(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberFor absolute clarity, I asked the Chancellor and the Business Secretary whether the scheme applied to buy-to-let properties, and whether it would allow second homes. Neither of them knew. The Business Secretary said that it had not been decided, but in fact the document has been published and states that the scheme does not apply to buy-to-let properties, but it does allow second homes. The accusation stands. Is that true? It is not in the document; are they going to amend it?
Is it in the document or not?
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes.
I will set out what needs to be done to turn this bad Bill into a good Bill and to put the public interest, not party politics, in the driving seat in financial regulation. I will set out four objectives that should guide this legislation. The first is stability. We must ensure that we have a system of financial regulation that is robust in good times and in bad times. The second is to protect the taxpayer. We must guarantee that the public purse is protected from irresponsible decision making and wider systemic failures. The third is to be on the side of the consumer. There must be effective regulation, more competition and action on financial education and exclusion. The fourth is to support growth and employment. Let me take each objective in turn.
On stability, provisions to improve the structures for financial regulation and financial stability are at the heart of the Bill. As I have said, we support the FPC and we look forward to debating its powers. We are pleased that the Chancellor has today done a U-turn and decided that the Government will take up the recommendation of the Joint Committee that the macro-prudential tools to be used by the FPC should be properly scrutinised by Parliament. I hope that he will ensure that that happens not just when they are introduced, but when they are subsequently changed and updated. We believe that a new scrutiny committee should be established in this House to play that role. We will propose such an amendment.
On the splitting of the PRA and the FCA from the FSA—I know that these acronyms are hard to keep up with, but this is quite a complex system—it is fair to say that there are advantages and disadvantages. The jury is out. The Chancellor’s decision to put all this new and more complex architecture under the umbrella of the Bank of England, and arguably under the personal direction of its Governor, raises serious questions of accountability and clarity in decision making, as has been highlighted by the Treasury Committee and the Joint Committee.
We share the Treasury Committee’s concerns about accountability within the Bank and accountability to Parliament. As the Committee stated,
“the governance of the Bank needs strengthening and…it needs to be more open about its work. The Bank must be held more clearly to account”.
The Committee has proposed that
“the role of the Court of the Bank of England should be substantially enhanced. It should be transformed into a leaner and more expert Supervisory Board, with the power to conduct retrospective reviews of Bank policies and conduct.”
The Chancellor has said that he does not want to go down that road. He has made some moves, but we think that there is further to go to ensure that there is proper accountability. Again, we will propose reforms in Committee.
It is on the issue of crisis management and the processes for deliberation and decision making within the new, more complex structure, that we have misgivings. The Joint Committee was right to state:
“The powers and responsibilities of the Bank of England and the Treasury during a crisis are key.”
However, the Bill and the memorandum of understanding are deeply confused and opaque, as we have just heard from the Chancellor. We welcome the fact that the Chancellor has accepted the Treasury Committee’s recommendation that the Chancellor should be provided with a discretionary power to direct the Bank when there is a material risk to public funds. The British Bankers Association also welcomed that in its submission, but stated that it was
“unclear that the assignment of powers now proposed is consistent with the strategic division of responsibilities envisaged by the Government, including the proposed power of direction over the Bank.”
Article 20 of the memorandum of understanding exposes the hole. I will quote it in full:
“During a potentially fast-moving crisis, it will become especially important to ensure close and effective coordination so as to maintain coherence in the overall crisis management process. At the heart of institutional coordination during a live crisis will be frequent contact between the Chancellor and the Governor. However, the Chancellor and the Governor may agree to establish ad hoc or standing committees at other levels to support this process.”
Under the Bill, there will be three deputy governors at the Bank, a new Financial Policy Committee, two new sub-agencies at the Bank—the PRA and the FCA—and a new quartet of relationships, in which there are separate statutory responsibilities for the Treasury, the FPC, the PRA and the FCA, as well as for the MPC. Will the Chancellor hear any of the views in a crisis, or pre-crisis, from the statutory office holders? Only, according to the MOU, if the Chancellor and the Governor decide that he should. It states that there will be frequent contact just between the Chancellor and the Governor. It is inevitable that there will be a variety of views and dissenting voices, not only at senior levels within the Bank, but between the different statutory agencies, because those agencies have overlapping and, in certain types of crisis, contradictory objectives. Those different statutory responsibilities are being put under one umbrella organisation—the Bank of England.
In a second. I will make the argument and the hon. Gentleman can then ask a question.
Senior and responsible figures who hold statutory offices will get to put their views to the Chancellor only if they are on one of the ad hoc or standing committees, which do not yet exist. It seems as though the Governor will decide whether they should exist at all and who should attend them. My advice to the Chancellor is that one cannot just rely on Treasury officials or gossip by the water pump. Unlike many of the Back Benchers who have intervened, I am not seeking to play a party political game; I want him to change the Bill. [Laughter.] Honestly. This is a deeply confused and highly dangerous ambiguity.
I will give way in a minute. Let me just make the argument, and then the hon. Gentleman, with all his experience of crisis resolution meetings at the Bank, can share his intervention with us.
In the run-up to a crisis or during a crisis itself, having such a high degree of ambiguity in the structure and placing such a concentration of power and access to the Chancellor in the person of the Governor would be highly unstable. If the deputy governor and head of the PRA—a statutory individual, but not the Governor—the head of the FCA or the majority on the FPC believed that there would be a systemic risk from one troubled company without support from public money, the Chancellor must know about it, and in time so must Parliament. They must know about it whether or not the Governor agreed. Whether or not the Governor believed that there was or might be a risk, and whether or not he believed that the moral hazard outweighed the risk, the Chancellor must know about it.
If the Chancellor wants a personalised, twin-peak system with all the responsibilities and accountabilities of the Bank of England located in just one person, the Governor, as is set out in the memorandum of understanding that he has negotiated with the Bank and as it seemed he did at times during his speech, the Bill is flawed. The new system will be unstable and the taxpayer will potentially be more exposed. All the statutory architecture of the FPC, the PRA and the FCA will be for the birds.
If, instead, the new committees and agencies are to have a separate statutory identity with clear and separate purposes that may sometimes conflict, and with leaders who must be properly heard, that must be clarified in the Bill. That was what the Chancellor seemed to suggest at other times in his speech, and the Bill seems to suggest it in places. It must be clarified not just in the memorandum of understanding but in statute.
The Bill sets out clearly the statutory identities of the FCA, the PRA and the FPC, which seems to suggest that the Chancellor intends to move from the tripartite system to a quartet system under the umbrella of the Bank of England—the Treasury, the FPC, the PRA and the FCA. If so, he should say so clearly in the memorandum of understanding and in legislation, for reasons of accountability, financial stability and effective decision making in a crisis. We will table amendments to that effect in Committee.
I know that the right hon. Gentleman is desperate to defend the tripartite structure that he designed—
It is not, by far.
The accusation that the right hon. Gentleman makes undermines his point that the Bill sets out a quadripartite system. It sets out a bipartite system, involving the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor. The fact that it will be delivered through the person of the Governor, who has to manage his own institution with appropriate accountability to court, means that it is a binary system rather than a tripartite one. It will therefore be better at resolving crises at the rushed times when they occur.
I made it very clear that I was not defending any particular regulatory structure. I do not think the crisis was caused by institutional structures in particular, because other countries with different structures had a crisis as well. We will seek to support the Government in reforming and strengthening the system of financial regulation, including through the addition of the FPC and the new powers of the PRA and FCA. However, all those individual agencies are being given statutory authority in the Bill.
The Bill cannot be setting out a binary or twin-peak system, because there will be the Treasury and the Governor of the Bank of England, then underneath him there will be a deputy governor who is also the head of the PRA, another who is also on the Financial Stability Committee, the head of the FSA—also a statutory office holder—and another deputy governor on the Monetary Policy Committee. The Bill is designed to bring in not a twin-peak system but a quartet system, which will be more complex than a tripartite one.
There may be very good arguments for having a quartet system and for splitting the FSA into the PRA and the FCA, and I support the FPC, but the system will be more complex, not simpler. The Chancellor is trying to fudge the matter by giving the impression in the memorandum of understanding that it will be not a quartet system but a twin-peak system, because things will be sorted out between him and the Governor.
That is not an ad hominem point. Other Chancellors and Ministers from Governments through the ages have known very well that there is an inevitable conflict in financial regulation between the regulator, examining systemic risks from individual firms, and the guardians of the system, who worry about potential systemic risks on the one hand and moral hazard on the other. The Chancellor’s role is as the guardian of the public purse and wider financial stability, so there are different points of view.
My advice to the Chancellor is that to try to subsume all those points of view into a separate institution away from him, without transparency and with multiple and overlapping roles for different statutory office holders, but then say, “I’m only going to deal with the Governor,” is ahistorical, deeply foolish and flawed. If the Chancellor changes and clarifies the Bill, we will be pleased, but at the moment it is a terrible fudge.
I am very grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way again. Does not his argument—that we cannot have an umbrella regulator under which inevitable tensions are resolved, and that we must instead have separate organisations—show exactly the thinking that led to the problems in the tripartite system, under which responsibilities were segregated and separated and problems fell between stools? The FSA and the Bank were told that one was to look at the regulation of individual banks and the other at the macro-economy, and never the twain shall meet. That is precisely the problem that needs to be addressed.
The Chancellor referred to his years of thinking about this legislation. I am afraid that his former adviser demonstrates the kind of muddled thinking that has got the Chancellor into this difficulty.
I am not saying that the tripartite system is the best one. I am quite happy to go along with the shift to the quartet system—I can see the advantages of the FPC and the split of the FCA and the PRA. I am not worried because individual statutory agencies will be under the umbrella of the Bank of England; I am worried because the deputy governor and head of the PRA, who has a clear responsibility, is not part of the decision-making process. That is what I am worried about. I want the MOU to say that at the heart of the system—in pre-crisis and crisis—there will be a “clear view” group, in which the Governor and his key deputies, who will have separate and sometimes contradictory statutory responsibilities, come together with the Chancellor to make the decision.
Even if the Chancellor—this is not an ad hominem point—has the umbrella of the Bank of England and the quartet system, he should want to hear from the person whom he appoints on a very large salary and in law to be the head of the PRA. What I do not understand is why that would not be written into the MOU. Actually, I sort of do understand. There is a history in the Bank of England of the Bank equalling the Governor of the Bank—of wanting to personalise the appointment—as the Chancellor has described. However, we cannot personalise something as complex as the proposed system. It is not just that the system is complicated; there are also tensions and differences of view.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) is quite right that it is hard to operate a tripartite system in which there are different views, but those differences will not be avoided by burying them under the table and pretending they do not exist. Had that happened at key moments in the previous crisis, the wrong decisions would have been taken.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI withdraw it. Will the shadow Chancellor have the weight to state explicitly what he has just argued, which is that private sector debt is a good thing?
The numbers for the hon. Gentleman’s constituency show that 8,600 families in his constituency are losing out from the cut in tax credits. [Interruption.] He is normally quite excitable, but he is really getting rattled this afternoon.
What are the facts? “We are all in this together,” yet women are being hit twice as hard as men; there has been a 100,000 rise in child poverty, according to the Treasury’s own figures; there is a four times bigger hit for families and children than for the banks, which have seen their taxes cut this year compared with last year; not 400,000 but 710,000 public sector jobs are set to go; there is £158 billion more in borrowing than was planned a year ago—£6,500 more in borrowing for every household in this country—and there is the cost of rising unemployment. That is the cost of the failure of the Chancellor’s plan. As for the Deputy Prime Minister’s contribution, we have a cobbled-together replacement for the future jobs fund that is judged by the OBR to have no impact at all on employment and zero impact on jobs. I have to say to the Chancellor and to the Chief Secretary that protecting our economy, businesses, jobs and family finances is more important than trying to protect a failing plan and their failing reputations.
I am very grateful. The right hon. Gentleman keeps making his argument about borrowing, but is it not completely undone by the fact that according to the OBR forecasts, borrowing has fallen and is set to fall over the next five years, and then debt will fall once it is under control? Can he answer the question that neither the shadow Chief Secretary nor other shadow Treasury Ministers can answer? How can spending more money possibly lead to lower borrowing?
The economics of this are clear and easy to understand, which is why both the IMF and the OECD have made exactly the point that I am making. The fact is that the Government are borrowing £158 billion more than they planned, and the deficit is coming down much more slowly than was planned, because unemployment is going to be so much higher.
The issue is the pace at which we try to get the deficit down. If we try to get it down too fast, as the Chancellor did a year ago, it blows up in our faces. Growth and taxes slow down, unemployment goes up, and we end up borrowing £158 billion more. The right thing to do is to have a staged and balanced approach, get the economy moving, get people into jobs and get the deficit down. That is the only plan that will work.
Let me make an offer to the Chancellor. It is not too late to change course, and the deepening euro crisis makes it more important for him to see sense. If he does, we will back him—a new start, a second attempt. We read in The Daily Telegraph today about the Chancellor’s recent efforts to land a plane at Manchester airport—on a flight simulator, I should add, to reassure Members. There was too rapid a descent and a crash landing on the runway, narrowly missing ploughing into the terminal building. Too far, too fast—no surprises there. However, the Chancellor had a second go. With a little help from the experts and a steadier hand on the controls, things worked better the second time round. Perhaps there is a lesson for him in that story.
Perhaps the Chancellor should take my prescription after all. He claimed last week that a balanced plan to get our economy moving and to get the deficit down was like
“the promises of a quack doctor selling a miracle cure.”—[Official Report, 29 November 2011; Vol. 536, c. 810.]
Was not the Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman closer to the truth when he described Britain’s experiment in austerity as being
“like a medieval doctor bleeding his patient, observing that the patient is getting sicker, not better, and deciding that this calls for even more bleeding”?
The patient is crying out for a second opinion, and all we hear from the Chancellor is a call for more cuts and more leeches.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI understand the hon. Gentleman’s point. If, rather than preparing his intervention, he had listened to my last point, he would have understood why borrowing is already set to be £46 billion higher than the Chancellor planned. The reason is that if unemployment goes up, if the economy flatlines, if fewer people are paying tax and if more people are on benefits, you borrow more. In the hon. Gentleman’s constituency, 50 more people are unemployed than a year ago. Perhaps he should be apologising for backing a Chancellor who got it so badly wrong.
This increasingly desperate Chancellor is now relying on plan B—or should I say plan BOE? But quantitative easing cannot work on its own, and any sensible economist can tell him why that is. The new shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves), who is a former Bank of England economist, can certainly explain to the Chancellor why quantitative easing cannot do the job on its own. Whether the current Chief Secretary—the former national parks press officer—could explain to the Chancellor how quantitative easing works is another question. As the shadow Chief Secretary could very well explain—[Interruption.] Does the hon. Member for West Suffolk (Matthew Hancock) want to intervene? If so, I will happily take his intervention.
As a former Bank of England economist, may I explain to the shadow Chancellor that quantitative easing works only when one has a credible fiscal policy?
I am so pleased that the hon. Gentleman has made his intervention, because we have missed him for the past couple of debates, and now he is back. Last time he intervened on me, he put this on his website:
“Shadow Chancellor boosts Matthew’s work in West Suffolk”.
I want to do the same again. His campaigns to get more money for schools, to keep Thetford forest safe and to stop cuts to school crossing patrols are going well. The chief executive of his council has been sacked, and the Labour council in Ipswich has intervened and backed his campaign on school crossing controls and libraries. I have a quote from the shadow Chancellor for his press release: “Mr Hancock has been tireless in his campaign against unfair cuts to local services imposed by the Conservative-led Government—cuts which go too far and too fast.” He can leave the last bit out if he likes; I do not mind.
I will give way, but before I do, let me return to quantitative easing. As these Bank of England economists know well, simply printing money cannot boost demand and keep interest rates low when they are already close to zero. Printing money cannot boost spending when companies are too scared to invest and consumers to spend. QE—the hon. Gentleman should know this—cannot revive a stalling economy by boosting demand in one direction when fiscal policy is working in a contractionary way in completely the opposite direction. As the Bank of England Governor said only last week, and in this respect I agree with him:
“We can do our part in it but we can’t solve all our problems alone.”
I now give way to the hon. Gentleman.
The shadow Chancellor is famous for being a supporter of Norwich City football club, so will he join me in welcoming the decision to break ground on dualling the A11—an investment project that did not get the go-ahead under Labour and is happening under this Conservative Government?
I think the hon. Gentleman got the name wrong. He does not mean Norwich City—he means premiership Norwich City, which is more than one can say for any football team in Suffolk. I will back his campaigns to stop the cuts and to spend more, and I fully support the dualling of the A11. At last some Conservatives have persuaded some Conservative councils to do the right thing about these proposals, which is very good.
(13 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberFor a fleeting moment, I thought that I was in the wrong debate. It is always interesting to hear proposals put before the House by the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone).
Twelve months ago, at the time of last year’s Budget, unemployment was falling, growth was rising, inflation was low and stable, and we were on track to halve the deficit in four years. Indeed, because more people were in work, paying taxes and not receiving benefits, borrowing ended up £12 billion lower last year than was forecast the autumn before. However, there was still a long way to go. Following the biggest global financial crisis of the past century, we were getting back on the right track to get the deficit down and to restore our economy to sustainable growth.
One year on, the economic context for this Budget is radically different. Inflation is up to 4.4%, increasing prices for everyone and threatening a rise in mortgage rates. Unemployment, which was falling, is now rising to its highest level for 17 years. Consumer confidence has seen its biggest fall for nearly 20 years. Our economy, which was growing, has ground to a halt according to the latest figures. Just a few months ago in the autumn, we were told by the Prime Minister, among others, that the economy was out of the danger zone. However, on growth, inflation and unemployment, it appears that we are now re-entering the danger zone.
The question that families and businesses up and down the country will be asking is what changed over the past 12 months. Let me set out for the House what did change over the past 12 months. Yes, commodity prices have gone up. Yes, world oil prices are higher. Yes, we had a bad winter. However, other countries such as America, Germany and France have been similarly affected by higher oil and commodity prices and by bad weather, and their economies are still growing, unlike the British economy. Germany had worse snow than Britain, there was a big freeze in France and the US had the worst blizzards for decades, but their economies grew in the fourth quarter of last year. While our growth forecasts have worsened, theirs have improved. The German economy is forecast to grow more strongly than it was last year, as is the American economy. Growth in the world economy has been revised up. Which is the major economy that is now downgrading its growth forecasts? It is the United Kingdom.
Will the right hon. Gentleman accept and welcome the fact that the British economy is growing faster than the EU average, or will he continue to talk down the economy?
On the latest figures, the British economy was not growing at all—in fact, it had contracted by 0.6%.
I see the hon. Gentleman’s press releases regularly. They come across my desk two or three times a day. I want to give him some support. [Interruption.] I want to give him some support. The hon. Gentleman has a campaign to reverse the cancellation of funding for a dilapidated school in his constituency following the cancellation of Building Schools for the Future. I am right behind him. He has called for a new pedestrian crossing and to unblock the money for it, which is being blocked by a Tory council. I am with him. He has campaigned to keep his local library open. I am right behind him on that one. He wants to keep Thetford forest safe. Yes, I am with him on that one. He asks how we can deal with the pressures on the voluntary sector. I have to say, I think that he is in the wrong party.
Under Labour’s plan, the economy was set to grow strongly. [Interruption.] I have just given the hon. Gentleman more publicity than he had in three months from all those press releases.
I think the rise in VAT was a mistake, and I think the hon. Gentleman used to agree. I think that spending cuts this year are a mistake, and I think he used to agree with that too. I would halve the deficit over four years, and borrowing would have come in £20 billion lower—[Interruption.] I will answer the question. I set out more detailed spending cuts—in schools—than any other Cabinet Minister at that time. We said we would cut £1 billion from policing, and, for example, that we would go ahead with the disability living allowance gateway reforms. However, the scale and pace of the Government’s cuts are too deep and too fast, which is destabilising our economy. We were right to say, “Don’t make the cuts until the recovery is secure. If you make cuts on this scale before the recovery is secure, what do you end up with? No recovery at all.” That is the situation today.
I also remember the Chancellor saying that the Budget was progressive, and it turned out to be regressive, but my hon. Friend is being unfair to Liberal Democrat colleagues. They were not against a VAT rise; they were against a Tory VAT rise. Nick Clegg’s general election leaflets said, “Stop the Tory VAT bombshell,” and he never said, “Stop the Tory-Liberal Democrat VAT bombshell,” so my hon. Friend is being a little harsh on colleagues.
The right hon. Gentleman talks about international evidence, but why should we listen to him rather than to the OECD, the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and all major business organisations, which support the concept of dealing with our debt?
The hon. Gentleman needs to be careful with boastful interventions. Let me read out a quotation:
“The measures we have taken have been commended by international bodies such as the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the IMF and the OECD. They have also won the approval of the international markets.”
That is the financial statement of 9 December 2009 from the Irish Finance Minister. He is no longer in office, because he had OECD and IMF approval for a policy that drove unemployment up, growth down, confidence down and the deficit up. Does that not sound somewhat familiar? [Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman wants to make a third intervention, I shall happily take it, but perhaps he should reflect a little further before he puts out his next press release.
The Chancellor said yesterday that this was not a tax-raising Budget and he did not need to ask for a penny more. However, when we study the details of the Red Book—in table 2.1 on personal tax, the tax cuts from the personal allowance and the tax increases from the switch to the consumer prices index, and changes to national insurance contributions—we find that the tax increases are bigger than the tax cuts. That is the fact. The increase in the personal allowance, which the Liberal Democrats boasted about with such enthusiasm yesterday, is completely crushed by the CPI increase: that is there in the Red Book. The Chancellor said that he would not come along and mislead the House in his Budget, but that is exactly what he did.
We also found out that because the Government changed the indexation of national insurance and the personal allowance, and because many people in our country—disproportionately women—are in part-time work and on low wages, and pay national insurance but not income tax, yesterday was a tax rise for 400,000 of the lowest-paid workers in our country, disproportionately women and part-time workers. That never made it into the Chancellor’s speech, nor did he say that the personal allowance changes were worth £48 a year, but the VAT rise will cost the average family with children £450; that never cropped up in the speech either. Nor did he point out that the upgrading of the GDP deflator—the inflation measure—means that despite the Prime Minister’s promises last year that NHS spending would rise in real terms year by year, it will actually fall year by year. That is another broken promise from the Prime Minister.
Many business people will be asking, “Why didn’t we have a Budget that did a bit more for growth?” It looks as if I was right in Treasury questions on Tuesday when I suggested to the Chancellor that his growth strategy was so flimsy he needed to beef it up, because he has now cut corporation tax by 1p, which is welcome, and is paying for it through measures on tax avoidance, which is also welcome. However, paragraph B.13 of the OBR’s Budget document reads:
“The OBR was notified of the change to corporation tax and the 1p cut in fuel duty…too late to incorporate any indirect effect of these measures in the economy forecast.”
I do not think he told the OBR until the afternoon before. However, it was able to give some clarity. It said that it believed that
“any such effects would have been minimal.”
This growth strategy has been produced with fanfare and much delay, but since publication his own independent auditor, the OBR, has said that it will have no impact on growth and jobs in our economy. Is that not the reality?
An alternative was open to the Chancellor, and it was one that I have set down. He could have decided to follow the American example and cut the deficit at a steadier pace in order to strengthen growth and lower unemployment.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am happy to accept my hon. Friend’s clarification on that point.
The context for this legislation includes the largest cuts to policing that we have seen, police officers losing their jobs through A19 powers and a freeze on recruitment across the country, at a time when the security threat is rising. The Home Secretary and the business managers have chosen the day on which the cuts have been announced to ask for support for the risky experiment in police accountability that is elected police commissioners. The coalition has no mandate and no evidence base for that reform. It has not done a proper consultation and it has failed to win the active support of either the police or the public.
Before the election, when the then Home Secretary was asked whether he could promise that police numbers would not be cut under Labour, he replied “No.” Is not that and this nonsense about the Olympics budget why nobody is listening to the right hon. Gentleman as shadow Home Secretary?
I will answer the hon. Gentleman’s previous erroneous intervention before I give him a second go to see whether he can do better. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, an independent body, said that it was possible to make reductions of 12% in the central Government grant over four years, without cutting front-line policing, as we heard last week. The Government are pushing through savings not of 12% but of 20%, and they are doing so not over four years but by front-loading them, so that the biggest cuts are in the first two years. As police authorities say, it is impossible to make such cuts without cutting front-line policing capability. If what we proposed was being done, cuts to front-line police numbers—indeed, cuts to all police numbers—would be avoided. Under the coalition, there will be cuts to front-line policing. No Government Members were elected on such a manifesto, and they will be held to account in the coming months and years. I happily give way to the hon. Gentleman so that he can have a second go.
I do not mind being held to account for sorting out the nation’s finances. The right hon. Gentleman should answer the question. He said that my intervention were erroneous. When the previous Home Secretary was asked whether he could guarantee to protect police budgets from being cut, did he not say, “No”?
The hon. Gentleman knows the answer to his own question. He can wave his arms around in a histrionic way, but the reality is that the previous Home Secretary said that he could not guarantee the individual decision of every chief constable of the 43 forces. However, he said that on the basis of a 12% reduction over four years, there would be no need for any reduction in police numbers. Under the coalition, the Police Federation estimates that 20,000 officers will be cut. We know that 1,100 officers will be cut in Birmingham and that 1,400 will be cut in Greater Manchester. The difference is that under our proposals there would have been no cuts to police numbers, and under the coalition proposals there will be cuts in every constituency and in every police force in the country. Those cuts will be made worse by the additional expenditure on the ridiculous and flawed proposals before us.