(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI am pleased that hon. Members have echoed my support for the DWI. This clause is specifically about how it can recover some of its costs. It is estimated that the increased cost to householders will be only 2p a year, so it is very good value for money.
The wider issue of regulation and regulators will be covered by the water commission, which is looking at the entirety of regulation. That is out of the scope of this Bill, although the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale has made those points a number of times, and I have heard them each time.
This measure will cost customers about 2p a year. This is a much-needed clause. The Government maintain that it is important that the Drinking Water Inspectorate is remunerated for its security and emergencies work and is able to design a more equitable fee structure. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Modification by Secretary of State of water company’s appointment conditions etc to recover losses
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 12, page 16, line 11, leave out from “to” to “such” in line 13 and insert “recover from its creditors”.
If the hon. Member does not mind, I would like to finish my remarks, and then I am sure we will hear from him again.
Although I have outlined some of the merits of clauses 12 and 13, I would like to stress again the importance of including them in the Bill. A SAR will ensure the continued provision of essential public services and is the ultimate tool in Ofwat’s regulatory toolkit. There is therefore a high bar for the use of a SAR. A water company can be placed into special administration either on insolvency grounds, where it is unable to pay its debts, or on performance grounds, where it is in such serious breach of its principal statutory duties on enforcement order that it is inappropriate for the company to retain its licence. That includes consideration of a company’s environmental and financial performance. Although the Government have had the powers to place water companies into special administration for more than three decades, it is important that we regularly update legislation to reflect the modernisation of law and experience in other sectors.
Clauses 12 and 13 are essential because if a SAR occurs, Government funding could be provided to cover the cost of special administration. In the unlikely event that the proceeds of a sale or a repayment agreed as part of the rescue at the end of a SAR are insufficient to cover repaying Government funding, there is risk of a funding shortfall. I really am at a loss to understand how this has suddenly become about the Government using customer money to bail out creditors. I am confused about how that started.
The money will be used to cover the cost of repaying Government funding in the risk of a funding shortfall. The DEFRA Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers do not currently have the power to require this shortfall to be repaid. The shortfall, of course, is the money that the Government may have to provide in the event of a SAR. This is unlike other sectors such as energy, in which the relevant Secretary of State has flexible powers to recover a shortfall in funding. Without this power, there is a risk that taxpayers will foot the bill for costs usually contained within the water sector. Again, that has nothing to do with creditors; it has to do with the costs that the Government could have to pay for the SAR.
Clauses 12 and 13 will therefore introduce a new power for the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers to modify water company licence conditions to allocate costs appropriately should there be a shortfall in financial assistance provided in a water industry SAR. The power is designed to be flexible, allowing the Secretary of State or the Welsh Ministers to recover any shortfall in funding in a manner appropriate to the circumstances. The use of the power is also subject to public consultation.
The Secretary of State will be able to decide whether or not to use the power, and to decide the rates at which the shortfall should be recovered from customers. The shortfall that we are talking about is any cost that the Government could have during the time the company is in a SAR; it has nothing to do with shareholders and creditors. The decision will include the group of customers from which it should be recovered. For example, it could be recovered from all water companies’ customers—that is, those in England—or a subset of the sector, or only customers whose water company went into a SAR.
It is possible that a decision could be taken to spread the cost of a SAR across multiple companies, such as where spending benefits are coupled in another region due to shared infrastructure. There is a well-established practice of socialising costs in the energy sector. If a SAR occurs and this power is ever required, it will allow a decision to be made and consulted on as to what the fairest cost recovery option is, based on the evidence and the circumstances at the time.
I think the Minister is confirming that consumers will pay for that shortfall. We are advocating that the creditors should pay. We are not looking to rewrite the Insolvency Act. Whatever the special administrator decides in terms of the hierarchy, fine—that is up to the special administrator. I think the Minister has just confirmed what paragraph 69 in DEFRA’s explanatory notes says, which is that a company is required to
“raise amounts of money determined by the Secretary of State from its consumers”
—that is, the bill payers—for that shortfall, rather than the creditors. That is the bit that we are getting at. We think that the special administrator should take into account that hit that the Government have taken and take it out of the creditor’s pocket rather than the customer’s.
The hon. Gentleman has failed to acknowledge that, as I have just remarked, there is a hierarchy under the Insolvency Act when it comes to debt being repaid. The people he suggests that we take the money from might be people who, in fact, do not receive any money back. As I have already mentioned, the exact quantity of debt recouped by creditors or equity recouped by shareholders is a matter for the SAR. It is unlikely that all debt will be repaid at the end of special administration, and Government funding provided during a SAR takes priority over most creditors. In the event that there was a cost unable to be recovered from the sale of the company or from reprioritising its debt, the Government would receive their money back first and, therefore, this cost recovery mechanism for customers might not be provided before we reach some of the other creditors, and of course that is determined under the Insolvency Act. I am therefore at a loss to understand the hon. Member’s point. It would make sense if there were people who received their debt repayment before the Government, but that is not the case. There seems to be a lot of confusion about what is happening.
All that the Government are doing are providing that, in the unlikely event of the Government’s being unable to recoup costs that they could have paid during the time that a company is under a SAR, there are various mechanisms to have that repaid, all of which would be consulted upon. At the moment, as we know, that would come from the taxpayer. We are instead providing that, yes, we could still use the taxpayer to recoup that debt, or we could use the customers of that particular water company, of neighbouring water companies, or of all of England—and that would be consulted upon.
I think that the hon. Member’s confusion emanates from his being under the impression that, at the exiting of the SAR, creditors would skip off into the sunset with all the money and the Government would take money from customers. That is not the point I am making because, as I have already said, it is unlikely that all debt will be repaid at the end of a SAR and there is a specific order of priority for repayment. I will make the offer—as I did last time and made good on—to provide a fact sheet on exactly how a SAR would work so that there is no further confusion as we progress through the Bill.
I hope that the Committee agrees that the power is essential to protect taxpayers’ money in the event of a SAR.
We are going backwards and forwards. I have made my point. The note here is clear—the Secretary of State is looking for moneys from the customers. I think the special administrator should follow the insolvency rules, but that the hit should come from the creditors, not the customers. I will park it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
New clause 31 would make the process of putting a company into special administration much easier and clearer. There are two steps in the provision: making it easier to apply for special administration and giving more guidance to judges on whether to grant special administration.
Proposed new section 24(1B) of the Water Industry Act 1991 states:
“Where a company which is a qualifying water supply licensee or qualifying sewerage licensee…is required, as a condition of its licence, to maintain two Issuer Credit Ratings which are Investment Grade Ratings from two different Credit Rating Agencies, and…fails to comply with that requirement, the Secretary of State must make an application to the High Court by petition under this section.”
That states that if a company does not have investment grade credit ratings, the Secretary of State will apply for special administration.
Proposed new section 24(2)(ca) of the 1991 Act states that special administration may be granted if a company
“is required, as a condition of its licence, to maintain two Issuer Credit Ratings which are Investment Grade Ratings from two different Credit Rating Agencies, and…has failed to comply with that requirement.”
That gives guidance to the judge. It says, “You’ve got to have those credit ratings. If you don’t, special administration is much more likely to be granted.”
At the moment, we have some bizarre situations. Thames Water, which I will use as my standard example, has £17 billion of debt and cash flows of £1.2 billion; its debt is 14 times higher than the cash flow it generates every year. By financial standards, that is somewhere between ludicrous and ridiculous. In an unregulated sector, the company would have gone bankrupt long ago. I believe—people may contest this—that our Government are keeping it alive because they are worried about being sued by the bondholders if they put it into special administration, because the criteria are not very clear.
If we are serious about fixing our rivers, we have to deal with the debt. We cannot spend the money our rivers require if we do not fix the debt, but we are still digging. Thames Water’s proposed £3 billion of special restructuring is going through the courts right now, so we are adding even more debt—an even bigger millstone around that company’s shoulders. Its debt will go from £17 billion to £20 billion. The Government have the opportunity to say, “That is the last Administration’s trick. We are going to do something different,” but at the moment they are not saying that. I really hope that we will change course. If we do not, all we will do is add more debt on to these companies; that will keep them alive for another 12 or 18 months, but we will be back in the same place again. Customers in Witney and in every constituency are paying through the nose just to cover the interest expenses.
Ofwat has just thrown Thames Water the great big juicy bone of a 35% price increase. That is great news for lenders, but not such great news for customers. It means that instead of 46% of my bill covering the lenders’ interest expenses, it will be only 38%, but I will be paying 35% more. I do not believe that is helping, so the purpose of the new clause is to make it easier to get water companies into special administration.
I emphasise to Committee members that special administration is the ultimate regulatory enforcement tool; as such, the bar is set high.
To respond to new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Waveney Valley, and new clause 31, tabled by the hon. Members for Witney and for Westmorland and Lonsdale, a water company can already be placed into special administration on performance grounds where it is, or is likely to be, in serious breach of its principal statutory duties or an enforcement order—in other words, where it is inappropriate for the company to retain its licence—as set out in section 24 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
The Secretary of State and Ofwat will consider all aspects of a company’s performance and enforcement record, including environmental and financial performance, when considering whether to pursue an SAR on performance grounds. Licence breaches, such as the loss of an investment-grade credit rating, are considered as part of that holistic review of a company’s performance. Ofwat will consider the circumstances around any loss of an investment-grade credit rating to identify the actions that the company must take to address associated licence breaches.
Regulators have a range of enforcement mechanisms to ensure the delivery of performance, including environmental performance. Water companies can also be required to make clear plans to address failures. I gently point out that this Bill does an awful lot to give more powers to address environmental performance. As we have discussed, our pollution reduction implementation plans address some problems relating to pollution.
Special administration must be a last resort, as it has significant consequences for a company’s investors. If special administration could be triggered without allowing a company to rectify performance issues and licence breaches, investors would have low confidence and would not provide the necessary funding. That could create instability in the market, potentially affecting the entire sector.
Although we recognise the concern behind these new clauses and others tabled by the hon. Gentlemen that highlight concerns that the system is not working, they address the symptoms rather than the underlying causes. In October 2024, the Government announced an independent commission that would be the largest review of the water sector since privatisation. That commission has a broad scope and will consult experts in areas such as the environment, public health, engineering, customers, investors and economics.
The governance of companies and regulatory measures to support financial resilience will be covered, including the operation of existing tools, such as the special administration regime. The review will report by quarter two in 2025. The UK and the Welsh Governments will respond and consult on proposals they intend to take forward. We expect those to form the basis of future legislation to tackle the systematic issues to transform the water sector fundamentally. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member is content to withdraw the proposed new clause.
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWith respect, I feel that we are living in parallel universes. I will take Thames Water as an example, whose debt is 14 times the level of its cash flows. The Minister is saying that financial resilience could be threatened, but I spent 25 years in finance, and that ratio is very threatening. Is Ofwat closely monitoring that? Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have put Thames Water into junk bond ratings—seven ratings under the investment grade—and we are pedalling on regardless. Could the Minister give a view on Thames Water’s levels of debt, and whether they are threatening to the company?
I hope that the hon. Gentleman has not misunderstood. There is certainly no desire from me to keep pedalling. Instead, what we want to do is look at the entire financial situation of companies—he knows that we have had that conversation outside this room. We need to look at some of the longer-term reform options for how companies are structured financially, which is why we have the deputy governor of the Bank of England leading our review, and using his knowledge and expertise to look at how companies are structured.
I do not think that the new clause is the appropriate place to pre-empt the outcome of the commission before it has had an opportunity to report, or even to listen to the hon. Member for Epping Forest through the call for evidence that is yet to be announced. I want to stress that I support sentiment of the hon. Member for Witney, but I express caution around the risks of putting through changes of this magnitude without giving full and proper consideration. We believe that the commission is the appropriate way to do that.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This is a very nuts and bolts thing. I believe we are here to try to make a better water sector. I will rattle through the clause, which would mean that each relevant undertaker
“must publish a map of its sewage catchment networks”,
and that maps published under the provision
“must illustrate…pumping stations, pipes and other works constituting part of the undertaker’s sewerage network…must be published within 12 months of the passing of this Act…must be made publicly accessible on the undertaker’s website.”
I am a district councillor as well as an MP and in my ward of Standlake Aston and Stanton Harcourt, parish councillors, members of the public and campaigners have grappled for information and failed to find it. Many people do not know how to do a freedom of information request. This means that people do not know where the sewage is going from and to, and that leads to confusion and means that the problems are further away from us.
Putting these maps in the public domain, making them easily accessible and making sure that not only the pumping stations and the treatment works but the pipes connecting them all—which are not automatically clear —are always in the public domain and always easily accessible means that we are getting to a solution quicker. That is all this new clause is about. I am probably going to get a response saying, “We have to wait for the water commission”, in which case I would express some disappointment, because these things do not cost any money and they mean we move quicker to solve problems. I would really like a culture of, “If that’s a good idea, let’s do it”.
I understand the intent of new clause 11. The location and health of a water company’s assets is key to ensuring their maintenance and improvement. Under section 199 of the Water Industry Act, companies are required to keep records of the locations of many of their sewers, natural drains or disposal mains. Members of the public are able to request this information from water and sewerage companies in map form. Furthermore, the Environment Agency hosts a public register of information relating to all sites and assets permitted under the environmental permitting regulations. As of 1 January—this month—all water companies are required to publish discharge data from their storm overflows. Water UK’s centralised map shows that near real-time data for water companies across England in a publicly accessible format.
I have the name of one here: Thames Water Utilities Cayman Finance Holdings Ltd. Why Cayman? If I say “Cayman”, people say “tax haven”. That is why it is there. We should be doing our best to stop that. Last I looked, London was still a financial capital, and equity and debt could still be raised in this country, and I sincerely hope that remains the case. So I do not see a good reason to have holding companies offshore. Hon. Members might be happy to hear that that was all I wanted to say on new clause 19.
New clause 23 is also being considered in this tranche, and I will highlight proposed new subsection (2DZB)(b), which refers to
“a process for agreeing capital expenditure necessary for service improvements, bill increases, and changes to operating costs while the undertaker is subject to the Special Administration Regime”.
We have to spend a huge amount of money on our water utility companies, because they have not been spending enough over the last decade or two. When a special administrator is appointed in such instances, the goal is to ensure that the special administrator takes that future spend into account in considering how much debt needs to be cut. We do not want to come out of special administration with debt that is still high, which will prevent the investments from being made that will be required over the next. That is the goal of the new clause.
I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for the intent behind new clause 19. As highlighted, it seems in parts to contradict new clause 18, which was also tabled in his name.
It is important to highlight that Ofwat already has a core duty under section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991 to ensure that water companies are able to finance the proper carrying out of their statutory obligations. Ofwat already monitors information it receives about companies and their financial positions on an ongoing basis. That includes carrying out a detailed review of the financial information published by companies in annual performance reports, statutory accounts, interim accounts, investor reports and other sources. Ofwat also directly engages with companies where it sees an increased level of risk. Additionally, Ofwat has recently updated water company licences to require companies to take account of service delivery for customers and the environment, as well as financial resilience when deciding whether to pay a dividend.
More broadly, the independent commission into the water industry will look at long-term, wider reform of the water sector, as I have mentioned. Company financial structures are one of a number of areas that could be explored under the commission, and we do not want to pre-empt the outcome of the commission through this new clause. The former deputy governor of the Bank of England, Sir Jon Cunliffe, chairs the commission. As mentioned, he has decades of financial, investor and regulatory experience. His appointment demonstrates the Government’s ambition to fix the foundations of the industry. As I have mentioned previously, there will be a call for evidence, and the hon. Member will be able to make his points to Sir Jon Cunliffe and the commission. Given the existing monitoring of the financial resilience of the sector and the forthcoming recommendations of the independent commission, we do not believe that the new clause is appropriate, and I ask the hon. Member to withdraw it.
Turning to new clause 23, which was also tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, a special administration regime enables a company that provides vital public services—water, energy or rail—to be put into administration in certain circumstances to ensure that the public service will continue to be provided pending rescue, via a means such as debt restructuring or transfer, via a sale, to new owners. There is no need for a company exiting a SAR to be placed under an enhanced regime regarding its debt levels. Water companies are allowed to raise debt to fund the delivery of their services, and it is for companies to decide their financial structures. I will resist the urge to repeat my previous comments about the water commission looking at the financial structures of all the water companies, and I hope the hon. Member will take what I outlined previously as read.
In relation to capital expenditure during a SAR, it is not necessary to establish a statutory process for agreeing that expenditure, as that would be agreed under a court-appointed special administrator in the lead-up to a SAR. The Government can provide funding support to a special administrator. Any company under a SAR will still be subjected to the same regulatory regime and expected to meet its statutory obligations.
I hope the hon. Member understands why we cannot accept his new clauses, but I repeat the offer made: he will be able to talk to Sir Jon Cunliffe and present to him the evidence he has just presented to the Committee, so that he can consider it as part of the wider evidence gathering. I therefore ask the hon. Member not to press his new clauses.
It is very kind of the Minister to have so much faith in, and be so charitable towards, Ofwat, given its record over the last decade or two, particularly with regard to its management of water companies’ financials. We will not press new clause 23, but would like to call a vote on new clause 19.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will be brief. We just want to highlight the five-year price review and the shoehorning in of that time period. It might have worked for Lenin—maybe not—but we do not think it works well in the water sector, so we want to see whether we can release ourselves from it. We will come to new clause 35 later, but in certain situations we will all be better off if we look over a longer time period. We have some really big problems and we need to think about reducing them not just over the next five years, but over a 10 or 15-year period. We need to work towards some really big fixes over a longer period. If we are always locked into these five-year cycles, we are not serving ourselves well. That is the point of new clause 21.
New clause 29 states that
“the Authority must have regard to the performance of the relevant undertaker or undertakers against pollution targets across the previous five years.”
At the moment, how companies do is not very well linked to their reward. Most of the time, with water companies, everybody is thinking about sticks—I certainly am—but we ought to think a little about carrots as well. Let us say that ultimately we do good things such as setting pollution reduction targets. If companies beat those targets, we should work towards a solution whereby they do well out of that. They could have a carrot as a reward for doing well, as opposed to endlessly being given the stick. That is the point of new clause 29. We will not push either new clause to a vote.
I thank the hon. Members for Witney and for Westmorland and Lonsdale for the intention behind their new clauses. The water sector is facing multiple challenges and growing pressures. Resolving them will require transformational change.
The Government agree that it is crucial to conduct a fundamental review of the water industry regulatory system. We want to ensure that we have a system that supports strategic planning and investment, with fairness to customers and environmental improvement at its core. I reassure the hon. Member for Witney that such a review is already under way—I might have mentioned this once or twice before—through the independent commission, led by Sir Jon Cunliffe. That comprehensive review is addressing the three elements that the new clause raises: planning, financing and investment. It is taking a holistic approach to assessing the system, and it will make recommendations to ensure that the water sector is better equipped to ensure clean rivers, lakes and seas and a sustainable water supply for the future.
The commission will report to the Government by the second quarter of 2025, ahead of the timeframe recommended in the new clause. I trust that the hon. Member for Witney is reassured that the requirements of the new clause are already being addressed through the work of the independent commission.
On new clause 29, which was also tabled by the hon. Members for Westmorland and Lonsdale and for Witney, I reassure them that the Government are fully aware of the scale of damage that pollution is causing to our waterways. We are committed to working with the water industry regulators to address that.
As a regulator, Ofwat has a range of primary duties, including ensuring that companies properly carry out their functions and can finance the delivery of their statutory obligations, including environmental obligations. Ofwat sets the total spending envelope for companies through its price review process and it reviews company business plans to ensure compliance with statutory obligations. I am pleased to inform the Committee that Ofwat published its final determinations for the 2024 price review on 19 December, which included confirmation of £104 billion-worth of expenditure over the next five years. That is the highest level of investment in the water sector since privatisation and will fund reducing the number of spills from storm overflows by 45% through upgrading 2,800 storm overflows.
In addition, companies will improve river water quality by improving more than 1,700 waste water treatment works. Furthermore, Ofwat has increased the number of outcome delivery incentives against which companies must deliver, including targets on reducing serious pollution incidents, such as a reduction in storm overflows and operational greenhouse gas emissions. That means that serious pollution incidents will lead to clear and robust financial penalties for companies. I trust that the hon. Member for Witney is reassured that his new clause is not required, as pollution targets are already closely factored into the current price review model, and I ask him not to press it.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
Prohibition on bail-out of water company shareholders and creditors
“(1) The Secretary of State and His Majesty’s Treasury must not directly or indirectly discharge, assume, or guarantee any debts of legal entities in any water company group subject to proceedings under section 24 of the Water Industry Act 1991 (special administration orders made on special petitions), except in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) The special administrator of a water company may reduce the debts owed by the regulated entity to its creditors by up to 100 per cent, taking into account the future forecast expenditure over the short, medium and long term and subject to the administrator’s confidence in the company’s ability to accommodate this spending.
(3) The prohibition set out in subsection (1) and the reduction of debts set out in subsection (2) must not include pension, wage and other obligations owed to employees, excluding any past or current member of a board of directors, within the water company group.”—(Charlie Maynard.)
This new clause aims to allow up to 100% of debts to be cancelled in the event of special administration proceedings, taking into account the scale of investment required to hit the future targets established by the Authority.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We have covered this already, so I will be brief. I highlight subsection (2):
“The special administrator of a water company may reduce the debts owed by the regulated entity to its creditors by up to 100 per cent, taking into account the future forecast expenditure over the short, medium and long term and subject to the administrator’s confidence in the company’s ability to accommodate this spending.”
We have already discussed this. I am not going to go through it further, and I am not going to push it to a vote, so I will leave it at that.
I thank the hon. Members for Westmorland and Lonsdale and for Witney for tabling new clause 22. As the hon. Member for Witney says, we have already had a debate on this issue. I hoped that we had made the situation quite clear about what the special administration regime is and what it is not, but here we go again.
I must reject the new clause, because it would jeopardise the main purpose of the water special administration regime: the continued provision of vital public services. The role of a special administrator does not include a power to cancel debt, and the purpose of the administration is not to bail out water company creditors or shareholders. The new clause is therefore unnecessary. It would divert from long-established insolvency principles of treating creditors equally according to their rights as commercial entities. When a water company enters special administration, creditors are unable to enforce their debt repayments unless they seek leave of the court or receive permission from the special administrator. When a water company exits from special administration either by rescue, such as debt restructuring, or by transfer, such as a sale, the special administrator determines the level of repayment to credits. That will be calculated according to the statutory order of priority.
It is very unlikely that all debt would be repaid at the end of a special administration, because of the order in which payments are required to be made. Debts can be cancelled only according to a restructuring plan or under court supervision. The Government do not directly or indirectly make any decisions relating to the exact quantity of debt recouped by creditors or equity recouped by shareholders.
I must reject the new clause, because the changes that we are making align the water industry special administration regime with regimes in other sectors. We do not intend to alter the regime’s relationship with the existing framework of insolvency legislation.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 26
Rules about performance-related pay
“(1) The Water Industry Act 1991 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 35D (inserted by section 1 of this Act) insert—
‘35E Rules about performance-related pay
(1) The Authority must issue rules prohibiting a relevant undertaker from giving to persons holding senior roles performance-related pay in respect of any financial year in which the undertaker has failed to prevent all sewage discharges, spills, or leaks.
(2) The rules issued under subsection (1) must include—
(a) provision designed to secure that performance-related pay which, if given by a relevant undertaker, would contravene the pay prohibition on the part of the undertaker, is not given by another person;
(b) that any provision of an agreement (whether made before or after the issuing of the rules) is void to the extent that it contravenes the pay prohibition;
(c) provision for a relevant undertaker to recover any payment made, or other property transferred, in breach of the pay prohibition.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)—
(a) “performance-related pay” means any payment, consideration or other benefit (including pension benefit) the giving of which results from the meeting of any targets or performance standards on the part of the relevant undertaker or the person to whom such payment, consideration or benefit is given;
(b) a person holds a “senior role” with a relevant undertaker if the person—
(i) is a chief executive of the undertaker,
(ii) is a director of the undertaker, or
(iii) holds such other description of role with the undertaker as may be specified.’”—(Tim Farron.)
This new clause creates a new section in the Water Industry Act 1991 to require Ofwat to ban bonuses for water company bosses if they fail to prevent sewage discharges, spills, or leaks.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I do not really want to press this new clause to a vote, but we tabled it because my noble Friend Lady Bakewell withdrew it in the Lords after being given assurances by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for whom I have enormous respect and of whom I think very highly. It seeks to ban bonuses for senior company executives who have been found guilty of a category 1 or 2 discharge. It would prevent any loopholes such as pay rises and share options that might enable bonuses to be paid under those circumstances.
From the Dispatch Box in the other place, Baroness Hayman said:
“However, we are very aware that water companies need to attract investment so, as outlined in Ofwat’s consultation, the circumstances under which performance-related pay bans are being proposed represent very serious failures by a company. I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville, that this includes instances of criminal convictions, credit ratings falling below investment grade and Ofwat’s proposed metric for bonuses to be prohibited if a company has had a serious category 1 or 2 pollution incident in the preceding calendar year…I would like to be clear with all noble Lords that we are not asking companies to meet any higher or new standard than that which is already expected of them.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 November 2024; Vol. 841, c. 247.]
We were grateful for that assurance, but nothing of that sort has appeared in the Bill since. Will the Minister give me some reassurance as to why we should not press the new clause to a vote? I do not see anything in writing that gives us confidence, other than the words of the noble Baroness.
(6 days, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers, and if I may I will start by wishing everyone a happy new year. I thank members of the Committee for the engagement with the Bill they have shown, and I also thank all the environmental groups, everyone who submitted evidence, and Members in the other place for the work they did on the Bill.
I am pleased to be back debating this vital piece of legislation. As I set out on Second Reading, the Bill will drive meaningful improvements in the performance and culture of the water industry as part of wider efforts to ensure that water companies deliver for both customers and the environment and, as has been mentioned in the debate so far, act on the real anger and mistrust we feel towards our water sector at the moment.
However, the Bill is one part of the Government’s ambitious and long-term approach to fundamentally transforming the water sector. As Members will be aware, in October 2024 the Government announced an independent commission, which will be the largest review of the water sector since privatisation. The commission has a broad scope and will consult experts in areas such as the environment, public health, engineering and economics, as well as customers and investors. It will look closely at financial resilience as one of its key areas—I know we all care about that.
I reassure members of the Committee on the timeline; the commission will report to the Government by quarter 2 of 2025. The UK Government and the Welsh Government will then respond and consult on proposals that they intend to take forward, and we expect those to form the basis of future legislation.
We expect the commission to report to the Government in June. I reassure the hon. Member that when I respond at the end of every session, I will go through each and every amendment in turn.
I turn to Government amendments 1 and 2 to clause 1. The Government have carefully considered all non-Government amendments made in the other place and how they fit within the wider plans for reform of the water sector, including the amendments tabled by Lord Roborough and Lord Cromwell. I thank them, and indeed the other place, for their careful consideration of the Bill, particularly for the constructive way in which they worked with the Government during the Bill’s passage through the Lords. That collaborative approach enabled the Bill to be strengthened, for example, through the introduction of new requirements relating to the implementation of measures in pollution incident reduction plans. However, the Government have determined that the amendments from Lord Roborough and Lord Cromwell are not necessary and should be removed from the Bill.
Government amendment 1 concerns financial reporting. During the Bill’s passage through the other place, it was amended in such a way that required rules made by Ofwat under clause 1 to include reporting requirements on company finances. The Government strongly agree with the need to ensure water company finances are closely monitored, especially given the current financial issues experienced by some companies. However, having considered the Lords amendment in detail and having had further discussions with Lord Cromwell about the intent behind his amendment, we feel that it is duplicative of existing processes as well as conditions in water company licences.
Ofwat already has processes in place to monitor where a company may be heading towards financial difficulties. It is already a condition of water company licences that companies are required in their annual report to publish by a set date financial performance metrics, including interest on their borrowing, financial flows and analysis of their debt. Based on those reports, Ofwat sets out its observations on financial resilience across the sector in its “Monitoring financial resilience” report. Ofwat is also alive to the potential for financial engineering to occur outside of regulated companies and is thoroughly monitoring the financial position of all water companies. The Lords amendment would therefore duplicate existing requirements, with the potential to create confusion in what is already a complex regulatory landscape. This is important: we also retain concern about the potential for the Lords amendment to pre-empt forthcoming reforms following the independent commission led by Sir Jon Cunliffe. On that basis, the Government have tabled Government amendment 1 to remove Lord Cromwell’s amendment from the Bill.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Information will be coming out shortly about how each and every Member across the House can contribute to that review.
Government amendment 2 seeks to remove the amendment that requires rules made by Ofwat under clause 1 to be brought into force by statutory instrument within six months of the Act’s coming into force. Alongside my amendment, I will also address amendment 21—I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for tabling it—which is largely in line with the intention behind mine.
Although the Government understand the need to ensure the rules relating to remuneration and governance are subject to efficient scrutiny, this additional process risks compromising Ofwat’s independence, which must be protected. The necessary secondary legislation would be prepared by the Government, and therefore would represent significant Government interference in the independent regulatory process. That kind of interference has the potential to have adverse effects on investor confidence. The consultation requirement in clause 1 already provides the Secretary of State and other interested parties with the opportunity to raise major concerns with the regulator on the content of the rules. We are confident that Ofwat will continue to work constructively with the Government and other stakeholders to determine a robust and appropriate set of rules.
I will finish what I am saying. I might answer the hon. Gentleman’s question in my upcoming remarks—who knows?
The additional requirement for the rules to be confirmed for affirmative resolution statutory instruments could also risk delaying the introduction of the first set of rules. That is counter to the other aspects of Lord Roborough’s amendment, which requires Ofwat to publish the first set of rules within six months of Royal Assent. I reiterate that the Government expect Ofwat to have the rules in place as soon as possible. Indeed, Ofwat has already concluded its initial policy consultation on the rules, demonstrating its commitment to meeting the Government’s expectations. I highlight the fact that Ofwat today submitted to the Committee written evidence of its statutory consultation on the proposed timelines for introduction of the rules, demonstrating its commitment to getting this done as quickly as possible. I urge all hon. Members to have a look at that evidence.
I will just express disappointment. The Bill currently sets a deadline of six months, which is not exactly a moment in time; six months is a long time to get something done. I respect what the new Government are doing by trying to go after the bonuses and hold people to account, but to take a step back and say, “Actually, we are going to weaken the Bill”, which is what amendment 2 is doing—the Government are taking out the deadline—is retrograde and a real mistake.
I strongly disagree that this amendment weakens the Bill or is retrograde. Instead, it is doing things effectively. If we were to put a six-month deadline in the Bill and rush to get the rules done in that period of time and there were complications, we would risk leaving a loophole that could be exploited by companies that have exploited loopholes for an incredibly long time and become rather apt at doing so. With respect, I would rather do it properly.
(6 days, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank all hon. Members for their thoughts on this set of amendments. I would also like to pay tribute to all of the citizen scientists—in fact, many Members have paid tribute to them—and the incredible work that they do as volunteers, going out there to discover the true state of many of our rivers, lakes and seas. I think we can all agree that it is vital to understand the scale and the impact of sewage discharges by ensuring that water companies install monitors on emergency overflows as soon as possible and by encouraging public access to emergency-overflow discharge statements. As the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham said, I think this is about us all trying to move in the same direction.
Just before I turn to the amendments, I think there may be some confusion in the debate today about the different types of monitors and the different types of discharges being discussed. There is a big difference between fully treated waste water being released from treatment outlets and the discharge of untreated sewage from an emergency or storm overflow. I am therefore very happy to share a factsheet detailing the differences in the different types of emergency and storm overflows to help inform future debates.
On amendments 13 and 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, clause 3 requires water companies to provide information on the frequency and duration of discharges from emergency overflows in near-real time. Combined with the equivalent duty for storm overflows, which has just come into force, that will ensure that all sewage overflows on the network are monitored. That will enable regulators and the public to see, in near-real time, when a discharge from any overflow has occurred, and how long it has lasted for. Water companies will use that information to prioritise investment to mitigate the impact of the most polluting overflows, as guided by the regulator.
However, the monitors required to measure volume are much more difficult and costly to install compared with those used to monitor discharge duration. By comparing that with the cost of installing flow monitors at waste water treatment works, we estimate the cost of installing flow monitors on all 18,000 storm and emergency overflow sites in England to be up to £6 billion. Network overflows are not set up for flow monitors to be installed, which means that the majority of overflows would require complex works, such as pipework modifications, in order for monitors to record volume accurately. We do not think this added cost is proportionate to the additional value that volume information would provide, especially given that volume information alone does not provide a comprehensive account of the impact of a discharge. For example, a very small volume of very concentrated foul water could enter our rivers, which would be very damaging, or a large volume of diluted rainwater overflow. Volume cannot give an accurate assessment of impact. The measurement of water quality, as the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham has said, is required.
Would the Minister be willing to give information on the breakdown of that £6 billion? That would be very helpful. Also, I think we are all in agreement and of course we want to know the quality. As has been said, if that is the case, surely the plan is to go there. By all means, have flow meters with the quality meters installed, rather than not going there. I think the Minister was proposing not putting in flow meters and not putting in any quality meters either, or is she planning on putting in flow and quality meters? If so, when and how?
I am very happy to give a breakdown of the numbers that we have worked out. To reiterate the point I made before the intervention, that is why the Government believe that it is the measurement of water quality that is required. Water companies have been instructed to begin installing continuous water quality monitors for storm overflows and waste water treatment works from April 2025 onwards, so they have been told to put in those water quality monitors from April 2025. That will provide further information on the impact of sewage discharges on water quality. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will see that amendment 13 is not needed and feels able to withdraw it.
The Minister said from 2025, which is great, but over what timeline? Is that the Library’s 10 years, or is that another timeline?
I want to make sure that I am not giving the hon. Gentleman inaccurate information, so I will find out the answer to his question and return to it, if that is okay. I do not want to give him the wrong information. The main point we are making is that it is not the volume that is having the impact; it is the toxicity. We think that, by focusing on measuring water quality, we can accurately see the damage being done to our environment by what is being discharged, and I think that is the point. If we are choosing where to put the monitors, we think that focusing on water quality and how damaging it can be is more important than focusing on how much there is.
I think the hon. Gentleman is probably moving on to amendment 16 with his point about the speed at which these were being rolled out. We were discussing amendments 13 and 14. That is where the confusion lies in this conversation. I will address the points about speed when we move on to amendment 16 —it is all to come.
I turn now to amendments 3 and 15, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale respectively. Clause 3 already requires companies to publish information on discharges in a readily accessible and understandable format. That includes information on the occurrence, location and start time of the discharges, which must be published within an hour of the discharge starting. To meet this requirement, water companies will install monitors that have telemetry technology to communicate discharges as they occur. To the point the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham made, that information cannot be falsified. It is not based on someone coming; it is automatic communication.
Those requirements are the same as those for publishing storm overflow discharges, which is now a statutory duty enforced by Ofwat. Water companies have already published individual maps for their regions to show storm overflow discharges in near real time. In addition, Water UK launched a national storm overflow hub in November last year to centralise all discharge information from water companies on a single national map. We expect that a similar approach will be taken for emergency overflows. If further direction for companies on how to approach the duty is needed, that can be more appropriately addressed through guidance. Furthermore, validated historical information on discharges from emergency overflows will be available through annual returns published by the Environment Agency. Those will allow for long-term trends in annual data to be analysed. If there are any specific requests from groups or organisations about how they would like to see information, they are of course welcome to communicate that to me.
We are here for another week or so. I take the point about apples and pears, but if the information is already in DEFRA’s hands, would it be helpful, if DEFRA can move fast enough—I do not know whether that is possible—to have a little grid circulated to Committee members about storm and emergency installation periods, whether that is quality, flow or EDM? With that data we could talk about it decently and honestly.
I think that might be really helpful. It has been an interesting but slightly muddled conversation. We were going to produce a factsheet to explain the difference between emergency and storm. Maybe we can include as much information as we can for Committee members by the end of Committee or before Report, if that does not put too much on my hard-working officials.
On the annual data being analysed, the proposed amendments are unnecessary and I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments. On amendment 16, which was also tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale, and which is about the speed of delivery, the need to deliver the installation of monitors on emergency overflows must be balanced with practical constraints and with due consideration for the cost of rolling out so many monitors, especially as those costs are ultimately passed to consumers through water bills.
Water companies have been instructed to install monitors at 50% of emergency overflows by 2030. This represents a doubling of the previous Conservative Government’s target of 25% of emergency overflows monitored by 2030. The Environment Agency will agree with water companies which emergency overflows will have monitors installed over the next five years based on priority areas, such as those that impact designated bathing and shellfish waters. As set out in the impact assessment, we expect the roll-out of monitors at emergency overflows to cost £533 million over a 10-year period. We believe that pace of roll-out strikes the right balance of recognising the urgency—this Government are doing double what the previous Government promised—while ensuring that companies have the capacity to progress other improvements and balancing customer bill impacts.
To speak frankly, it is very important to monitor, but it is also very important to fix the causes of some of the problems that we see. There is always a balance between monitoring and fixing the problem, and we believe that we have got that balance right.
Requiring a faster roll-out of monitors could undermine the delivery of other improvements that water companies must make in price review 24—I would not want to be in a situation at the end of the price review where we monitor everything and fix nothing. That includes upgrades to wastewater treatment works and sewerage networks to reduce sewage discharges from storm overflows. Where companies can move further and faster to achieve the roll-out of monitors at emergency overflows, they will of course be encouraged to do so, but we cannot accept this amendment to require water companies to install all monitors within 12 months. I therefore ask the hon. Member to withdraw it.
(1 week, 2 days ago)
Commons ChamberI thank my hon. Friend. I am sure her constituent has done an incredible job—the flood groups have done an amazing job—and I understand why she must be feeling so exhausted. We have mentioned the impact that flood events have on people’s mental health. We want to look at areas at risk of repeated flooding in the flooding formula review to make sure that those areas are getting the support they need. The immediate post-flood situation is of course for MHCLG, but if I can help in any way she needs only to contact me.
Many of us recognise that our drainage network is in disrepair in many places. Much of that stems from the Environment Agency’s main river designation; an enormous amount of bureaucracy is required in order to get permission to unblock what is nominally called a main river but to almost all of us is a ditch. These ditch networks are very broad; in Northmoor and Bablock Hythe in my constituency, virtually every ditch is a main river, which means that in one case we required about three years to get a permit from the EA. That makes things extremely difficult and nothing ever gets done. We have had five permits in five years from the EA throughout the West Oxfordshire district. Will the Minister please consider doing two things: making it easier to de-designate main rivers to ordinary watercourses; and simplifying the EA’s permit procedure, which is incredibly byzantine, so that people can apply for permits and be able to unblock their ditches?
I am incredibly interested in what the hon. Gentleman has had to say, because the last thing we want is it taking five years to deal with a problem when there is a simple solution for it. If unwanted bureaucracy is causing a problem, I would like to try and help. I ask the hon. Member please to send me all the information. I am happy to have that conversation with the EA, and let us see what can be done.