Oral Answers to Questions Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDouglas Alexander
Main Page: Douglas Alexander (Labour (Co-op) - Lothian East)Department Debates - View all Douglas Alexander's debates with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
(11 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe United Kingdom made that distinction and we believe that those wings are organisationally distinct, even if they both come under the same overall leadership. It is important to recognise that Hezbollah’s political wing is and will remain an important part of Lebanon’s political scene, and we have to be able to act in the interests of the stability of Lebanon. We do not believe that an EU consensus could be arrived at on the designation of the whole of Hezbollah.
I have listened carefully to the answers offered by the Foreign Secretary, and on this matter I sense that there is genuine cross-party agreement across the House. He says that active discussions are under way with European partners on the proscription of Hezbollah’s military wing, but that some countries are looking at further evidence. Given the terms of the report published by the Bulgarians on 5 February and the discussions that the Bulgarian Minister has had with other European colleagues, will the Foreign Secretary tell the House what further discussions he is going to have, particularly with the French and with others? What assurance would they need in order to be able to match the action that, with our support, the British Government have taken?
Of course, we are in active discussion with other European partners, including France. As I say, some are immediately supportive of designation, as we are, but some want to look in more detail at the evidence, although plenty of evidence is available. Some have concerns about the impact on the stability of Lebanon—concerns that I think are unfounded—on EU relations with Lebanon or on European troops serving in the UN mission in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon. So there are a variety of reasons for this, which I do not agree with, and it is clear that the right hon. Gentleman does not agree with them either. I shall, thus, quote the strong cross-party support in this House in the Government’s further discussions about this issue.
In a very short answer, Mr Speaker, we do indeed have serious concerns about the recent wave of self-immolations and urge the Chinese authorities to show restraint towards Tibetan protestors. As my hon. Friend knows, we believe in meaningful dialogue between the Dalai Lama’s representatives and the Chinese authorities as the best way to address and resolve the underlying grievances. There is no change in our policy towards Tibet, which we regard as part of the People’s Republic of China. However, we are always concerned about human rights issues and—in the interests of brevity, Mr Speaker—we will take an additional look at the points that my hon. Friend raises.
In the light of the latest round of the P5 plus 1 talks held last week in Kazakhstan, will the Foreign Secretary update the House on progress? In particular, will he share with the House, if he feels able, some of the specific guarantees that the UK Government would be looking to achieve from the Iranians as part of these important discussions, given that being clear about the objectives increases the likelihood of success in the negotiations?
These discussions took place in Almaty last week, on 26 and 27 February, and they were successful enough for further meetings to be agreed. Meetings of officials will take place in early April, also in Kazakhstan. Of course, it is pleasing that it is worth while having those further meetings. In the E3 plus 3 we have put a revised offer to the Iranians. However, that revised offer would involve both sides taking actions that then build confidence for further negotiations, without our thinking that we can resolve the entire problem in one move—one negotiation. We hope that Iran will continue to take a strong interest and a constructive role in these negotiations. It is too early to tell whether the Iranian position is to do that or to play for time, as has often happened in the past.
I note that the Foreign Secretary says that it is too early to tell about these negotiations and that the issue cannot be resolved in one go. I certainly recognise both those points. In recent days there has been quite a lot of speculation about the prospects for bilateral negotiations between the United States and Iran. Will he share the Government’s thinking as to the likelihood of a grander bargain between those two powers taking place in the months ahead?
The United Kingdom is, of course, open to bilateral discussions, which are difficult in our case because of the unavoidable closure of embassies. Nevertheless, I have from time to time met the Iranian Foreign Minister and we are open to the idea of other members of the E3 plus 3 having bilateral discussions with Iran. Such discussions sometimes take place at the margins of the E3 plus 3 meetings. It is important for Iran to know that we are seeking to settle the nuclear issue—Iran would, of course, have all the rights of a country under the non-proliferation treaty—and that the western world is not embarked on regime change in Iran. That sincerely is what we are trying to do. Any bilateral discussions that make that clear and allow negotiations to proceed more successfully on that basis would, of course, be welcome.