declaration of incompatibility.

We must be careful about demonising this issue in that way, in so far as there has not already been trespass on the idea of freedom of expression and freedom of thought. That is that balance that has to be struck between making the counter-terrorism law work and at the same time preserving our rights. The courts have to be asked to make that balance day in, day out.

I wonder just how one would work around this provision. If I were so minded, would I, for example, click once and then take out my phone and take a film of what I was watching on the internet? Is that a reasonable proposition? Is that captured in this Bill? I do not think so. Those are the kinds of questions that one might return to later on in your deliberations.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Q Just one question, Mr Clancy, arising out of the Minister’s question about section 18 of the Public Order Act 1986 and the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. Both Acts are about the use of abusive, threatening or insulting behaviour to stir up hatred, but do you agree that there is a distinction between that and actual recruitment to the cause, which is what the clause in this Bill is talking about? Are they different things?

Michael Clancy: Clearly, there is a legislative distinction between the two. It depends on what the abuse in terms of race or religion is intended to do. Is it simply to make someone feel uncomfortable, aggrieved or violated, because of their religion or race? Or is it in some kind of a way to encourage others to take up that same kind of attitude toward people based on their religion or race?

Legislation in this area, countering discrimination on the basis of religion or race, is something that we have had in this country since the 1960s. Therefore, the fact that we are continually having to look at this again means that the educative value of that legislation has not yet reached its optimum. We have to be aware of pushing that further, to make sure that those who would fall into that pattern of behaviour know that it is wrong, illegal and that they must desist from doing it.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Gavin Newlands and Nick Thomas-Symonds

Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th June 2018 Public Bill Committees

[Gavin Newlands]

Q It would be useful if you provided the Committee with more examples. The Bill is asking for an extension from two plus one to five years; that would be more than double in some cases. To justify that, it would be useful for the Committee to have that information.

Gregor McGill: We can certainly look for those examples and write to the Committee.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Q I have a narrow question. Clause 12 concerns the power to enter and search houses. I am trying to get a practical sense of that. There are, of course, various requirements. On at least two occasions there has to have been attempts at entry before. The purpose is this:

“to enter premises specified in the warrant for the purpose of assessing the risks posed by the person to whom the warrant relates;”

Could you expand on that? Mr Basu, what exactly do you think is meant by “assessing the risks”? What practically would be likely in a situation like that?

Assistant Commissioner Basu: This is based around lifetime offender management of terrorism. The parallel is obviously registered sex offenders, where this power exists. You are looking for anything that looks as though they have re-engaged or are breaching their notification requirements, if they are on notification. It is something that allows us to assess the ongoing risk of their re-engaging with terrorism. You might find material if you were to do such a warrant. You might find a flag being displayed. You might find material that is of use to a terrorist. That is the purpose of it.