Child Arrangements: Presumption of Parental Involvement

Emily Darlington Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Westminster Hall

[Dr Tidball]

I agree. As someone who has worked in criminology and criminal justice for over a decade, I think the need for us to move beyond siloed working can be no more important than it is in these sorts of cases.

Just yesterday, we learned that the man Kiena Dawes named as her killer when she committed suicide wants to launch a custody battle over their daughter, saying that

“I’m coming to get you baby girl”.

This man has been jailed for six and a half years for assault of and controlling behaviour towards Kiena. Our current law would allow this person to have unsupervised contact with their child.

[Emily Darlington (Milton Keynes Central) (Lab)]

I thank my hon. Friend for securing such an important debate and for making such a powerful speech. Does she agree that the visitation presumption, custody presumption and all these sorts of things that happen in family law courts are a continuing perpetration of the domestic abuse that the women and mothers were fleeing in the first place? I will keep this case anonymous, but in my constituency I was meant to meet a woman on Saturday. The handling of the handover of the children on Friday had been so abusive and painful for her that she had to cancel her appointment with me because she was in hospital with heart palpitations. Can my hon. Friend address how we can ensure in the future that the presumption in the court service takes into account that this is continuing domestic abuse for both the mother and the children?

[Dr Tidball]

Absolutely. I will return to this later, but the harm report makes quite clear the re-traumatisation of both children and parental victims of domestic abuse that comes with repeated attempts at contact and the presumption that is currently in place. The consequence of that is a generation of lost voices like Jack and Paul Sykes and Sara Sharif, but there is no definitive way of knowing how many parents whose partner or spouse is a known domestic abuser have been persuaded into some form of shared care because of the presumption.

The harm report, published in 2020 by the Ministry of Justice’s expert panel on harm, found that presumption of contact must be reviewed urgently, because the principle

“put a misplaced emphasis on the child’s right to a relationship with both parents…above the child’s welfare and right to be safe from abuse and its effects”.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Sarah Sackman)]

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge (Dr Tidball) for securing this debate on an incredibly important subject. I am deeply sorry about what her constituent, Claire Throssell, has been through. The loss and trauma that Claire and her family have experienced is unimaginable and, frankly, unspeakable. If I can address you directly, Claire, the resilience you have shown in the face of the devastating loss of Jack and Paul is astounding. Your commitment to campaigning and advocating for children and adults who have experienced domestic abuse is inspirational, and you are shaping the national conversation on this issue. I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend and to you, Claire, for the time you spent with the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), back in November to discuss the presumption and the wider issues surrounding it.

There is no question but that protecting vulnerable children from violence and abuse must always be a first priority for the state, and the family courts have a vital role to play in that mission by protecting children and safeguarding victims of violence against women and girls. What does the statutory presumption we have been discussing do? As currently designed, it has two important aims. The first is to ensure that any parent who poses a risk to their child can be prevented in law from being involved in their child’s life. The second is to ensure that when it is safe, and only when it is safe, to do so, children are able to maintain some form of relationship with their parent after separation.

Under our current law, the child’s welfare is, as it must be, the paramount consideration. This is known as the welfare principle, and it is enshrined in section 1 of the Children Act. The presumption reflects an understanding that, where it is safe, and only where it is safe, to allow it, and where it would be in the best interests of a child’s welfare, both parents being involved in a child’s life is a goal of family justice.

The Children Act sets out this two-stage process, and it is important that we understand what that process is and how it works when family courts come to consider it. First, the court will consider whether a parent can be involved in a child’s life in a way that does not put that child at risk of suffering harm. If it cannot be assured of that, the presumption does not apply. If a parent can be involved in a way that does not put the child at risk of suffering harm, the child will move to the second stage, and the court will consider whether the parent’s involvement would further that child’s welfare. If there is evidence that a parent’s involvement would not further the child’s welfare, the presumption can be rebutted and will not apply to that parent.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge set out the history of how that came to be enshrined in our law. In 2014 the Children Act was amended to introduce the presumption of parental involvement, built on well-established case law in our domestic law and in law enshrined in the European convention on human rights. The intention was to recognise the benefits of both parents being involved in a child’s life.

[Emily Darlington]

I appreciate that the Act was amended in 2014, but our understanding of abuse has widened since then to encompass financial, emotional and coercive control—abuse is not limited to just physical violence. In the light of that, is it not time to review the law and change the definition of harm to the child to encompass the wider definition of what we now understand abuse to be?