Home Affairs
Debate between Emily Thornberry and Damian Green(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Damian Green
As the right hon. Gentleman would expect, the Justice Secretary and the prisons Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright), take a close interest in what is happening on the ground. I hope the right hon. Gentleman would acknowledge that the purpose of the changes in probation, as I explained to the hon. Member for Islwyn (Chris Evans), is to make rehabilitation more effective than it has been in the past. Reoffending rates have not fallen despite the great efforts made by the National Offender Management Service and those who work in the probation service. We need change to get those reoffending rates down. The vast majority of crime is committed by a very small number of people, so if we can get the reoffending rates down, we can continue to get overall crime down. That is the most effective thing we can do.
As I said, this is a carry-over Bill. I am grateful for the work the House has done to progress this important piece of legislation. There has been very thorough and lively scrutiny of the Bill during its Commons stages, and I am sure that the quality of debate will continue as it completes its second day on Report. I should inform the House that we have today tabled an amendment to introduce an offence of police corruption, because it is untenable that we should be relying on an 18th-century common law offence of misconduct in public office to deal with serious issues of compliance in modern policing. We tabled the amendment to establish a statutory offence of police corruption to supplement the common law offence and to focus on those who hold police powers.
A number of references have been made to the social action, responsibility and heroism Bill. I am particularly grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Goole (Andrew Percy) for his speech, not least because he was reporting from the front line as a first responder and, as he told us, a regular snow clearer in his constituency. He knows what these situations are like, and he said precisely why this Bill is necessary. [Interruption.] The shadow Attorney-General is expressing some cynicism—or, to be fair, scepticism—about the Bill. My hon. Friend knows that legislation is necessary, because people are worried about doing something that their conscience wants them to do. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) is chuntering from a sedentary position.
Damian Green
The hon. Gentleman is yelling rather than chuntering—I shall take the shadow Attorney-General’s word for it. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman should talk to my hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Goole, who knows what he is talking about, whereas the hon. Gentleman does not, as is, regrettably, so often the case.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Debate between Emily Thornberry and Damian Green(11 years, 2 months ago)
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Damian Green
This has been a serious debate, appropriately, because these are serious issues. Having listened carefully to the views of Members on both sides of the House, I believe that there are some genuine misunderstandings about what is proposed and what its effect will be. I will seek to deal with those as briefly as I can. It is a complex issue.
As we have heard, amendment 95 seeks to maintain the current definition of a “miscarriage of justice” derived from case law, which is therefore subject to ongoing litigation. Amendment 184 goes further and would prevent us from creating a statutory definition of a “miscarriage of justice” at all, leaving the definition subject to the shifting view of the courts. Over the years, the courts have provided complicated definitions of a miscarriage of justice, which are often confusing to a lay person and are by definition subject to change over time. In this instance, it is unlikely that an applicant for compensation would know what
“properly directed as to the law”
means in a particular case. That would have disadvantages for applicants, who will find it difficult to know whether they have a valid claim, or to understand the Secretary of State’s decision on their case.
Emily Thornberry
Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that, although there has been a challenge in respect of the case of Adams in the Supreme Court, the position has not moved and the law on the definition of miscarriage of justice has been settled since 2011?
Damian Green
I will come to the Adams case in a moment, if the hon. Lady will be patient.
Many disappointed applicants seek judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision, because they do not fully understand its basis or because the case law is unclear. In practice, very few such claims succeed, and they place a significant burden on the applicant involved and on the taxpayers who have to fund them. Therefore, the purpose of clause 143 is to restore the law to the pre-2011 position and to make the definition of a miscarriage of justice more consistent, clearer and easier for the public and potential applicants to understand. That is fairer than using an obscure and confusing definition, or continuing to work, as we have to now, with a definition that is subject to unpredictable change. We are firmly of the view that the provision is compatible with our international obligations and the convention rights. I am conscious that we are in discussions with the Joint Committee about that and that we hold different views on the matter.
Damian Green
I am happy to continue to engage in the discussions that the Departments have been having with the Joint Committee or anyone else, but I regret to say that I am not sure that having a meeting at which a definitive view could be arrived at would be possible, as that would be subcontracting the right of Parliament to be that Chamber—that is the purpose of this House and the other place, and I do not think it is constitutionally right to try to subcontract that to a meeting of experts.
The nub of Members’ complaints about clause 143 is that it is in some way incompatible with the presumption of innocence—I do not think I am traducing hon. Members in saying that—and that is the issue we need to address. Of course the Government recognise the fundamental constitutional importance of the presumption of innocence and we would not introduce legislation that cuts across that. We consider that article 14.6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 gives effect, provides only for compensation to be paid to those persons whose convictions have been overturned because a new fact shows that they did not commit the offence. In the Government’s view, that is the proper definition of a miscarriage of justice. Compensation should not be payable where the basis for the conviction being overturned does not demonstrate the applicant’s innocence.
The hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) brought up the European Court of Human Rights. We are aware of its decision on this issue and we have written in some detail to the Joint Committee on Human Rights about it. However, we continue to consider that this provision would not interfere with a person’s fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. We take firm support for this view from the Supreme Court in the Adams case, which held unanimously that the presumption of innocence is not infringed by the current arrangements for compensating a miscarriage of justice. In our view, the proposed change does not alter that analysis. As the European Court acknowledged, more than an acquittal is required to establish that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Through clause 143, we are determining where that line should be drawn.
Under clause 143, there is no requirement for a person applying for compensation for a miscarriage of justice to “prove” their innocence. What is determinative is the fact on which the conviction was overturned. So, for example, if a person’s conviction is overturned because DNA evidence comes to light showing they could not have committed the offence, it is only right that they should be compensated. Following the coming into force of clause 143, they will, as now, be eligible for compensation.
The proposed new test for determining eligibility for compensation does not require the applicant to demonstrate his or her innocence; it focuses on the new fact. When the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently ruled in the case of Allen that the presumption of innocence is engaged when deciding whether to pay compensation for a miscarriage of justice, the Court made it clear that states were entitled to conclude that more than an acquittal was required. This clause will enable us to say, for the first time in statute, what beyond an acquittal is necessary for there to have been a miscarriage of justice. It introduces for the first time some certainty in the process.
I should say in response to a point made by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) that the clause will have no impact at all on the very valuable work being done every day by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, and nor will it change the basis on which a conviction is overturned.
Emily Thornberry
I hope the right hon. Gentleman recognises that the wording of amendment 95 reiterates the wording in the settled case law I have been telling him about.
Damian Green
Yes, indeed, and I have addressed directly the cases the hon. Lady raised.
We are returning the law to where it was in 2008 under the previous Government, where following the decision of the House of Lords in Mullen, compensation was held to be payable only where a person could be shown not to have committed, or to have been demonstrably innocent of, the offence for which he was convicted.
As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Adams, it is difficult to glean exactly what the framers of the ICCPR intended on this point from the papers now available, and nor is there international consensus on what the ICCPR requires in this regard. Signatories to the ICCPR have some latitude in determining the requirements of article 14.6. For example. New Zealand and Canada restrict the payment of compensation for a miscarriage of justice to cases where the applicant was innocent. Further, while the Supreme Court in Adams ultimately held that eligibility for compensation was not limited to cases of innocence, four members of the Supreme Court, including the current Lord Chief Justice, considered that compensation should be payable only in cases of innocence. We are therefore confident that what we are doing achieves the aim of creating a more readily comprehensible test which meets the Government’s policy objectives, while also complying with our international obligations.
We recognise the fundamental constitutional importance of the presumption of innocence, and there may simply be a disagreement in this Chamber as to whether we are breaching it, but I can assure the House that there is no intention of doing so, and I am firmly of the belief that clause 143 does not do that. All it does is require compensation to be paid to those persons whose convictions have been overturned because a new fact shows that they did not in fact commit the offence. This, in the Government’s view, is the proper definition to be given to a miscarriage of justice
I hope I have cleared up what I think are genuine misunderstandings about the effect of clause 143, and I urge the Members concerned not to press their amendments.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 10 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 11
Power of community support officer to issue fixed penalty notice for cycle light offence
‘(1) Part 1 of Schedule 4 to the Police Reform Act 2002 (powers of community support officers) is amended as follows.
(2) In sub-paragraph (2)(b) of paragraph 1 (power to issue fixed penalty notices)—
(a) for “in respect of an offence” there is substituted “in respect of—an offence”;
(i) an offence”;
(b) at the end there is inserted “, or an offence, under section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, of contravening or failing to comply with a construction or use requirement about lighting equipment or reflectors for cycles;”.
(i) an offence, under section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, of contravening or failing to comply with a construction or use requirement about lighting equipment or reflectors for cycles;”.
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 11A (power to stop cycles)—
(a) for “has committed an offence” there is substituted “has committed—
(a) an offence”;
(b) at the end there is inserted “, or
(b) an offence, under section 42 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, of contravening or failing to comply with a construction or use requirement about lighting equipment or reflectors for cycles;”.’.—(Damian Green.)
Brought up, and read the First time.