Iraq: Coalition Against ISIL

Debate between Dominic Grieve and David Burrowes

Friday 26th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

It is my intention when the House divides this afternoon—if it does divide—to support the Government’s motion, but in doing so I am very mindful, having listened to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood), my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Mr Holloway)—indeed, even the hon. Member for Bradford West (George Galloway), had he not treated the House as the recipient of a human foghorn—that they had some important points to make. A note of caution needs to be sounded about what we are trying to do.

The Prime Minister made a powerful case. First, he said that ISIL is a threat to this country directly. I have no doubt that he is right about that. Having spent the first six months of this year signing off consents for the prosecution of young people returning from Syria, where they had served and trained with ISIL—and, in some circumstances with clear evidence, it seemed to me, that they had participated in atrocities—I am perfectly alive to the fact that that threat is real. However, I sound this note of caution. Simply bombing ISIL—whether in Syria, or Iraq, as we are planning to do—is not going to make that threat go away. Even if we ultimately get rid of the ungoverned space, the threat will remain unless or until civil society exists within the Muslim world of a kind that provides a model of how people can co-exist peacefully. We face a challenge domestically, which we must not shirk, in persuading people that that peaceful co-existence exists here and they should not be inclined to emulate what they see in the middle east.

The second factor, and for me the most persuasive, is the genocide being perpetrated in northern Iraq and Syria. This country has a long history of international involvement, and although we may be able to make only a small contribution, I find it difficult to see how we should sit on our hands when a barbarous group of individuals perpetrates the kind of crimes we see daily on our screens. If we can make a contribution to dealing with that, the justification for military intervention is there.

[Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)]

My right hon. and learned Friend is making a compelling case. Would he advise the House that the legal principle of the responsibility to protect in relation to genocide has a wider application that goes beyond the Iraqi borders into Syria?

[Mr Grieve]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend—that is precisely the point to which I was about to come.

I have not the slightest doubt that the legal framework exists to take action in support of the Iraqi Government, at their request, to deal with ISIL. I am clear that the legal base is present for that, and the House should not be concerned on that issue. Equally, so far as action in Syria is concerned, should the Government ever be minded to pursue that option and the House to debate it, the preconditions for action in Syria are also present: first, because of the right to self-defence of the Iraqi Government when some of the attacks are clearly coming across the Syrian border; and secondly, because of the doctrine of humanitarian necessity in terms of intervention to protect the population in northern Syria from ISIL’s attacks—something we have seen in recent days in the Kurdish villages by the Turkish border.

In his speech, the Leader of the Opposition rightly raised the question whether, on that latter point, there should be a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. There is no doubt that it has an important role to play in issues concerning humanitarian necessity, but the Government will at least have to consider whether any application, if it were to come, to the UN for such a resolution has any prospect of success. The ability to intervene, I have no doubt, exists, even if no such resolution is present.

However, the Leader of the Opposition’s comments and those of other Members highlight one of the really important challenges we face. The fact that the framework for legal intervention is present will not necessarily mean that the intervention that subsequently takes place meets the criteria of lawfulness. It has to be reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the aim that has to be achieved. In that, I can well understand the Government’s making a distinction between the situation in Syria and that in Iraq. Even in the context of Iraq, there are some pretty serious challenges. Some of our partners—including particularly the Iraqi Government—have a rather chequered human rights record. We must avoid being party to the ill treatment of prisoners, to the massacre of prisoners, or indeed to any action on the battlefield that could take place that we might facilitate by our aerial intervention. I trust that the Government have looked carefully at that in finding ways of co-operating.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Dominic Grieve and David Burrowes

Tuesday 7th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

The Crown prosecutors who appear in court as advocates are monitored. Indeed, it is a rather more rigorous monitoring process than the one available, for example, for the independent Bar that does their work. I would be happy to write to my hon. Friend with further details of how this monitoring is carried out. The previous Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer, made a very particular point in the first year that I was working with him in carrying out an extensive review of the performance of Crown prosecutors. This is monitored and it is also the subject of inspections by the Crown Prosecution Service inspectorate. There are published reports on the quality of the advocacy being delivered.

[Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)]

Now that wasted cost orders are no longer available in legally aided cases awarded against the Crown, how can accountability be enforced against Crown prosecutors who have plainly not only wasted the court’s time, but let down the criminal justice system, which includes victims?

[The Attorney-General]

First, if there is adverse publicity in respect of prosecutors not doing their jobs properly, that is a matter of very serious concern to me and should and would be a matter of serious concern to the Director of Public Prosecutions. That provides some sanction in itself, quite apart from the fact that I have to answer for the work of the Crown prosecutors once a month in this House.

Abortion Act

Debate between Dominic Grieve and David Burrowes

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) on securing the debate.

Investigative journalism plays an important part in a vigorous and healthy democracy. The Daily Telegraph has done a very important public service in bringing these issues before us today. The debate has been a characteristically thoughtful one, as befits matters touching on the criminal law, personal health and dignity, ethics and moral issues, professional standards and the wider public interest. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), my hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) and for Tiverton and Honiton (Neil Parish) and the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who have all made contributions, and to those right hon. and hon. Members who have intervened.

The cases highlighted by The Daily Telegraph were much debated at the time of the original CPS decision not to prosecute. The terms of that debate may have given the public the impression that this case was about medical practitioners offering abortion on the basis of the gender of the child. On that basis, it may well have seemed incomprehensible that the full force of the criminal law was not being brought to bear on a practice that most people would regard as abhorrent. I certainly do and I think that everyone in this room does. But as I hope to make clear and as I hope has been made clear by the DPP’s explanation, that is not in fact what these cases are at root about.

The DPP has recently published detailed reasons for the CPS decision. I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to read his account very carefully, if they have not already done so. It is absolutely right that prosecution decisions are taken by independent prosecutors on the facts before them and free from political influence. That is what entitles the public to have confidence in those decisions. However, it is also important that the public should be able to understand the decisions and, where that is not straightforward, that prosecutors make a special effort to explain them. This was obviously such a case, and I am particularly pleased that the director has taken the time and trouble to review—I requested him to do so—the decisions personally and to set out fully the reasoning that led him to endorse the conclusion that it would not be right to prosecute.

[Mr Burrowes]

Will the Attorney-General give way?

[The Attorney-General]

In a moment; I was going to answer the two questions raised by my hon. Friend. First, the director did not make the initial decision not to prosecute, but he was consulted, as is normal in complex and sensitive cases. The answer to the second question, on whether I was consulted on the decision before it was taken, is that I was not. The case was not raised with me by the director prior to the decision not to prosecute being taken. In my view, it should have been, and on reflection, the director accepts that he should have done so. Before that leads to an inference that therefore the decision might have been different, I simply make the point that as I asked the director to review the decision completely and I had ample opportunity to consult with him before he did so, I am satisfied that the decision that has now been reached, which I will come on to in a moment, would have been the same had that process taken place in the first case.

[Mr Burrowes]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General agree that in hindsight it would have been appropriate for the DPP to be involved at an earlier stage, to respond to the question raised by the shadow Attorney-General, and should not all future investigations of allegations of contraventions of the 1967 Act involve the DPP at that earlier stage and proper consultation with my right hon. and learned Friend?

[The Attorney-General]

As my hon. Friend will appreciate, the DPP himself does not under the statute have to give consent. Nevertheless, I am sure that the DPP will have noted my hon. Friend’s comments—representatives of the Crown Prosecution Service are here. It is clear to me that this is an important issue in a difficult area, which I will come on to in a moment. I trust that his comments are noted, but he will appreciate that the decisions are ultimately for the DPP, not me.

The director’s reasons speak for themselves. I am satisfied that this difficult decision was taken properly and conscientiously. The responsibility of taking such decisions is a heavy burden, which few of us would relish. I would like to take the opportunity to pay tribute to the distinction with which the current director has fulfilled an onerous and difficult series of public duties over recent years, particularly as his term of office is drawing to a close.

The hon. Member for Strangford asked whether I agreed with the decision taken by the director. I emphasise the point I made: I am clear that it is not my role as Attorney-General to second-guess the decisions of independent prosecutors. These were difficult decisions on which different prosecutors could reasonably have come to different conclusions, but I am entirely satisfied that this difficult decision was taken properly and conscientiously.

I shall say a little more by way of context. First, abortion law in this country, in my judgment, is workable, but needs to be understood. I should perhaps emphasise that the law is not framed in terms of prohibiting gender-specific abortion or indeed listing any other forms of unlawful abortion. It works, or was intended to work by Parliament, by providing for abortions to be performed safely, by qualified medical practitioners, when those practitioners judge it to be in the medical interests of the patient and where that is the course that the patient herself agrees is right. Two medical practitioners must on each occasion have formed a view, in good faith, that the health risks of continuing with a pregnancy outweigh those of termination. That is our guarantee, as provided by Parliament, that we have a system of safe and lawful abortion provided by the 1967 Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

I reassure my right hon. Friend that that is certainly not the case. Ultimately, in any case, the jury decides, not the experts. One would normally expect a jury to be given some indication of the professional standards expected in a profession—there may even be rival professional views about what the standards should be—in order to help it decide.

Such a problem might not arise in an extremely clear-cut case. We might imagine a case in which a doctor behaved in a way in which no reasonable practitioner would behave, for example by arranging a medical abortion for a patient about whom he or she knew nothing and whom he or she had never met or spoken to. In any other circumstances, however, the CPS would need, and would expect to be able, to refer to medical consensus to determine whether a proper professional approach had been taken.

When they are looked at in the kind of detail considered by the prosecutor, the cases that we are debating are not extreme ones in which the doctors behaved as no reasonable practitioner would behave. Complicating factors were raised by both the patients and the doctors, who subsequently had to take the decisions. There were, as we have discussed, no detailed professional rules or step-by-step guidelines telling doctors how to take such decisions; the matter was left to general professional standards and ethics. The CPS, therefore, had no detailed consensus to help it to evaluate the matter.

To prosecute would have been to ask a jury to decide what steps a doctor should take. Juries take difficult decisions robustly, and sometimes they have to find their way through conflicting medical evidence. Is it right or fair, however, to ask a jury to arbitrate on a question of medical standards and ethics on which the profession has not published a detailed consensus, and on which a great deal turns for both doctor and patient? The CPS concluded in the recent cases that it would be contrary to the public interest to proceed.

Those who have the relevant policy and professional responsibilities are, no doubt, reflecting on the conclusions to be drawn. The Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison), is present for precisely that reason. As the House will appreciate, these are not my responsibilities.

[Mr Burrowes]

I recognise that in such cases, because of the level of uncertainty, it is questionable whether a prosecution would serve the interests of justice. When more certainty has been achieved through the publication of guidance, will the Attorney-General undertake to review the matter and consider whether further guidance is required to provide clarity on prosecution?

My supplementary question is to ensure that the Attorney-General does not get off the hook without commenting on another issue. The CQC has provided evidence of 14 hospitals where—forget “good faith”—doctors were not even present when forms were signed. Surely the Attorney-General must ask why no prosecutions occurred in such cases, which go way beyond questions of guidance. They are malpractice and a flagrant abuse of the Abortion Act 1967, and they must lead to prosecutions.

[The Attorney-General]

I hope I may be able to reassure my hon. Friend. On the second matter that he raises—it is not germane to one of the cases, although it was to another—as he knows, the evidence revealed that the pre-signing of forms was quite widespread. I understand that that practice has now been stopped, and that clear guidance has been issued as to its undesirability. That is a policy issue, and I have no doubt at all that as a result, the requirements set down by professional standards have already been clarified.

I turn to the more general point. There are two ways in which we can move forward. We might take the view that the current situation is, overall, a satisfactory one, in which professional medical discretion, which must inevitably be relied on, is left at large, with the law enforcement agencies acting as a back-stop for the most egregious cases that flout any conceivable proper standards. The other view, which I understand that the Department of Health has accepted, is that such a situation allows law enforcement far too residual a role and that the balance needs to be redressed. The law enforcement agencies will need clearer and more specific guidance on how to distinguish between desirable and undesirable professional practice in making and recording decisions on the termination of pregnancy. I greatly welcome that, and I have no doubt that it will make the task of prosecutors much easier.