European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Robert Neill

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Robert Neill]

There have been a number of powerful speeches from Members on both sides of the Committee on this important issue. I shall be as brief as I can, but I want to begin by picking up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach). This is what we are supposed to be doing in this House. This is about proper parliamentary scrutiny. I do not care about the views of writers of newspaper headlines. If any one of us stands up and seeks to scrutinise the Bill to improve it, we are doing our duty by our constituents. Anyone who thinks that doing so is somehow opposing either the Bill or the wishes of the electorate has precious little knowledge of—or, even worse, no respect for—our parliamentary processes.

In an endeavour to seek to improve the Bill and assist the Government, I supported a number of amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) and others, and I stand by that. I hope—I get the impression from the spirit of what has been said—that the Government recognise those issues and will find a means to take them forward constructively. That is in everyone’s good interests, but I want to reinforce as swiftly as possible the significance of that. The Government’s position in relation to the protection of human rights has been grossly mischaracterised by some Opposition Members. That does the debate no good. I do not believe for a second that it is the Government’s intention to diminish rights protection. Equally, it is important that we get right the way in which that is protected. I hope that my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General will reflect on that.

I particularly want to refer to Francovich litigation, because this is a classic case of making sure that we do not inadvertently do injustice to people as we take necessary measures in the Bill to incorporate existing European law into our own. No one has a problem with that, but it is not right to deny people the ability to seek effective remedy for a course of action that arises under retained law. The whole point of having sensible limitation Acts is to prevent people from being denied a remedy with the passage of time when they have done nothing to deserve that. We need a bit more clarity—for example, if there is a pre-existing right to a course of action that is available until the moment we leave the European Union, it ought to be possible for someone, once they have become aware of that course of action, to pursue it through our courts.

[Mr Grieve]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. While the Government have made an argument that there is a problem because of the international law aspect in such a piece of litigation going all the way to the European Court of Justice, there can be no argument that the same rules that applied when we were in the EU should apply to any such piece of litigation, even if the end-stop is our own Supreme Court. It is perfectly easy to do, and the Bill has to be altered to allow that to happen.

[Robert Neill]

The case that my right hon. and learned Friend makes is completely unarguable. There is no answer to that thus far from the Government, and the only answer is to change and improve the Bill. To fail to tie up that clear, apparent and recognised loose end in the Bill could have the effect, almost by negligence or a measure of inadvertence, of denying UK citizens rights they might otherwise have. That would seem to me to be almost verging on the disreputable. I do not believe that the Ministers on the Treasury Bench wish to do that for one second and I know they will want to put it right. I hope that they will make it clear that it is the Government’s intention to make sure that that lacuna is resolved.

Human Rights Act

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Robert Neill

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Westminster Hall

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. I welcome the Minister to his place in what is the Justice Department’s first debate in Westminster Hall.

At the risk of offending both sides, may I suggest that we need to be a bit less theological? I have much sympathy for the points made by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) in opening the debate, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is a distinguished lawyer. However, I suspect that the truth is somewhere in the middle.

There were human rights protections before the Human Rights Act came into force. The United Kingdom was a signatory to the European convention, and it is worth observing that although Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, in his subsequent career, was not noted for being on the liberal wing of the Conservative party, he none the less thought that the convention was a good and desirable thing. There were protections in the convention that the British courts took account of. It is fair to say that there were also sometimes practical issues about access and implementation, and we should not lose sight of that. The thought, therefore, that the Human Rights Act is a sort of holy grail is probably misleading, and we should not be afraid to think of looking at it again and reforming it. Equally, we should not assume that the convention is a permanent intrusion on the rights of British courts, because that would be wrong too. Let us try to find a way through the middle.

I serve on the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly and legal affairs committee. Perhaps rather horrifyingly to some people, I also serve on a committee that appoints the judges to the European Court—the idea that a committee of politicians appoints judges may seem odd to us, and that is perhaps an issue we have to look at. The quality of the current Court is, frankly, variable: we have some very good people, and we have some people whose independence does not come from the tradition that we are used to, if I can put it that way. On the other hand, the United Kingdom generally does not have an issue in terms of being at variance with the Strasbourg Court—we have one of the highest rates of compliance with its judgments—so, again, a bit of perspective might be required.

It is perhaps ironic that the Human Rights Act did not seek to create a binding precedent, but the approach taken by our domestic judiciary has frequently got fairly close to that. That is not an issue that withdrawal from the convention, of itself, would address, so we have to be realistic about what can be achieved. In any event, Strasbourg judgments would be regarded as being at least of persuasive value in arguments before our Supreme Court. Simply repealing the Act will not, therefore, make some of the controversy go away, and we have to be realistic about what can be achieved.

On the other hand, bizarre consequences sometimes stem from the Act’s operation, and we perhaps need to look carefully at that. I do not take the view that that would be a signal that we have turned our back on human rights. Britain’s compliance with the convention is rather better than, for example, Russia’s—I do not think we have invaded any of our neighbours recently—so let us put our disagreements with the convention into a bit of perspective.

I hope the Minister will give us a little more assistance on how we go forward. We are committed to a consultation, which is right. In fairness, the Government have committed themselves to a much more significant consultation than that which happened before the Human Rights Act. I would like to know more details of the consultation’s timetable and what form the consultation will take.

[Mr Grieve]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is one thing we need to look at? In the past, where we have found difficulties, we have legislated in separate legislation—we did that with the Immigration Act 2014. Changing the text of the Human Rights Act may not be the best course of action. If there are areas of difficulty, we can see whether there is separate legislation that is still compatible with the convention that we can introduce.

[Robert Neill]

My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very fair point. I hope the Government will include that as part of the consultation. Some of the things that cause offence to many of our constituents might be remedied more easily in a more appropriate fashion. That is an important point.

The Government are committed to basing a British Bill of Rights on the convention, but we need a little more detail about what “basing” means. For example, are there any rights in the convention that it would not be proposed to include in the Bill? That is critical, because people would be concerned about a diminution of protections. On the other hand, are there areas where the current protections might be enhanced? We need that spelled out at an early stage.

What is the timetable? What is the proposed scope and level of detail of the prelegislative scrutiny? The Justice Committee, which I chair, will be most anxious to be involved in that scrutiny, but other parts of the House will also rightly have to have an input. We also need carefully to address the impact across the whole United Kingdom, because the United Kingdom was a signatory to the convention, and the Human Rights Act was a United Kingdom piece of legislation. It is important that we reflect on all those matters.

I am not perhaps as pessimistic about the prospects for constructive change as my right hon. and learned Friend. Perhaps that is because I am a West Ham supporter, so optimism must come naturally to me—something that you, as a Sheffield Wednesday supporter, will understand very well, Mr Betts.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Dominic Grieve and Robert Neill

Tuesday 11th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

Sharing legal services brings considerable benefits in greater flexibility and reliance; more efficient deployment of legal resources, including specialist expertise; and more opportunities for savings and improved knowledge sharing. It also provides a more coherent legal service for Government as a whole and good career development opportunities for lawyers, and it improves the legal support to individual Departments.

[Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that one area of expertise that could be improved by shared legal service is that of awareness of and consistent access to expertise in forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, which should be available to all Government Departments?

[The Attorney-General]

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. That is precisely the benefit of bringing the legal advisers from different Departments into one organisation. There is now a single board that groups those people together in the Treasury Solicitor’s Department, and I am confident it can deliver savings, lower charging costs for Departments—we have already seen that—and greater efficiency and expertise in-house.