(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Minister for his statement, and congratulate him on his pronunciation of the full name of this group. I shall refer to it as Ansaru.
We support the Government on issues of national security and work with them on the basis of cross-party co-operation. As the Government are acting today against a group that was identified as an independent entity only in January 2012, I commend them on their speedy action.
As the Minister has said, under section 3 of the 2000 Terrorism Act a group can be proscribed if it
“(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, .
(b) prepares for terrorism,
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”
Obviously, the Opposition are at a disadvantage in evaluating the evidence against such groups, as we do not have access to the same intelligence data as the Government. However, based on what is in the public domain and the brief summary the Minister was able to give today, we are satisfied that the Home Secretary is justified in coming to the conclusion that Ansaru meets these criteria, and we will support the motion.
Members will be particularly concerned to hear about possible links between Ansaru and the kidnap of Chris McManus and his Italian colleague, Franco Lamolinara. The treatment of Mr McManus and Mr Lamolinara was barbaric and despicable, and it is right that the UK Government should take action against any group that commits such acts of terror against UK citizens.
Ansaru has also been linked to the long-established Boko Haram sect, which is not proscribed. I hope the Minister will commit today to keeping the status of Boko Haram under review. So far the actions of this group have been largely confined to Nigeria, but I hope the Government will act to proscribe Boko Haram if links to the UK emerge.
Finally, I remind the Minister of his party’s commitment, made repeatedly when it was in opposition, including by the now Prime Minister, to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir. The Conservatives have now been in power for two and a half years, yet Hizb ut-Tahrir is still a legal organisation in the UK. Now that the Minister has the responsibilities of government I wonder whether, in respect of that organisation, he regrets playing politics with national security while in opposition.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is right to draw the House’s attention to this increasing problem, which has been raised with me at the constituency level as being a serious reason to be alarmed. We are obviously making sure that the law is adjusted to take account of the threat to society, but it is a difficult field because it is, of course, evolving very quickly. We need to make sure that we take the necessary measures to protect society. Just because a drug is legal, does not necessarily mean that it is not harmful, especially if taken in the wrong way, so members of the public need to be mindful that this is a potentially hazardous area.
The Government promised swift action against legal highs and official figures show that 57 legal highs have hit the UK market just this year—nearly two a week—yet there has been only one temporary banning order in two years. These dangerous substances are killing people, so when will the Government act to protect young people in particular with timely bans and to ensure that the drug strategy promise of good-quality drugs education is delivered in our classrooms?
On the hon. Lady’s second point, I think there is an awareness and knowledge, particularly among young people, of the harms that drugs can cause. I see that among 11 to 15-year-olds there has been a quite marked decline in drug consumption over the periods for which surveys have been carried out. Of course legal highs are a new threat—not just to young people, but to the population as a whole—which is why we have to consider how best to respond to them. This is an increasing threat, but I repeat the point that overall, drug consumption in this country is falling.
(12 years ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the hon. Members for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood) and for Stourbridge (Margot James) and my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) on securing this debate on child sexual exploitation. However, I have to say at the outset that, like the Chair of the Education Select Committee, the hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Mr Stuart), and the former Children’s Minister, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), I am disappointed that the present children’s Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Education, the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr Timpson), has not been on the Treasury Bench throughout the debate. I appreciate that he has been here for the past hour.
I was also surprised to be told that I would be responding to the debate as shadow Minister on behalf of the Opposition, as the lead on this matter is obviously with the Department for Education. However, I am pleased to have had the opportunity to listen to the whole debate and to the contributions from Members on both sides of the House on this important subject. I also recognise the special role of Back-Bench debates.
This is a timely debate, and I am pleased that it has consistently focused on the victims of exploitation, on what we can and should do to support them and on what needs to be done to learn from current cases to prevent abuse in the future. As we have heard today, sexual exploitation takes many forms and needs to be understood within the wider context of physical and sexual abuse. It is important to recognise the different situations in which children are exploited, because abuse is often not recognised for what it is.
This has been a good debate, and I want to respond to some of the contributions that have been made. The experience and knowledge that Members have demonstrated has been first class. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport spoke about her long engagement with these issues. The ex-Minister, the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham, brought his experience of the past few years to the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) spoke of his experience in Nottingham, and of the need for a cultural change.
The Chair of the Select Committee and my near neighbour, the hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness, went through some of the recommendations in his Committee’s report. My hon. Friend the Member for Luton South (Gavin Shuker) is the chair of the all-party parliamentary group on prostitution and the global sex trade. He provided the House with his particular focus on the matter. The hon. Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) described his experience of working with the police. The hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) told the House of his first-hand experience of being in care.
Many Members described constituency issues, including the hon. Member for Keighley (Kris Hopkins), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd), who talked about issues in Wales and about the power that insurance companies have commanded in recent inquiries. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Simon Danczuk) spoke powerfully on behalf of his constituents, and talked about some of the shocking revelations in his constituency. The hon. Members for Stourbridge, for Ealing Central and Acton (Angie Bray), for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and for Aldershot (Sir Gerald Howarth) also described what was happening in their constituencies.
I want to comment on the contributions of other Members who brought their specialist knowledge to the debate. My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Sandra Osborne) talked about her work with incest survivors and paid tribute to those who were strong enough to get their voices heard. We should of course thank them for that. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) talked about her experience as a prosecutor of sexual offences, while my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) talked about what was happening in Birmingham.
We have encountered a great wealth of experience in the many hours of our discussion this afternoon. We need to remember that neither perpetrators nor victims are easily defined, although we know that certain groups are particularly vulnerable and that the reality is that young women from all different social groups are exposed to sexual violence and are vulnerable to exploitation. It is equally unwise to generalise about the perpetrators. In the media—the hon. Member for Keighley raised the issue, too—much has been made of the prevalence of grooming within certain Asian communities, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East said, in reporting what the Children’s Commissioner had said, sexual exploitation extends far beyond any particular community or ethnicity. By trying to identify typical perpetrators, we risk missing many others.
Indeed, we need to remember that most child sexual exploitation is done either by a child’s peer or by a young adult. A National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children study found that 65% of sexual abuse was conducted by the under-18s, while a Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre sample of 1,200 known perpetrators found that where the age was known, over half were under 24.
Over the last year, we have seen a number of high-profile cases of abuse and exploitation. Obviously, there has been the Jimmy Savile case, and also the fresh allegations of abuse at the north Wales care homes. We have seen the practice of grooming and sexual exploitation occurring in several towns, most notably Rochdale and Derby, where vulnerable young women were abused by networks of men and then used to recruit new victims. These cases are themselves shocking and the public interest that they have provoked is entirely understandable. However, it is important that this debate goes beyond these high-profile examples.
The really shocking truth is that child abuse and exploitation is far too common. We have already heard in this debate the comments of the Deputy Children’s Commissioner that
“sexual exploitation of children is happening all over the country.”
The NSPCC’s 2009 survey on the prevalence and impact of child maltreatment found that 5% of under-16s reported coerced sexual acts. That is one in 20 of our young people. A YouGov poll commissioned by the End Violence Against Women coalition found that 29% of 16 to 18-year-old girls have experienced unwanted sexual touching at school.
We know that a number of inquiries and pieces of research have either already been conducted or are now under way. There are the investigations into Jimmy Savile’s conduct at the BBC and other institutions, and the inquiry into the Waterhouse inquiry, while the Deputy Children’s Commissioner is in the process of conducting an inquiry into the culture of grooming. The Home Affairs Committee is conducting an inquiry into localised grooming, and the Education Committee has just completed an inquiry into child protection. The NSPCC has conducted a number of excellent pieces of research. I would also like to acknowledge two pieces of research from Barnardo’s: “Puppet on a String” and “Cutting them free: How is the UK progressing in protecting its children from sexual exploitation?” Then there is the excellent work done by CEOP, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind”, which has already been mentioned. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport referred to the joint inquiry of all-party parliamentary group for runaway and missing children and adults and the all-party parliamentary group for looked-after children and care leavers. A joint report into children who go missing from care has been produced under my hon. Friend’s able chairing.
Now that we actually have both Ministers in their places on the Front Bench—they have seen half the debate each—perhaps I could ask the Minister of State, Home Department, the hon. Member for Taunton Deane (Mr Browne), even though he has already spoken, to provide a response in writing to the following issues. First, in evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, the Department for Education claimed to have accepted all 11 recommendations contained in the Children’s Commissioner’s preliminary report, so it would be helpful to know how far the Government have got in implementing those recommendations.
Secondly, support and treatment for victims is a key issue, which the hon. Member for Strangford raised. The NSPCC has identified an estimated shortfall in the provision of therapeutic services of between 51,000 and 88,000. Is either Minister aware of that shortfall, and can either of them tell us what is being done to deal with it?
Thirdly, given that the NHS is currently being reorganised, can either Minister tell us which organisation will be responsible for giving care and support to abused children within the new structures? Where will statutory responsibility for child protection lie following the demise of the primary care trusts?
Fourthly, local safeguarding children boards are key structures, and when they fail children are left particularly vulnerable. The CEOP inquiry, to which Members have referred today, found that
“Most LSCBs do not fulfil the pivotal role prescribed for them in statutory guidance in respect of child sexual exploitation.”
Can one of the Ministers explain what the Government have done to improve the performance of those boards? Thursday’s elections for police and crime commissioners have been mentioned; how will the role of the new PCCs support the boards, and what work has been done to encourage PCCs to promote and engage with them?
No. I am very short of time.
Although children’s services are another key component of the process of keeping our children safe, many councils are being forced to slash the budgets of those services. In my home city of Hull, the council’s budget has been cut by 20% during the current Parliament. What assessment have the Government made of the effects of those cuts on the performance of local safeguarding children boards?
The Government have scaled down the child protection regime to what they call a common-sense level, although organisations such as the NSPCC and experts including Lord Bichard challenged them on some of their plans. I hope that Ministers will take a moment to consider the number of children who have not been protected by common sense in some of the cases that have been discussed today. I hope that they will also have a look at the changes in the criminal records regime, which will restrict information sharing.
No. I am going to continue my speech.
Let us take the example of a schoolteacher who has been barred from working with children by the Independent Safeguarding Authority following a series of corroborated allegations at different schools, none of which has been reported to the police. Let us imagine that that man volunteers to help with drama at another school in a different local authority area, where he works with the same group of children each week under the day-to-day supervision of a teacher. As he is under day-to-day supervision, he will no longer be considered to be in regulated activity. Will a Minister confirm that the school will no longer be required to obtain a CRB check, and that even if it obtains an enhanced CRB check, it will still be explicitly forbidden to be told about the man’s barred status, as he will not be taking part in regulated activity? Would not most parents be horrified to learn about that? I hope that Ministers will reflect on it.
I also hope that the Government will think again about their reluctance to allow a single inquiry to collate information from the many inquiries that I have already mentioned. We have 11 recommendations from the Children’s Commissioner, five from CEOP, 40 from the Education Committee and 31 from the joint APPG inquiry, and a host of inquiries are yet to report. I hope that as the Government receive that further series of reports in the coming months, they will be prepared to consider the Opposition’s call for a single overarching report. Today the Care Leavers’ Association called for a comprehensive national investigation of past abuse in the care system, adding its voice to many others.
In the meantime, there are real questions to be answered about what mechanisms exist to co-ordinate cross-departmental work and understanding of child exploitation. The confusion over who would be on the Government Front Bench today probably highlighted that. Cross-departmental work is never more important than when it challenges the culture that allows abuse and sexual exploitation to go unrecognised, unchallenged and unreported.
Grooming and sexual exploitation are facilitated by a culture in which sexual violence is normalised. The YouGov poll that I mentioned earlier found that 71% of young people regularly witnessed sexualised name-calling, and the findings of studies have suggested that up to 40% have been exposed to sexual content on phones, known as “sexting”. We need to appreciate the link between the prevalence of that sexual culture and an acceptance of abuse. An NSPCC study found that one in three girls and 16% of boys had reported some form of sexual partner violence.
The cases referred to ChildLine showed that time and again young people did not realise they were in an abusive relationship, and when they did, they blamed themselves for the situation. Good work is being done to support young people in making good choices and empowered decisions about their relationships, but we need to do more. I commend to the children’s Minister, the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich, the excellent work of the End Violence Against Women coalition campaign project, Schools Safe 4 Girls. I hope the Minister will think about meeting that group to discuss the excellent work it is doing. I know that there are individual Government programmes, and I applaud them, but there is no sense of this work being brought together. We need to look at the issue of personal, social, health and economic education, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport mentioned. It is a vital issue that needs to be addressed in schools.
Finally, will the children’s Minister confirm today that the Department for Education has disbanded its expert working group on sexual exploitation and has no lead person on violence against women and girls?
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) on an excellent speech. He was, as usual, a very powerful advocate for his constituents and his constituency, and for open justice, which is very important. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), a near neighbour of mine, made his usual compelling case for open justice and cogently set out the key issues in this case.
The debate overall has been of an extremely high quality, with excellent contributions from across the House. My right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Paul Murphy) made a very good speech based on his own practical experience and knowledge in a number of roles. It was telling that he said that this is not an easy matter and that we need to keep on looking very hard at the use of intercept evidence. The hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) set out a strong case for the motion and drew on his experience in the US. My hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Jim Fitzpatrick) asked exactly the right questions, drawn from his practical experience with the police, about why we are not doing this and how we can move it forward. The hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Stephen Phillips) spoke briefly about civil liberties and, in particular, control orders. I want to return to his comments later.
Over recent years, successive Governments, and particularly Home Secretaries, have grappled with the problems of trying to get intercept evidence into courts, and it has also been considered by the Privy Council review, so it is absolutely right that Parliament is debating the matter. We have heard at length about the benefits that might reasonably be expected to result from the use of intercept evidence in courts and inquests as regards, for example, increases in the number of successful prosecutions in serious organised crime and terrorism cases. However, the debate must cover not only the benefits but the difficulties involved, including the risks, such as exposure of interception capabilities and techniques, the resource implications of any changes in the law, and the implications of new communications technology. While the United Kingdom continues to struggle to find a way of accommodating intercept evidence in court, other countries, as we heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham and the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden, allow such evidence, and it is important for us to see what we can learn from those jurisdictions.
This is a very unusual issue. Successive Governments, the Privy Council and leading lawyers have long supported the principle of allowing intercept evidence, but none has been able to come up with a satisfactory model for the admission of such evidence without compromising national security. Labour has long supported the principle of allowing intercept evidence into courts. Indeed, the current push to find a way of doing this was started by my former right hon. Friend and Home Secretary, John Reid, the then Member for Airdrie and Shotts, in 2007, and that commitment was reiterated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) when he was Home Secretary. In opposition, my right hon. Friends the Members for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls) and for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) have reiterated Labour’s desire to see intercept evidence in court and to work with the Government in a constructive manner to achieve that. I restate that commitment.
It is clear that there would be significant benefits in allowing intercept evidence to be admissible in a wider range of courts than is the case at present. In particular, it would be desirable to allow the use of intercept evidence in criminal proceedings and inquests.
I am sure that we all sympathise with the Duggan family, who, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham has said, have unanswered questions. Understandably, they and the community in Tottenham want answers as to how Mr Duggan died, but without an inquest those answers cannot be provided. The Government have proposed secret inquests in which intercept evidence would be admissible, but that would not solve the problem—not only do we need justice to be done, but we need it to be seen to be done. I hope that the Minister will update us on the progress that he has made on this particular issue and I look forward to hearing his comments.
Allowing intercept evidence would seem to support two fundamental principles of British justice. The first is that courts should always have the best evidence available to them, and the second is that all crimes should be dealt with by the same legal system and guided by the same principles. We should, wherever possible, ensure that our legal system is able to protect national security and uphold standards of justice.
We would also like the use of intercept evidence to lead to practical outcomes, such as more prosecutions, particularly for serious crimes and terrorism. It is generally accepted that allowing intercept evidence would have a significant impact on some trials, facilitating some prosecutions and making others more likely. Indeed, the Crown Prosecution Service thinks that allowing intercept evidence would result in more prosecutions and more convictions, and it foresees time and money being saved as a result of more guilty pleas. We would particularly like to see the prosecution of cases that could not otherwise be tried, including those in which intercept evidence has led to a prosecution, but not necessarily for the most serious crime committed. It is often cited that allowing intercept evidence would reduce the need for other measures aimed at countering terrorism, namely pre-charge detention and terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or control orders as they were formerly known.
We should not, however, overstate the practical benefits of allowing intercept evidence. I now want to turn to the point that the hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham made about control orders, or TPIMs as they are now known. The noble Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, was unequivocal in saying that he felt that intercept evidence would not have made control orders obsolete. That was backed up by a report by an independent counsel commissioned by the Home Office. It concluded that allowing the use of intercept evidence would not be enough to facilitate trials in any of the cases of the nine people who were subject to control orders at the time. Indeed, the Privy Council concluded:
“We have not seen any evidence that the introduction of intercept as evidence would enable prosecutions in cases currently dealt with through Control Orders.”
I will put to one side one of the weaknesses of the Privy Council report, namely its assessment of the effectiveness of intercept in prosecutions, and take up the issue of control orders. When we eventually allowed the use of control orders, our presumption when in opposition was that they would allow the control of people who could not be prosecuted in the courts because the available evidence—in other words, intercept evidence—could not be used there. Now we are being told that such people are having their freedom removed on the basis of, in essence, suspicion, because there is nothing beyond intercept other than suspicion. Members on both Front Benches are in a Catch-22 situation: either intercept is effective in dealing with control orders, or control orders are being imposed on the basis of suspicion alone.
The right hon. Gentleman raises an issue that could be debated for many hours. I think that his first point—that evidence was available—is the correct one. However, a review has taken place and the view of the independent counsel, who was commissioned by the Home Office, is that what the right hon. Gentleman has said is not correct. I have only limited time left, so I will move on. We will have to differ on that.
The number of criminal cases in which intercept evidence might be used is limited. An independent survey conducted in 2004 concluded that allowing intercept evidence would secure no more than 20 to 30 additional convictions a year.
Under the current arrangements, intercept evidence is of significant use for the protection of national security and the detection of serious crime. The Privy Council’s report into intercept evidence gives an excellent summary of the importance of wiretapping to UK law enforcement agencies. Under the current arrangements, the UK is able to benefit from intelligence gleaned from wiretapping, without compromising intelligence capabilities. Wiretapping often facilitates the collection of other admissible forms of evidence.
The Serious Organised Crime Agency has stated that
“interception, together with communications data, is the single most powerful tool for responding to serious and organised crime.”
It is because the current regime is so successful that the Metropolitan police currently secure a conviction in 88% of cases where they have employed intercept evidence. It estimates that that would rise only to 92% if intercept evidence were to become admissible. The more sophisticated criminals become, the greater the need for more advanced detection techniques and the greater the need to protect those intelligence techniques.
Of course, we cannot discuss individual cases or the evidence involved in them in Parliament, but it is clear from independent studies that law enforcement and Security Service agencies have provided numerous examples of intercept evidence having been used to apprehend wanted criminals, seize drugs or stolen property, or alert law enforcement agencies of planned criminal activities, enabling them to gather the admissible evidence that they require. We must recognise the important role that wiretapping already plays in the fight against crime and terrorism, and the importance of not jeopardising that success. The Privy Council stressed its belief that:
“The overriding objective should be to promote national security.”
That has been the position of successive Governments, and is the position of the Opposition.
If there was an easy solution to this problem, it would have been produced, but there is not. I will touch on a few of the issues that have prevented previous Governments from allowing wire-tap evidence in court. I hope that the Minister will update the House on what progress has been made on each issue. How can we allow the use of intercept evidence in courts, while protecting the most sensitive information which, if made public, would reveal a particular intelligence technique or source, and while upholding the principle of the equality of arms, under which the defence must have access to and be able to present all the relevant information?
The central desire is to protect the work of the security services and the techniques that they use. Proponents of the use of intercept evidence often counter that by saying that criminals are already aware of the intelligence services’ ability to intercept calls. However, the Privy Council rejected that point and said that criminals’ knowledge is currently conjecture based on rumour and that, while a few of their presumptions may be right, the evidence is that most of them are wrong.
Partnership is important. Earlier, I set out some of the successes of the current regime. Those are based on partnership between law enforcement agencies and the security services, between the UK and our international allies, and between state agencies and communication service providers. There is concern that any attempt to allow intercept evidence in court would jeopardise those successful partnerships. Indeed, some communication service providers have indicated that it would make them much less willing to co-operate. I hope that the Minister will respond to those points.
Much has been said about other jurisdictions. I would appreciate it if the Minister again set out clearly the unique position of the United Kingdom’s legal system, which is very different from that of some of the other countries that have been cited, such as France and Spain.
In conclusion, we all want to have intercept evidence in court. We want answers for the families of those who have died in controversial circumstances, where an inquest cannot take place. However, we have to acknowledge that this is a complex process and that at stake is a system that has delivered a lot towards the protection of our national security and in tackling international crime. It is not clear that any other country uses intercept-gained evidence as effectively as the United Kingdom.
The Opposition will of course work with the Government to get intercept evidence into courts without compromising national security, and international examples, particularly from Canada and the US, give us some indication of how that might be achieved. I hope the Minister will be able to update the House on the progress that the Government have made towards that end, and particularly on what plans he has to allow inquests such as Mark Duggan’s to take place; what processes are currently under way to evaluate the practicalities involved in allowing intercept evidence; what processes are in place for the Government to take expert advice from lawyers, law enforcement agencies and the intelligence services to that end; and whether he has any plans to bring forward a Green Paper.
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs the hon. Gentleman may be aware, venue security is being delivered by the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, G4S and the military. It is a huge operation to protect more than 100 different venues, and delivering it is a big challenge. The Home Office has put in place a number of assurance processes to ensure that we have effective and robust scrutiny of venue security planning. We have been testing our plans thoroughly and are confident that our partners will deliver a safe and secure games, but we are not complacent and will leave nothing to chance, so we will stay on the case.
The Home Secretary has not answered the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Gregg McClymont). First, will she confirm that she personally signed off the G4S recruitment schedule? Secondly, will these 9,000 people be recruited, trained and in place, and will they have gone through the proper security vetting, by the opening of the Olympic games?
(12 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI start by thanking the Minister for his courtesy in having discussions with me about the order. Proscription is serious, and it is quite right that the decision to proscribe an organisation is not taken lightly. The consequences of proscription are very serious, not least because it potentially criminalises the group’s members. Proscription must be reserved for the most dangerous groups where there is clear evidence of terrorist activity.
Under the regulations laid out in part II of the Terrorism Act 2000, a group may be proscribed only if the Home Secretary believes that the organisation commits or participates in acts of terrorism and the Opposition are confident that there is evidence to support the Minister’s assertions and will support the proscription.
I would like to ask the Minister a few questions about the Indian Mujahideen. It is quite clear that it is a terrorist organisation. Indeed, as the Minister set out, it has been behind some of the most appalling acts of terrorism of recent years—most horrifically, the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, in which nearly 170 people were killed. The IM also shares responsibility for the general decline in the security situation on the Indian subcontinent.
It is important, however, to look at the group’s history and to understand the wider movement from which it developed. It is particularly important to recognise the strong links between the IM and the Students Islamic Movement of India—a movement first identified back in 1977. In 1986, the SIMI called for the liberation of India’s Muslims, and evolved into a militant organisation at some point in the 1990s.
The Royal United Services Institute suggests that the IM needs to be understood as a product of the SIMI. This is important because, as far as I am aware, the Government have not banned the SIMI. Will the Minister explain why the SIMI has not been included in the order? As I understand it, if an IM branch converts back to become a SIMI group, it will not be proscribed and the Government will be unable to act against its members. Is that correct? Will the Minister confirm whether he considers the SIMI group to be a terrorist organisation? We also know of concerns about links between the IM and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has also been known to commit attacks on the Indian subcontinent and has already been proscribed.
Let me move on to other factors to which the Home Secretary has to give consideration in making a decision to proscribe. The first is to look at the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities. Will the Minister confirm whether the decision to proscribe this organisation now is a result of evidence suggesting an increase in the scale of the IM’s activities?
Secondly, the specific threat posed to British nationals overseas has to be considered. There are many British nationals in India, particularly in Mumbai. Sadly, British nationals have already been caught up in terrorist attacks in India. Does the fact that the Government are proscribing this organisation now mean that the UK Government recognise that there is an increased level of threat in India and to British nationals in particular?
The Minister has set out evidence of the targeting of UK nationals, and we know that the IM, being active in India, also has a presence in Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. I understand that it uses the porous borders between Nepal and Bangladesh and Bangladesh and India to avoid Indian security on the Pakistan border when it acquires weapons from factions based in Pakistan. May I also ask whether there is any evidence linking that group to forces attacking UK troops operating in Afghanistan?
Thirdly, there is the issue of the extent of the organisation’s presence in the United Kingdom, and the question of whether any specific threat is posed to the UK. Is there any evidence that the IM is active in the UK, or receives direct support from it? Have the Government any estimate of the number of people in the UK who might be affected by the proscription of the group?
According to a 2011 report by the Royal United Services Institute,
“SIMI's (and, thereafter, IM's) distinguishing characteristic was that it was, essentially, home-grown. Its activists and leaders are virtually all Indian.”
Does the decision to proscribe the group reflect a change in its composition? Is there now a greater IM presence outside India? In particular, have links been found between that group and groups operating in the middle east and Europe?
As I said earlier, there are strong links between IM and the Students Islamic Movement of India. Will the Minister tell us whether SIMI is known to the Home Office, and whether there has been a proper assessment of its activities in the United Kingdom? Specifically, is there any evidence that it has operated in UK universities, colleges or mosques, or within communities? Is there any evidence that the IM has forged links with other Islamic terrorist organisations operating in the UK? As I said earlier, there is evidence that Lashkar-e-Taiba has given logistical support to the IM. Is there now evidence to suggest that the IM has developed links with any other groups? In particular, is there any evidence of links between the IM and any other groups on the UK’s proscribed list, which I think now contains about 47 international terrorist organisations?
Fourthly, the Home Secretary should bear in mind the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism. The Minister has said that the UK is proscribing the IM when that has already been done by some of our international allies: India, New Zealand and the United States. Why is that? Did India ask the UK to proscribe the IM? Did discussions include a discussion of the role of other groups, including SIMI? Will this have any European consequences, and have any discussions taken place with our European allies?
Today is the fifth anniversary of the first Prime Minister’s Question Time after my right hon. Friend the Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) became Prime Minister. On that occasion, the then Leader of the Opposition chose proscription as his first topic, using the opportunity to attack the then Government for not proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir. He said:
“Hizb ut-Tahrir. We think it should be banned—why has it not happened?”—[Official Report, 4 July 2007; Vol. 462, c. 951.]
Five years later, the Minister stated in a letter to me:
“this is an organisation about which we have significant concerns and their activities are kept under review”.
Will he explain today why Hizb ut-Tahrir still has not been banned, five years after the present Prime Minister called for such action?
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberTomorrow my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will launch the Government’s proposals to combat antisocial behaviour, strengthening the powers available to the police to deal with antisocial behaviour and giving citizens greater power to tackle repeat antisocial behaviour that they feel insufficient action is being taken to address.
The Home Secretary has frequently claimed that her 20% cuts to police funding will not reduce front-line policing. I am sure we all agree that 999 first responders, including traffic, CID and neighbourhood police, are, indeed, front-line officers. Will the Minister therefore confirm that recent freedom of information requests show that front-line police numbers have fallen by 5,261 since March 2010?
Why does the Labour party never admit that its proposed spending reductions of over £1 billion would also result in a reduction in the police work force, and why does it also never admit that it supports the two-year pay freeze, and that the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), the shadow policing Minister, supports further savings to the police budget, which means it is committed to a greater saving than we are? That is a fact, and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) should attend to the real issue, which is that there have been 25,000 police officers in backroom positions rather than on the front line. We are seeking to redress that.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend has consistently argued for the indefinite retention of DNA profiles. We certainly recognise the importance of DNA in solving crimes. It is rarely possible to say that convictions could not have been obtained without DNA evidence, although of course the availability of DNA evidence can frequently help to focus an investigation. We have been clear on ensuring that those convicted of crimes remain on the DNA database indefinitely, and speculative searches are undertaken on each occasion.
May I press the Minister a little further on the high-profile rape case that collapsed due to sample cross-contamination at LGC Forensics? Also, a New Scientist survey shows that three quarters of forensic scientists expect that the coalition’s closure of the FSS will cause more miscarriages of justice. Will the Minister outline the steps that he is taking to ensure that the integrity of the criminal justice system is not undermined by a lack of confidence in the available forensic science services?
We have absolute confidence in the provision by forensic service providers, and I know that the hon. Lady accepts that private providers are well equipped and well able to offer services to police in future. On her specific question in respect of the individual case, I repeat that the forensic science regulator, Andrew Rennison, has launched an immediate investigation into the case. The initial investigation suggests that this is an isolated case. Although we will learn any lessons to be learned from the formal inquiry, there are no indications at this stage that it undermines the use of DNA or private providers providing services to the police.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will give way to the hon. Lady, and as I have said, I look forward to hearing the Opposition’s clarification on the amendment.
Will the Minister clarify what would happen if one or both parents have refused permission for biometric data to be taken from their child, but the child wishes to consent? Would the child have the right to have their biometric information taken?
As the hon. Lady will be aware, the provisions relate to the consent of the parents. They say that the consent of one parent is required, but it is left open to the other parent to object, and such an objection would stand. If need be, in the light of the arguments that the right hon. Member for Delyn makes for his amendment, I will provide further clarification.
Finally, I turn to the motion to disagree with Lords amendment 28. The amendment is a response to an observation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that questioned the necessity of an affirmative procedure for an order revoking a temporary extension order. In the Government’s response to the Committee, we concluded that it was not necessary to subject a revocation order to parliamentary scrutiny, given that it would be neither appropriate nor meaningful. The Committee did not take issue with that conclusion. It would be perverse if Parliament were in the position of debating and voting on a revocation order when it had not had the opportunity to approve the original temporary extension order, given that the order had been revoked before it had been approved. Any such debate would be likely to be academic because a temporary extension order lasts for only three months, and there is therefore a strong possibility that an order would have expired before any debate had taken place. Furthermore, a revocation order will simply return the maximum period of detention to 14 days, the maximum period already approved by Parliament, which negates the need for parliamentary approval of a revocation order. That remains the Government’s view, and I hope that the House will not support the Opposition’s motion to disagree with the Lords amendment.
With this we will discuss the following:
Lords amendment 31, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendments 32 to 47.
Lords amendment 48, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendment 49, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendment 50, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendments 53 to 55, 57 and 58, 60 and 61, 63, 67 and 69.
Lords amendment 102, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendment 103, and amendment (a) thereto.
Lords amendments 104 to 113, 117 to 132 and 138 to 145.
I wish to put on the record the fact that Lords amendments 33 to 36 are very welcome, as they relate to a matter raised in Committee and on Report, and directly with the Prime Minister. Originally, the Government planned that anyone committing a serious sexual offence against a child would not automatically be placed on the barred list unless they had worked with children or planned to do so. We are pleased that the argument we made in Committee has been accepted by the Government and that now, for all serious sexual offences committed against a child, the perpetrator will automatically be placed on the barred list. The original plans were bureaucratic and appeared to the general public to leave children in a potentially vulnerable position, so we very much welcome the Government’s action.
Both Houses of Parliament have debated extensively the vetting and barring part of the Bill. One of the key issues debated at length was what constitutes “supervision” of a volunteer and how that relates to ensuring that children are properly protected. Initially, in the Commons, the Government turned their face against defining “supervision”, but they have now set out a definition, albeit a very weak one, in amendments 30 and 31, which refer to both children and vulnerable adults.
At this stage, I wish to refer to the excellent report by the all-party group on child protection, chaired with great knowledge by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Meg Munn), which also called for a tightening up the definition of “supervision”. Amendments (a) to Lords Amendments 30 and 31 deal with this issue, and it is important to set out why the definition of “supervision” is so important.
Under the Government’s new system, any employer, voluntary sector body or charity will be aware that, from the Bill’s enactment, they will be able to obtain full disclosure of information about an individual only if that person is in “regulated activity”, which is now much more narrowly defined in the Bill. To take schools as an example, we know that all employees in a school will be in “regulated activity”, so full information on teachers and caretakers, including details of cautions, convictions and barred status, and any soft information, will be available. However, we also know that if we delve a little further in a regulated setting, we find people who might have volunteered within the school—to read with the children in an individual classroom a few times a week, for example. They will not be deemed to be in “regulated activity” if they are supervised within the school. Will the Minister clarify whether the school will be committing an offence if it requests information on the barred status of a volunteer who is supervised? The measures mean that schools will not have the right to any information about whether a volunteer had been barred by the Independent Safeguarding Authority. If a school decides to apply for a Criminal Records Bureau check, they will be provided only with very basic CRB check information.
I will return to this point in relation to Lords amendment 48, but first let me address the question of supervision. There is genuine concern that “supervision” is a very loose concept, which can mean many different things to different people, and that could put children and vulnerable adults at risk.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way and for her kind words. I apologise that I was not quite in the Chamber when she started speaking.
Are there not two areas of risk? First, if someone has something in their background that has previously been identified, it should be notified to the school so that the school can make an appropriate decision. Secondly, the supervision needs to be close to ensure that the behaviour and propensity to groom a child and build a specific relationship with them can be identified sooner.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. She speaks with great knowledge and makes very important points. Those two issues are key when it comes to looking at supervision, volunteering and information sharing. The problem is with the looseness of the definition of supervision. Supervision must be close enough to make it meaningful. When a volunteer is in a classroom engaging in an activity such as teaching a child to read or listening to a child read, there is a formation of trust between the volunteer and the child. That might be in a classroom where a teacher and teaching assistant are present, but unfortunately grooming could be taking place in some cases. Similarly, a volunteer sports coach develops a level of trust and relationships with young people on the sports field. Such bonds and levels of trust are also formed in youth clubs.
A number of highly informed Lords raised those questions in the other place. I pay tribute to the excellent contributions of the noble Baronesses Royall and Butler-Sloss, the noble Bishops of Hereford and of Newcastle and the noble Lord Bichard who, as we all know, conducted the Soham inquiry and has great knowledge of this area of child protection. I ask the Government to reconsider what the noble Lords said from a position of great knowledge and experience.
It is very important that, wherever possible, supervision is meaningful and ensures that everything can be done to make sure that volunteers behave properly at all times and that children are kept safe. The vast majority of volunteers give their time freely and want to give something back to society, and we applaud them for doing that, but we know that people who want to harm children are very devious and manipulative. They are always looking for a way to access children, and if there is a weak link in the chain—the weak supervision of volunteers, for example—they will use that to their advantage. So that employers fully understand all their responsibilities in having volunteers on site or within their organisation, and use best practice in dealing with volunteers, it is important to provide a proper definition of supervision and guidance.
The Sport and Recreation Alliance, Fair Play for Children and many other charities have highlighted the problems of using the notion of supervision to decide whether a person is in a position to exploit their relationship with children from reading with children in a class or volunteering as a sports coach. We have considered several definitions of supervision in our deliberations on the Bill. One was about day-to-day supervision, but after a long debate it was felt that that definition would not be enough to ensure close supervision. For example, a football coach could see their supervisor for a quick chat at the beginning of the day and that could be it for their supervision for the day. They could then be with children for long periods of time each day, perhaps taking them to a distant football field for several hours out of the supervisor’s eyesight and earshot. Similarly, a drama volunteer could be working with children in another room away from a supervisor, week in week out. They might have a short supervision once a day with the supervisor, but for the majority of the time they could be away from any real oversight. Most people would think that such volunteers should be subject to full background checks, and that if they are not, they should be effectively and constantly supervised.
The definition of supervision we have set out in amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 30 is
“constant monitoring by an individual engaged in a regulated activity who is on the same site and able to maintain close visual and audio contact with the individual who is under supervision.”
We believe that definition is helpful and sets out for everyone who needs to read and act on it the required standard and what is expected when supervising a volunteer in regulated activity. Given the importance of this issue, I will seek to press the amendment to a vote to test the opinion of the House.
Lords amendment 48, which the Government tabled in the other place, provides welcome clarification on how police forces should record cautions. The effect seems to be that cautions will now always be treated as convictions. The inevitable result of that will be that many more cautions will be disclosed on CRB checks. Given that the Government are to disclose more information on CRB checks, I am surprised that they continue to block the release of information on barred status to a school or voluntary organisation. That is why my hon. Friends and I tabled amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 48, under which barred status issued by the Independent Safeguarding Authority would be treated in the same way as a conviction or caution. Under our amendment, barred status could be disclosed to a school or voluntary organisation when they request an enhanced CRB check on a volunteer. The Government appear to be making it an offence for such organisations to make a request about barred status, as they previously could.
We have spent many hours discussing in Committee, on Report and in the other place how the arrangement would work. I am concerned that the Government have not heeded the advice offered to them by a range of knowledgeable sources, including the NSPCC, Fair Play for Children and the Sport and Recreation Alliance. Those organisations have all called for barred status to be revealed, as has the noble Lord Bichard, who conducted the review of the Soham murders. He tabled amendments on this issue in the other House for which he had the support of many noble Lords including several bishops. I hope that at this late stage the Minister will reflect on the opinions of so many experts in this field.
Let us consider where these questions might arise. Suppose that a supply teacher is barred from working with children after substantiated allegations of inappropriate conduct are made by four schools. Suppose that teacher then goes to another local authority and volunteers to hear reading in a classroom, twice a week, taking children out of the classroom and working with them on a one-to-one basis for 15 minutes. Under the Government’s proposals the school would be prevented from finding out that that person was barred from working with children. I do not think that is right and I believe that the vast majority of parents would agree with me.
The Government have consistently stated that they do not believe it is proportionate to reveal barred status, but they are happy to reveal any criminal conviction, regardless of whether it is relevant to child protection; similarly, any caution can be disclosed, regardless of whether it is relevant to child protection. Yet information on whether a person has been assessed by experts at the Independent Safeguarding Authority and deemed inappropriate to work with children cannot be disclosed. The Government’s response has been to say that the evidence leading to the barring decision will be revealed. To that end we welcome Lords amendments 37 and 38, but information sharing between the ISA and the police is not enough unless that information is then passed to the school. One of the key recommendations from the Soham inquiry was about the need to share information.
In many respects, I am speaking on behalf of the Minister for Equalities, who is also responsible for criminal information; she would wish to be here if it were not for a family emergency.
This group of amendments relates to parts 5 and 7 of the Bill. Part 5 will implement our reforms to the disclosure and barring arrangements, which will scale them back to common-sense levels. The Lords amendments to part 5 address a number of concerns raised by hon. Members in our earlier deliberations on its important provisions. We have had useful debates on the issues in this House and the other place, and I am pleased that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) welcomes Lords amendments 33 to 36, which amend clause 67 and relate to the criteria for automatic barring by the Independent Safeguarding Authority.
Our review of the disclosure and barring scheme concluded that it did not make sense to bar somebody if they had never worked, and are unlikely ever to work, in regulated activity. We recognise that this change to the barring arrangements was a matter of concern to hon. Members in this House and in another place, and to partner organisations. We therefore brought forward the amendments, so that people convicted of the most serious offences, such as the rape of a child—in such cases, representations are not allowed—are barred automatically, whether or not they have any link to regulated activity. In all other cases, a person will be barred only if they have been, are, or might in the future be involved in regulated activity. Should they ever apply to work in regulated activity, their details will be passed to the Independent Safeguarding Authority or the disclosure and barring service, which will consider them for barring at that point. I welcome what the hon. Lady said in that regard.
On amendments 30 and 31, obviously there continues to be a genuine difference between the two sides of the House. I listened carefully and intently to what the hon. Lady said. Amendments 30 and 31 amend clause 64, which amends the definition of “regulated activity” and introduces the concept of regular and day-to-day supervision of individuals whose work would be regulated activity if unsupervised. We previously debated at length the appropriate level of supervision; the Opposition suggested that it should be “close” and “constant”; notwithstanding what the hon. Lady has said, we still believe that that formula is unworkable in practice.
When the Bill left this House, it already made provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the meaning of “day to day supervision”. Amendments 30 and 31 require the level of supervision to be reasonable in all the circumstances for protecting children. That qualitative threshold, coupled with the statutory guidance, will assist employers and voluntary organisations in making appropriate judgments as to which of their supervised staff or volunteers fall within or outside the scope of regulated activity. The hon. Lady’s amendments to Lords amendments 30 and 31 would remove the definition of “day to day supervision” in clause 64 and replace it with:
“constant monitoring by an individual engaged in a regulated activity who is on the same site and able to maintain close visual and audio contact with the individual who is under supervision.”
Such constant monitoring is, in our judgment, likely to be impossible in practice. A trip away from a classroom, perhaps for a comfort break or something like that, would be enough to cause someone to fall foul of the amendments. The effect of the amendments would be to reinstate all supervised people within regulated activity.
I appreciate that this is a point of difference between us, and I know that the hon. Lady has considered the issue carefully, but as we have said, we believe that although it is right that all paid staff and unsupervised volunteers in specified places such as schools, and unsupervised staff in other places who carry out activities such as teaching and training, should be within regulated activity, it is not proportionate to include other staff in those areas within regulated activity. Lords amendments 30 and 31 make it clear that the test of supervision is whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances for child protection, so if supervision is not reasonable, the person falls within regulated activity, but if it is reasonable, there is no need for them to do so. Our judgment is that that is right, in order to empower employers to make decisions, to reduce unnecessary burdens on employers, and to remove barriers to volunteering. If a grandparent whom a head teacher has known for years wants to help out with reading at their local school, why should the head teacher have to check their barred status, if he or she knows that they present no risk?
However, I repeat the assurances given by my ministerial colleague, Lord Henley in another place: supervised people who work regularly and closely with children will remain eligible for enhanced criminal record certificates, and our guidance on supervision will make it clear that it is best practice to request such a certificate when employees or volunteers are unknown to the organisation, or if checks are needed for new posts or staff moves.
It might make sense for me to talk about the Opposition’s amendment (a) to Lords amendment 48, because there is a strong link between that amendment and their amendments to Lords amendments 30 and 31. The effect of the amendment to Lords amendment 48 would be that the definition of “conviction” in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 included a person’s inclusion on an ISA barred list. I presume that the intention is that the information should then be included on criminal record certificates.
We have debated the issue of barred list information before. The Government do not think it right to include barred list information on enhanced criminal record certificates, except for posts falling within regulated activity, and a few compelling exceptions, such as when people are applying to foster or adopt a child.
Employers in regulated activity must know about a bar because of its legal effect; otherwise, there is no need to know because it relates to a different area of work and in practice would lead to individuals being excluded from areas of work to which their bar does not apply. In most cases, the information which led to the bar will be available on an enhanced criminal record certificate. When it is not, as Lord Henley also confirmed last week in another place, we will use secondary legislation to allow the ISA to give the police the information which led to a bar so that they can disclose it on an enhanced certificate, if it is relevant to the post applied for.
Bars may apply, for example, because there is a criminal conviction, but equally a bar may apply because someone has been dismissed by their employer in respect of a particular case. In those circumstances the ISA would be able to give the police the relevant information. The police would then be able to determine, through an enhanced check, whether its disclosure was appropriate. We think that that provides an important safeguard.
With the experts at the ISA making a judgment about whether someone should have barred status, why is another layer of bureaucracy introduced by giving that information to the police to allow them to make a further judgment about whether that should be disclosed to a school, for example? Why do we not trust the ISA to make the right decision and disclose that?
This is where we differ on the appropriate way to treat the bar. We believe that if there are circumstances which would otherwise not necessarily have been disclosed for the ISA to make that judgment, it is appropriate to allow that information to be disclosed to the police and for the police to consider the application that they have received on an enhanced check and to judge whether the disclosure of those facts and circumstances is right in that case.
I appreciate that a difference exists between us. We do not see that as bureaucratic. It is about respecting the purpose of the bar and ensuring that on an enhanced check, if the ISA holds relevant information, it can be provided to the police. We have made that clear through our assurances in another place. I hope that that gives greater reassurance on a matter about which I know the hon. Lady feels strongly.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will not make the standard jokes about military intelligence that would normally arise at this point. I entirely understand what my hon. Friend means. That is precisely why I think it essential for all chief scientific advisers to be provided with all the papers. The problem is how they can know what is going on, because some Departments are not as free with their information as others. I will not single out the Home Office in this instance, but I think it right for chief scientific advisers to have the information at an early stage. It is difficult to comment on things that you do not know about until it is too late.
I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman was as surprised as I was when I read the evidence from the chief scientific adviser, who had said that he did not think it appropriate for him to be consulted about the decision to close the FSS because he thought that it was merely about finance and the possibility that the service would go into administration. Was that not a rather shocking approach for him to take?
I think the key point is that chief scientific advisers should be consulted, as a matter of routine, at the beginning of the process. That is much more important than raking through the question of exactly what counts as a commercial and hence legitimately non-scientific issue, and what counts as a genuinely scientific issue. Chief scientific advisers should be given more access, and their roles and seniority should be elevated.
Professor Silverman conducted a review of research and development in forensic science, and the findings were published in June 2011. They make a very interesting read, and raise a number of issues. I hope that the Minister will tell us how the Government will respond to some of the key points.
The report says that, when it comes to forensic sciences,
“improvement in the degree of linkage and communication would drive forward innovation most effectively”.
Will the Minister consider whether the forensic science regulator should have a duty to improve the linkages that are necessary, in order to fill the role that was formerly occupied largely by the FSS?
The report also recommends that there should be a regular cross-disciplinary forensic science conference, and I hope that that will be possible. Perhaps the regulator should be able to deal with it as well, because there are problems with fragmentation of the field.
Another issue that has not been touched on so far is training, and ensuring that the right people enter the forensic science sector. I had a very interesting time when I visited the Laboratory of the Government Chemist. One of the issues that we discussed was the poor quality of the vast majority of training courses in forensic sciences at universities. If I remember correctly, there were only two courses that the LGC considered to be of a sufficiently high standard. I will not test my memory by attempting to remember which two they were, but it is a problem if the right people are not being employed in the sector.
The LGC believes that it should generally take people who have been trained in chemistry and a range of other subjects, and that people are being misled into taking forensic science courses that are not good enough to secure their employment in the sector. I hope that the Government will think about that, because it would be consistent with Government policy to try to steer people away from courses that will not enable them to achieve the expected goals.
Professor Silverman’s report also argued that
“the interdisciplinary nature and societal importance of forensic science, as well as the opportunities that would be created by better communication, make it an appropriate candidate for particular attention by the Research Councils and the Technology Strategy Board.”
In other words, he recommends that we should be investing in it as part of our general science spend. Although I am, of course, aware that there must be limits on how much the Government can tell the research councils what to do, has the Minister had any conversations about whether that recommendation could be implemented?
Like all other hon. Members who have spoken in the debate, I want to congratulate the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller), and all its members on the report we are discussing this evening. It has been described by many as a comprehensive and accurate outline of the key issues relating to the closure of the Forensic Science Service. I believe that the report gives a fair account of the history of the FSS and of the background to the decision announced on 10 December 2010 to close it by 31 March 2012.
The Forensic Science Service has a world-class reputation and is recognised as a pioneering body, especially in the field of DNA. It has been responsible for the training of many scientists in other jurisdictions and other forensic science services around the world, as well as being noted for playing a vital role in national emergencies such as the 7/7 bombings. Professor Niels Morling, president of the International Society for Forensic Genetics, has said:
“'So many of us have benefited from the research, development and education offered by the FSS—a worldwide network of scientists is grateful to the FSS and to British society”.
Of course, the most important part of the FSS is its employees, who have a deserved reputation for excellence. Their skills and experience are second to none, and we should pay tribute to all the commitment and hard work of the scientists and staff of the FSS as it faces its final month in operation. I have had the privilege of visiting two of the FSS sites. I visited Wetherby last February, and the site at Lambeth just before Christmas. I met the chair of the FSS with representatives of the trade union, Prospect, which represents many forensic scientists. I have also met representatives of the Law Society in relation to this matter, and many forensic scientists who care about and are committed to forensic science.
As I understand it, following the decision to close the FSS, England and Wales will be the only countries in the world without an independent, accredited forensic science service. We will still have a centrally provided service in Northern Ireland and in Scotland. I am also aware that the United States believes that this decision to close the FSS is a backward step, as it starts to examine the creation of an independent forensic science service of its own. William Thompson of the University of California has said:
“At a time when the deficiencies in forensic science are increasingly apparent, to lose one of the major research institutes is not just a loss for Britain, it’s a loss for the entire world”.
Returning to the Select Committee report, it is clear that the history of the FSS has not been a happy one under successive Governments, and the Chair of the Committee set out that history in his opening speech. We heard a candid, powerful and well-informed contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr Campbell), who was a distinguished Home Office Minister with responsibility for the FSS. He talked, in particular, about the decision by the Government in 2009 to make a grant of £50 million available to the FSS to restructure the business so that it could modernise and become more competitive, for example by closing forensic science sites and laboratories and reducing the number of staff. However, it is now clear that before that transformation could conclude the Government decided to pull the plug on the FSS.
The decision seems to have been taken in a hurried way and with a failure to consult all interested parties. The Government seem to have been working on a set of assumptions that have little evidence to back them up, as the report confirms. I say to the Minister, for whom I have great respect, that that seems typical of the way they are making decisions at the moment. They are making decisions quickly and then finding that they have failed to consider all the issues they need to address as a responsible Government, as we are now seeing with the Health and Social Care Bill.
In the light of the excellent Select Committee report, I would like to draw out a number of issues and highlight the concerns of the Opposition and many others who care about forensic science. First, there is huge concern—it has been voiced this evening in the Chamber—about the way the Government decided to close the FSS when they did. The decision was of course announced in a written statement to the House and there was no opportunity at the time to question the Minister. It is clear from the report that only ACPO was consulted before the decision was made, and ACPO provided a report on the planned closure of the FSS to the Home Office through the work of PricewaterhouseCoopers. Unfortunately, the Government have blocked the public release of that report, which is extremely unhelpful, despite their claim to want open and transparent government and to allow proper and effective scrutiny of their decisions.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter) said, a number of experts from the fields of forensic science and criminal justice have recently come forward to express concern that the closure of the FSS will lead to an increase in the number of miscarriages of justice and wrongful acquittals. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Minister explained why he did not consult the Director of Public Prosecutions, the head of the Crown Prosecution Service or the Criminal Cases Review Board before making his decision. Surprisingly, neither the FSS, nor its regulator, was consulted.
Like the Committee, I was astonished to read the evidence of the chief scientific adviser to the Home Office, who was also not consulted. However, what is even more astonishing in this case is that in his evidence to the Committee he did not seem to think that there was anything wrong with that. He said that the decision to close the FSS was about matters of finance and the FSS possibly going into administration and so apparently had nothing to do with him as the chief scientific adviser. I believe that he failed in his professional duty and agree wholeheartedly with the report’s scathing comments about his approach to his duties.
It is expected that the 60% of the market share that the FSS currently has will transfer seamlessly to the private sector. I am concerned that there appears to have been little attempt to obtain market intelligence about what private sector providers could provide if the FSS closes. The underlying assumption is that the market is fully elastic, which I argue is not the case, as can be seen when looking at the instability recognised by all parties in forensics at the moment. It is also unclear whether the private sector will be able to deal with the volume of work available or has the specialist techniques that the FSS has.
I shall highlight one area in which I think we are going to lose a particular technique. It is known as direct analysis in real time mass spectrometry, or DART-MS, and when I visited the Lambeth site in November I was shown how the FSS uses it. The technology allows chemicals to be analysed very quickly—indeed, it was used in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings—and substances to be identified within hours instead of days. The FSS was the only UK provider able to do that analysis, and no private provider has come forward to pick up the process.
When I asked a written parliamentary question about the matter, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone), stated that it was
“not stipulated in any of the work packages of the National Forensic Framework Agreement”—[Official Report, 5 September 2011; Vol. 532, c. 237W]
so no information was held on what would happen to it. Does the Minister before us, in his role as the counter-terrorism Minister, feel comfortable with that important technology being lost to the UK?
It is not clear whether the Minister, when making his decision, gave any thought to the broader issues regarding the FSS. They include the research and development for which the FSS is world-renowned, the role of the archive and how important it is to the criminal justice system.
It is generally accepted that the forensics market is currently unstable, especially when police budgets are being cut by 20% and there is the knock-on effect of the police choosing to commission forensics services in-house. The spend on forensics is costed at about £150 million but is mooted to decrease to £110 million by 2015. That might happen much sooner, however, with the police in-sourcing forensics. The budget is being distorted by the police customer becoming increasingly the competitor, so what modelling has been done on the effect of such in-sourcing and on the establishment of a stable market?
The Minister is committed to opening up the market in forensics, but how will that happen in practice? Owing to instability in the marketplace, it is difficult for new providers to enter, and there is no targeted support for new entrants. LGC and Cellmark dominate the market, and LGC, because of the additional work it has been able to attract, has subcontracted some to Key Forensics, but owing to market instability that is unlikely to carry on for long. Key Forensics has had to expand quickly, but that work might dry up just as quickly. That leaves companies with a difficult position in which to operate.
Businesses throughout the economy are finding trading hard, and investment is even harder to come by, so it seems to me that the Minister’s hopes of being able to provide forensics services seamlessly after 31 March are pinned on a very unstable position. Has he given any thought to what would happen if there was a change in the forensics market with, perhaps, one main supplier withdrawing? How would the Government be able to protect the supply of forensics to the criminal justice system?
We all agree that forensics plays a very important role in the criminal justice system by ensuring that bad people are brought to court and convicted. A forensic scientist told me:
“The FSS has always proudly provided all types of forensic discipline in order to best serve the criminal justice system, whether profitable or not. Private sector providers have however carefully selected only profitable areas of forensic science and left specialist, costly disciplines to the trusty supplier of last resort, the FSS. Inevitably, the FSS has therefore suffered financially where other private companies may seem to have succeeded. Clearly, overall forensic science is not a profitable or sustainable business arena. It is an essential service, requiring government support, in order to serve its sole function: to contribute toward a successful criminal justice system”.
Finally in this section, I turn to the financial issues, which appear to have been the only matter that the Home Office and the Minister looked at when reaching their decision. There is some confusion about the rationale that the Government used to take the decision, claiming that the FSS was losing about £2 million a month and that, therefore, a decision had to be made urgently to close it.
The Science and Technology Committee queried that figure in the light of the changes that the service was undergoing as part of the £50 million transformational grant it had been given to reduce its costs. For example, were the savings resulting from the disposal of FSS sites factored in, and were the one-off redundancy costs of staff leaving the FSS treated as just that—one-off costs? The FSS has pointed out that, at the time of the decision, it was in the middle of restructuring, including a transition to a new computer system for processing and assessing work and the introduction of a new DNA analysis technique. Little consideration seems to have been given to the additional costs that the FSS carries in its budgets regarding the compulsory levels of accreditation that it must have, the cost of its archive, and its work in research and development. The FSS claims that its losses for 2010-11 were about £11 million. The Home Office has announced that, after the closure, it will continue to provide funding for the archive, which costs approximately £2 million a year, plus £1 million for drugs and explosives provision. The Home Office is also bearing the cost of the areas that it brought in-house, such as international co-operation on drugs profiling, and police forces are now likely to incur higher costs for complex cases.
The second issue is the employees of the FSS. It is often thought that equipment is the key thing for forensic science but, in fact, it is the analysis, interpretation and contextualisation provided by expert forensic scientists. Many people at the FSS have had decades of experience. I am sure that the House will recognise that forensic scientists cannot be trained overnight. It takes five years to become a fully accredited fingerprint expert and approximately five years to be able to carry out crime scene investigations of serious crimes such as rape and murder. A key recommendation of the Committee was that the Forensic Transition Board must ensure that forensic scientists employed by the FSS are retained within the profession, yet the Government did not introduce any measures to help staff to stay in it, and evidence suggests that up to 90% have left. Does the Minister regret that loss of expertise to the forensics market? Will he update the House on the numbers of people with many years of experience who are leaving the FSS? It is estimated that the redundancy costs are between £100 million and £200 million. Will he update us on the budget for those costs?
I want to highlight a couple of matters that have come to my attention during the transition period in which staff are being TUPE-ed over to other positions or leaving the profession. In Yorkshire, 147 staff were aligned to LGC under TUPE, but in the end only 44 people transferred to LGC under different pay and conditions; the rest took redundancy and were then invited to reapply for their jobs. Can the Minister confirm that the Government, and not LGC, ended up paying for these redundancies? I have been contacted by many employees of the FSS with concerns about what is happening and about the protections that are offered by TUPE, which are apparently being sidestepped. In particular, what pension provision has been given to those who have been TUPE-ed to other companies? My hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth asked about the Government’s ongoing pension liability, and I hope that the Minister will be able to respond to that.
The Metropolitan police service TUPE-ed in hundreds of staff from the FSS but says that it will still outsource its analytical work. That means that it will have taken on highly qualified staff who are on higher salaries but whose skills are not being utilised. Does the Minister think that that will improve efficiency? In addition, the sexual offences team from the FSS has been excluded from employment by the Metropolitan police service, which has decided to outsource that work. That loss of very skilled scientists is a worrying development. Will the Minister comment on it? I know that his Secretary of State is greatly concerned to ensure, particularly in rape cases, that more perpetrators are brought to court and convicted. I wonder whether getting rid of these experienced people will assist in that aim.
The third issue that I want to raise is about the police. As we all appreciate, the police are the pre-eminent customer who control the market in forensics. We also know that they face cuts to their budgets of 20%, meaning that their spend on forensics will reduce. Alongside that, there is an expansion in the internal provision of forensic science services by police forces that are banding together. That will mean a loss of access for non-police organisations that in the past could access the FSS. While I have the greatest of respect for the work of the police, there are genuine concerns about criminal justice that have to be addressed. There must be impartiality and the perception of independence in the forensic evidence that is presented to the courts.
The main concern about the Government’s approach, with the new forensics world and the idea of police commissioning, is what it will all cost and whether we will get value for money. It is difficult to get a national picture of what the police are spending, in terms of both revenue and capital. As the Chair of the Select Committee said, my freedom of information request on this issue resulted in a lot of very confusing answers. As the Select Committee report pointed out, it is regrettable that the Home Office does not collate spending on forensics by police forces centrally, because there is no way of knowing what is happening up and down the country. The budget being spent by the police is an important part of the forensics jigsaw puzzle. It would show how the forensics market fits together and what the total cost will be to the taxpayer. I was asked by an FSS scientist whether the money that the Home Office pays for the FSS is different from the money that is paid by the police. The answer is that it is all taxpayers’ money and so needs to be looked at together to get a complete picture of the total spend on forensic science services.
I will now turn to the concern over accreditation in relation to the police, which has been raised by many Members. In the main, the laboratories that have been created by the police do not have accreditation. As we all recognise, accreditation is designed to ensure that all forensic science providers operate to agreed standards and with agreed methods. Of course, all the leading players such as LGC and Cellmark have labs that have been accredited or subcontract to labs that have been accredited. The vast majority of police labs do not have ISO 17025 accreditation, which is the kitemark for standards in forensic science. It is worrying to think that police labs are not at that level. I understand that the Minister has said that four police forces have that level of accreditation. I would be grateful if he confirmed whether that is true of every science lab in each of those four force areas. Will he also confirm that all private sector and police crime scene investigators have ISO 17020 accreditation?
The Minister has said that the 60% of the market that the FSS has will all be transferred to accredited labs. I hope that that is happening. I am concerned about the attitude of the Government, who appear to be relaxed about getting accreditation for police labs before 2014 or 2015. I was told recently that the Metropolitan Police Service was one of the few police forces that had accreditation, but that it relinquished it voluntarily when it moved the lab to the Lambeth site. Why will the roll-out of accreditation for police forces occur after the closure of the FSS? Would it not have been more sensible to ensure that the police labs had accreditation before closing the FSS?
The fourth issue that I will raise is about the Forensic Science Regulator and his role in accrediting labs. As many Members have said, the regulator is powerless to enforce any codes of practice or standards as he has no statutory powers. The Science and Technology Committee report called for the Forensic Science Regulator to be given statutory powers to enforce a code of conduct. Nearly 80% of forensic scientists surveyed by the New Scientist magazine did not feel confident that the regulator had sufficient resources to ensure that standards were adequate and consistent between providers. Although the regulator was content with that situation, he has now changed his mind and wants powers to allow him to do his job effectively. I understand that he has little staffing support. How will the regulator adequately address accreditation with this huge upheaval in the market? Will all providers be accredited, and by when? Will that include independent specialist firms and sole traders, and how will it be funded?
I wish to make two other points about the role of the regulator. First, what role will he play in dealing with the real concerns that have been raised today about the fragmentation of forensic science? My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), in particular, set out his concerns about that. One example of which I have been made aware is a recent stabbing. Blood pattern analysis was sent to seven different analysts in four different organisations. That evidence should have been analysed by one individual who could contextualise it, interpret it and present it in court. Instead, the jury will have to piece together a narrative from seven different expert witnesses. Does the Minister accept that that has made a conviction much harder to achieve? Would it not be appropriate to give the regulator powers to address fragmentation? An anonymous response to the New Scientist survey from a forensic scientist at a private lab said:
“More and more cases are being broken into component parts and incomplete examinations are requested of private laboratories because in-house police laboratories believe they are saving money…This makes the interpretation of the evidence within the context of the whole case very difficult because the scientist does not have a complete picture.”
Secondly, what will happen if a whistleblower comes forward? What procedures are in place to deal with that, and would the regulator take responsibility for dealing with the concerns of whistleblowers in either a private provider or a police force provider?
I turn to the FSS archive. We have heard about the importance of the national archive and how little thought seemed to be given to it when the decision to close the FSS was made. For many victims of crime and families who have lost a loved one, the Government’s cavalier attitude to the archive is frankly shameful. We know that, with advances in forensic science, there have been cold case reviews and, thanks to the integrity of the national archive, opportunities to bring to justice those who have committed horrific murders and rapes.
The president of the Law Society wrote to the Home Secretary on 21 December expressing concerns about the closure of the archive and what would happen to its funding. I now understand that funding of up to £2 million has been made available, but the Minister has indicated that the business case is still being examined. There is no clarity about how the archive will operate, despite his saying to the Select Committee in December that he would write with full details in the spring.
The FSS closes on 31 March, just over a month away, and we are still none the wiser about what will happen. For example, will all forensic providers be able to contribute to the national archive in years to come? That is a really important issue that needs to be addressed by 1 April. Does the Minister recognise that particular skills are needed to run a national archive properly, which need to be factored into the budget?
Perhaps the Minister could spell out his thoughts on the value of the archive in general. Does he not think that a statutory power needs to be introduced for the Criminal Cases Review Commission to obtain files from private forensic providers? At the moment, it has the power to get files only from public bodies.
Finally, I turn to research and development. I noted from reading the Select Committee report that that seemed to be considered only after the decision on closure had been taken. A month later, a review was set up asking for some analysis of what would happen to research and development in forensics with the closure of the FSS. I understand that the regulator believes he has an agreement that if a private company produces some new advancement in forensics, it will share it. I am sceptical about that, because in a commercial environment any investment that a company makes will surely be on the basis that it will be in a position to reap the rewards of innovation.
My hon. Friend the Chair of the Science and Technology Committee asked the Minister to address whether there will be a strategy for forensic science in the UK, and whether it will be in place before the election of police and crime commissioners in November. He also asked him to put the delivery of justice at the heart of that strategy. I hope the Minister will address those points.
I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth that the Government’s decision is very risky. Coming alongside the changes to DNA retention and the cuts to the police budget, I believe it was hurried and ill considered. It will mean that we may well see miscarriages of justice and cold cases not being effectively reviewed in future. We are also losing the hugely experienced staff group at the FSS. The Government may well come to regret their decision.
I gave evidence before Christmas in conjunction with the Forensic Science Regulator and the chief scientific adviser at the Home Office, Bernard Silverman. He is an excellent CSA. He and I have regular meetings, not only about the FSS but on Home Office science issues in general. I want to put on record my appreciation for his work and expert input.
There are various recommendations on research and development in Professor Silverman’s report, one of which addresses questions to do with the various funding councils and the different available options. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) highlighted interdisciplinary issues, and there might be a conference to address some of them. I will take on board the point made by the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston about providing updates and following through on Professor Silverman’s report. I will consider how best to do that for his Select Committee.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman) highlighted a constituency case. I do not necessarily think there is a direct role for the Home Office in that, but I have no doubt that colleagues at the Foreign Office will have noted his comments.
Forensic findings can mean the difference between guilt and innocence. It is vital that forensic conclusions are reliable, error-free and beyond doubt. Forensic scientists must work to rigorous and robust scientific principles, methods and evaluations. That is why we have made sure that all new and transferred forensics work by commercial forensic service providers must be carried out by accredited laboratories.
Commercial forensic service providers have provided high-quality forensic science services for the criminal justice system for a number of years, and there is no reason why the closure of the FSS will reduce impartiality or affect the accuracy of their work. The extensive and detailed forensic work by LGC Forensics that formed the core of the evidence in the recent trial of Gary Dobson and David Norris for the murder of Stephen Lawrence is an example of the good work being carried out by commercial forensic service providers. My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) made that point.
I have made it clear from the outset that any FSS work taken in-house by police forces must be carried out to the same high standards as the work of accredited private sector laboratories. I utterly reject any suggestion that the closure of the FSS will lead to miscarriages of justice.
I have two minutes left and I want to address a key point about fragmentation, which both the hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) raised. Dr Gary Pugh, head of forensics at the Metropolitan Police Service, and Chief Constable Sims of West Midlands Police said in their evidence to the Committee:
“it is not general police practice to send exhibits from the same crime scene to different providers. There are a very small number of exceptions in rare cases where a highly specialised piece of analysis is only offered by a niche provider. In such cases, care is taken to ensure continuity is maintained.”
Roger Coe-Salazar confirmed that if fragmentation were taking place,
“it is not creating an operational delivery problem”
from the CPS’s perspective. It is important to put that clearly on the record.
I also wish to highlight the work taking place on the archive. I have made clear all the way through this process, even before the publication of the report, the importance that I attach to the continued availability of the archive. That work is ongoing and is clearly being undertaken. We have made significant progress since the announcement in December 2010—