Intelligence and Security Services

Debate between Diana Johnson and Lord Watson of Wyre Forest

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Brady. I congratulate the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) on securing this debate. I read with interest his article in The Guardian this morning, previewing the arguments he would be putting forward. I also congratulate the co-sponsors: the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) and my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson). They both bring an enormous amount of experience and knowledge to these matters.

Fifteen Members have spoken in this debate, which shows how important it is. It has benefited enormously from the contributions of members of the Intelligence and Security Committee—its Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) and the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). I am sure all hon. Members would want to pay tribute to the hard work that members of the ISC undertake on our behalf.

I pay tribute to the work of the intelligence services. I am sure we all admire and respect the work that they do to keep us safe from harm every day and to protect our freedoms. It is absolutely right that we are having this debate about the oversight of the intelligence and security services.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley hit the nail on the head. We do not have access to all the information, so it is not possible for us to reach conclusions today on a number of points that have been raised. However, we must debate the investigatory procedures that Parliament has put in place and satisfy ourselves that they are fit for purpose.

Parliament has spent much of the past year debating the oversight of the intelligence services through part 1 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, which redefines the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I will return to that in a moment, but I concede that the part did not perhaps catch the public consciousness—given some of the comments made by hon. Members today, that is true of the House, too—in quite the same way as The Guardian’s revelations. Even the Deputy Prime Minister, given his recent comments to the media, appears to have missed the reforms that strengthened the Intelligence and Security Committee. That is surprising, considering he has 19 special advisers. I would have thought that one of them might have picked up on the reforms. Because of all that, I am pleased to have this opportunity to debate the subject.

The concept that many people have of the intelligence agencies is James Bond or, perhaps more recently, “Spooks.” The reality is that terrorists and organised criminals have been quick to adopt new technology, which means that the nature of our intelligence agencies has changed over the past few years, too. Electronic surveillance is now the key asset in the battle against terrorism. It is therefore appropriate that today’s debate has mainly focused on electronic surveillance. The key question seems to be whether the intelligence services have exceeded the powers given them under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

Surveillance is covered by parts 2 and 3 of RIPA, and intrusive surveillance is described by section 26. An example of intrusive surveillance is placing a device in someone’s property, which requires a warrant from the Home Secretary, the Northern Ireland Secretary or the Foreign Secretary if conducted abroad. The relevant Secretary of State has to be convinced that the surveillance is necessary and proportionate. That form of surveillance is easily understood.

Part 1 of RIPA covers remote electronic surveillance, which is where things get a bit more complicated. Chapter 1 addresses the interception of an individual’s communications—telephone communications, e-mails and texts—and it is only under that chapter that the contents of such communications may be accessed. There are extensive safeguards on the use of chapter 1 powers. Their use must be necessary, proportionate and in the interests of protecting national security, detecting or preventing serious crime or safeguarding the UK’s economic interest. A warrant must be issued by the Home Secretary for each individual whose data are collected.

Chapter 2 of part 1 addresses the acquisition of communications data more generally, which is more about the who, the where, the what and the when, rather than the contents. The rules on that are not as stringent as for chapter 1.

Generally, I believe that RIPA is poorly understood among the general public and, I think, among Members of Parliament. Only once we understand the framework can we look to the oversight bodies to ensure that the intelligence services are staying within that framework. Probably the most important level of oversight is from Ministers. They are answerable to Parliament and the public for all the actions of the intelligence agencies.

Will the Minister assure me that he has seen no evidence that the intelligence agencies have collected information covered by RIPA part 1, chapter 1 without the necessary warrants being in place?

Of course, oversight requires much more than just a Minister. The Intelligence and Security Committee was formed in 1994 and reformed earlier this year by the Justice and Security Act. The Opposition supported those reforms. Indeed, in some key areas we would have liked to have gone further. We support the long-term aspiration that the ISC should become a Select Committee, which we believe would allow the public a clear understanding of how the Committee works and the processes it operates.

Such reform would also give clear protections to both the Committee and its witnesses. We appreciate that that may be a gradual process, and we support the changes to move the ISC towards becoming a Committee of Parliament with open proceedings. The Labour party has always said that it believes the ISC is the right body to investigate the allegations against Tempora, and we have confidence in its investigation.

I also believe that the ISC, which is composed of very senior and experienced politicians, appreciates the need to restore public confidence. Indeed, I believe that the agencies appreciate that, too. During the passage of the Justice and Security Act, I was struck by comments made in the other place by the noble Baroness Manningham-Buller, who said that public confidence is vital for the agencies because of the degree to which they rely on the public’s co-operation.

We have heard that 7 November will be a momentous day in the Committee’s history, as it will hold its first public session with the heads of the three agencies. Over the past three years, the public have started to understand Parliament a little better through things such as Rupert Murdoch’s appearance before the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport. I hope the public will take a keen interest in the appearance of the heads of the intelligence services before the ISC next month.

[Mr Watson]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Diana Johnson]

I will carry on because I have very little time and I want to give the Minister an opportunity to respond.

I hope next week’s Committee hearing will be the start of a process through which the ISC demonstrates its ability to conduct a thorough inquiry and to improve public understanding. I hope the Minister will do everything he can to reassure all hon. Members that the Government will facilitate as many public hearings as possible.

Finally, I was struck that the hon. Member for Cambridge made no comment about the important role of the two commissioners. The intelligence services commissioner oversees the performance of the agencies under parts 2 and 3 of RIPA, focusing on intrusive surveillance. His powers were widened by the Justice and Security Act.

The interception of communications commissioner considers operations under part 1 of RIPA. He produces an annual report that clearly sets out the legal framework for electronic surveillance and the way it is used by various bodies. He has oversight of all surveillance under part 1. In particular, he has access to all warrants issued under chapter 1, as well as overseeing a team of inspectors who consider the use of chapter 2 powers.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley said, it would be good to raise the profile of the interception of communications commissioner, as he has had a relatively low profile since the revelations by The Guardian. Indeed, the commissioner wrote in a letter to The Independent:

“I am currently conducting an investigation into the various recent media reports relating to disclosures about interception attributed to Edward Snowden.”

Instead of trying to decipher what the commissioner is doing through references in a letter to a newspaper, both the commissioner and the Government should be emphasising the commissioner’s role and telling Parliament and the public how his office will be responding to the revelations in The Guardian. Will he be compiling a special report? When can we expect to receive that report? A report covering surveillance in 2012 was not published until July 2013, so if we have to wait until July 2014 for the next report, we could probably say that the commissioner is not reporting in the effective and timely manner that we all want.

I also hope the Minister is able to confirm categorically that the commissioner has been given full access to all surveillance undertaken as part of the Tempora programme, as well as, where appropriate, information acquired by the agencies from our allies.

I am pleased that we have had this opportunity to debate the intelligence and security services this afternoon, and I look forward to the Minister’s response to my points.