All 1 Debates between Emily Thornberry and Lord Tyrie

Financial Services (Banking Reform) Bill

Debate between Emily Thornberry and Lord Tyrie
Wednesday 11th December 2013

(11 years ago)

Commons Chamber
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Lord Tyrie Portrait Mr Tyrie
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I have pressed the Bank of England on that issue with my Treasury Select Committee hat on. A subsequent exchange of letters between the Governor and the Chancellor makes it pretty clear that by the end of next year the issue will be resolved and responsibility will lie with the Bank. Indeed, I think that for anything else to happen, given that exchange of letters, would be considered extraordinary, unless the review came up with some major obstacle that no one had previously spotted.

Another important assurance has been given in respect of so-called special measures. We proposed the establishment of an intermediate tool between enforcement at one end of the spectrum and day-to-day supervision at the other, which regulators could use to keep an eye on banks and help to improve standards. The Americans have something of the kind, which is known as a memorandum of understanding. The Government said that the statutory underpinning that we proposed would not be necessary, but the regulators have now announced that they will produce a full and detailed guidance note after consultation, which will set out how the new tool will be created and administered.

Emily Thornberry Portrait Emily Thornberry
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I am listening with great interest to the hon. Gentleman. As he may know, the United States operates a regime called the deferred prosecution agreement, under which an institution accepts that it has committed an offence and agrees to pay a large fine on the understanding that it will not be prosecuted. Part of the deal is that the institution must allow auditors in, and must change its behaviour. Is there a similarity between the DPA structure and the structure the hon. Gentleman is describing?

Lord Tyrie Portrait Mr Tyrie
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In some cases, the “deal”, as the hon. Lady called it, is accompanied by a memorandum of understanding, in order to achieve exactly the result that we intend by means of special measures. However, the primary purpose of special measures is to provide a tool that need not lead to escalation and full enforcement. That is a step back from the example given by the hon. Lady.

We were also assured that there would be a review of the system of enforcement decision making, which is currently very unsatisfactory. We had proposed that the regulatory decisions committee should be separated further from the enforcement division of the Financial Conduct Authority and given statutory autonomy in relation to its decisions. The Government did not accept that proposal, but they did accept the need for the issue to be re-examined and the need for a fresh and independent pair of eyes to look at each enforcement action before it proceeds, and a review is now to be carried out.

The important issue of remuneration was raised, later in her remarks, by the hon. Member for Kilmarnock and Loudoun. The PRA has committed itself to aligning the maturity of the rewards for bankers with the maturity of the risks that they have incurred. That is crucial. It is the collecting and taking of bonuses in return for the creation and selling of a new financial instrument or tool when, although the full risks will not mature for many years, the individuals concerned have had the money in advance that has created so many misaligned incentives and so much poor behaviour. Those individuals need to know, even several years later, that there may be a clawback, or, better still in most cases, that their bonuses are deferred. They need to know that the product had better be robust enough to survive the test of time before they start selling it.

Let me now mention a few measures that the commission did not succeed in inserting in the Bill. I shall not describe any of them in detail—although I note that when I have tried to deal briefly with the measures that I have described so far, Members have intervened to ask me about a number of them.

Both the Select Committee and the commission concluded that the governance of the Bank of England was still in a mess, and would have to be sorted out. The Bank of England still has no board worthy of the name, and the cross-cutting lines of responsibility and accountability between various new institutions are, to put it mildly, very confused. One of the most senior people in the Bank told me recently that he thought the situation was like the Schleswig-Holstein question: the former Governor probably understood it, and one other guy had forgotten it—and the third was this person himself, whose name I had better not reveal on the Floor of the House.

We also failed to achieve change with our proposal to abolish United Kingdom Financial Investments Ltd. UKFI has been exposed as a fig leaf: it seems to be of very little practical use. The Labour Government’s intention in introducing it was good, but when the Government want to intervene directly in the activities of institutions they simply do so, and UKFI does not seem to be performing the “buffer” function that was intended for it.

We argued that the regulator should have a duty to compensate whistleblowers who had been disadvantaged by their firms. There are still risks, at least perceived risks, for whistleblowers, which will tend to deter them. It is a remarkable feature of the current crisis that there has been so little whistleblowing, and I am not yet convinced that we have managed to sort the matter out.

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Lord Tyrie Portrait Mr Tyrie
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I think the banks have discovered that the scale of the damage done by the revelations and the scale of the fines that are now being imposed are systemic in implication for their institutions and that has shaken them up a lot. But I do think the culture at the top of our banks is changing. The task of our legislation is to entrench that change for a generation. We have had this crisis. The horse has bolted. What we have got to do now is devise a stable door that can keep the next horse in.

Emily Thornberry Portrait Emily Thornberry
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Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Lord Tyrie Portrait Mr Tyrie
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I will this one last time, but I get a sense that Members might want me to draw to a close in a minute.

Emily Thornberry Portrait Emily Thornberry
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The hon. Gentleman mentions LIBOR. In respect in particular of fraud, does he agree that if an individual working within an institution is behaving dishonestly for the benefit of that institution, the institution itself should be liable? If the law were to be changed to allow that, there really would be institutional change.

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Lord Tyrie Portrait Mr Tyrie
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The question the hon. Lady should ask herself is that if she were a banker, would she be prepared to take the risk?

Emily Thornberry Portrait Emily Thornberry
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There are other things that can be done, and I shall briefly touch on some of them. May I begin with the difficulties that exist in relation to this offence? Under the Bill, it would be an offence for a senior manager recklessly to take a decision. I appreciate that some of the additional 175 pages that have been added to the 35-page Bill have been to backfill exactly what a senior manager is and how they will be defined. That is clearly an improvement, and it is unfortunate that it was even suggested that the Bill would be sufficient in its original form. One must remember that even if a definition of senior manager is now one with which we can all be happy, there have been banks that have been brought down by people other than senior managers. Nick Leeson from Barings bank comes to mind, as does the £2 billion that was lost to UBS by Kweku Adoboli.

Emily Thornberry Portrait Emily Thornberry
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The point is that he was not a senior manager and he brought down a bank. This measure will not solve the problem of banks being brought down. An offence of reckless banking that will apply only to senior managers is not by itself sufficient, which is why I want to go on to say what I think should be done instead.

Lord Tyrie Portrait Mr Tyrie
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I think the hon. Lady is misunderstanding the intentions of each bit of legislative change. The primary purpose of this measure is to change bankers’ behaviour. It is not primarily to protect banks from being brought down. That task lies with ring-fencing and a range of other proposals, particularly with all the structures being constructed around bail-in and resolution. It does not lie with the criminal offence.

Emily Thornberry Portrait Emily Thornberry
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With respect, I am even more confused than before. What is the point of bringing in an offence that will change the behaviour of bankers, but will not, by itself, defend the banks? As I understand it, if the behaviour that we seek to stop is reckless banking, the reason that it should be criminalised is in order to stop banks failing and the financial system crashing.

There are other difficulties with this offence, which include recklessly to take a decision or to fail to prevent the taking of a decision that results in the failure of a bank. That sets a high threshold and, as has already been pointed out, it is not clear who, of those who may have behaved in a reckless way in our banks and who may have brought down the banking system before, would have been prosecuted. The Minister has not been able to assist us as to who might have been prosecuted under the offence. [Interruption.] It is unfortunate that the Minister is distracted at the moment, but the point I am making is important, and I hope that he will be in a position to address it.

It is difficult to prove that aspect of the offence, and prosecuting it would be a risky undertaking for the prosecuting authorities who will be expected to invest public money in prosecuting such matters. There is no point in putting something in legislation that can be discussed on doorsteps but will never be used to prosecute. We have seen the Serious Fraud Office struggle with high-profile, high-risk prosecutions. Too often such prosecutions end in shambles because of the behaviour of the Government, which have cut the SFO’s funding from £53 million in 2008 to £30 million by the end of this Parliament. Differences can be made to the behaviour not only of banks but of businesses generally. May I just add that of course I support Labour’s position on a stringent licensing regime for bankers, the imposition of a fiduciary duty of care on financial-sector staff for clients and customers and its call for a dedicated financial crime unit. In a moment, I will move on to what will work better, but before I do that, I give way.