Contracts for Difference (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 3) Regulations 2025
(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)
Read Full debate
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government have committed to achieving clean power by 2030 and the contracts for difference—CfD—scheme will play a key role in achieving that ambition. The clean power action plan, published in December last year, outlined several key reforms to the CfD scheme ahead of allocation round 7 opening this August. Following a robust public consultation process, we published our consultation response, which set out that legislative changes are needed to enable the Government to reach clean power 2030 and enable a fair price for consumers.
The draft SI will enable changes to the allocation process to ensure that our clean power 2030 ambitions are met and that consumers pay a fair price. It amends the Contracts for Difference (Allocation) Regulations 2014 budget publication process and the information that the Secretary of State will have access to during the allocation round. With access to anonymised bids and by changing the budget publication process, the Secretary of State will be able to set budgets for CfDs that maximise good value capacity deployment for clean power 2030 and avoid the outcome seen in allocation round 6, where an unspent budget for fixed-bottom offshore wind meant that a potential opportunity to secure additional projects at a good price was lost.
These amendments mean that the Government can bring forward renewable capacity that represents value for money, which will benefit consumers by moving the country away from volatile fossil fuel prices. The instrument also amends regulations to enable the costs of the clean industry bonus to be included in the Ofgem price cap. There needs to be a specific provision in the relevant regulations that allows the CIB to be counted as a specific bill cost as part of wider CfD costs. This is a technical change; the rest of the CIB regulations are already in place. It will ensure that the price cap captures all the relevant factors that might impact on it.
These draft regulations represent an important step in ensuring that we achieve clean power 2030 and protect bill payers now and into the future. They make the necessary amendments to enable the CfDs to adapt as we head towards clean power 2030. This will enable us to maximise renewables deployment at a fair cost to consumers. I beg to move.
Lord Frost (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as an unpaid director of the campaign group Net Zero Watch. I think the Secretary of State for Energy is at the moment giving a Statement in the Commons on the state of the climate and energy in which he promised—or, at least, briefed—that there would be some radical truth telling. It may be useful to do a bit of that ourselves in this discussion. In particular, there are two areas of concern before I come on to the detail of this instrument.
First, the Government’s policy is based on the incorrect belief that renewables are cheaper than gas. There are different figures out there, of course, but independent commentators show that if you include all the subsidy costs, grid balancing costs and capacity market costs, onshore wind is about twice as expensive per megawatt hour as gas, offshore wind is two and a half times as expensive, and floating offshore is three times as expensive. Even solar, which is perhaps the most of viable of any of these renewables, is 50% more expensive. That is the first incorrect belief.
The second incorrect belief is that prices will go down rather than up, which has been very well debated recently. According to data from the International Energy Agency, Britain had, as is well known, the most expensive industrial and domestic energy prices in 2023. The data for 2024, in so far as we have it, shows that we have the most expensive industrial energy prices in Europe, and now only the fourth most expensive domestic energy prices. However, gas prices are about average for Europe, which strongly suggests that, contrary to everything that is said, gas prices are not driving the high costs. In fact, it is the subsidy, the balancing costs, the capacity market and the inflated capital costs—all of which, by the way, the OBR predicts will increase rather than decrease over the next few years. All those are driving higher prices.
The Government have to pretend to believe the things that I just outlined; I do not know whether they really believe them, but they certainly have to pretend to. The problem is that doing so makes it difficult to run a proper renewables policy, and that is why AR6—allocation round 6—was such a fiasco. As the Explanatory Memorandum says, AR6 constituted a
“budget underspend for offshore wind”.
Alternatively put, renewables producers would not supply at the prices that were offered, so there was an underspend. If renewables are as cheap as the Government say they are, why should that be the case?
Therefore, the Government badly need AR7 to be a success. They need this vast expansion of renewables, whatever the cost, if they are to decarbonise by 2030. But developers are getting cold feet; we saw it in AR6, and we have seen the cancellation of projects since then. Hence this statutory instrument is a different approach. It is very complex and obfuscatory, in the way we have come to expect, and there are many technicalities, but the core of it, as various commentators have set out, is that instead of setting a budget and seeing what capacity the Government can get for the money, they are setting a capacity ambition, seeing what bids come in and then seeing what they have to pay to get that capacity. That is why the Secretary of State needs this anonymised data early and why they need to delay publishing the budget until all this has been assessed. The Government hope that no one will notice what is going on if it is done in this technical way in the statutory instrument, but I am afraid it is a scandal, because we will see prices and budgets go up, and we will not get a proper explanation for it.
I have two other points to make on the instrument. The consultation on it, which the Minister referred to and described as “robust”, involved developers, electricity traders—I quote the Explanatory Memorandum—
“businesses operating in the offshore wind sector”
and “environmental groups”. Those, of course, are all producers. What about actual businesses that have to use energy or electricity and have to deal with the increased energy costs and complexity that come as a result? We know what the consequence is and we know why they did not consult them. It is because they know that prices will go up. We know that because, in the industrial strategy announced a couple of weeks ago, the Government have had to pick sectors and subsidise their energy costs to make their operations viable.
My second point is about the security risk of all this. We all saw what happened in Iberia a couple of months ago as a result of excessive reliance on renewables. The Government say that they are investing in nuclear, gas and, to the extent they can, storage, but, of course, none of this will be ready by 2030.
I shall finish with three questions. First, can the Minister tell us how much the Government expect to spend on the AR7 budget? If prices are falling, why will it not be less than AR6? Can he tell us how much consumer prices are expected to fall as a result of the constant fall, as we are supposed to believe, in the cost of renewables? Secondly, if they did not consult consumers of electricity on this SI and the new methodology, can they commit to doing so in future on similar instruments? Thirdly, can the Government tell us how they expect to fill the gap in production that renewables create before the new gas, nuclear and storage come online well after 2030?