Lord Mandelson: Response to Humble Address

Debate between Emily Thornberry and Julian Lewis

Wednesday 3rd June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

We are a very long way from one of the original aspects of this scandal, which was an allegation that the Prime Minister knew when appointing Peter Mandelson that he had failed his developed vetting. We have moved a long way from that, but one thing we have not moved away from is that the man who was appointed was a “best pal” of the world’s most notorious paedophile, that he remained his “best pal” when he was in prison, and that he stayed in his house. Personally, I found it so profoundly shocking when I heard that was what happened. It is a matter of good character to stand by friends when they are in trouble, but when they are convicted of a terrible crime like that, you do not stand with them, you do not stay in their house and they should not be your “best pal”. It is not just that: we have also learned that Peter Mandelson was friends with Russian oligarchs, Chinese Finance Ministers and former Israeli security chiefs; he had a loan of £1 million from an unknown source, which he used to buy shares in a secretive Israeli company; and, of course, there are all the issues in relation to his business dealings.

Given that it is the job of the Foreign Affairs Committee to try to ensure that the Foreign Office is as good as it possibly can be, the Committee has tried to remain focused on why it was that a man like that—when it came to developed vetting, it was decided that he was a case of high concern and that his clearance for vetting should be denied—was nevertheless appointed. There is a lot of gossip and other stuff, the tittle-tattle and things that obviously the Westminster village loves, but the serious point is: how could we have got it so wrong and how did this happen?

[Sir Julian Lewis]

At the beginning of her speech, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee said most powerfully that what happened in relation to Epstein should alone have been a sufficient bar for anything to go further, but even if that had not happened, it was already in the due diligence document, purely on foreign policy grounds: the Prime Minister was told that Mandelson gave a speech at the University of Hong Kong where he claimed that the rule of law and independence of the judiciary remain intact there. In November 2024, I personally challenged the proposed appointment on the grounds that Mandelson had said in a radio interview that the basis for a settlement with Ukraine would be that Ukraine should give up to Russia all the land that Russia had so far occupied, and that Ukraine should give up any hope of ever belonging to the NATO alliance. These were political grounds that should have ruled him out. The Prime Minister knew about them, but nothing seemed to prevent him from following through on his intent to appoint such an unsuitable individual.

[Emily Thornberry]

The right hon. Gentleman tempts me down a path that I was not going to go down, although I have gone down it for quite some length in the Committee hearings. It seems to me that all these papers tend to show one thing: the Prime Minister was not particularly interested in the appointment of the ambassador to the United States. He was certainly not a good friend of his: there is no correspondence between them, there are no chatty messages and there is no attempt to get the Prime Minister to vote for Mandelson when he was standing for chancellor of the University of Oxford—I mean, there is not a friendship at all.

The criticism that I make, and I make openly, is that I think the decision was subcontracted to others who were close to Mandelson. The criticism that one can level at the Prime Minister is that he delegated and he did not watch sufficiently what was going on, essentially giving power to others who then abused it—I think that is central. That is not very flattering to the Prime Minister, but it is an honest assessment of the evidence that I have heard. I think the appointment was being pushed and I think that it was being pushed by his then chief of staff, who has a style—and that style is, “When I want to do something, I will go for it hard, I will go for it fast and I will push everybody out of the way.” Once Mandelson had not been elected chancellor at Oxford, someone who should have been a marginal candidate—and had been, as I understand it, just in November 2024—suddenly, within two weeks, moved from being a borderline candidate to being the main person in the frame.

[Emily Thornberry]

We may be talking about the same thing. Another way of putting it is that the Prime Minister’s chief of staff had taken responsibility for it on his behalf and was pushing it, and the power that the chief of staff had was because he was the chief of staff to the Prime Minister. It is borderline one way or the other.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

I disagree with the right hon. Lady’s analysis because the whole point of what we have been saying from the Opposition Benches is that the Prime Minister himself knew about these points: he knew what Mandelson had done in relation to Epstein; he knew what he had said in relation to justice in Hong Kong; and he knew what Mandelson had said in that radio interview because I had challenged him about it. I must say, although it may not meet the high standards of court litigation, that when the Prime Minister brushed aside my challenge to him on 21 November, he sat down with a very notable and ingratiating grin, and I turned to the person sitting next to me and said, “He’s definitely going to appoint Mandelson.” It was his decision.

[Emily Thornberry]

I will move on, but before I do so, I will say something that I think any fair-minded person will know. Presumably the job of being Prime Minister means that there is so much on your desk, and if someone comes to you and says, “Don’t worry about this, I’ll take it and sort it”, there is a temptation to go, “Okay, you do that, because I have 7,000 other things that I have to deal with today.” I do not know—I have never been Prime Minister—but I would assume that that is the reality of the situation.

The question is how somebody who is so manifestly inappropriate gets appointed. It may be that those behaving in this way did so because they felt under huge amounts of political pressure, but how does someone whose case was of high concern and for whom it was recommended that clearance be denied become interpreted as a borderline case, leaning against? How do we bridge that gap? The only way that gap is bridged is through mitigations, so I spend my time looking for mitigations, and I cannot find any. Ian Collard, who was one of the security men speaking to Olly Robbins—who, at the time, was the permanent under-secretary—mentioned the importance of mitigations 10 times in his written evidence to us, and Olly Robbins talked about it six times. It is at the forefront of their evidence.

I have already referred to an aide-mémoire that Ian Collard made in September. He says that he looked again at the summary. He accepts that UKSV’s statement was

“‘this case presents as a high concern’ with a recommendation of ‘clearance denied or withdrawn’”,

and he

“noted that, as well as the tick boxes”—

red tick-boxes, which were ticked—

“UKSV stated in the final case assessment: ‘Overall, I believe that this is a very borderline case…If a clearance was awarded to the individual by the Department, it is recommended that a very robust risk management model is put in place’”.

I do not know whether that is just Ian Collard’s memory of what he may or may not have read—well, I know that he did not read it, because he says that he did not read it at that stage. I do not understand how the UKSV paper can say, “Don’t give him the job”, and then it can also be believed to be a very borderline case with robust risk management recommended. I suspect that the latter bit is an interpretation—a way in which, it was hoped, the difficulty that Mandelson was essentially being refused vetting could be slid over into “He can be given the job, so long as there are robust mitigations.”

But where are those mitigations? When Sir Olly gave evidence to our Committee, I said to him,

“I do not really follow why you would not know the contents of the UKSV document and their concerns or even that they said that there was high concern about Peter Mandelson. I do not understand how you can not know that if you are considering what the mitigations are. You cannot have the mitigations without knowing what the problem is.”

He said,

“The risks were explained to me, but I have not seen the underlying documentation. That is what I am saying. That obviously strikes members of the Committee as odd”—

well, it certainly did—

“but in all my years as a civil servant—many of them as a relatively senior one—I have never seen a UKSV document, other than the ones that I have filled in myself.”

It is ridiculous. If he is putting down mitigations in order to deal with legitimate concerns and a security threat, he needs to know what that security threat is, and to understand that UKSV is saying that it is very serious and that Mandelson should not be given the job—yet he says, “I didn’t know. I just thought it was borderline, leaning the other way.” I mean, this is Alice in Wonderland.

[Emily Thornberry]

I really do not know. The Foreign Office got the UKSV clearance on 29 January 2025, and it says that it did something about it, but we cannot see what that is. An email on page 72 of part I is the nearest thing to mitigations I have been able to find, and Ian Collard referred to it in his evidence. It is an email he wrote on 30 January, and I think it is the mitigations, but I just do not think it is a robust set of mitigations to deal with serious security concerns. The email states:

“As part of the usual clearance policy process, UKSV identified some areas in his application for ESND to review”—

that is the security man.

“I understand that Lord Mandelson’s private sector engagements are being managed by HRD”—

that is human resources—

“and the Legal Directorate through the conflict of interest process.”

Who knows? It continues:

“With regard to personal conduct”—

I think that is hanging out with oligarchs, being friends with the Finance Minister, borrowing money and who knows what else—

“I understand that Lord Mandelson has received a letter from Mervyn Thomas, informing him of his responsibilities as an FCDO employee, including under the Diplomatic Service Regulations.”

Is that it? He got a letter from a man telling him to behave himself! We have not seen the letter, and I do not know what it is. The email continues:

“Matters pertaining to his overseas contacts will certainly be reviewed by the STRAP authorities.”

STRAP is another issue, and we should not be distracted by STRAP. Mandelson needed to follow the developed vetting before getting anywhere near the latest STRAP stuff.

It is important that we take these things in order. We have that email, which is about as pathetic as it can be. There might be something in the nine-page summary that some Members sitting in this Chamber have seen. It might be that that summary showing the security concerns has a page or so at the end—it is a blank page—asking the Foreign Office for its response. UKSV is giving a recommendation saying, “Mandelson should not be given the job, he is a security risk.” The process might be that the Foreign Office has to write something on that form saying, “We have read this. We don’t agree with you. We think he should be appointed, and we’re going to put in the following mitigations”, and then list them. It might be that the Foreign Office did not fill that in properly, and it might be that that bit of the form remains blank. I do not know whether anybody is in a position to be able to enlighten me one way or the other, or whether we will have to wait for the police to give us the document.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Emily Thornberry]

I do not think the right hon. Gentleman is one of the people I am referring to, but I give way.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

Surely that information would be precisely the kind that could be safely entrusted to the ISC, and it ought to have been entrusted with it.

[Emily Thornberry]

I suspect that the ISC may have been entrusted with it—that is what I am trying to say. I am hoping that if the form is blank, it is not necessarily the case that anything of particular security interest was being disclosed, and it is just a process issue, where the Foreign Office did not follow process as it should have and at least put on that form, “Yes, we have done these things.”

I am just trying to do my job, holding the Government to account. Why did Britain employ a man who was a security risk to this really important job? We did so because of the mitigations, but nobody will tell us the mitigations. After all these thousands of bits of paper, and after my poor right hon. Friend the Member for Bristol North West coming to the Chamber 11 times, we still cannot get to the root of it.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Debate between Emily Thornberry and Julian Lewis

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I absolutely endorse everything that the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee has said about the BBC World Service. Will she, in the time available, make a brief comment about its sister organisation, BBC Monitoring? That monitoring service used to receive a modest ringfenced grant from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as it then was, but that was done away with, and it is now entirely dependent on the BBC’s wider organisation for its funding. Is not the restoration of that dedicated ringfenced grant for BBC Monitoring, which filters all the most interesting comments that other countries’ broadcasters are making, long overdue?

[Emily Thornberry]

I do not think I need to repeat the points that the right hon. Gentleman has made, and made very well. Perhaps I could mention another specific service: BBC Persian, which is particularly important at this time. It is doing incredible work. It is sharing vital, lifesaving information with millions of Iranians who are suffering right now during internet blackouts. It is BBC Persian that is doing the fact-checking. It is a source of truth. It is an independent voice. It is not propaganda. If we want to understand its effectiveness, we need only bear in mind that the regime absolutely loathes it. If we require a badge of truth and a gold star, that alone must be sufficient. Why are we not supporting BBC Persian? And why did the Arab radio station that was broadcasting in Lebanon get cut? Guess what? Sputnik took over the airwaves immediately afterwards. What are we doing? What is the matter with us? This must surely be a priority.

I see your beady eye on me as I speak, Madam Deputy Speaker, so let me end by giving what I think is the best example. I have been told that BBC usage is growing in the fringes of China—in the countries around the edge of China—more than anywhere else, through TikTok accounts. What story does that tell us? It tells us that young people want the truth and are desperate to find it, and they are doing that in the way young people do, through TikTok—but they go to the good old BBC.

Israel-Palestine Conflict: Government Response

Debate between Emily Thornberry and Julian Lewis

Thursday 30th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I must confess that, in the 20 years I have been in Parliament, I have never done one of these before; it is all entirely new to me. If I am doing anything wrong, please, Madam Deputy Speaker—and I am sure you will—put me back on the straight and narrow.

The situation in Palestine is a humanitarian catastrophe, an injustice and great unfinished business. It has also been a huge diplomatic challenge for our country and indeed for the rest of the world. We as a country believe that we have some responsibility to try to find a way through—and rightly so, given our history in the region and the potential assistance that we can give.

For a long time, our policy on Israel and Palestine has been dictated by being close to the Americans, believing that they are the ones with the influence, but the Americans, until recently, were not really doing anything. In any event, the Israelis were certainly not listening to the Americans, and for sure they were not listening to us. The international community, I think, just stood and watched as hopes for a two-state solution ran into the sand.

Meanwhile, our long-standing alliances with countries such as the Arab countries were blemished by our continual refusal to recognise Palestine, so while we had willingness, we were not as influential as we should or could be. In the view of our Committee, Britain needed to have a stronger voice, and there is more that we could do. In the words of the former Member for North East Bedfordshire, the former Middle East Minister, we tended to do “too little, too late”.

Most of us thought that it was beyond time to recognise a Palestinian state. It was of immense importance as an expression of intent and good will, and to help reset the important relationships in the region. I was really pleased that, four days after our report was published, the Government committed to recognising a Palestinian state. I accept that it was not just our report that persuaded them. It was also the circumstances of the France-Saudi Arabia conference, and the campaigning of a great many people, not least Members of this House, particularly the Chair of the International Development Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion).

Our report also recommended that humanitarian aid must immediately flow in under the auspices of the UN, and called for the immediate dismantling of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation. I am glad that we have seen the back of that organisation—good riddance—but I am keen to hear more from the Government about their contribution to the UN 60-day plan to deliver vital food, aid and sanitation.

The Committee’s report was not just about Gaza. We all agreed that everything has to be done to protect the west bank from an increasingly violent and organised settler movement with representation at the highest levels of the Israeli Government. We went on a visit, and saw evidence of settlers thinking they could act with impunity. We also met organisations established to monitor the settlements that are being undermined by Israeli legislation taking funding away from non-governmental organisations. We urge the Government to prepare a comprehensive ban on the import of settlement goods, because when we say that settlements are illegal, we must mean it, and we must follow through.

We also called for the Government to immediately evacuate injured children for medical treatment in the UK, and I am pleased that they immediately committed to doing so. We called for the Government to participate in peacebuilding, and to kick-start negotiations for a long-term two-state solution. They told us that they had played a full part in the France-Saudi Arabia conference, but the question is: what is happening now, and how are we going to keep moving forward? We have to keep moving forward.

Many of us have been asked to express a conclusion on breaches of international law, from genocide downwards. The Government have consistently maintained the position that they are not able to make a determination—first because it is not for them but for a court, and secondly because we need to see the evidence. I have to say, it looks like a genocide to me, but I am not a court. That is why we need to play a role in collecting evidence for the future legal reckoning that must come.

I am really disappointed—more than that, I am genuinely surprised—that the Government did not agree to this in their response to our report. One of the things that the Labour Government pride themselves on, which I am proud of too, is their commitment to upholding international law, no matter how difficult it is. I really do not understand why they have taken that view.

Our report is the sum of a huge amount of work by members of the Committee and Committee staff, for which I am hugely grateful. We always knew that as soon as it was published it would go out of date. Maybe it has gone out of date in a good way; at least there is some semblance of a ceasefire now and the hostages have been released, though it is very difficult to say all that given the events of this week.

What remains consistent is the approach that we believe the Government should take: to be consistent and clear; to act as a convenor, a sensible friend and a force for good; to work hard; to refuse to look away; and to take seriously our responsibilities in the region. Peace will come. It is a question of when and how, and whether Britain will be at the forefront of crafting it. We believe that Britain should be.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I congratulate the right hon. Lady on her Committee’s report. In response to the seventh recommendation about a Palestinian state, the Government state:

“Our message to the terrorists of Hamas is unchanged and unequivocal. They must immediately release all the hostages, sign up to a ceasefire, disarm and accept that they will play no part in the government of Gaza.”

Did the Foreign Affairs Committee give consideration to what should be done if Hamas refuse to disarm and give way to, for example, the Palestinian Authority?

[Emily Thornberry]

At the moment we find ourselves in a vacuum where there is no plan for what is to happen to the strip now. In a lawless situation, it is extremely challenging. That is why we have to keep moving forward. The ceasefire is not the answer but only the first step. There is some work being done, but I would like to be reassured that we are playing a central role in that. I believe that we could be and we should be.

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

Debate between Emily Thornberry and Julian Lewis

Wednesday 5th March 2025 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

Since the election of the Labour Government last July, I am proud to say that Britain is back on the world stage. When we are at our best, we are a respected and influential global player. We have many things to our advantage: we are the bridge between the US and Europe; we have a place on the Security Council; and our security services and defence are very respected. Under recent Governments, it must be said that we lost our way, fighting among ourselves about Brexit and everything else and threatening to break international law, but under this Government we are taking a lead again.

The question is: are we going to step up to the challenge? We are more than capable of that, but we cannot do it on two Chewits, a button and a postage stamp. Alongside a pivot to hard power, the Prime Minister has set out his priorities for the reduced aid budget: Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine. To achieve peace, we need that investment in hard power, but if we abandon Britain’s soft power strength we cannot secure it.

In Ukraine, for example, political and financial investment and military might are key to ending the war, but when we reach the ceasefire, there will be shockwaves across eastern Europe that must be absorbed. There are many ways in which Russia will continue on the offensive, and that is not just about tanks; it is about misinformation, telling lies and trying to influence people by not telling the truth. The best way to counter that is to tell the truth.

How are we going to tell the truth? Well, we could rely on the BBC World Service, which is internationally respected and recognised. There is nothing like the BBC World Service, yet we spend only £137 million on it, which is given from the Foreign Office, and roughly 80% of that comes from ODA. Russia and China combined spend more than £8 billion each year on their state media. When we vacate the airwaves, which we have done, Russia moves in and takes over the same frequencies.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I entirely endorse what the right hon. Lady says about the BBC World Service. There used to be a ringfenced grant for BBC Monitoring as well, but now that falls on BBC general income and expenditure. Does she agree that that monitoring service performs an equally crucial role to the World Service in terms of open source information?

[Emily Thornberry]

I do, although I think that the role has changed given the rise of the internet.

If we lose the World Service, will this be remembered as the moment not just when Britain abandoned Africa to the Chinese, but when we abandoned our historic role of telling the truth and speaking the truth of a united west around the world?

The second priority for the aid budget is Gaza. I visited Jordan last week with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Jordan, which relies on US and UK aid, has absorbed over 2 million Palestinian refugees. Its continued stability is fundamental to a lasting peace in the region. Can that be guaranteed if we no longer have a humanitarian budget to spend on it?

The third priority from the Prime Minister was Sudan, where we are the penholder and we face a situation where Russia has secured a Red sea base that it has long coveted. The situation reminds me of warnings given by Lord Dannatt, the former Chief of the General Staff, that every pound cut from spending on development today risks costing us more in future military operations.

Soft power is not just a nice-to-have; it is core to peace and security. I have looked into the numbers following the latest cuts, and after taking into account the ODA money spent on asylum costs as well as our commitments to the UN and the like, we have only about £1 billion left for the Foreign Office to spend on overseas aid. Is that really going to be enough, even just for those three priorities and the money that needs to be spent on that?

I am concerned that the ODA cuts will not be the last of the challenges. There are also rumours that the Foreign Office is expecting cuts, on top of those, of between 2% and 11%. In that scenario, it will sell its buildings. Will embassies shrink? I am concerned that we will lose the British Council, which only receives 20% of its funding from the FCDO and generates the rest of its income itself. I trust that an enormous amount of work is being done on the details of the cuts, but at the moment, we have heard nothing more than an aspiration about where the other funding will come from. I fear that we may look back at this time and say to ourselves, “This is when Britain left the world,” and yet, it really should be the time when we are able to say, “Britain is back, and we are back as a force for good.”