Prorogation (Disclosure of Communications)

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Monday 9th September 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point. That was a matter that exercised me very much before I decided to table this motion, but against that, we have to face up to another fact: those necessary protections for civil servants cannot and must not be used as a device to hoodwink this House and the public as to the way the Government conduct their business. The Government have a duty. They can sometimes have a duty not to say something, but they certainly do not have a right to mislead, and this is such a fundamental matter that I think we are right to pursue the issue. Of course, if it turns out that the information I was given was mistaken, well, in those circumstances, I shall be the happiest person of the lot, but I have to say that I think it is sufficiently serious in its nature and content that I would be failing in my duty as a Member of Parliament if we were not to seek to ascertain whether it was correct.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Surely all that matters is what was in the Prime Minister’s mind—his reasons for making the decision—and we cannot work that out from the personal testimonies of lots of officials, some of whom met the Prime Minister about this and some of whom did not. The question is what was in the Prime Minister’s mind, and the House has had ample opportunity, which it has already used, to cross-examine him and to satisfy itself as to his true motive. I do not see how knowing what some officials thought helps at all.

[Mr Grieve]

If I may say to my right hon. Friend, last week, at Prime Minister’s questions, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Hertfordshire (Mr Gauke) and I asked questions of the Prime Minister seeking to elicit an answer about his motive and state of knowledge, and I was rather struck by the fact that he avoided answering both questions completely. He made not a single attempt—my right hon. Friend should look at Hansard—to answer the question. I am afraid I do not have much confidence that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has the capacity—frankly—to answer questions of this kind, because he does not appear to understand how serious they are and appears to treat them with a high level of flippancy.

Business of the House

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Wednesday 3rd April 2019 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

I think my hon. Friend misheard me. I made no such allegation about her or my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset. I was paying them all due civility in saying that they may win, but nobody can claim that there is a big consensus in this House or a large potential majority on either side, so we need more time than is being offered in this business motion. Lightning legislation is bad legislation.

As we have already heard, this potential legislation poses fundamental questions about the nature of government, how government is conducted and the powers of Government, which go to the heart of our very processes, and seeks to overturn conventions and Standing Orders that have been in place and accepted by Governments of both persuasions for a long time. That should happen only after due consideration. I am not one to think that there should be no constitutional change or experiment. I have often been against my own Government and have understood the need to use the available procedures to get them to change their mind. However, we should not enter into a radical transformation on the basis of just a few hours’ debate, which is what we are being offered in this business motion.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Viewing this situation objectively, I do not believe that there is any constitutional impropriety whatsoever in what the House is being asked to do this afternoon. It simply does not arise. The truth is that we have a flexible constitution. I rather agree with my right hon. Friend that one often wants more time, but it is precisely when one faces an emergency that the flexibility of the constitution becomes most desirable, and I cannot alter the fact that the emergency exists. With that in mind, I would hope that he would appreciate that there is nothing improper in what the House is doing. In fact, it is only since a recent date in this House’s history that we have been fettered by the Government’s almost total control of the Order Paper.

[John Redwood]

Again, I fear that my right hon. Friend did not listen carefully. I never suggested any impropriety. I said that we wished to proceed in an orderly manner, which Mr Speaker will ensure that we can do, and that there are occasions on which we need to change our procedures or modify our Standing Orders. On this occasion, however, the case I want to make is that there are some fundamental issues that are worthy of rather longer time than is being offered in this business motion.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Report stage: First Day: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the best guarantee of the fundamental rights of the British people is the will of the British people as expressed through the Parliaments they elect? That is the system I thought we all believed in. I know of no threats to these important rights coming from this Parliament. There are not people proposing that they are watered down, and there would be no majority to do so. The guarantee to the British people is that their Parliament will look after their rights.

[Mr Grieve]

May I gently say to my right hon. Friend that if his analysis were accurate, no statute would ever have been enacted by Parliament, at any stage in its history, providing additional protections to people’s rights over and above the common law? That must be the end point, because the whole point about the Human Rights Act was that it added to protections enjoyed under the common law and did so in a way that was compatible with this House’s sovereignty. All I am saying to Ministers is that given that, for 40 years-plus, we have been involved in an international organisation that in practice has entrenched certain rights, it must now be for Ministers to come forward with a sensible proposal as to how those rights, in so far as the Government consider that they are in fact rights, will be protected in the future.

I am afraid that I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). Nice as it is to rely upon the Executive’s good will, 21 years in this House—heaven knows, my right hon. Friend has been here far longer—persuades me that that good will is not something that we should always rely on. I am afraid that I have seen a number of instances—particularly when I was in opposition, I might add—where it did not seem very wise to do so.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Committee: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 20th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

I think I might be a little kinder to my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, because it seems to me that at the time the Bill came into being, the Government still thought that it was all that was required to take us out of the EU. I think that that is where its genesis and origin lie. In actual fact, one of the supreme ironies is that for all the heat that has been generated—we have carried out some proper scrutiny as well, but certainly, last Wednesday, there was a lot of heat—much of what we are doing here might well turn out in practice to be completely academic. In fairness to the Government, once they were landed with this immense problem, I am not sure that they were wrong to proceed in this way, but it just so happens that that is where we are going to end up. However, that is not a reason why we should not pay attention to the powers that the Government are seeking to take—we do have to pay attention to them.

[John Redwood]

rose—

[Mr Grieve]

I will give way to my right hon. Friend in just a second, because I do not wish to speak for very much longer.

For that reason, I do hope that a bit of focus can placed on schedule 5. I do not have any amendments tabled. I am not about to create difficulties for the Government or to divide the House on schedule 5, but I will, if I may, just ask a question as we approach Report, because I cannot believe that this will not be looked at in the House of Lords. It would be quite nice for the Christmas period to be used for quiet reflection on just how wide these powers are and whether, yet again, the Government might, on reflection, be able to circumscribe them a little bit, so that they appear to be slightly less stark in terms of the power grab that they imply. That is quite apart from the fact, to come back to my first point, that the exception in paragraph 2 giving Ministers the power not to print strikes me as very, very odd.

[John Redwood]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the Henry VIII powers, as he calls them, in the Bill are much more modest than the Henry VIII powers in the European Communities Act 1972 that it replaces? This is about only transferring existing law into UK law. Where and when we wish to amend, improve or repeal, that will require a full parliamentary process, which it did not need when it came from Europe.

[Mr Grieve]

I understand my right hon. Friend’s point. Of course, I am mindful of it—it has been raised on numerous occasions during the passage of the Bill—but the system that we had to follow as a result of our EU membership implied that that law, having been agreed by the Council of Ministers and translated into directives, had direct effect in this country and was then applied, not usually through primary legislation but by means of secondary legislation, or indeed directly sometimes. I understand all that, but it does not provide a justification for taking unnecessary powers in trying to effect our departure.

As I said, there is something a bit odd about schedule 5. There must be legal certainty, so why are the Government taking for themselves a power to create legal uncertainty if they so wish? Let us be clear about this: if guidance is a matter of Executive discretion, it is a very unusual state of affairs indeed. There is guidance and guidance. There may be general guidance that Parliament might give as to how it intends retained EU law to be treated. I do not have difficulty with that. Indeed, I think that it may be something that we will have to do. As we have discussed—my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset and I were in agreement about this—we think that Parliament might want to explain how it wishes this matter to be approached generally. That, if I may say, is a rather different thing from saying that Ministers can suddenly wake up one morning and decide, “I want the law to be interpreted in a different way on some specific matter, and I am going to lay a statutory instrument before Parliament that will enable me to do that.” It is a very unusual thing to do, and the Government must be in a position to justify it. It slightly troubles me that the law can be tinkered around with in this form. Obviously, Parliament can decide what it likes about changing law. Occasionally, we change laws by statutory instrument, through regulatory change, but it is not something that we should do lightly.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

In a moment.

On my key issue and what I was trying to tease out in tabling amendment 7, I could, I suppose, have simply said that I will not support clause 9. Indeed, if my amendment is not accepted, I am afraid I shall be voting against clause 9 this evening—I have no option—but rather than do that, the purpose of my amendment is to try to explore what it is that the Government want clause 9 to do that, in fact, we should not be doing when we enact the legislation at the end.

It is for the Government, in those circumstances, to explain themselves; it is not for Parliament simply to roll over and accept something because the Government say that that is what we should do. Indeed, if we all get told that we must support the Government out of loyalty because to do otherwise would undermine the Prime Minister—I think that is cuckoo, for the reasons given by the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper)—we need to know why.

Last week, I engaged in a whole series of dialogues with the Government, trying to understand what was bothering them. At one point, I thought we might be getting to the point where we would reach an agreement that some power might be needed in the Bill before we came to the final Bill, although I will come back to that in a moment. It started to dawn on me that one possibility was that this power might be exercisable, but only provided it could not be used to bring anything into force—we might lay some statutory instruments, but they could not be brought into force in any way until the end statute had been passed.

That is where I thought we might be—and then everything closed down, and I am none the wiser why the Government need this power, except that I note that a journalist who seemed to have been speaking to a briefing was told it might be required to effect the registration of EU citizens. I thought to myself, “I thought we were going to have an immigration Act to do that.” So I am still at this moment—this afternoon—absolutely at sea about why this power is needed. If the Government cannot make a case for this power, it should not be here.

Even at this stage, I say to my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench, if they accept this amendment, which is absolutely central and necessary to ensuring that a power of this scope cannot be abused in a way that the House should not tolerate, and if they want to come back on Report and tidy it up because there is some adjustment or some caveat they want to put in, I will of course listen to what they want to say—my job is not to make their lives more difficult—but I am not prepared to sign away such an extensive power, when it appears to be contrary to the Government’s stated policy on how Brexit will be carried out and, in fact, surrenders without any good reason the control of this House over how the Government conduct Brexit.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

If my right hon. and learned Friend’s version of what our vote would be were to prevail, rather than the Government’s version, what would happen if, close to our leaving date, Parliament voted against any agreement there might have been and against no deal?

[Mr Grieve]

Ultimately, as my right hon. Friend knows, this Parliament is sovereign, although its sovereignty does not extend to concluding agreements with other parties in international relations that the Government do not wish to adhere to or sign up to. I have no idea what the circumstances are going to be in 12 months’ time. I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich: we are dealing with a whole series of hypothetical questions. I get a bit fed up when I keep on being asked, “What is it? Surely, it is a choice between the deal on offer and no deal.” I do not know. There is no way that any of us can know, and that is why the process matters so much. If we get the process right, we will answer correctly each question as and when it arises. Far from that hurting or damaging the Government, it will enhance their power. To come back to the point I made in an intervention, it will convey an impression of purpose and method to our EU partners in negotiation, whereas, at the moment, the major thing that has been undermining our negotiations is the impression of chaos in our procedure and our aims.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Committee: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

I am glad we agree about that. I am trying to make a helpful suggestion for the future on this issue and a wider issue to which we need to return at some point. We need a system that establishes parliamentary control—as I have explained, all the methods we are discussing today are parliamentary control of one form or another—but we may need to think about how we improve processes for the future when that control is a statutory instrument.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend is making some important points. If I may say, I have signed up to the amendments tabled by the Procedure Committee because they are a reasonable compromise, but they are most deficient in the absence of a revision mechanism to ask a Minister to reconsider. My right hon. Friend may agree that, even at this stage, those on the Treasury Bench could go away, reconsider the issue and bring a further amendment forward on Report to deal with it.

[John Redwood]

That may be hanging a bit too much on this piece of legislation. I think this is a wider issue, which Parliament may need to consider, so I was not going that far in my recommendation. However, Ministers would be well advised, if by any chance they did make a mistake in a draft instrument, not to do what the previous Government did and just drive it through, but to accept that they needed to withdraw it and to come back with a corrected version, which would make for better order.

The Bill as drafted, with the amendments to provide a process to make the task of parliamentary scrutiny manageable, is a perfectly sensible package, and I look forward to hearing sensible promises from Ministers on the Front Bench, who I am sure will want to exercise these powers diligently and democratically.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

Yes, and there we are in agreement. It is inevitable and regrettable that we face this situation, but that is why simply to convert the charter, which, in any case, has lots in it that is unconvertible, and to say that it should maintain entrenched rights, seems to me, in the light of what we are debating in the context of Brexit, to be an impossibility. That is not something that commends itself to me.

Let me now move to a slightly narrower issue. We have to accept that, in the course of what we are doing, we are going through a complex period of transition. Forget about the transitional arrangements we may be negotiating with our EU partners—the truth is that we are creating a whole category of transitional law. By the concept of retained EU law, we are doing some very strange things indeed with our ordinary legal principles.

Clause 5(2) allows EU law to have priority over domestic law in certain circumstances. In fact, it allows for the possibility of UK law enacted prior to exit day being quashed for incompatibility with EU law that is retained on exit day. I simply make the point that, leaving aside our EU membership, which of course will have ceased, this is an utterly unique development in our legal system—it has never happened before. We are about to create a species of domestic or semi-domestic law—I would not quite describe it as feral law—which will have the unique quality of being able to override our own laws. Clause 6(3) will also allow CJEU judgments given before exit day to be binding, but not on our Supreme Court—a matter that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) and I have been worrying about quite a lot in the course of the passage of this legislation.

So although the CJEU will rightly lose jurisdiction, it and EU law will keep a special status. However, that is intended to be only temporary, although how temporary is speculative, and I of course note clause 5(3), which says that this law can be modified and still retain this special status, as long as the modification, I assume, is not so dramatic or drastic that it is made explicit that it should lose it. That is different from replacement. That, I suspect, is because the Government know very well that this situation may continue for decades to come.

Yet, in the middle of that, the charter is removed. Leaving aside the other issues concerning the charter, which I have touched on, and which I do not want to go back over, that creates an unusual circumstance. EU law was always intended to be purposive, and one of the purposes is to give effect to the fundamental principles under which the EU is supposed to operate. Yet we are removing the benchmark under which this law is supposed to operate, because the charter will no longer be there, although, interestingly—I think this is an acknowledgment by the Government of the problem they have—they have then, in the next clauses, essentially allowed the charter and general principles of EU law to continue to be used for the purposes of interpretation.

It is very unclear how all this, in practice, is going to work out. That is why I tabled my two principal amendments. Amendment 8 would allow the retention of the charter. It provides an easy route to ensuring that this legal framework is retained, but for the reasons we have just been debating, there are serious issues surrounding it, which is why I think it is probably wrong to pursue it.

However, there is then the question in schedule 1 of what we do with general principles of EU law. What they are is totally undefined, but I assume—I have to assume—that if the Government are content to articulate the existence of general principles, they have done enough research to establish to their own satisfaction that general principles do exist—they are the result of court judgments interpreting the law and, indeed, the fundamental principles in the charter, but not the ones that are going to disappear on the day we leave.

[John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Is not the important point about clause 5 that any future Act of this Parliament takes supremacy, so if there is a muddle or a problem, this Parliament can sort it out definitively? I should have thought that that would deal with the interests of all parties concerned.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend almost makes my case for me. He is absolutely right that, in so far as we want to depart from anything, this House, once we have left the EU, can do what it likes, and as regards anything we enact thereafter, the supremacy of EU law is entirely removed. We can do exactly what we please, except, I am afraid, in so far as we may find ourselves still locked into trying to maintain comity with the EU when the penny drops about the economic consequences of not having it. However, I will refrain from straying too far into that area.

So the question is: is there some merit in keeping the right to bring a challenge using general principles of EU law? I would have thought that there is. I tried to work through in my mind the importance of this. First, we may have retained EU law that is deficient, defective or does not operate properly, or a court might be forced to conclude that it operates in a capricious or even unfair manner, or is disproportionate. At the moment, the only remedy for the court, unless it can bring in the Human Rights Act, will be to apply the law and somebody points out to a Minister that that law is working very badly.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

There are massive uncertainties in all this, and I do not want to pile the gloom on the Treasury Bench. All I will say is that there are great risks. I do understand that the Government have an important point on this, but if that is the case, the proper dialogue that should be taking place between those on the Treasury Bench and the House is how we craft and alter this legislation both to emphasise the statutory process to be followed and to make sure that the only circumstances in which it is not followed—clause 9 has to be used as an example—is where it would be impossible to get an article 50 extension to enable the statutory process to take place before we go. If we do that, we will start talking sense in this House, rather than the polemical nonsense that we have been talking over the past few days.

[John Redwood]

When Czechoslovakia decided to form two countries with two Governments—a very complicated task—it took six months planning and was implemented over a weekend. Why does my right hon. and learned Friend think that the 16 months remaining is not enough time in which to reach an agreement or to reach the sad conclusion that an agreement is not possible in the mutual interests of both sides, and to do all that in an orderly way? Surely 16 months is more than enough time to sort this out.

[Mr Grieve]

I cannot help it that the reality is that we entered into a partnership that now includes 27 other member states. We cannot just magic that away; they all have their interests, and they will all have to be taken into consideration at the end. As we have seen with trade agreements that are reached with the EU and other states, they take time. Indeed, my right hon. Friend and some of my other hon. Friends are, frankly, delusional in their belief of the speed with which these wonderful new trade agreements with third countries will be concluded once we leave the EU. My main anxiety on that topic is that there are 759 external treaties that come through our membership of the EU and that we are in danger of losing with amendment 381, tabled by the Government, in respect of putting a writ-in-stone date on when we have to leave. That should worry us just as much as any other aspect of leaving the EU.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Dominic Grieve and John Redwood

Committee: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 7th February 2017 Commons Chamber

[John Redwood]

I am very grateful. Perhaps I can clarify the matter by saying that the Attorney General was very clear in his submission to the Supreme Court, as was the lawyer on the other side of the case, that article 50 is irrevocable, and the judgment was based on that proposition. Does the right hon. Gentleman therefore agree that it is irrevocable?

[Mr Grieve]

rose—