House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Baroness Laing of Elderslie Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 11th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Hamilton. I am one of the latest recruits to your Lordships’ House and I have to say to my noble friend that, in the very few weeks I have been here, I have so far encountered no violent criminals at all, as far as I am aware. Everyone has been extremely kind and gentle, and, given that I spent nearly three decades in the other place, I have been astounded at the courtesy and politeness. Being new, I hesitated to take an active part in today’s debate, but it is perhaps my very newness that allows me to observe your Lordships’ House from a slightly different angle.

I begin by congratulating my equally new noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham on his excellent maiden speech—90% of which I agreed with. We will argue about the other 10% for many years to come, I hope, as we have for many years in the past.

I had the privilege of serving, during the consideration of the Bill that was brought forward by the coalition Government in 2011, on the Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform. Some noble Lords might recall that committee. I remember very well that the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, who I see in her place, was a very active member of that committee and that we drafted together an excellent minority report, which I draw to the attention of noble Lords. That committee sat for nine months, so we looked at this matter in some depth.

I make just three points this afternoon. First, there is a general misunderstanding among journalists, commentators and Members of the House of Commons about what this House actually does. The fact is that your Lordships’ House has influence but not power. The elected Government have power. This misapprehension means that many observers of the current constitutional settlement are looking at it through the wrong end of the telescope.

Secondly, the hereditary Peers are in a unique position in the democratic world because they have genuine independence. They owe their position to no one—well, perhaps to their great-grandfathers, but to no one to whom they are answerable now. Our unwritten constitution requires inbuilt checks and balances, and the hereditary Peers provide a very important element of that balance because they are truly independent. We should value that independence.

Thirdly, there is a sharp contrast between theory and practice. If we were constructing a constitution from scratch, we would not start from here, but our constitution has developed over centuries, and the fact is that it works. The current balance between our two Houses of Parliament works. It is our duty as Parliament to hold government to account. Government is held to account in one way by the elected Members of the House of Commons, and in a different way by your Lordships. The current system works, and, as a wise man once said, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Baroness Laing of Elderslie Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will focus on paragraph (3) of Amendment 11, suggesting what should be in the consultation paper on methods for introducing elected Members to the House. House of Lords reform has been unfinished business now for well over a century, as emphasised in the Parliament Act 1911. I believe the Bill provides an opportunity for looking at several different ways of reform for the House: elected or appointed, or a mixture of both.

The Electoral Reform Society produced an interesting paper on an elected House in December 2023. I will first explore how other countries select members of their upper houses, to give comparison for an elected House of Lords here. The majority of second chambers choose their members by election, whether direct or indirect. The Inter-Parliamentary Union—the IPU—categorises 55 second chambers as predominantly chosen by either direct or indirect election, and only 22 as predominantly chosen by appointment. Many chambers do, however, combine a direct and/or indirect election with a small element of appointment. For instance, while the Italian Senate is nearly wholly directly elected, a handful of life seats are held by ex-officio members, formerly presidents, and up to five citizens are appointed by the President for outstanding service.

In Ireland, of the 60 members of the Senate, 43 are elected by panels representing different vocations, six are chosen by graduates of the two major universities, and 11 are nominated by the Taoiseach, creating a mix of direct and indirect election for some appointments.

In Spain, the Senate combines direct and indirect election based on different territories. The majority of senators are directly elected in multi-member constituencies based on the 50 provinces. Around a fifth are appointed by the legislatures of the autonomous communities, which are themselves elected by closed-list proportional representation—PR.

Concerns are often raised about the potential conflict arising from having two directly elected chambers. Wholly directly elected second chambers can be found in Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland and the USA. Within this group are significant differences in the electoral system used, which in turn affects their composition. It is generally agreed that one party should not have a majority in both chambers. Because of this, few parliaments with direct elections for both chambers choose similar electoral systems for both chambers.

Two notable exceptions are Italy and the United States. Italy employs a similar mixed system for both the upper and the lower house, with both chambers also electing on the same day. Because of this, while there may be some differences, the party balance tends to be the same in both chambers. The United States is the only country to use a majoritarian system for both chambers. While using the same system, the two USA chambers have different compositions because of the difference in size of their constituencies and the length of term. However, with party competition forcing a two-party shape due to the nature of the electoral system, the opportunity for gridlock is high. In both Italy and the USA, similar electoral systems are also matched by similar powers.

The majority of parliaments with wholly directly elected upper chambers use different electoral systems in the lower chamber. Brazil, the Czech Republic, Poland and Switzerland have PR-elected primary chambers and use majoritarian systems for their second chambers. Australia has a majoritarian-elected lower house and a PR-elected upper house. Japan and Mexico use mixed systems for both chambers.

Using different electoral systems for both chambers tends to produce different electoral outcomes, which are also supported by arrangements such as different term lengths and staggered elections. For a wholly or partly elected second chamber, the question remains as to which system of election to use. If direct election is chosen, there are many options for the type of electoral system that could be used.

Previous suggestions for Lords reform have put forward different options, including versions of party lists and single transferable vote, STV. The STV option was recommended in the cross-party Breaking the Deadlock proposals in 2007 and the House of Lords reform draft Bill in 2011. As Liberal Democrats will know, STV is a proportional and preferential election system in which voters get to choose their choice of candidate. Constituencies are multimember, returning usually around three to five candidates per district, although constituencies can be larger, and voters can put a number to as many or as few candidates as they like. Candidates who reach the quota are elected, and any votes over and above what they need are redistributed to vote as second preferences, and so on until the places are filled.

The 2011 draft Bill selected STV to ensure that those elected have

“a personal mandate from the electorate, distinct from that of their party”.

STV is a candidate-based system, which means that independents are placed on an equal footing with party-political candidates. In addition, because it is a candidate system, voters are able to choose between candidates of the same party, putting an emphasis on which party candidate they think will be most suitable. Candidates such as community leaders, who have a party leaning but would rather stand as independents, are able to do so without harming their party’s chances by splitting the votes.

According to the Electoral Reform Society:

“In the Scottish local elections of 2017, between a third and a fifth of voters gave their second preference to a candidate of a different party to their first choice. And, whilst many voters are loyal to their party, when no more candidates are available for their first choice party … the majority go on to give lower preferences to candidates of other parties. This opportunity for voters to make more nuanced choices would likely result in a chamber that has a different political character to the Commons.


STV could also help elect a more diverse chamber. Because STV is a multi-member constituency system, it encourages parties to put forward candidates who differ from each other in order to maximise their vote. District magnitude, the number of people being elected in an electoral district, has an impact on the diversity of those elected, so larger STV districts are … more likely to create a more representative chamber without needing additional measures … STV would likely go furthest to fulfilling the goals of a more politically diverse and independently minded chamber where voters would be able to select candidates according to their expertise and experience, as well as ensuring representation from across the regions and nations of the UK”,


which I believe the Labour Party wished for the Lords in its manifesto.

Another form of rank ordering preference is the AV system. While STV is considered a form of proportional representation using multimember constituencies, AV would operate in single-member constituencies and is not. There are of course other forms of PR, namely list PR, which was recommended by the Wakeham commission and the subsequent White Paper in 2001. In 2010-11 the House of Lords reform draft Bill put forward semi-open regional lists. List PR systems can be open, closed or semi-open.

With apologies to the Lib Dems, I will briefly go into the three main types of list. First, there is the closed list PR; secondly, the open list PR; and, thirdly, the semi-open list. There is a range of these types of list PR. Finally, we must not forget the first past the post system.

The 2008 White Paper modelled the options for election to the House of Lords on the basis of an 80% and 100% elected Chamber of between 420 and 450 seats. Using the four different systems I have outlined, while the first past the post and AV options produced results close to those in the Commons, the list modelling showed a greater proportion of seats for other parties, with no single party gaining an overall majority, but highlighted the problem for independents to get a place under this system.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to my noble friend who has just spoken, there is no point in going into all those details about methods of election, interesting as they are. Amendment 11 is wrong, and I oppose it because it would undermine the very basis of our democracy, which actually works very well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, referred to the Joint Committee report published in 2012. I had the duty—I almost said pleasure—to sit on that committee, along with the noble Baroness and others, for eight months while we went into these matters in very great detail. I recommend that report to noble Lords. The report itself was critical of the then Government’s plan to introduce a directly elected second Chamber. The minority report, which was signed by 12 of the 25 members of that committee, was even more critical of the Government; I especially recommend that to noble Lords.

If we had direct election to this upper House, it would not only upset the delicate balance of our constitutional settlement. It would also totally undermine the delicate relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I seem to recall that in speaking on this matter back then in 2012, I said something like, “Mr Speaker, I don’t care about the House of Lords; I care about the House of Commons”. If I may correct myself, I do now care passionately about the House of Lords. It is for that very reason that I hope Amendment 11 does not have support here.

The great value of your Lordships is that the majority are not politicians, as the noble Lord, Lord Moore, most articulately said a few moments ago, whereas if we had direct election, the moment anybody stands for election and puts their head above the parapet, they become a politician. I can be critical of politicians because I am one to my fingertips; I have been a full-time one for more than 30 years. As a new Member of this House, I appreciate just how valuable noble Lords who are not politicians are in the work that they do and the scrutiny that this House brings to holding the Government to account.

My second point is that if the upper House is elected, that undermines the position of the House of Commons. It undermines the authority and accountability of the House of Commons. The electorate have to know where the buck stops. There is a direct relationship between the voter and the elected person, which is embodied in our House of Commons, one of the best democratic institutions anywhere in the world. If the upper House were to have democratic accountability and authority, that would challenge the House of Commons—and then the electorate would not know where the buck stops. As Tony Benn used to say, “If you don’t know how to get rid of the people you elect, then you don’t have accountability and you don’t have true democracy”. It is very strange to find myself agreeing yet again with Tony Benn.

My third point is simply that a well-functioning democracy is not just about elections. Our democracy works because of the checks and balances of civic society. That includes the work of your Lordships’ House as a revising Chamber, not as a representative Chamber. I beg your Lordships not to support Amendment 11.

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend, for two reasons. First, I served with her on the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. Secondly, I intend to follow her in actually referring to the text of Amendment 11, which makes me somewhat exceptional in this debate, because it has been about an elected second Chamber. The amendment does not actually stipulate that.

Let me begin with one or two quick points. First, it is not self-evidently the case that an appointed second Chamber is undemocratic. I have developed this case before; there is a democratic argument for an appointed second Chamber.

Secondly, it is not self-evidently the case that elected second chambers fulfil functions that benefit the political system, certainly not in terms of facilitating good law. Following what the noble Lord, Lord Moore, said, this Chamber is defined by its relationship to the other place. This is a complementary second Chamber. It adds value by fulfilling functions the other place does not have the time or political will to carry out. That renders it distinct, it adds value and I would argue that good law is a public good that deserves to be preserved.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Baroness, Lady Laing, said, as a demerit of elections, that the House would be composed principally of people who were politicians. Let us not fool ourselves about what we are: this is a House of politicians. She is no less of a politician now than when she was in the Commons. Politicians would arrive by a direct, rather than indirect, route. Frankly, the idea that we are not politicians is strange.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

I am grateful to the honourable—

[Noble Lords]

Noble!

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

I think I just proved the point there. I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. My point was not that I am not a politician, but that I am a lesser person for being a politician. The great thing about this Chamber is that it has a very large number, if not a majority, of Members who are not politicians, and that is what gives it its value.

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, I am happy to debate the numbers, but I disagree that the majority of people who take a party Whip can legitimately not call themselves politicians. The Cross-Benchers are not politicians, although they are very political in many cases. Under my proposal, they are not being abolished anyway.

On the noble Lord, Lord True, I was intrigued by his reference to Lloyd George. Lloyd George does not come with a totally unblemished record when it comes to matters relating to the House of Lords.

As I said at the start, this amendment is to set up a process. It is not a blueprint. We on these Benches believe that this process should now be commenced. We believe that it is very long overdue, and we will return to this amendment on Report with that in view.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Baroness Laing of Elderslie Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie]

67: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Ministerial members(1) In each Parliament, a limited number of persons may be appointed as temporary ministerial members of the House of Lords.(2) Appointments are to be made by His Majesty the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.(3) A recommendation may be made only for the purpose of facilitating the performance by the recommended person of that person’s functions as a Minister of the Crown.(4) An appointment may be made only at a time when there are fewer than 8 ministerial members appointed to the Parliament by the current Prime Minister who are Ministers of the Crown.(5) Any person appointed as a ministerial member of the House of Lords ceases to be a member of the House of Lords when they stop serving as a Minister of the Crown.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to allow temporary appointments to the House of Lords for serving Ministers of the Crown.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment in my name on the Marshalled List, Amendment 67, regards the potential appointment of temporary ministerial Members of your Lordships’ House. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, for his support of this amendment and for having added his name to it.

In the very few months during which I have been a Member of your Lordships’ House, I have seen from the inside what outside observers cannot appreciate fully: that this is an institution that works. It is a House that does its duty efficiently and effectively. I hope that discussing Amendment 67 will give the House, and indeed the Government, an opportunity to consider how the House could work even more effectively.

It is vital that a significant number of Government Ministers should be Members of this House, and equally vital that a significant number of Members of this House should be Government Ministers. Our duty to hold the Government to account is accomplished in a variety of ways, as your Lordships are well aware, the most obvious of which is asking questions of a Minister at the Dispatch Box.

In recent years, 36 Ministers have been directly appointed to this House as Ministers. They have come in and made their maiden speeches at the Dispatch Box as Ministers of the Crown. I am not for a moment suggesting that there is anything wrong with that.

A Prime Minister is entitled to appoint the person he or she considers best for the job. It is in all our interests—indeed, in the interests of the country as a whole—to have Ministers carrying out the business of government who know their subject and know how to put policies into action.

It has long been an accepted practice that a Prime Minister can appoint a person who has not been elected to Parliament to become part of the Government. But surely we all accept—some of us more than others—that the ability to win votes at a general election is not the only attribute that makes a good Minister. A successful government department needs a mixture of talents. The aim of Amendment 67 is not to restrict the ability of a Prime Minister to appoint the right person to do a particular job. On the contrary, the effect of this amendment would be to make it easier for a Minister to be appointed.

At present, the only possible appointment to this House is as a Peer for life. I put it to the House that there should be an alternative: the Prime Minister should be able to appoint a person to be a Government Minister and they should be a Member of this House during their tenure of the ministerial appointment and only for that time. Of course I will give way to my noble friend.

[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for giving way. I just seek some clarification. She is making a very strong, cogent argument. When they leave their appointment as Ministers, will they keep their title or not?

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for that very pertinent question. I think the answer is yes. A title is an honour—we have discussed this in various aspects of the Bill and in the changes that we are considering. There is no harm in a title. It is the presence of being in this House and having the ability to vote, et cetera, that is really the point at question. So, indeed, a title, once conferred, would be kept for ever. It is a great honour to be appointed to this House, but I ask noble Lords to consider that an appointment for life means something rather different to a person aged 30 and a person aged 60. None of us can predict what “for life” will mean, but if one is planning one’s career, it looks rather different from the point of view of having accomplished most of the things you are going to do, rather than from the point of view of having accomplished not very much yet.

There might be bright young things out there who could serve a few years as very effective members of a Government but who do not wish to undertake the duty of being a Member of this illustrious House for the rest of their lives. All recent Prime Ministers have vowed that they want to reduce the size of your Lordships’ House. Let us try to help the current Prime Minister to do that, by giving him the option to appoint Ministers on a temporary basis. It would be a modest step towards a 21st-century House if the Government were to consider adopting Amendment 67. I beg to move.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Laing of Elderslie proposes the creation of a new class of Members of your Lordships’ House, as ministerial members. It is not clear from her very eloquent speech whether such persons would be created Peers or not. She did suggest that they would be accorded titles, not only for the duration of their tenure in office but for life. This amendment does not address the problem of unpaid Ministers in your Lordships’ House. I am not so sure there would be many volunteers for such posts in the absence of a salary and a peerage. I hope my noble friend will clarify whether, on reflection, these temporary Ministers would be given a peerage or the right to sit after retirement from ministerial responsibilities.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for his question. Just to clarify, it is set out in Amendment 67 that such a person would be created a Peer, but not a Peer for life. Although the title might continue, the right to sit in your Lordships’ House would not, once the ministerial appointment had ended.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for her clarification, but I wonder about the creation of yet another type of Peer. I wonder how many people would be happy to be created that kind of Peer, if others appointed as Ministers were created proper Peers for life. It might be a bit difficult.

I will comment on Amendment 90C, which my noble friend Lord Brady is going to move. He seeks to abolish the Lords Ministers altogether. Who would speak for the Government in your Lordships’ House? My noble friend clearly has in mind a very different role for the House, and I look forward to his elucidation of that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

I thank my honourable—I am sorry, he is not my honourable friend; he has stopped being honourable. I thank my noble friend for giving way. I was trying to be brief in my initial remarks, so I did not go into great detail. This amendment would not apply to all Ministers; it would simply give the Prime Minister the ability to appoint some Ministers on a temporary basis. It would not oblige the Prime Minister to make all ministerial appointments to this House on a temporary basis. I hope that reassures my noble friend.

[Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con)]

The noble Baroness was effectively my first employer, when I was 21 years old, and we have this telepathic understanding: she has seamlessly introduced the main point I wish to make.

I want to turn this round and pick up precisely on what the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, was saying. Moving to a system where the Government of the day could appoint temporary Ministers to this place would give the Prime Minister and the Government a huge amount of flexibility to fill government posts with genuine experts with, effectively, executive ministerial power to carry out their functions. There must be a small, niggling doubt when a Prime Minister is filling positions. Even with the very distinguished people appointed in recent months, he—and it is “he” in this case—must be thinking, “Am I appointing too many people to fill these Benches; people who are going be here for the rest of their lives?” If he had the freedom, for example, to appoint 12 or 13 experts in the field to fill specific ministerial roles, knowing that at the end of those roles they will leave this House, that would sit better with public opinion and give him more freedom. It would serve the country better if he were able to appoint such experts to carry out these functions—by definition, almost certainly as junior Ministers—and help the Government of the day. That is a very powerful argument.

As I say, there would be discretion to convert those Ministers into life peers at the end. In fact, I had not considered the question of whether they should have a peerage when they enter this House. My conclusion is that they should not. They should be called MILs—Ministers in the Lords—and then they can aspire, based on their service as Ministers and their contribution to the House, to a peerage after they have served as Ministers here.

Finally, I turn to the question, raised by one of my noble friends, of how many people would be attracted to the unpaid role of a Minister in the Lords. First, it does not necessarily need to be unpaid. It is a matter for the Government of the day as to whether they have the courage to face down public opinion and expand the number of paid ministerial positions. But this House should certainly seriously consider giving the Prime Minister and the Government of the day the freedom to appoint temporary MILs to help service its business.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

As the noble Lord knows, we are going to look at participation generally. That means that we have to engage in proper dialogue and consultation, so I do not accept the noble Lord’s point. I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his assessment of the amendment that I have put before the Committee. It had not been my intention to have any argument ad hominem. I was not looking backwards in my tabling of this amendment in order to eject from the House any particular former Minister—and certainly not any sitting here.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

I just make it clear, as far as I am concerned, that a copy of today’s Hansard is going directly to my mother, and I am very grateful for what my noble friend said.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

In consideration of the feelings of the noble Lord’s mother, let me make it absolutely clear that I share the Minister’s admiration for recent Ministers on both sides of the House, and, indeed, those who are now shadow Ministers and those who were previously shadow Ministers. The quality of the personnel who take charge of this House is exemplary and magnificent. Does the noble Lord think that that will be enough for his mother?