National Health Service (Clinical Commissioning Groups) Regulations 2012

Earl Howe Excerpts

Tuesday 16th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Turnberg]

I am afraid that my message tonight will be rather familiar. Although I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, whom I respect enormously for her experience, I am afraid that I cannot agree with her. Commissioning services in the NHS is an extremely complex activity. For CCGs to make rational decisions, they need the best data and information available about their populations and how to meet their needs.

I understand that economists talk about perfect and imperfect markets. Perfect markets exist where both the purchaser and provider know exactly what they are getting and giving. This is particularly important when we talk, for example, about packages of integrated care, especially care across the hospital community divide. Who better to provide the data and information that CCGs need than those working locally in our hospitals? CCGs should not only understand the needs of their populations; they also need to know something about what can realistically be provided locally to meet those needs. Relevant questions might include whether the local hospital provider has the relevant orthopaedic surgeons who can do specialised and complicated knee or hand surgery, whether it has the oncologists and haematologists to deal with all cancers or only some, and whether it has the relevant up-to-date scanning facilities. There will be a dozen other questions that only local knowledge can answer.

It seems obvious to many in the field that local specialists and nurses from the local trust are in much the best position to provide the answers, and to engage constructively with GPs in the provision of services. The idea that there is a conflict of interest appears to me to be nonsense. Of course there is local interest. Local consultants and nurses are there to provide local knowledge and information. The idea that consultants and nurses from elsewhere can be parachuted in to provide local information is asking too much, quite apart from the problem of whether another trust will be willing to allow its staff time off to travel around the country.

We do not want or need disinterested clinicians in the CCGs; we need interested clinicians. I hope that the noble Earl will listen if not to my noble friend Lord Hunt then to the royal colleges, which are very strongly in favour of local input from the secondary sector.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health (Earl Howe)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for tabling this Motion, which provides a welcome opportunity to clarify the Government’s intentions in making these regulations on clinical commissioning groups—an opportunity that I feel is rather necessary in the light of some of the speeches that we heard this evening.

The regulations set out the legal requirements on the size and membership of a CCG’s governing body. Together with amendments made to the National Health Service Act 2006 by the Health and Social Care Act 2012, they provide a clear legal framework within which CCGs can appoint their governing body and develop appropriate governance arrangements. CCGs will be different from previous commissioning organisations. They will be built on the GP practices that together make up the membership of the CCG. These member practices must decide, through developing their constitution, how the CCGs will operate. They must ensure that they are led and governed in an open and transparent way that allows them to serve their patients and population. It is vital that CCGs are clinically led, with the ownership and engagement of their member practices, so that they can bring together advice, as noble Lords emphasised, from the broadest range of healthcare professionals to influence patterns of care and to focus on patients’ needs.

That is a necessary preface to the subject that has been the focus of much of tonight’s debate: the role of the governing body of the CCG. Following the NHS Future Forum, we introduced measures in the then Health and Social Care Bill to strengthen governance arrangements for CCGs, primarily through the requirement for each CCG to have a governing body that would have responsibility for ensuring that the CCG operates effectively, efficiently and economically, and does so with good governance. As we discussed during the passage of the Bill, our intention was to provide the public with greater confidence that CCGs would have suitable governance arrangements in place, including independent views and strong leadership, and would have proper checks and balances for the stewardship of public money. CCGs will be the guardians of significant amounts of taxpayers’ money. It is therefore only right that there are strict requirements in relation to governance, probity and transparency of decision-making. We must balance the benefits of the clinical autonomy of doctors with a robust management of potential or actual conflicts of interest. It is essential to get this right, and that means a proportionate and reasonable approach.

The Health and Social Care Act already provides real safeguards against conflicts of interest. The CCG must make arrangements in its constitution for managing conflicts and ensuring the transparency of its decision-making process, and it must have appropriate governance arrangements, including a governing body with lay members and other health professionals. These arrangements will be scrutinised by the NHS Commissioning Board as part of the process of ensuring that a CCG is fit to be established as a commissioner.

The requirements in relation to the secondary care doctor and registered nurse are therefore part of an overall package of requirements to ensure that they operate with good governance. We made clear in the Government’s response to the NHS Future Forum in June last year that neither the secondary care doctor nor the registered nurse should be from a local provider in order to prevent any potential conflicts of interest. We did that because a conflict of that nature would be a constant issue for a secondary care provider, given that CCGs will be responsible for commissioning the vast majority of hospital services. In contrast, CCGs will not commission primary care—that will be the responsibility of the NHS Commissioning Board. Therefore, for the most part, GPs on the governing body do not have a conflict of interests, and in any case GPs will not necessarily be in the majority on a CCG governing body.

On any occasion where CCGs consider commissioning local community services, arrangements must be made to manage both actual and potential conflicts of interest in such a way as to ensure that they neither affect the integrity of the CCG’s decision-making process nor appear to do so. The NHS Commissioning Board has issued guidance and a code of conduct for CCGs to deal with that set of circumstances.

What then is the role of the secondary care doctor and registered nurse on a CCG governing body? Their primary role, along with other members of the CCG governing body, will be to ensure that the governing body exercises its functions effectively and with propriety and absolute fairness. However, each member of a governing body will be expected to bring additional perspectives to underpin the work of a CCG. For the specialist doctor and the registered nurse, this perspective will be to provide a view beyond primary care and a broader understanding of health and social care issues—specifically patient care in a secondary care setting for the specialist doctor and, for the nurse, the contribution of nursing to patient care.

That is different from the role of clinicians in commissioning. Involving clinicians in commissioning has been one of the primary goals of our healthcare reform. I need to underline that as it is very much separate from the specific role of the CCG governing body. The detailed work on service design will not be done by the governing body of a CCG: rather, it will be done by the CCG itself, working with clinical networks and other multiprofessional groups. The governing body will have oversight of the governance of this decision-making process.

CCGs have a legal duty to obtain advice from people with a broad range of professional expertise when carrying out their commissioning responsibilities. My noble friend Lady Williams was absolutely right in saying what she did on that score. This could involve, for example, a CCG employing or retaining healthcare professionals to advise the CCG on commissioning decisions. Local knowledge and an in-depth understanding of local health issues will come not only from local GPs and their member practices but from other local clinicians, including local secondary care clinicians, who will work with CCGs to review local health needs and design local services. So the arguments presented by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others around excluding local secondary care clinicians from the governing body as affecting the quality of the CCGs commissioning are wholly misplaced.

As to the restrictions placed on councillors preventing them from serving on CCG governing bodies, I start with a point of principle. We have been very keen from the outset of our reform programme to limit political interference in the day-to-day activities of the NHS. We have always been clear about that. Consequently, in addition to local authority members, we are also excluding MPs, MEPs and London Assembly Members from serving on a CCG governing body. However, our proposals do not mean that councillors are excluded from CCGs. A local councillor may still serve as a member of a committee or sub-committee of a CCG governing body, with the exception of the remuneration committee, as long as a CCG has set out the arrangements for such a committee in its constitution. A councillor falls within the description of an individual “specified in the constitution” as being eligible for membership of a committee. A CCG may provide in its constitution for any function of the governing to be exercised on its behalf by a committee or a sub-committee of the governing body, or by any individual of a description specified in the constitution. These arrangements could therefore allow for a local councillor to play a pivotal role in the CCG’s decision-making without formally being on the governing body.

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[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the question I was asked was about the officers of local authorities, and I hope I have clarified that. A member of a local authority is an elected councillor, of course, and is debarred from a governing body, as we have discussed. If the noble Lord, Lord Harris, will allow me, I will write to him on the point.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

Paragraph 5 of Schedule 4 refers to:

“An employee of a Primary Care Trust”.

[Earl Howe]

That is what I have just clarified. The heading of that schedule is:

“Individuals excluded from being lay members of CCG governing bodies”.

As long as they are not a lay member, they can serve.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

They may be excluded from being a lay member, but one of the lay members is defined as someone who has,

“knowledge of the local area”.

However, if by chance they happen to be a part-time employee of any local authority in the country, they are excluded, and I want to know why that is. Why not leave it to the good judgment of the local people?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, these regulations lay down the minimum membership of a governing body. It is open to CCGs, in their constitutions, to widen the membership of the governing body if they wish. I will follow this up in writing to the noble Lord.

[Baroness Thornton]

Before the noble Earl leaves the issue of lay members, I have a question about having only two lay members—I am sorry that I did not jump up in time to ask it before he started summing up. The noble Earl and I sat opposite each other for several years discussing regulatory reform of the NHS, and one thing that I think we agreed on was that for all the new regulatory bodies that are now appointing lay members, 50:50 was the right balance to ensure proper regulation and accountability. Why is that not the case with the CCGs? What is different here? We felt that it was safer to have 50% in the regulatory reform of the NHS. Why do we not have 50% on the CCGs?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, it will be up to local CCGs to determine their own constitutions, as I have said. What we are attempting to do in these regulations is simply to set down the bare minima. As we discussed during the passage of the Act—these provisions were well rehearsed—providing there are two lay members, a secondary care clinician, a nurse and an accountable officer, that is the extent of the prescriptiveness that we feel is appropriate from the centre. Otherwise, it looks very much like the Government dictating the governance arrangements. The Future Forum’s recommendations were very clear that we should not go down that path.

It was suggested that CCGs were experiencing difficulties in appointing secondary clinicians or a registered nurse. I understand the concerns that noble Lords have raised on that score but I have recently spoken to the NHS Commissioning Board, which has started the process of considering applications from emerging CCGs. The news I have is that CCGs have so far successfully recruited to these roles. In addition, the medical and nursing royal colleges have offered to help CCGs in sourcing appropriate candidates, which is very welcome.

The noble Lord, Lord Warner, referred to the HSJ article of 11 October. I will clarify my answer when I write to him, which I will be happy to do. We are very pleased not only that so many clinicians have chosen to apply for leadership roles, which they have, but that so many first-rate clinicians have done so, whether as clinical chairs or clinical officers in CCGs. What is important is that there is a good mix of expertise in the broader leadership team of clinicians and managers, to help the CCG discharge its responsibilities effectively, and that is what we are now seeing.

I have a number of examples of where the drive towards integration is really taking shape on the ground. My noble friend Lady Jolly mentioned South Devon and Torbay; this is a service designed by secondary care doctors and GPs working together in a clinical pathway group for urology, and the whole impetus of the CCG is to improve collaboration and get over the gulf between primary and secondary care. There is another excellent example of integrated services in Wokingham, which again I would be happy to write about.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked whether police commissioners and Peers could be members of a CCG governing body. Yes, they can. He also asked who was consulted over these regulations. As I have indicated, the proposals were developed in response to the NHS Future Forum, the listening exercise that set out requirements around the secondary care doctor and registered nurse. The proposals were further discussed with emerging CCGs, primary care organisations, the medical royal colleges and, yes, colleagues in the NHS Commissioning Board Authority.

The regulations discussed today provide a fair and transparent rules-based framework to complement the provisions in the Health and Social Care Act around the establishment of CCGs. Creating a responsible and accountable CCG with good governance is essential for good management, good performance, good stewardship of public money, good public engagement and—our ultimate goal—good outcomes for patients. I commend the regulations to the House.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I shall be brief. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe. He started by referring to the importance of clinical leadership and I would not disagree with him, but he has not really answered the point that the biggest potential conflict of interest is if GPs are in a majority on the boards—and I would hazard a guess that, in most places, they will be. They do not commission primary care, but their decisions can shift resources into primary and community care services. That is the essential conflict of interest.

The Government’s legitimisation of what must be some of the worst drafted regulations that I have ever come across would stand up in relation to conflicts of interest in other professions if one had any inkling at all that they recognised that CCGs carry a huge risk in relation to the GPs’ own position. The Minister said that the CCGs are about clinical leadership. As my noble friend Lord Warner pointed out, you are not even getting that, because only 20% or so of the accountable officers of those CCGs are to be GPs. The remainder are to be managers. Let us be clear: the accountable officer will in effect be the chief executive. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said that the exclusion of local consultants and nurses from CCGs would mean that, in large parts of the country, the people appointed would have no local knowledge whatever. I agree that, in London, it may be more practical; in most of the rest of the country, it will not be.

I agree with all the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Jolly and Lady Williams, but it is not sufficient to say that there will be a review in 2014. At this late stage, I invite them to join us in the Lobbies tonight. I could not disagree with anything that either noble Baroness has said. They tore apart the regulations. Will they not join us tonight?

I was amazed by the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege. She came to the health service, as did I, through local government. Local government is having to take some immensely tough decisions. Having a local authority councillor around the board table of a CCG would help legitimise its decisions and help tie in the local authority with difficult decisions that have to be made. Excluding them is a huge mistake. I do not understand—clearly, the department forgot them—why elected police commissioners are deemed worthy of service on a CCG board when elected MPs and councillors are not. When my noble friend Lord Prescott is duly elected a police commissioner in a few weeks’ time, as one hopes, he will be eligible to serve on the whole clinical commissioning group, but no MP and no councillor. These are some of the most nonsensical regulations that I have ever seen.

The Minister said that we should not worry because local authority councillors, local doctors and local nurses can serve on the committees of a CCG—no conflict of interest there—but they cannot serve on the board. However, the board is the sovereign decision-making body of the CCG. I would have thought that most clinical commissioning groups would have wanted to have local expertise, whether it is local authority representation, a doctor or a nurse.

The Minister then said that these are only minimum requirements. Well, Schedule 4 states:

“Individuals excluded from being lay members of CCG governing bodies … An employee of a local authority in England and Wales or of any equivalent body in Scotland or Northern Ireland … A chairman, director, governor, member or employee of an NHS foundation trust”.

Excluding a chairman, director or governor of a foundation trust is fair enough, but a member? My trust has 100,000 members. Patients are automatically enrolled in membership of my trust unless they decide to opt out. We are talking about 100,000 people living in the catchment area of my hospital who are not allowed to be lay members of a CCG. Surely they are the very people you would want to be lay members of a CCG.

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[Earl Howe]

They are not allowed to be the statutory lay member.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Earl for that enormously helpful clarification. The point is this: why should they not be statutory lay members of the CCG? There is no guarantee that CCGs will appoint any more lay members. I have yet to hear any rational explanation as to why this statutory instrument has been drafted in this way.

As we know, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, is a very fair man and always engages in debate. He will know that this statutory instrument has been ripped apart tonight. Even at this late hour, I ask him to withdraw the instrument. If he is not prepared to do so, I will test the opinion of the House.