Earl Howe
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Investigatory Powers Bill
Earl Howe Excerpts(8 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, my noble friend and I decided that I would be the one to confess how difficult I find it to understand Clause 151(5), so this is a probing amendment. I managed to make some progress in following the trail between different clauses and subsections this morning, but it involved something like copying and pasting chunks of wording in my head. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could explain straightforwardly what follows from modifying a bulk acquisition warrant so that it no longer authorises or requires telecoms operators to do what is listed in Clause 146(5)(a). We are told to disregard Clause 151(2)(a), but the same criteria are then brought in by reference to Clause 146(1)(a) and Clause 146(2). I am sorry to be dim, but we decided that this probably justified seeking a short explanation.
I have complimented the draftsmen of the Bill—and I do not resile from that—as it is very helpful to have references to where definitions are to be found and so on, but given the complexity of the subject matter, this is a plea for the Bill to say, for example, “If a warrant is modified so that there is no requirement on a telecoms operator, then, in the case of renewal, the following”. That would have caused slightly less of a scrambled brain. I beg to move.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Baroness has explained, Amendment 210ZA relates to the modification of a bulk acquisition warrant for the purpose of allowing examination of material after acquisition has ceased. Here, we come back to the issue that we debated earlier in relation to Amendments 201ZC and 217C, which covered bulk interception and bulk equipment interference warrants. The amendment would remove important technical provisions from the Bill—a point that I made in that earlier debate.
The Bill enables a bulk acquisition warrant to be modified such that it no longer authorises the acquisition of any material but continues to authorise the selection of material for examination. The circumstances catered for here are limited to a situation where it may no longer be necessary or possible to continue the collection of data, such as where a communications service provider goes out of business, but the data collected up to that point under a warrant remain pertinent. In circumstances such as those, it may continue to be necessary and proportionate to examine data that have already been collected under that warrant.
Clause 151(5), which the amendment would remove, simply clarifies that a warrant that has been modified in that way remains a valid bulk warrant if the Secretary of State considers that examination of the acquired data remains necessary and it is approved by a judicial commissioner. That is necessary because Clause 146(5) states that one of the conditions of the warrant is that its main purpose is to acquire data. But, of course, a warrant that has been modified in the manner I have described will no longer meet that condition because it will no longer authorise the collection of data.
I hope that that explanation clarifies any uncertainty in the noble Baroness’s mind and that she will agree that these provisions are necessary.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is extremely helpful, and I got an example without asking for it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(a) ”
“(5) The operational purposes specified in the warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services (“the list of operational purposes”), as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which material obtained under bulk equipment interference warrants may be selected for examination.”
(6A) An operational purpose may be specified in the list of operational purposes only with the approval of the Secretary of State.(6B) The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 164(1)(b) or (2).(6C) At the end of each relevant three-month period, the Secretary of State must give a copy of the list of operational purposes to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.(6D) In subsection (6C), “relevant three-month period” means—(a) the period of three months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, and(b) each successive period of three months.(6E) The Prime Minister must review the list of operational purposes at least once a year.”
Earl Howe
My Lords, this is the first group of amendments specific to Part 7, which relates to bulk personal datasets. In moving Amendment 218 I shall speak also to Amendments 219, 226 and 232.
The Government agreed in the other place that we should provide further restrictions on the use of class BPD warrants, and the new clause provided by Amendment 219 and the consequential changes made by Amendments 218 and 232 honour that commitment.
This builds on Clause 187, “Additional safeguards for health records”, previously introduced in the other place. That clause states that a dataset that includes health records can be retained under a specific BPD warrant only if there are exceptional and compelling circumstances to do so.
Lord Paddick
My Lords, I will speak to our Amendments 218A, 218B, 219A, 223A and 223D, and question whether Clauses 185 and 186 should stand part of the Bill. The purpose of Amendments 218A and 218B, and of the question whether Clauses 185 and 186 should stand part of the Bill, is to ensure that each bulk personal dataset is separately authorised by the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner, and to exclude class bulk personal dataset warrants. It is our intention not to disallow specific bulk dataset warrants, but to remove class bulk personal dataset warrants from the Bill.
Both the Joint Committee on the Bill and the Intelligence and Security Committee recommended that class bulk personal datasets should be removed from the Bill, yet they remain part of it. The Intelligence and Security Committee reported that the acquisition, retention and examination of any bulk personal dataset is sufficiently intrusive that it should require a specific warrant. I accept what the noble Earl said on working with the ISC to try to meet it half way by adding these additional safeguards, but we maintain that it still does not go far enough, because bulk personal datasets containing private information on a large number of people are of no relevant or legitimate interest to the agencies.
I appreciate that the amendments we have proposed do not make every amendment necessary to completely remove the provision of class bulk personal datasets from the Bill, but at this stage we believe it is sufficient to raise the point of principle. I ask the Minister to justify going against the recommendations of the Joint Committee and the ISC.
Amendment 219A is an amendment to government Amendment 219. It would require the head of the intelligence service to consult the judicial commissioner when deciding whether the nature of a bulk personal dataset acquired through a class bulk personal dataset warrant requires a separate warrant. It would require consultation with the judicial commissioner where there is a sense from the head of the security services that a particular bulk personal dataset requires separate authorisation.
Amendment 223A relates to Clause 186(6), which states that a separate warrant is not required to retain and examine a bulk personal dataset that may reasonably be regarded as a replacement for a bulk personal dataset for which a warrant already exists—for example, the latest edition of the electoral roll. The amendment would exempt from this automatic authority for a replacement dataset—
Earl Howe
It may be for the convenience of the Committee to appreciate, as I understand it, that the noble Lord would like to put this group with the group that I think was originally separated out; that is, the group beginning with government Amendment 221. Is it his wish that we should deal with everything comprehensively in one go or shall we split the groups as originally proposed?
Lord Paddick
I do apologise; perhaps I have an out of date list. It would be helpful if we could deal with all these matters together if that is possible. The noble Earl indicates that it is and I am grateful.
Amendment 223A refers to Clause 186(6), which states that a separate warrant is not required to retain and examine a bulk personal dataset that may reasonably be regarded as a replacement for an updated bulk personal dataset for which a warrant already exists. The amendment seeks to exempt from this automatic authority a replacement dataset which contains new and additional information that was not included in the original bulk dataset. For example, if a new electoral roll was to contain the email addresses of voters as a new category of information, a new warrant would be required even though it might be considered a replacement for a bulk personal dataset that was already in existence.
Amendment 223C refers to Clause 187 and the definition of “health record” under subsection (6)(c). It states that a,
“‘health record’ means a record, or a copy of a record, which … was obtained by the intelligence service from a health professional”.
Should this not be “would be obtained” to cover the situation where the authority to obtain the record was not given? Whether something is a health record or not should not depend on whether it has or has not been obtained by the intelligence service.
Amendment 223D requires that the judicial commissioner who approves bulk personal dataset warrants, in addition to those matters contained in Clause 188(1)(a), should also consider in the case of health records the additional safeguards set out in Clause 187(3); that is, that there are “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. Following on from our previous amendment, we would say exceptional and compelling,
“circumstances ‘relating to national security’”.
Earl Howe
My Lords, given that we are grouping everything together in the way we have agreed, perhaps it would be appropriate if I complete my remarks on the government amendments before addressing the noble Lord’s amendments. The amendments that I have not yet spoken to are government Amendments 221 and 222. These are related to and consequential on the government amendments introducing restrictions on the use of class warrants that I have already spoken to. They are part of a set of amendments that honour the Government’s commitments in the other place that we should provide further restrictions on the use of class BPD warrants. Amendments 221 and 222 amend Clause 186, which makes provision for specific BPD warrants. In particular, Amendment 221 adds to the circumstances in which an agency may apply for a specific BPD warrant the situation in which it is prevented from relying on a class BPD warrant by the new clause placing restrictions on the use of those warrants that we debated earlier. Amendment 222 builds on this by placing an obligation on the agency in such circumstances to include an explanation of why it cannot rely on a class BPD warrant in its application for a specific BPD warrant. These amendments thus ensure that the provisions in the Bill setting out the circumstances in which class and specific BPD warrants should be used will operate coherently together. These amendments thus also respond to the constructive engagements we have had with the ISC and the other place.
Turning to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I understand that the intention behind Amendments 219A and 218B and the stand part debate is to remove the provisions allowing for class BPD warrants. Perhaps it is worth reminding ourselves that class BPD warrants provide an appropriate means of authorising the retention and use of datasets that are similar both in nature and in the level of intrusion that their retention and use would result in. This would, for example, allow the Secretary of State to authorise a class of dataset relating to travel covering datasets that are similar in nature but refer to different travel routes, or perhaps where they were provided by different sources. The decision to issue a warrant for a particular class of data would be subject to approval by a judicial commissioner before being issued.
Removing class warrants would increase bureaucracy without increasing safeguards. It is also unnecessary because such warrants are subject to the “double lock” authorisation process by a Secretary of State and judicial commissioner. If they considered that a class bulk personal dataset warrant was too broad, they would not issue it.
It is quite true that the ISC and the Joint Committee which scrutinised the draft Bill did not endorse class BPD warrants in their original reports on the draft Bill, but the ISC’s view on this has changed. As the chair of the ISC said at Third Reading of the Bill in the other place,
“we then had further evidence—as has happened in the dialogue with the Government and the agencies—in particular from the Secret Intelligence Service, about the rationale for retaining class warrants in the Bill. In particular, the evidence highlighted the fact that many of these datasets covered the same information or type of information. In those circumstances, we considered that a class warrant would be appropriate, as the privacy considerations were identical”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/16; col. 1063.]
He then made additional comments on restrictions on their use. The Government accepted in principle the ISC’s arguments for restrictions on the use of class BPD warrants, and we have already discussed amendments brought forward by the Government to reflect this. So I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord will want to think further about those amendments that seek to excise class BPD warrants.
Amendment 219A adds to Amendment 219—the government new clause on restricting use of class bulk personal dataset warrants—that the judicial commissioner must be consulted before a decision is taken. This is an unnecessary amendment. The Secretary of State and judicial commissioner double lock will apply not only to new class and specific BPD warrants, but also to renewals of both types of warrants. This gives them effective oversight of the datasets that appear under each type of warrant. These decisions will also be subject to retrospective oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. To add another pre-consultation is not necessary or efficient. Moreover, the draft code of practice includes detailed guidance on when a specific BPD warrant should be sought. It also makes it clear, for example, that if required in an individual case, the security and intelligence agency can seek guidance from the Secretary of State or a judicial commissioner on whether it would be appropriate for a specific BPD warrant to be sought. So again, I hope that the noble Lord will want to reflect further on that amendment.
Amendment 223A would restrict the extent to which a specific BPD warrant could extend to replacement datasets. In effect, it would mean that only absolutely identical datasets could be covered by these provisions. The provision for a replacement dataset would be relevant only where a specific BPD warrant has been authorised and is already in place. The provision is a pragmatic and sensible approach to situations where a dataset is regularly or continually updated; for example, a particular dataset may be updated weekly or monthly. These updates would, by definition, include additional information, but in these cases the necessity and proportionality case and operational purposes would not alter. To require repeated new warrants in this scenario would not be proportionate; the notion of a replacement dataset allows the agencies to use these amended and updated data in line with the existing authorisation. Again, I hope the noble Lord will find that acceptable.
“Restriction on use of class BPD warrants
(1) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, a bulk personal dataset in reliance on a class BPD warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers—(a) that the bulk personal dataset consists of, or includes, health records, or(b) that a substantial proportion of the bulk personal dataset consists of sensitive personal data.(2) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, a bulk personal dataset in reliance on a class BPD warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers that the nature of the bulk personal dataset, or the circumstances in which it was created, is or are such that its retention, or retention and examination, by the intelligence service raises novel or contentious issues which ought to be considered by the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner on an application by the head of the intelligence service for a specific BPD warrant.(3) In subsection (1)—“health records” has the same meaning as in section 187;“sensitive personal data” means personal data consisting of information about an individual (whether living or deceased) which is of a kind mentioned in section 2(a) to (f) of the Data Protection Act 1998.”
“( ) The fact that a class BPD warrant would authorise the retention, or the retention and examination, of bulk personal datasets relating to activities in the British Islands of a trade union is not, of itself, sufficient to establish that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3)(a).”
(i) the intelligence service is prevented by section (Restriction on use of class BPD warrants)(1) or (2) from retaining, or retaining and examining, the bulk personal dataset in reliance on the class BPD warrant, or(ii) ”
(a) ”
“(5) The operational purposes specified in a class BPD warrant or a specific BPD warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services (“the list of operational purposes”), as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which data contained in bulk personal datasets retained in reliance on class BPD warrants or specific BPD warrants may be selected for examination.”
(6A) An operational purpose may be specified in the list of operational purposes only with the approval of the Secretary of State.(6B) The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 185(3)(a) or (as the case may be) section 186(5)(a).(6C) At the end of each relevant three-month period, the Secretary of State must give a copy of the list of operational purposes to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.(6D) In subsection (6C), “relevant three-month period” means—(a) the period of three months beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, and(b) each successive period of three months.(6E) The Prime Minister must review the list of operational purposes at least once a year.(6F) In this Part, “the specified operational purposes”, in relation to a class BPD warrant or a specific BPD warrant, means the operational purposes specified in the warrant in accordance with this section.”