(11 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs hon. Members know, the press of late have come in for some knocking—justifiably—for scandal, corruption and illegal practice, but it is also obvious from the inquiry that urgent action needs to be taken to restore the public’s confidence in the media. I do not intend to dwell on the reasons for the inquiry because all hon. Members agree on them. We also agree that it is vital that freedom of the press is maintained and upheld, as it is in any strong democracy, but I was glad that the inquiry did not shy away from controversy, and that it recommended, in effect, a regulatory body whose independence is guaranteed by law. We have heard fine speeches from hon. Members on both sides of the House—there are entrenched feelings on both sides, and this debate is an important one.
Unlike wholly independent regulation, regulation by either the state or the media would clearly fail to be truly accountable. At the same time, it is vital that we do not throw out the baby with the bathwater, so protecting freedom of expression and high standards of journalism is non-negotiable. Much attention has been paid recently to the kind of model we could look at for the regulated body. Something similar to the Office for Judicial Complaints or those bodies overseeing medical practitioners, vets, barristers or lawyers, have been suggested by some. There is, of course, a crucial distinction. They are licensed and, because they are licensed, they are entitled to practice, and that is an entirely different thing altogether. Incidentally, all those bodies are creatures of statute and nobody says that they interfere politically with anybody delivering services. However, I would think that every journalist would baulk at having to be licensed, and naturally so.
We need something to replace the Press Complaints Commission, which palpably has failed over many years to deliver. It has been characterised by lack of teeth and ineffectual compromises and, in addition, it has only covered the actions of the press that have opted into the system. Some serial transgressors decided to opt out and redress against them was then limited to the libel courts, access to which was unaffordable for many people—indeed, the vast majority.
We have heard about the Irish model. Although that is not a statutory body, it is recognised in legislation—the Defamation Act 2009. It has the power to deal with complaints made against its member publications. There is also a press complaints ombudsman, and both the ombudsman and the Press Council of Ireland are funded by a levy paid by each member title, based on circulation. Member titles of the PCI become members on a voluntary basis and are subject to a code of practice. Interestingly, as has been mentioned, all UK newspapers that also publish in Ireland have joined the PCI, and that includes even those that now oppose what they think is statutory regulation in the UK. During the inquiry, oral evidence was heard from many corners. A number of individuals suggested that the PCI could be a model to be replicated in England and Wales, and that it is recognised by statute, but not set up by statute.
The PCC is UK-wide. It is confusing, however, that despite servicing all parts of the UK, the PCC, which is based in London, states on its website:
“Newspapers from all four countries circulate across borders and are often owned by the same companies. Separate PCCs…would lead to confusion…as well as considerable additional expense.”
It is disheartening that the Prime Minister has hitherto hinted that he is reluctant to follow suit and implement the findings of the inquiry in total. Supporting regulation in principle is not enough. Changes must be implemented in practice for there to be a meaningful change. We have heard about 70 years and seven attempts and so on, but central to any new system must be access to restitution, and a simple and easy-to-navigate complaints process.
In his statement to the press last week, Sir Brian Leveson chose his words very carefully. He pointed to the elephant in the room: the internet and Twitter, which is another issue that we will have to look at in the not-too-distant future. I would welcome comments from Government Members on how we can tackle that anomaly.
Lord Leveson’s inquiry was a careful and thoughtful process, and its recommendations have been reached by hearing a vast amount of evidence. Sir Brian has said that statutory underpinning is vital. He was at pains to say that freedom of the press was vital, and that freedom from political interference is, of course, extremely important. On statutory underpinning, he said:
“What would the legislation achieve? Three things. First, it would enshrine, for the first time, a legal duty on the Government to protect the freedom of the press. Second, it would provide an independent process to recognise the new self-regulatory body and reassure the public that the basic requirements of independence and effectiveness were met and continue to be met; in the Report, I recommend that this is done by Ofcom. Third, by recognising the new body, it would validate its standards code and the arbitral system sufficient to justify the benefits in law that would flow to those who subscribed; these could relate to data protection and the approach of the court to various issues concerning acceptable practice, in addition to costs consequences if appropriate alternative dispute resolution is available.”
He goes on to say:
“Despite what will be said about these recommendations by those who oppose them, this is not, and cannot be characterised as, statutory regulation of the press.”
We have heard a great deal about the great and good so far in this debate, and it has been interesting, but does the right hon. Gentleman think that sometimes Leveson might just say something—it might actually be so—but that we might take a different view?
Having read large parts of the report—it is a carefully constructed document that has evaluated the evidence—I take Sir Brian Leveson at his word. I do not see what benefit would accrue to him if he said something he did not believe to be true, and I do not think for one minute that he would say that.
Others may disagree, of course—that is why we are having the debate. I respect the fact that others may disagree—that is what debate is all about.
Personally, I do not quite see the merit in the current debate being about “non-statutory” or “statutory”. It seems to me that there will have to be some form of legislation in any event. Some argue that because the head of Ofcom is appointed by Government, choosing Ofcom or a similar body as the underpinning regulatory body—or, say, a version of it—could lead to political interference. I had a debate on the radio on Friday with the ex-head of legal affairs at the Telegraph—a man I have known for many years and whose views I respect. He proposed the notion that involving Ofcom amounted to possible political interference. I asked him for examples of where Ofcom had acted politically in the past. I am yet to hear of any example of where that may be the case. Sir Brian’s proposals are clearly well thought out and the exact opposite of “bonkers”. The Government should adopt them in full.
I am hardly likely to disagree, am I? [Laughter.] Good luck to them, and so say all of us. I am taken aback by the sheer irrelevance of the question. If I may, I will get back on track, and return to the subject of the conduct of the press.
The Press Complaints Commission has never been a natural arbiter or umpire in these matters. It has always been the creature of the newspapers and their proprietors, year after year, but it has not always been so staggeringly ineffective. Examples that I have heard in the recent past of the sheer ineptitude and incompetence of its leadership indicate that any future statutory body, or whatever we call it, should not include anyone who has ever been connected with it. It has betrayed the British public by pretending that it can police the excess of the press and failing dismally to do so, and by failing so dismally, it has encouraged the worst excesses of the tabloid press.
After last Thursday’s statement, my good friend—although not in political terms, as he sits on the other side of the House—the hon. Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale), the Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee, and I attended the same event in the City. We spent the best part of 20 minutes arguing animatedly about the Leveson report and our responses to it. The hon. Gentleman and I have different views, but most of those 20 minutes were occupied by an argument that is one of the features of this place and the Members in it: we were arguing over whether he agreed with me or I agreed with him. We were both seeking to achieve the same thing.
As others have said, legislation will result from Leveson, and so it should. This is the first of many debates on the subject. We need to apply ourselves, with the best of intentions, to describing exactly what that legislation should be. As others have already declared, it should be minimalist but also robust. It should give and guarantee freedom to the independent press regulator, and also enable it to do its job.
The idea that the press can be trusted is a strange one, because all the evidence has shown that they cannot. Not only do they believe that they should be left to their own devices—that they are above control and regulation—but they openly flaunt the fact that they believe that to be the case. Last week, The Spectator—a magazine which, I am led to believe, is much read by Members on the other side of the House, although I have to say that I have read it myself on occasion—stated:
“If the press agrees a new form of self-regulation, perhaps contractually binding this time, we will happily take part. But we would not sign up to anything enforced by government. If such a group is constituted we will not attend its meetings, pay its fines nor heed its menaces.”
However—and we can all be grateful for this—
“We would still obey the (other) laws of the land.”
How very generous! How very kind! How very noble! Perhaps we should ring The Spectator once a week and ask, “Which laws do you want to abide by this week? Which laws do you want to abide by next week? Which laws do you not care for and will have nothing to do with?”
The Spectator went on to say:
“But to join any scheme which subordinates press to parliament would be a betrayal of what this paper has stood for”
in all the 15 years
“since its inception in 1828.”
I added the bit about the 15 years—it is not actually there—but, by Spectator standards, it is not much further forward than that.
What those people are basically saying is that they are above the law. This Parliament and the British people can say what they like, but if it does not meet their approval, they will not abide by it. That is the calibre of the people with whom we are dealing, and we cannot trust them to act in the public interest.
I suppose that what The Spectator and its editor meant was that they would not take part in that whole structure, and so they would then be regulated directly by Ofcom as per the recommendations of Leveson.
They cannot possibly have meant that; otherwise they would not have alluded to all the “other” laws of the land. They meant that this would be a law of the land, and that they would not obey it.
Why do we have the rule of law? What is the purpose of this place? As far as I am aware, everyone in this place is united in believing in the rule of law, but what does the rule of law do? Predominantly, it protects the weak and not the strong. If there were no law, the strong would always get their way, by force if necessary. The weak are defended by the law. It provides the only way in which they can seek any redress, and Lord Leveson’s report—certainly in terms of its advocacy of a new method of dealing with the press—is empowering to those who currently cannot obtain the justice that they deserve.
Given what the rule of law does, it is no surprise that the strong—in the shape of the press barons, media moguls or whatever we wish to call them—are demanding that there should not be a law, because they know that it will curb their power. I do not mean their power to observe and comment as they see fit; no one is talking about a commissar to sanction every single item that goes into a national or a local paper. We are talking about regulating the way in which those people conduct themselves, and, more particularly, the way in which they treat the other citizens of these islands.
As I said earlier, if there is a dispute between the rich and powerful and the weak and powerless, it is the duty of this House, and certainly of those on this side of the House, to stand up for the latter.
I have listened carefully to what hon. Members have said. I have no strongly formed views on what is being proposed that I cannot change in most respects. I listened carefully to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside and Hillsborough (Mr Blunkett) and believe that there is room for considerably more compromise than we have seen in the first few days since the Leveson report was published. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) pretty much summed up my approach to the whole business, which is that I would really like us to avoid statutory legislation. My instinct is that the distinction between statutory underpinning and statutory legislation is pretty much angels dancing on the head of a pin, regardless of what learned Members of this House might say.
Confining myself to a narrower matter in the report, one thing that struck me was paragraph 72 of the executive summary, in which Leveson states:
“What would the legislation achieve? Three things. First, it would enshrine, for the first time, a legal duty on the Government to protect the freedom of the press.”
Yesterday’s edition of The Observer referred to that as being much like the first amendment to the US constitution. Of course, it is nothing like it. There is no real comparison. Any party of Government in future could readily change a law. It could scrap it or, more worryingly, tighten it up with a simple whipped majority if it was unhappy with how it stood. The first amendment is set within an entirely different constitutional structure, as changing it would require the support of 75% of the state legislatures and a two-thirds majority, so there is no possibility that a constitutional amendment could be overturned as readily as could a statute underpinning press freedom in this place. Indeed—let us be absolutely honest—there are Members who would say that if what we do now is not to our liking, when we are in government we can do something different.
Therefore, it is no more meaningful to compare such legislation to the first amendment than it is to compare it to anything else; it is simply inaccurate. I was surprised that The Observer, a newspaper for which I otherwise have great respect, published that yesterday, because it over-blows the proposal. I was concerned that Lord Justice Leveson hinted knowingly at the overblown idea that his proposals are like the first amendment, because that has implications for how we sell the idea of a free press to nations abroad. I have had quite a lot of contact with countries—not all of them heinous and hideous non-democracies—where the press and its relationship with government is fairly complex. Press freedom is very fragile in these places.
We have heard from learned Members of this House that statutory underpinning is very different from statutory regulation. The Leveson report said that ultimately the regulation of the regulator would be done by an organisation that is described on its own website as the office of the independent regulator. Of course this is about regulation—the clue is in the name. Whether it was arm’s-length regulation or direct regulation—which Leveson allows for in the case of organisations such as The Spectator, which has said that it would not sign up to the voluntary option—we would have, to all intents and purposes, what people in fragile democracies abroad would see as state regulation.
If this does not sound too grand, it is worth my saying what I think about the nature of freedom and how Leveson, with great respect to him, refers to it. When papers such as The Observer compare his proposals to the first amendment and say that they are about protecting and enshrining the rights of a free press, they make a fundamental mistake. In the UK, we do not have a written constitution. We do not have politicised Supreme Court judges; they are appointed by political leaders because it is acknowledged up front that some judgments will be politically based. In the UK, we can do anything we like provided that it is not illegal or unlawful. If I want to go walking or climbing in Scotland, I have complete freedom, within the constraints of some aspects of criminal law and trespass, to do that. If someone said they were going to pass a piece of legislation to enshrine my right to do it, I would be somewhat sceptical and look at what the imperatives were. In some people’s eyes, it might be perfectly legitimate to legislate to reduce the number of deaths on the hills or to protect the environment. Whatever the circumstances, such legislation would ultimately be directed at making a compromise about my freedom and my access to the hills, because that is what we do when we legislate.
If we choose to legislate where there is no existing legislation on things that we are free to do, as the press is free at the moment, we have to accept a compromise. I believe that Leveson is proposing statutory regulation, however light touch, by Ofcom—again, the clue is in the name—or perhaps another organisation of the great and the good. We hear a great deal about the great and the good being impartial and apolitical. I have big questions about their values and the fact that they do not intervene in what they have themselves decided, but that is a different matter. Fundamentally, if we want a free press and choose to enshrine that freedom in legislation, as Lord Leveson has suggested, then we have to accept a compromise, just as we do when we make any legislation that constrains our freedom to do what we want provided that it is not illegal or unlawful.