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Written Question
Folic Acid
Thursday 11th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, pursuant to the Answer of 5 March 2026 to Question 118172 on Folic Acid, for what reason people with (a) stents and (b) having kidney dialysis have been removed from the NHS list of people who cannot take folic acid.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

The information on folic acid was shortened and simplified as part of the process of redesigning medicines information on the NHS website. The NHS website sets out that before taking folic acid, patients, which includes those with stents or receiving kidney dialysis, should tell their doctor if they have any medical conditions. It also advises patients to check the information provided in the leaflet that comes with their medicine or contact a health professional to ensure that the medicine is suitable for them.


Written Question
Disease Control
Tuesday 9th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, (a) who wrote the document and (b) whether AI technology was involved.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

  • has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
  • is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
  • is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
  • requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.


Written Question
Disease Control
Tuesday 9th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, for what reason the strategy does not include modelling.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

  • has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
  • is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
  • is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
  • requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.


Written Question
Disease Control
Tuesday 9th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, how the word pandemic is defined.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

  • has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
  • is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
  • is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
  • requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.


Written Question
Disease Control
Tuesday 9th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, when his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, was written.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

  • has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
  • is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
  • is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
  • requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.


Written Question
Disease Control
Tuesday 9th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026, what type of pathogens the strategy is concerned with.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

  • has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
  • is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
  • is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
  • requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.


Written Question
Disease Control
Tuesday 9th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, whether he considered including hospital-acquired infections in his Department's Pandemic Preparedness Strategy: building our capabilities, published on 25 March 2026.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

  • has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;
  • is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;
  • is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and
  • requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.


Written Question
Railways: Wilmslow
Monday 8th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department for Transport:

To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, what are the passenger numbers for train services from Wilmslow to London, for each hour on each day of the week.

Answered by Keir Mather - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department for Transport)

The Department does not hold validated data on this.


Written Question
Disease Control: Harlow
Thursday 4th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, for what reason the new biosecurity centre in Harlow will not be operational until 2038.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) will finalise the design of the Harlow site before construction begins, with phased occupation of the facility starting in the mid-2030s. A period of dual running with existing sites will ensure a safe and effective transition of operations. UKHSA will maintain operations at Colindale and Porton Down until Harlow is fully validated and operational in 2038.


Written Question
Moderna
Thursday 4th June 2026

Asked by: Esther McVey (Conservative - Tatton)

Question to the Department of Health and Social Care:

To ask the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, with reference to FOI 903 to the UK Health Security Agency, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of the non-sharing of audit documents with government agencies on trust and confidence in the (a) pharmaceutical industry’s self-regulatory system and (b) Moderna-UK Strategic Partnership.

Answered by Sharon Hodgson - Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Department of Health and Social Care)

The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has requested a copy of the audit report from the Prescription Medicines Code of Practice Authority (PMCPA).

An interim case report is available on the PMCPA website. The PMCPA is a self-regulatory body, which independently administers the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry Code of Practice for the Pharmaceutical Industry.

The UKHSA continues discussions with Moderna on their response to the PMCPA’s recommendations. This is being considered and reviewed alongside the management of the Moderna-United Kingdom Strategic Partnership.