Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateEarl Howe
Main Page: Earl Howe (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Earl Howe's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(9 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall first address a concern that several noble Lords have flagged up most prominently: that the regulations are not sufficiently clear that the duties that we are talking about here are duties on providers rather than individuals. The regulations apply to registered persons. Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 makes it clear that in legislation “person” includes not only natural persons but legal persons, such as companies. Under the Health and Social Care Act 2008, the registered persons are providers, not individual members of staff.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked why the clause does not list the bodies covered by the Bill. The clause amends Section 20 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008. It is the 2008 Act which sets out who the regulations apply to. They apply to registered persons who, under the Act, are the providers, not individual staff, as I said. He also asked whether almost all providers would be likely to be in breach of the regulations for one reason or another. The clause amends the Secretary of State’s regulation-making powers. It would not by itself impose requirements on providers. Those requirements will be as laid down in the fundamental standards regulations, to which I shall come in a moment. On the specific example that the noble Lord gave, where a surgeon did not engage meaningfully with the WHO checklist prior to an operation, my answer is that that would be a disciplinary issue for the employer and/or the professional regulator, if it became known.
That is an extremely helpful answer, but will it be made absolutely clear to employers in the guidelines to be issued alongside the regulations that they have not only a right to take disciplinary action but a duty to do so? If that is set from the centre, that will give a lot of authority to boards, which they sometimes feel that they do not have at the moment.
That is a very important point, which I shall be happy to take away.
Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Turnberg and Lord Warner, would replace the reference to “no avoidable harm” with “take steps to reduce” avoidable harm. I accept that in some settings regulated by the CQC, including the NHS, that phrase may better reflect the scale of what can be achieved. However, regulation by the CQC is not just about the NHS. In the case of some health and adult social care services, I believe that it is reasonable to strive to eradicate all avoidable harm. It is for that reason that I prefer the current wording. Yes, it is more ambitious, but its ambition contains an incentive to strive towards a continuous reduction of avoidable harm across all settings regulated by the CQC.
The amendment would also result in requirements on providers to monitor the steps they take to reduce avoidable harm and to train staff in the reduction of avoidable harm. That is clearly desirable, but I must question whether it needs to be a duty set out in primary legislation. The training of staff in reducing avoidable harm is important, and Section 20(3)(d) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 already expressly provides for regulations to include requirements on the training of staff.
The fundamental standards regulations, to which I referred a minute ago, which were passed by this House in November and come into force in April, already meet the test of the Bill, and no change to regulations is required. The fundamental standards require that care and treatment is provided in a safe way for service users. They give the CQC power to take action against providers where a failure to take steps to provide care in a safe way results in avoidable harm.
The regulations are breached not whenever avoidable harm occurs, but where there has been a significant failure effectively to manage the risks of harm. They are clear that that involves assessing the risks and taking steps to mitigate them. They ensure that staff have the right skills and qualifications, that premises and equipment are safe and that medicines are properly managed. They also require providers to have systems in place to assess, monitor and improve the quality and safety of services.
Noble Lords have cautioned that the clause might lead to staff taking a risk-averse approach. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, expressed the concern that it could encourage staff to lose sight of the patient and instead focus on covering up mistakes. I firmly believe that the reverse is the case. What it does is to underpin our efforts to strive for the very thing so strongly advocated by the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg: an open reporting culture where identifying errors helps organisations to improve the safety of care. Where providers take the steps to manage the risk to safety, front-line staff can focus on the needs of patients and service users, content in the knowledge that the environment in which they work promotes safety and quality.
Our debate up to now has perhaps given the erroneous impression that the fundamental standards are just about the systems and processes. They are not. They focus on the outcomes of care and treatment. The new regulations, which come into force in less than three weeks, place patients and service users at the heart of service provision. They require that treatment and care meet the needs of service users and reflect their preferences. They prohibit providers from providing care without consent. They also put in place a new duty of candour that requires providers to inform service users where there have been failings in their care.
In those ways, patients and service users are central to the fundamental standards. Clause 1 rightly ensures that safety and the reduction of avoidable harm will always be the foundation of the regulatory system operated by the CQC.
I turn to Amendment 4, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I am confident that all noble Lords share the same objective as that of Clause 1, which is to place patient safety at the heart of the delivery of services. The Committee will be aware of the importance that the Government place on improving safety. The recent report of the Morecambe Bay investigation has re-emphasised that that is the right approach. Moving towards the reduction of avoidable harm requires action across the health and social care system.
I agree with those who say that the main way to reduce avoidable harm is through changes in culture. None the less, there is also a role for legislation. The role of the law in this area is straightforward: it can define minimum acceptable standards and introduce ways to protect patients who are put at risk when those standards are not met. It provides a safety net that protects people from harm.
I stress that the regulations issued under Section 20 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, which Clause 1 amends, apply to registered providers of health and adult social care in England. There are two important points here. First, the regulations do not apply to individual members of staff but to the providers of care. In that respect, they offer protection to staff as well as to patients and service users. Secondly, the scope of the regulations is not restricted to the health service but applies also to adult social care. In that respect, the scope of the clause is broader than that of the noble Baroness’s amendment. For that reason, I prefer the current wording, which offers the same protection to patients and service users wherever they receive care, not just in the NHS.
The noble Baroness asked whether the clause applies to all care organisations, including those in the voluntary sector. All providers of regulated activities must register with the CQC and meet the registration requirements, including voluntary sector and independent sector providers. She also asked whether the regulations will be consulted on and subject to affirmative resolution. The answer to both questions is yes, but having said that, the fundamental standards regulations are consistent with the objective of Clause 1. Those regulations were consulted on and were subject to affirmative resolution. Any future regulations amending or replacing those regulations would also be consulted on and, unless the changes are minor, would be subject to affirmative resolution.
Can the Minister clarify something for me, because I am increasingly puzzled? He keeps talking about the fundamental regulations which are coming into force in three weeks’ time being consistent with Clause 1. If they are consistent with Clause 1 as they are framed, why do we need Clause 1?
What Clause 1 does is to amend the provision whereby the Secretary of State may require the CQC to have safety as its prime objective to one where it must have that requirement as its prime objective. That is what Clause 1 essentially does, so there is a good reason for having the Bill alongside the regulations.
I am sorry but this is quite a key point. If the Minister is right and those regulations were drafted in accordance with the law as it stood before this Bill, they presumably make the same requirement. The Minister is saying that they meet the requirements of the Bill. I still cannot reconcile why you need to change the law, particularly if we are now into “may” and “must” territory, which always delights your Lordships’ House. I am obviously being very dim but I still cannot understand why you need to change the law—the primary legislation—but do not then need to revisit the regulations which were made under other primary legislation. I thought I saw the Minister proceeding, uncharacteristically, with a degree of caution on this. There is an issue here on which, so far, the Government have not given me a particularly convincing explanation.
I am very sorry that I have not given that explanation clearly enough. The point was well drawn out at Second Reading by my noble friend Lord Ribeiro that what Clause 1 essentially does is to bring patient safety absolutely to the fore in the context of the CQC’s work. That is entirely consistent with the approach that we took in the fundamental standards regulations which, as the noble Lord knows, flowed out of the work done by Sir Robert Francis QC in his report on Mid Staffordshire. If I can be clearer to the noble Lord before the conclusion of this debate, I will be glad to do so but I find it difficult to say more than I already have on this.
The noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, asked about the CQC’s guidance. Its guidance on the new fundamental standards has been consulted on. The CQC has a range of actions that it can take when a provider does not meet the fundamental standards, ranging from a warning notice to cancelling registration. The CQC’s enforcement policy is clear that any action that it takes will be proportionate to the risks to patients and that its most serious sanctions will be used only in response to the most serious service failings.
My Lords, would another way of addressing the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Warner, be to say that Clause 1 removes from the Secretary of State a discretion to produce regulations which are not as satisfactory as the current ones are?
My Lords, I listened extremely carefully to what the noble Earl has just said and I am grateful to him for clarifying what a registered person is—I think that it is the word “person” that gets very personal here. I remain somewhat concerned about whether legislation to stop avoidable harm is a feasible proposition.
No. The heading “harm-free care” will be changed to “reducing harm in care”.
My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Turnberg, decides what to do with his amendment, I shall reinforce the explanation I gave earlier in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Warner. This clause removes the Secretary of State’s discretion around whether the requirements for registration with the Care Quality Commission should cover the safety of care. That is the approach at the moment, but the impact of the change we are making is to embed current policy and practice. As my noble friend Lord Ribeiro has helpfully explained, without this change a future Secretary of State could in theory decide not to include patient safety requirements in future regulations. The Bill ties the hands of future Secretaries of State on this important matter. It would require a change to primary legislation to alter that. That has substantive significance as well as presentational significance.
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised some important points in relation to the definition of “best interests”. Because she referred to a number of identification streams within the health service, I ought to declare my interest as president of GS1 UK, the barcode association. Barcoding is, of course, another indicator that can be used.
I recently had an interesting discussion in Solihull with people who are helping the integration board that is aiming to bring health and social care together to provide integrated services. It was interesting to get an insight from a company that is helping the statutory providers to do this by confronting situations in which individuals are provided with services from a number of different statutory agencies but where there is, seemingly, no co-ordination at all between them. One often gets professionals arriving at the same time but not communicating with each other. This is partly due to the problem over information systems.
I should like to ask whether the noble Earl considers that the passage of the Bill will help the integration of that information, provided that the public have confidence in the process under which information is shared. There is clearly a balance to be drawn between the benefit of information sharing between statutory bodies in terms of integrating provision, alongside the safeguards necessary to the public. One should be in no doubt that this is quite a tension. Yesterday, the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee published a report on the holding of information by the security services. Reading it gives some cause for concern, in many cases, about the amount of information available about individuals. Although, as I understand it, the committee report says that that information is often never referred to or used, it none the less could be. The whole issue regarding the integrity of confidential information is important. On the other hand, we know that we have considerable failures in service because there is no sharing of information. The point that the noble Baroness raised about what we mean by “best interests” and the issue of how we can ensure public confidence is extremely important.
I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, which offers an opportunity to debate the importance of including people’s communication needs in the information shared between health and care professionals. I have received helpful briefing from Mencap, the RNIB, the National Autistic Society and Sense. It has become abundantly clear that failure to understand the best way in which to talk to individuals can result in misunderstandings, misdiagnosis and, ultimately, poor care. Accessible and easy-to-read information, perhaps with pictures, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, referred, and the presence of family, advocates or interpreters, can make the difference between diagnosis and misdiagnosis.
It would be very helpful if the noble Earl could clarify that the communication needs of disabled people and the reasonable adjustments that they might need will be an important part of the health information that should be shared between professionals. I certainly hope that he is willing to place on record that guidance associated with the Bill will reflect this and that it will reach the relevant professionals.
My Lords, let me turn first to Amendment 5. I understand the noble Baroness’s concern that there should be no confusion over the “best interests” wording in the Bill and the more technical and prescribed “best interests” checklist test in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The key point for me to emphasise straightaway is that in this Bill the phrase “best interests” is ascribed its ordinary meaning: the consideration of a range of factors, including the wishes of the individual. Nothing in the Bill detracts from patient autonomy or the importance of supportive partnership working between clinicians and patients. This is in marked contrast to the “best interests” test checklist found in the Mental Capacity Act, which the noble Baroness was instrumental in shaping. In that Act, which concerns individuals who lack capacity, the term is not defined. A checklist of considerations helps professionals to determine what a patient’s best interests are.
The information-sharing provisions of the Bill respond to concerns expressed by the National Data Guardian. Dame Fiona Caldicott, in her 2013 review of information sharing, identified a risk-averse culture and concluded that the duty to share information for a person’s own direct care should be considered as equally important as the duty of confidentiality. I quote from her review:
“Health and social care professionals should have the confidence to share information in the best interests of their patients”.
These provisions seek to establish that sentiment in law.
The presence of the phrase “best interests” in this Bill ensures that it complies with the central principle of the Data Protection Act and the Caldicott review: to share information only where necessary and relevant. The term “best interests” is used elsewhere in primary legislation, including in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and Section 38 of the Medical Act 1983. It was also used more recently in the Charities Act 2011, the Legal Services Act 2007, and in the Pensions Schemes Act 2015, which received Royal Assent last week—all are without reference to the checklist in Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act. It is a term used across a wide-ranging legislative landscape with its ordinary meaning.
The “best interests” test in this Bill is no different from that in the pensions Act or the Legal Services Act. It requires a professional to apply a common-sense approach. I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concern that the use of the word “best” could herald a return to a “doctor knows best” kind of paternalism and to disempowering patients in the process. I sincerely hope that I can convince her that this is neither the intent nor the effect of this Bill. I am sure that the whole House will agree that the focus of information sharing should be on the needs of the individual, rather than defensive, risk-adverse behaviour of the type we have sometimes seen in the past.
I can confirm that the Department of Health will provide guidance to support the interpretation of these new duties. This will include a clarification that the term “best interests” is ascribed its ordinary meaning. The Government will also amend the Explanatory Notes to that effect.
My Lords, that was a very helpful response. May I just ask the noble Earl whether explicit examples will be given in the guidance? The issue of professional defensiveness is very important. He will know that, out in the field, people often have a different view about data protection. Sometimes it gets in the way of sensible, professional working together. I urge that the guidance should be as practical as possible and that it should be aimed at field workers, rather than just the organisations they work for. Let us take as examples care workers, health service workers, health visitors and nurses, in regard to whom it is clearly in an individual’s best interests that information is shared about visits, and that sometimes responsibilities are shared, and that they are not inhibited because of some myth about their inability to share information.
The noble Lord makes some very good points. The duty to share information will, we trust, ensure consistency in the sense that it will make it clear when the duty to share applies. It is clear that there is a real commitment throughout health and adult social care to overcome the cultural barriers that Dame Fiona referred to. For example, the sharing of information for the purposes of an individual’s direct care is already required as part of the professional duties of health and care professionals, and sharing for direct care purposes can be undertaken in accordance with the common-law duty of care.
The department is already working with its national partners to offer practical support to local provider and commissioner organisations on information governance and sharing. For example, the department is partner to the Information Governance Alliance, a group of national health and care organisations which has been established to provide a single authoritative source of guidance and support on information sharing. I confirm to the noble Lord that the guidance will include specific examples and will be prepared in consultation with our key stakeholders.
Turning to Amendment 6, the NHS number helps to ensure that an individual’s health and adult social care history is readily accessible when they move along their care pathway. This will improve safety and the experience of care. The adoption of the use of the NHS number as a consistent identifier has been a long-standing government objective.
It may help if I explain a little about the purpose and use of the NHS number. An individual does not need to know their NHS number to get treatment. Conversely, having an NHS number does not imply entitlement to the free use of all NHS services. The NHS number helps to confirm the identity of patients and link health records. There are some electronically based services for which an NHS number is essential and from which a patient who objects to the number being shared may not be able to benefit—for example, as the noble Baroness said, screening programmes, choose and book referrals, and electronic prescriptions in primary care. In these instances, the implications of objecting may be serious, which underlines why the decision to opt out should always be considered carefully and discussed with professionals.
That said, there is an important principle at stake here. The Government are committed to empowering the individual. In the future, it will increasingly be the citizen who determines who has access to their data, with care professionals respecting their preferences. For that reason, the Bill provides that if an individual objects, or is considered likely to object, then no duty to share information will arise under these new provisions. I hope that that is a useful explanation for the noble Baroness.
I am pleased to reassure her also that the Bill will not have any effect on the existing systems to protect victims of abuse. The Care Act 2014 sets out clear duties on adult safeguarding. Under the Act, local authorities must make inquiries, or cause others to do so, if they reasonably suspect that an adult who has needs for care and support is, or is at risk of, being abused or neglected.
Statutory guidance will provide that the early sharing of information is key to providing an effective response where there are emerging concerns. Where an adult has refused to consent to information being disclosed, practitioners must consider whether there is an overriding public interest that would justify information sharing.
There are equally robust mechanisms in place to protect children. The Department for Education has produced statutory guidance entitled Working Together to Safeguard Children, which clearly sets out that professionals should share information with local authority children’s social care where they believe that a child is at risk of abuse or neglect. It states:
“Fears about sharing information cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the need to promote the welfare and protect the safety of children”.
Existing guidance on information sharing for practitioners and managers states that if a child is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm, professionals should share information even if consent is refused or withdrawn. The interests of the child are paramount.
I agree wholeheartedly with the sentiment behind the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. It is critical that an individual’s communication needs are identified and shared appropriately with those responsible for providing and commissioning care and services. This Bill requires the sharing of information where this information is,
“likely to facilitate the provision to the individual of health services or adult social care in England, and … in the individual’s best interests”.
An individual’s particular communication needs would be a good example of such information. This will be made clear in guidance.
The concerns that the amendment seeks to address reflect those Mencap has recently raised with the Department of Health. I am pleased to say that my officials have had constructive discussions with Mencap and we welcome its offer to help shape the guidance. Mencap welcomes the Bill as it has the potential not only to improve information sharing between health and social care, especially for people with a learning disability, but also has, in its words, the potential to “save lives”. I would add that, provided the patient or his or her attorney have consented to its inclusion, any information from a GP record that can be coded can be included on a summary care record. Work is already under way to expand the summary care record inclusion data set to include specific communication needs items.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for clarifying the issues around the consistent identifier. It is interesting that the use of the consistent identifier and the sharing of information was welcomed at Second Reading by the noble Lords, Lord Turnberg, Lord Willis of Knaresborough and Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, confirmed that the Opposition were very supportive of sharing a patient’s information, which, as he said, was,
“clearly in the best interests of their patients”.—[Official Report, 6/2/15; col. 961.]
That slides me very easily and comfortably into Amendment 5 and the question of best interests, which, again, has been addressed. I must confess that I have always used, and continue to use, the term “best interest” without assuming that this can be used only about those without mental capacity, as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It is my understanding that in these clauses the phrase “best interests” assumes its general meaning and provides a relevant person with a duty to act in the individual’s best interest when providing information for direct patient care. That is my understanding of the term.
As regards Amendment 6, patient control and choice about how their information is used is the subject of wider government policy. I believe that what needs to be done in that respect has already been illustrated. It is about empowerment of the individual and giving them control over their own information. I also welcome the intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, in highlighting a key piece of information in patient care. Her description of a patient who died after surgery for want of the right word when asked a question—the patient answered incorrectly, which led to a fatal outcome—was truly revealing. In my experience, it is critical that if an individual has particular communication needs, those who provide care or treatment should know about them beforehand.
I am confident that the requirements to share information in support of direct care in the Bill already encompass communication needs. The Minister commented that Mencap has sought reassurances that health professionals should become more aware of the ways in which people can communicate their health and care needs. I am sure that, from his statement earlier, work on this will take place to ensure that those concerns are met. With those comments, I hope the noble Baroness will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I am not sure about the noble Lord’s latter point. I think my noble friend has done us a great service in raising this issue. Since we are talking about unique personal identifiers again, perhaps I may first remind the House of my presidency of the bar-coding association, GS1.
As a resident of Birmingham, I thank my noble friend for his work as the Children’s Commissioner, which has been invaluable. Your Lordships will have a great opportunity to discuss these matters further on Monday night after we debate standardised packaging of cigarettes, because I have a Motion to Take Note on the Birmingham electoral order, which changes the electoral cycle in Birmingham following the work of the three commissions and the Permanent Secretary at the DCLG.
On the substantive point, my noble friend raised the case of Victoria Climbié, on which I well remember making the Statement to this House a long time ago now. What was so striking in that report was that she went through, I think, at least eight or nine public agencies. If any one of them had talked to another, it is likely that she would still be alive today. It was a shocking report, because there were so many failures by so many different organisations. Although, inevitably, the local authority always tends to be the focus of concern, neither the health service nor the police covered themselves in glory. I am not really in a position to commit the Opposition in exactly the way that my noble friend wants, but if the noble Earl would like to institute some urgent cross-party discussions with my noble friend, we would certainly be very happy to take part.
My Lords, to start with a given, I am sure I speak for the whole Committee when I say that we are all committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to protect children from abuse and neglect. Clauses 2 and 3 are, as they stand, based on long-standing policy intentions. They have real buy-in and support from those who will need to deliver them.
As regards children’s social care and wider children’s services, the difficulty with proceeding without delay in the direction that the noble Lord, Lord Warner, is advocating is that we do not yet have robust evidence on the impact of the potential burdens and risks of an extension of these duties. Moving to the use of a common identifier for the education and children’s social care sector would represent a substantial change. In the discussions that I have had on this, I have been persuaded that it is only right that we fully understand and assess the impact before considering legislation.
However, I can give the noble Lord, Lord Warner, some hopeful news. I am pleased to inform him that the Department for Education has committed to undertake an evidence-gathering exercise to understand fully the impact of adopting a consistent identifier for these types of provision. That exercise is expected to report before the end of the year. I hope the noble Lord will understand that we would not want to pre-empt the outcome of that or make decisions now on behalf of Ministers in the next Government, who will wish to consider the evidence once it is available.
The amendment would also have the effect of creating a power to extend Clauses 2 and 3 to other public bodies where there was evidence that this would benefit the health and well-being or protection of children. I recognise and welcome the sentiment and reasoning behind the desire to extend the information-sharing duty under this Bill to encompass child protection issues. As I have already assured the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, there are clear requirements on professionals to share information to protect children. I hope that reassurance is helpful.
In fact, Reg Wells-Pestell, not Goronwy Roberts, was the Minister. I want to get that right for anyone who is old enough to remember and reads Hansard.
My Lords, some very important points have been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley. My regret is that we are dealing with these regulatory matters in this Bill. A number of statutory instruments will also come through your Lordships’ House, one from the GMC, in the next few days.
We had a Law Commission draft Bill which should have been a fifth Session Bill and would have enabled your Lordships to look at the statutory regulation provisions in the round. However, because of the Government’s decision not to proceed with that Bill, not even in pre-legislative scrutiny, we now have to look at this matter in a piecemeal way. It is wholly unsatisfactory. I am very sorry that we are having to deal with these issues in this way without enough time to focus on them properly. I am worried about Clause 5; I think that we are going to let it through without understanding its implications. We would be very grateful for anything that the noble Earl can do to clear this up.
My Lords, I very much hope that I can allay the concerns of both noble Baronesses and the noble Lord. In its report, the Law Commission recommended a consistent main objective for professional regulators and the PSA around patient safety. It also recommended two subsidiary objectives: maintaining confidence in the profession and proper professional standards and conduct. The Law Commission’s report describes this proposal as restating the existing legislative position that public protection is the regulators’ main objective. The Government’s view is that public protection is sufficiently important that it should be expressly adopted in the legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, asked whether public confidence might conflict with public health, safety and well-being. In the example of the Professional Standards Authority identifying a poorly performing regulator, it is clear that the interests of public protection and public health, safety and well-being would require the PSA to take action. In this example, any argument that the objective of promoting and maintaining public confidence in the professions would require the PSA to conceal poor performance would clearly run counter to public protection. The objective of promoting and maintaining public confidence in the professions does not mean that the PSA or the regulatory bodies should be promoting the reputation of the professions generally. Rather, it is about taking action where there is a risk that confidence in the profession as a whole is undermined to the extent that it may deter people from seeking the treatment or care that they need and impact on public protection. This example highlights the fact that while the objectives are all linked to public protection, in practice they may not always necessarily be relevant, or relevant to the same extent in particular cases. It is not a case of one objective overriding another or preventing it being considered but ensuring that they are pursued only where they are relevant to public protection.
The Bill does not prioritise or weight one element of public protection over another. It is for the PSA to determine how it applies those elements in carrying out its functions in relation to the regulators and considering the issues of the case. My view is that health, safety and well-being will always be relevant to public protection when the PSA is carrying out its functions in relation to the regulators. It will be for the PSA to determine how to apply the objectives appropriately.
The noble Baroness asked whether the objective to promote and maintain public confidence might inadvertently lead the regulators to be less transparent in highlighting bad practice. Equally, that might lead to regulatory committees and panels punishing professionals who do not pose any threat to the public. If the actions of a doctor appear likely to reduce confidence in the medical profession and influence the decision of individuals as to whether to seek medical help at all, it may be right to take action. However, panels and committees will be asked to reach their own objective judgment as to whether particular acts or omissions would affect public confidence if no action were taken. A subjective view, uncritically influenced by public opinion or the media, would be an unacceptable basis for a decision.
Turning to the term “well-being”, the BMA has raised concerns with my ministerial colleague Dr Dan Poulter about how it would be interpreted by fitness to practise panels and committees. Well-being has been a long-standing and established feature of the legislation for three of the regulators. It encompasses those aspects of a professional’s role that may have an impact on individual patients but not directly impact on their health or safety. Dignity, compassion and respect are all important in delivering care, and it would not be right to disregard them.
It will be for the regulators to formulate and issue guidance for fitness to practise panels on interpreting and applying the objectives in practice, including the term well-being. The legislation makes clear that those objectives are considered only under the umbrella of public protection.
My officials will draw the regulators’ attention to those concerns should the overarching objective become law. That is in order to inform any guidance that will be needed to implement both this Bill and the secondary legislation for the GMC.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, also asked about how we view the definition of “public” in the Bill. It of course includes patients and service users, as well as other parts of the collective public. I hope that that reassures the noble Baroness that the objectives in relation to well-being and public confidence will not be pursued outside the regulators’ objective to protect the public.
In following the Minister, perhaps I may deal, first, with “well-being”. At paragraph 3.20, the Law Commission’s report states:
“We disagree with the criticism of ‘well-being’. This term has already been incorporated without difficulty into the main duties or objectives of many of the regulators”.
Within that context, it feels strongly that that term cannot be misinterpreted.
The Bill introduces consistent objectives for the PSA and the regulators based on the proposals of the Law Commission’s review last year. Most of the professional regulators have some form of main objective. Although they are not consistently expressed they are generally to protect, promote and maintain the health and safety of the public. It is the health aspect with which the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, was particularly concerned at Second Reading. I think that that concern has been allayed today.
It is clear that public protection—by “public” I of course include patients—is sufficiently important that it should be adopted expressly in legislation. Defining public protection in terms of these three elements to be pursued by the regulators and the PSA as their overarching objective enables public protection to be considered in its fullest sense. That should give comfort and reassurance to the noble Baronesses who have spoken. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw the amendment.