(8 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) on securing this debate on a topic that I know is of great interest to hon. Members. I also thank him for giving a plug to what will follow this debate.
My hon. Friend asked a large number of questions; I shall try to get through them all in the time available. Let me first answer the last point about how this issue is changing both the shape and the look of our armed forces and the types of scenarios in which our armed forces might find themselves. It must be recognised that RPAS crews are fully immersed in the realities of combat. The persistence offered by these systems can result in crews observing the aftermath of their attacks, which is a sobering experience, rarely shared by other pilots or artillery men. As with any squadron that deploys in theatre, RPAS squadrons undergo pre-operational mental health briefings and post-tour briefs. They have trauma management practitioners embedded throughout to monitor the health and wellbeing of all those involved in operations. I know that my hon. Friend takes a great deal of interest in these matters, and I would be happy to discuss the issue further with him on another date.
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s acknowledgment of these systems in that they play a key part in our capability and help to save lives. If he will forgive me, I will briefly provide a bit of clarity and on the record bust some of the myths that surround the term “drone”, which conjures up images of machines free from human oversight and able to operate with complete autonomy. That is the stuff of science fiction movies, not the reality. Although drones do not operate with an individual in the cockpit, the fact is that a trained professional human being is in control of the system at all times. The difference is that they operate remotely from the vehicle. The term “drone” also overlooks the fact that the aircraft itself is part of a much larger system composed of other vital components such as the ground stations, networks and, most importantly, the personnel.
My hon. Friend asked what progress has been made on the joint doctrine note’s recommendations of March 2011 in developing a governance road map. We shall be developing that at the same time as bringing the Protector into service. I shall be happy to provide more details, but the rough date of completion for the programme will be the end of the current decade.
My hon. Friend asked some pertinent questions about the Raqqa strike. He asked, for instance, whether it would have happened if this capability had not been at our disposal. That raises hypothetical questions about whether having the capability changes our behaviour and whether we become more trigger-happy, and also about the nature of individual targeting, which, as he will understand, is an incredibly complex process. Many questions about collateral damage and the likelihood of success will also need to be taken into account. I think that the best way in which I can answer those hypothetical questions is to direct him to the Prime Minister’s statement that if there were a direct threat to the British people and we were able to stop it by taking immediate action, we would be prepared to take that action.
The hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison) suggested that the Intelligence and Security Committee would review the decisions about Raqqa. Will the Minister give the House a commitment that the Ministry of Defence will engage in the best possible collaboration with any inquiry that the Committee might mount?
I shall say more about that later, but, yes, it would be very welcome.
Let me say a little about the rules of engagement. United Kingdom policy relating to RPAS is exactly the same as that which relates to manned aircraft. There is no requirement for separate rules of engagement. UK crews always operate within UK and international law, regardless of what other rules of engagement apply to the operation concerned. If the United States were using one of our systems, it would use its rules of engagement, but it would be restricted by our UK red card holder, who is fully empowered to veto the use of a UK asset for action without UK permissions.
My hon. Friend asked about the number of individuals involved in US operations. No UK personnel are involved in flying in such operations, although three UK servicemen are currently involved in training. He raised the issue of data that might be gathered by RPAS when our allies could use them to attack targets that the UK public might find objectionable. The right hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) mentioned the ISC’s offer to examine and provide oversight in regard to that whole matter. The acquisition and dissemination of the intelligence that is gathered complies with all UK domestic and international law, and oversight from that body is very welcome. I will undertake to keep my hon. Friend informed, and will do what I can to facilitate it.
My hon. Friend raised the issue of the development of so-called killer robots, in the case of which there is some level of independence. He mentioned Phalanx, but I would guess that Goalkeeper and other such capabilities would fall into the same category. He asked what regimens, agreements and criteria they were bound by; I can confirm that they are bound by all those to which he referred.
We continue to track rapidly advancing RPAS technology development. Over the last decade, it has become a very important part of our military capability. Given the rapidity with which such technology is developing, I cannot envisage any reversal in the trend. Indeed, I expect RPAS to be used in an increasingly wide variety of environments and roles, and to form a key part of our future mix. The Government have no intention of developing systems that operate without this all-important human hand in the weapon command and control chain.
My hon. Friend asked how UAVs might feature in the SDSR. That has still to report its findings, but, as the Prime Minister has already announced, Reaper will be replaced towards the end of the decade through the Protector programme, which will develop a medium altitude long endurance RPAS, providing the UK armed forces with a theatre-wide persistent ISR—intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance—capability that is able to identify, monitor and, if necessary, attack land and maritime targets. The Protector programme is set to double the number of aircraft compared with Reaper, offering yet more capability.
My hon. Friend asked a list of questions, which I can get the Minister for Defence Procurement to respond to, addressing successors to Nimrod, maritime patrol aircraft and so on.
A variety of options, including unmanned systems, are currently being considered as part of the SDSR for future UK capability. The Department is funding research into the potential of this area of future combat air systems, and we are currently undertaking a two-year study with France scoping the feasibility of developing an unmanned combat air system together. This is complemented by a national programme including further work to advance the Taranis technology demonstrator aircraft.
My hon. Friend asked about exports. The Government take our arms exports responsibilities very seriously. I have sat on the Defence Committee as a Back Bencher and we operate one of the most rigorous arms export controls in the world. The transfer of unmanned or remotely piloted air systems and their related technology is controlled through the UK’s strategic export legislation, and any export of strategic goods such as these systems would need to be considered against the EU and the national consolidated export licensing criteria. Export licences are considered on a case-by-case basis against the export licensing criteria, and in the light of prevailing circumstances at the time and depending, critically, on what we think they would be used for. Any licence to export a UAS or RPAS would have to be consistent with the UK’s international obligations under those regimes and agreements that my hon. Friend mentioned. The overall aim of that is to prevent the proliferation of sensitive materials and technology to countries and end-users of concern. We do not export equipment where there is a clear risk that it might be used for internal repression or it would aggravate existing tensions or conflicts, or would be used aggressively against another country.
On that point, my hon. Friend asked about the danger and likelihood of these capabilities being developed by non-state actors and what we are doing about that. Clearly, that is an area of concern and he will know that we constantly assess those threat levels, and we are currently, as part of the work in the SDSR, looking at measures that could be taken to counter such threats.
My hon. Friend also asked when the Navy’s maritime UAV strategy paper will be finished and when it will be published. That, again, is part of the work of the SDSR.
In summary, I welcome this opportunity to put on record again the Government’s clear views on the benefits of remotely piloted aircraft systems. The role of those systems in armed conflicts will only increase over time, whether to gain a more complex level of situational awareness for tactical crews and military commanders or to attack positively identified targets when required. I find it hard to imagine a campaign in which such technology will not have a part to play. Indeed, in the most unpredictable and difficult of operational environments, these systems are vital in providing situational awareness, often avoiding the need to place our personnel in harm’s way, whether on the ground, in the air or at sea.
I know that the various aspects of this issue are of immense concern to Members on both sides of the House, and we are keen to facilitate visits to some of the facilities involved and to ensure that the House is well informed on all the issues. I will be happy to follow up any further questions that my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire might have.
Question put and agreed to.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Ministerial CorrectionsTo ask the Secretary of State for Defence what contracts his Department has with A4e; and what the (a) purpose and (b) monetary value is of each such contract.
[Official Report, 1 March 2012, Vol. 541, c. 436W.]
Letter of correction from Peter Luff:
An error has been identified in the written answer given to the hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) on 1 March 2012.
The full answer given was as follows:
The Ministry of Defence does not have any contracts with A4e.
The correct answer should have been: