Contracts for Difference (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Regulations 2025

Earl of Effingham Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2025 Grand Committee

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, before I turn to the SI, I will respond to a couple of the points the noble Lord, Lord Frost, has made. We shared a Select Committee, so I absolutely respect the noble Lord’s right to say what he wants to say. The noble Lord argued for the need to include all costs, but part of the calculations of using or continuing to use fossil fuels is that we do not continue to account for all the consequences of burning fossil fuels. The OBR has just this week said that that far outweighs any cost that we might spend on renewable energy. Prices are going down: solar and wind are the cheapest forms of energy, and they provide constant energy security. The noble Lord knows that gas sets the market price 96% of the time.

On the regulations, we broadly welcome this plan to bolster our nation’s energy security and accelerate the transition to clean power. We commend the Government on their intention further to update and reinforce the contracts for difference process that has been the backbone of our nation’s renewable energy transition. These draft Contracts for Difference (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Regulations 2025 represent an important update intend to fine-tune the CfD process to bring about a more efficient use of budgets, improve the bid management process and consider extra support for the UK industry.

We particularly welcome the continued focus on boosting our domestic industry through the clean industry bonus, CIB, referred to in these regulations as the “sustainable industry reward”. The first round of the CIB was a success, more than doubling its budget from £200 million to £544 million and leveraging up to £9 billion of investment in UK supply chains.

I agree with the Government: this is an unprecedented amount earmarked for UK factories and ports, particularly in our country’s poorest areas, fostering jobs and growth through the supply chains. We also support the intention for these costs to be accurately included in the Ofgem price cap, as these regulations ensure, which aids future transparency and fair accounting.

The regulations make three main changes. First, they amend the contract budget notice publication process for price and pot notices and the final contract budget notice signing within the allocation framework. Secondly, they amend the information that the Secretary of State has access to. The Secretary of State now gains access to anonymised strike price bids at any time, supported by an estimated budget to improve budget management and help prevent underspend. Finally, they include clean industry bonus payments in the Low Carbon Contracts Company’s calculations.

We generally welcome the spirit behind these notifications. I have some questions for the Minister. The first seeks to ensure that we get value for money and consumer costs. The changes will allow the budgets to be set at a price that balances value for the consumer with the development ambitions. However, given the significant investment involved—allocation round six was a record-breaking £1.5 billion for 127 projects generating 7.2 gigawatts, and AR7 is due to be even larger—how will Ministers ensure that the new-found flexibility generally translates into lower strike prices for offshore wind and ultimately lower costs for consumers? How can we be certain that value for money is not sacrificed in the rush to pursue record capacity?

Turning to competitive tensions and the risk of bid inflation, while the Government intend to review anonymised bid information and maintain anonymity, there is a risk that bidders might aim to obscure true costs and competitive tensions could be perceived as lacking, potentially leading to higher clearing prices, especially if there is a perception of an unlimited budget for AR7. Will the Government clarify what controls there are on the powers to mitigate any possible negative impacts from these changes?

Finally, turning to monitoring, evaluation and swift course correction, the Explanatory Memorandum details plans and processes for evaluations, robust monitoring and a post-implementation review five years after these changes take place. Five years is a long time in a rapidly evolving marketplace. I ask the Minister for reassurance about the specifics on the key performance indicators that will be rigorously tracked to assess the effectiveness of these legislative changes after each allocation round. How will any insights from each round and their implications lead to changes in processes before the next round?

We need to be careful that we do not get any market distortions from these regulations. I do not think that will be the case, but there is a need within the evaluation process to check that that is not happening.

We support the ambition to make Britain a clean energy superpower. This will help bring down bills, provide energy security, green jobs and growth and help get us off the rollercoaster of dependence on international gas markets. The Government need to bring forward proposals to lower energy bills, although that sits outside this SI. I simply seek reassurance on the points I have raised with the Minister.

[The Earl of Effingham (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the purpose of this instrument. These regulations make what may be described as technical adjustments to the CfD regime. However, in practice, they signal significant changes to the principles that underpin the scheme’s operation: transparency, predictability and fairness. The CfD mechanism has been a cornerstone of our low-carbon transition, driving record levels of renewable deployment, while securing value for consumers. That credibility depends on its rules being clear, impartial and competitively neutral.

This instrument makes three changes that in His Majesty’s loyal Opposition’s view merit particular scrutiny. First, as highlighted by my noble friend Lord Frost, it allows the Secretary of State to view anonymised bid data before finalising the budget for an allocation round. This breaks the long-standing principle that all participants bid on a level playing field based on pre-published terms. Ministerial discretion inserted into the process after seeing how the market has responded risks undermining confidence in the integrity of the auction.

Secondly, as also flagged by my noble friend Lord Frost, by delaying the publication of the final budget until after that review, the Government will have the ability to shape outcomes post hoc. However well-intentioned, that is potentially a slippery slope. It introduces uncertainty, opens the doors to perceived political interference and may ultimately deter long-term investors who value predictable rules-based frameworks.

Thirdly, the decision to reclassify the costs of the sustainable industry reward so that they are now recovered through Ofgem’s price cap means that these costs will be passed directly on to consumers. At a time when the cost of living is rising and households are under pressure, the perception is that a stealth measure introduced without full parliamentary scrutiny or a fully transparent impact assessment should not be made. What safeguards will be put in place to ensure that this new discretion over budgets does not distort the process or erode trust among participants? Has the department undertaken any modelling of how these changes might affect bidding behaviour, strike prices or project delivery timelines? What assurances can be given to consumers that the inclusion of new costs in the price cap calculation will not place additional upward pressure on their energy bills?

In conclusion, although these changes may be framed as flexible and technical, they represent a shift in the balance of power from an impartial auction model to one in which Ministers can influence the outcome after bids have been seen. That raises fundamental questions about fairness, efficiency and consumer protection. We urge the Minister to explain why such discretion is necessary and how its use will be accountable to Parliament.

[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords again for a good debate, with some incisive observations made by noble Lords opposite. This Government are steadfastly committed to deploying renewables in order to achieve our ambition for clean power by 2030 and to protect bill payers both now and in future. The instrument under discussion today will enable us to adapt CfDs so that they can support the delivery of our ambition for clean power by 2030 at the lowest cost to consumers.

Having said that, let me respond to the questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Frost. In an unstable world, the only ways both to guarantee our energy security and to protect bill payers permanently are to keep energy bills down for good and to speed up the transition away from fossil fuels towards home-grown, clean energy. During periods when wholesale electricity prices are higher than the fixed CfD strike price awarded, generators pay the difference back into the scheme, which can help reduce energy bills. This happened when wholesale electricity prices spiked during the energy bill crisis of 2022-23; over that winter, CfD payments reduced the amount needed to fund government energy support schemes by around £18 for a typical household. The budget underspend that has been referred to is a result of the allocation—